Managing Frontiers in Qing China

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Managing Frontiers in Qing China

The Lifanyuan and Libu Revisited

Edited by

Dittmar Schorkowitz and Chia Ning

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Cover illustration: Qing China's 'Inner' and 'Outer' with Lifanyuan and Libu Calligraphy.

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Preface

In relatively recent times research on the Qing dynasty has turned into a vigorous arena of historical exploration, one that remains as open to innovative approaches, fresh ideas, and groundbreaking scholarship, as it is potentially controversial, sensitive, and contentious. The Qing dynasty has turned into a major crucible in Chinese history, which intensely engages a current generation of scholars, both inside and outside China.

Past approaches have emphasized the position of the Qing dynasty as a watershed moment between tradition and modernity; such concerns have now been overtaken by other, more pressing questions. What makes research on the Qing especially relevant today, and influential beyond its confines, is the perception that this period holds a key (if not *the* key) through which the whole of Chinese history could be re-coded in terms of a China that has always been more than the bounded expression of the Chinese civilization: a history made of the interwoven experiences with intersecting narratives created by multiple actors and regions. This is by no means a new view of Chinese history, but it is one that arguably has found its most eloquent, cogent, and incisive representation in the Qing dynasty.

Whether we speak of a dynasty or an empire, the Qing is unquestionably Chinese insofar as its Manchu emperors ruled China and the Chinese people through a largely Chinese bureaucracy, with the support of Chinese elites, and through forms of governance, laws, and rituals that have deep roots in Chinese statecraft, politics, and religion. The Qing claimed the same Mandate of Heaven previously held by the Ming and previous dynasties. But the Qing is also more than that, and its multiple dimensions—most crucially, their Manchu and Inner Asian origins—can only be denied at the risk of drastically reducing and distorting the prismatic complexity that makes this dynasty—for all the trials and tribulations of its later existence—one of the most vibrant and dynamic periods in Chinese history.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Qing, as successful a political creation as it was, eventually ended. The first half of the twentieth century brought to China a whole new set of challenges, from the imperative to join a new political order to the struggle to re-envision itself as a modern state. When we look at China as a modern nation, it is clear that the rupture with the Qing and with the imperial past it represented occurred at multiple levels, chief of which is governance, insofar as it combines an ideology of rulership with distinct administrative structures. Many Qing institutions not only disappeared but were consciously abandoned as new conceptions of state and nation emerged.

This is why the Qing cannot be understood by rolling China, as the nation it is today, back into its previous dynastic existence. Current historical research is charged with the task of recovering a past that is only partially visible through present concerns.

Understanding and explaining a critical aspect of Qing governance is the question that frames the essays included in this book. This is the first comprehensive study of a key institution of the Qing dynasty: the Lifanyuan, that is, the ministry in charge of the government of "outer" (Inner Asian) provinces. The Lifanyuan was a quintessential Qing office. As a tool for the administration of far-flung peripheries, it can be studied, as illustrated in this book, from different angles.

Seen from the perspective of the comparative analysis of early modern empires, a study of the Lifanyuan destabilizes the centrality of Western imperial narratives more radically than approaches that simply assert differences between Asian and European empires. Displaying the importance of Qing agencies that specialized in the administration of effectively foreign (that is, non-Chinese) regions and peoples in the early modern period, this study forces theorists to grapple with a practice of empire-building that cannot be confined to the Chinese political tradition. From its inception, the Lifanyuan allowed the central government to penetrate frontier societies and to incorporate them in the broader architecture of the state without imposing administrative models from China proper. It also allowed the metropolitan center to cultivate special relationships with non-Chinese local elites. In these respects, the Lifanyuan constituted a wide-ranging, flexible, and adaptable institution through which the core of the Qing empire strove to govern its Inner Asian frontiers.

Seen from the perspective of Chinese history, the Lifanyuan—as a wholly new organism—gave the Qing dynasty a distinctive and unique character. Like a few other Qing institutions, such as the Eight Banner System, the Lifanyuan was the expression of political processes largely external to the Chinese practice of statecraft, but rather instigated by a conception of rulership forged from multiple cultural sources—a plurality that is especially evident in matters of legal codes, judicial practices, and foreign relations. Moreover, the history of the Lifanyuan is closely connected with the continuous existence of a Manchu-Mongol elite as a class of officials specifically charged with the administration of the Inner Asian frontiers, and who served as the top echelon of the Lifanyuan bureaucracy. In Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, correspondence with the metropolitan center continued to be carried out in Manchu to an extent not paralleled anywhere else in China.

Finally, two aspects set this book aside from other purely institutional studies. In the first place, it is remarkable for potentially stimulating research in other aspects of Qing history. Contrasting and comparing the Lifanyuan with the Libu, the northern frontiers with the southern ones, and the early stages with later developments (in particular during the Qianlong era), the studies included in this volume provide spatial, temporal, and conceptual dimensions that allow a more complete and rounded appreciation of the inner fabric of the Qing empire. Secondly, the authors work through different approaches—historical, anthropological, philological—and deploy a variety of analytical methods, so that the Lifanyuan is not presented as a closed system, but rather as an open-ended and versatile object of inquiry. This type of diversification is especially valuable in a study of such a pliable subject, and will play an important role in generating new areas of research in Chinese and Inner Asian history.

Nicola Di Cosmo
Institute for Advanced Study

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Emperors and Dynasties

Emperors of the Qing Dynasty

Hūwangtaiji	1636–1643
Shunzhi	1644–1661
Kangxi	1662–1722
Yongzheng	1723–1735
Qianlong	1736–1795
Jiaqing	1796–1820
Daoguang	1821–1850
Xianfeng	1851–1861
Tongzhi	1862–1874
Guangxu	1875–1908
Puyi	1909–1912

Chinese Dynasties

Xia	c. 2070–1600 BCE
Shang	c. 1600–1027 BCE
Zhou	1027–256 BCE
Western Zhou	1027–771 BCE
Eastern Zhou	771–256 BCE
Spring and Autumn Period	722–481 BCE
Warring States Period	476–221 BCE
Qin	221–206 BCE
Western Han	206 BCE–8 CE
Xin	8–23
Eastern Han	23–220
Three Kingdoms	220–280
Western Jin	265–317
Northern and Southern Dynasties	317–589
Sui	589–618
Tang	618–907
Five Dynasties	907–960
Song	960–1279
Northern Song	960–1126
Southern Song	1126–1279
Yuan	1279–1368
Ming	1368–1644
Qing	1644–1912

Contributors

Chia Ning
Central College, Pella/Iowa

Dittmar Schorkowitz
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale

Dorothea Heuschert-Laage
Institut für Religionswissenschaft, Universität Bern

Fabienne Jagou
École française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris

Laura Hostetler
University of Illinois, Chicago

Mei-hua Lan
National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Michael Weiers
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn

Nicola Di Cosmo
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Pamela Kyle Crossley
Dartmouth College, Hanover/New Hampshire

Song Tong
Renmin University of China, Beijing

Uradyn E. Bulag
University of Cambridge, Cambridge

Ye Baichuan
Renmin University of China, Beijing

Yuan Jian
Minzu University of China, Beijing

Zhang Yongjiang
Renmin University of China, Beijing


80°
95°
110°
125°
50°
40°
30°
20°
Lake Baikal
Lake Balkhash
Frontier area ceded by Russia (Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689)
ILI PROTECTORATE (1755-1757)
DZUNGARS
Urumchi
Khüree (Ulan Bator)
OUTER MONGOLIA (1697)
MANCHURIA
Yarkand
TARIM BASIN (1759-1760)
EAST TURKESTAN (Xinjiang)
INNER MONGOLIA (1635)
Yellow River
Beijing
ZHILI (1644)
KOREA
BOHAI SEA
QINGHAI (1724)
GANSU (1649)
SHANXI (1644-45)
SHANDONG (1645)
TIBET (Protectorate 1751)
SHAANXI (1645-46)
HENAN (1644-45)
JIANGSU (1645)
ANHUI (1645)
NEPAL
Shanghai
SICHUAN (1646)
HUBEI (1645)
ZHEJIANG (1646)
Yangtze River
HUNAN (1647-50)
JIANGXI (1649-52)
GUIZHOU (1658)
FUJIAN (1646)
EAST CHINA SEA
YUNNAN (1659)
GUIZHOU (1650-52)
GUANGZHOU (1650-55)
Canton
TAIWAN (Occupied 1683)
BURMA
TONKING
BAY OF BENGAL
SIAM
LAOS
QIONGZHOU (Hainan)
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Pre-Qing Han territory
Manchu homeland
Manchu expansion pre 1644
Tributary states
Manchu expansion by 1800
Taiping Rebellion 1850–1864
PROVINCE/AREA (YEAR ASSIMILATED)
Maximum extent of Qing Empire

Qing Empire, circa 1820

Introduction

Dittmar Schorkowitz and Chia Ning

1 A Few Words on Early Qing Empire Building

It goes without saying that China was a multinational state comprising many different cultures, religions, languages, and ethnic groups long before the Manchus came to power and established a dynastic rule in the early 17th century. Given the profound Mongol legacy from a Yuan past, as well as much older ties with the Turko-Mongol empires of Central Asia, in addition to the Korean kingdoms of East Asia, Ming China also developed sophisticated ways of building and maintaining relationships with neighbouring polities of Annam, Korea, Mongolia, and Tibet.[1] It also managed to administer and integrate a growing number of so-called aboriginal 'tribes' and non-Han groups such as the Yao and Miao peoples, who became incorporated into the state in the course of various campaigns on the southern and southwestern frontiers.[2]

While population and ethnic diversity were rapidly growing by the late Ming era,[3] they virtually exploded in the course of Qing empire-building. The Manchus first enlisted the support of the Khalkha, Khorchin, and Kharachin Mongols to fight Ming forces. Having emerged victorious, they subsequently defeated their rivals from Southern and Western Mongolia. They not only continued Ming-initiated campaigns, but soon started large-scale expansion into the northern and western peripheries of traditional Chinese influence zones.[4] Given the rapid formation of Manchuria as the new power center and the gradual submission of Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Kökenuur (Qinghai),

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[1] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Jonathan Karam Skaff, *Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power, and Connections, 580–800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nikolay N. Kradin, *Nomads of Inner Asia in Transition* (Moscow: Krasand, 2014).

[2] David Faure, "The Yao Wars in the Mid-Ming and their Impact on Yao Ethnicity," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2006).

[3] Timothy Brook, *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

[4] Michael Weiers, "Die Vertragstexte des Mandschu-Khalkha-Bundes von 1619/20," *Aetas Manjurica* 1 (1987); Idem, "Mongolenpolitik der Mandschuren und Mandschupolitik der Mongolen zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 22 (1989–91).

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Züngharia (North of the Tian Shan mountains), and the Muslim polities (south of the Tian Shan mountains) in present-day Xinjiang during the 17th–18th centuries, it is not surprising that the notions of 'Inner Asia' and 'China proper' (or 'Eighteen Provinces'), though a controversial concept in China today,[5] were invented as a useful reference to relate to the varying ways and forms of administrative, economic (nomadic vs. farming), social, and cultural integration undergone by the two parts in Qing China and, to a certain extent, still today.

Taking over the mandate of heaven in 1636, it was the Qing dynasty which, particularly during the early reigns from Taizong Hūwangtaiji (Hong Taiji, r. 1636–1643)[6] to Gaozong Qianlong (r. 1736–1795), transformed China into a global player. They lead the empire into modern times based on military strength, economic growth, and a continental expansion comparable perhaps only to the Romanov and Ottoman empires,[7] as well as on internal reforms and a reach-out for cultural inventions from the Western world (weaponry, cartography, diplomacy). Though being terrestrial in kind and limited to continental confines, the 'pacified' territories in the North, West, and South of 'China proper' were, by extent and separate administrative treatment, in no way inferior to overseas colonial acquisitions and empire-building by European powers of the time. Indeed, in that early stage of Manchu power consolidation, the gathering of allies from among Mongol and Han Chinese nobles and the battle against Ming and Mongol rivals was mirroring 17th-century developments of restoring empire in neighbouring centres, such as those of the Oirats and Chakhar, the Khalkha and Oirats, which have been aptly characterized as 'imperializing' projects.[8]

Starting out from this arena, the Qing 'project' turned out successful after about 150 years of campaigns and frontier strategies of divide-and-rule that turned the Mongols into 'vassals,' a time span generally referred to as the early Qing period, which—as is widely agreed upon—can be further subdivided into four interconnected phases: the first comprises the interplay between early Manchu and Mongol rulers culminating in the integration of Mongol military units into the Manchu Banner system and their reorganization as autonomous (but still subordinated) Mongol Eight Banners (*Baqi Menggu*) by Hūwangtaiji in 1635. The second phase entered its concluding stage with the convention of Dolonnuur in 1691, when the Khalkha Mongols submitted to the Kangxi Emperor and renewed tributary relationships with the Qing court as a result of decades of internal rivalries and fierce fighting with the Western Mongols. The Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed only two years earlier in 1689 and regulating, for the first time, international relations and specifically border issues between Russia and China, was, in fact, very instrumental in bringing first the Khalkha under Qing rule and then the Oirats whose troops were defeated in the summer of 1696. While the third phase is related to the replacement of Oirat control in and around Kökenuur and the Qing's implementation of indirect rule in Tibet by means of what we may call the *Dalai-Amban* system in the 1720s, the fourth and final stage of territorial empire-building in Inner Asia culminated in the 'complete destruction of the Züngharia khanate' in 1757 and the immediate conquest of what later became known as Xinjiang, which paved the way for yet another form of indirect rule: the *Beg* system in Eastern Turkestan.[9]

Given this growth in territory, population, and cultural diversity, Ming-era governance and practices in maintaining relations with foreign nations and non-Han peoples of 'China proper' had to undergo changes and transformations as well. New institutions and forms of governmental control needed to be invented and implemented for all recently 'pacified' peoples of Inner Asia. The Ming had generally managed internal relations with indigenous peoples through the Chinese prefectural or provincial structures according to the traditional 'Native Chieftain System' (*Tusi* 土司), and external relations with tribute paying countries through the well-known Board of Rites (*Libu* 礼部). Now a new agency—the *Lifanyuan* (理藩院)—came into play for Inner Asia. This office, whose prototype epitomizes the Manchu 'imperializing project' by being involved in the management of Manchu-Mongol relationships from the very beginning, made a remarkable career among Qing governmental institutions. Though undergoing structural transformations and changes in the transfer of power from a personal network to indirect (tutelage, patronage) and more direct forms of rule towards the end of the 19th century, it represented an administrative linchpin. Its main function was to deal with the affairs of incorporated nations and to communicate imperial policies and decisions of the Grand Council (*Junjichu*) and the Grand Secretariat (*Neige*) to the imperial peripheries of Inner Asia. This included legislation, taxation, trade, diplomacy and social welfare, and comprised civil, military, and cultural matters. Maintaining forms of indirect rule and separate administration in Inner Asia, the Lifanyuan—offering a Qing model of integration by difference—clearly represented an opposing model to the Qing's assimilatory policy (integration by sameness) 'of replacing the locals with residents' (*gaitu guiliu*) pursued in the colonization process in many parts of China's southern frontier.[10]

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[5] Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Irvington: Capitol Publishers, 1951); Harry Harding, "The Concept of 'Greater China': Themes, Variations, and Reservations," *The China Quarterly* 136 (1993); Colin Mackerras, "What is China? Who is Chinese?: Han-minority Relations, Legitimacy, and the State," in *State and Society in 21st-century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation*, ed. Peter Hays Gries et al. (New York, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

[6] In Manchu, Qing Taizong's name is Hūwang Taiji. See *Manhan dacidian*, ed. An Shuangcheng (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1993), 1146. Since the Manchu language allows for compound spelling of separately written units if they mean a name of a person, Hūwangtaiji is chosen throughout this volume.

[7] William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge, Mass., London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).

[8] James A. Millward, "The Qing Formation, the Mongol Legacy, and the 'End of History' in Early Modern Central Eurasia," in *The Qing Formation in World Historical Time*, ed. Lynn Struve (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Asia Center, 2004).

[9] Nicola Di Cosmo, "The Qing and Inner Asia: 1636–1800," in *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); cf. Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Making Mongols," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2006). For a more systematic treatment of the various systems mentioned here see Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity in Early Qing (1636–1795)* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012).

2 Lifanyuan and Libu: Institutional Beginnings and Early Divisions of Responsibilities

In the historical process from Hūwangtaiji, who founded the Qing dynasty, to the final formation of the Great Qing, institution building constituted a core part of empire building—particularly during Qianlong's reign. The Lifanyuan, an institution responsible for Inner Asia, and the Libu, which was in charge of education, morality, and ritual in the whole empire, are two key institutions in empire building, still under-investigated in the field of Qing studies. Helping to enhance the efficiency of the state in empire-wide governance, these two offices were clearly separate with regard to many responsibilities but

apparently overlapped in some others when managing newly integrated Inner Asia and operating the traditional tribute system. The cooperation of the two contributed to Qing geopolitical growth and to shaping the Qing political map by means of internal and external order, which lasted into the Jiaqing reign.

The administrative responsibilities of Lifanyuan and Libu structured early Qing governance to a great extent, mainly during the eighteenth century when "the Qing reached its height of political control [...], of economic power [...] and of military expansion."[11] The Qing established a Manchu-legitimized authority under which court-stipulated rules, such as the *Lifanyuan Regulations* (*Lifanyuan zeli*) and the *Regulations of Libu* (*Libu zeli*), classified the Inner Asian peoples and communities according to a designated order. That order, unavoidably vulnerable to frictions of various kinds when exposed to the complexities of imperial reality, combined Manchu rule with a sufficient degree of local traditions to maintain stability and to provide for prosperity. Our study of Qing statecraft thus outlines routine administration procedures from the center to the peripheries, highlighting the operational links of both institutions with Inner Asian societies and in Qing tribute management.

On the twenty-ninth day of the sixth month of his Chongde 3rd year (1638), Hūwangtaiji re-named the *Monggo Jurgan* (Ch. *Menggu yamen*), which he had established two months after proclaiming himself Qing emperor in 1636.[12] Even though Chinese sources usually indicate 1638 as the year of the Lifanyuan's foundation, thus omitting its previous years as *Monggo Jurgan*,[13] a Manchu source traces its appearance back to 1634 when Hūwangtaiji gave order that decisions about military affairs concerning the Kharachin Mongols were not to be made without consulting the *Monggo Jurgan*.[14] The Lifanyuan's Mongol nature has been highlighted by a number of Qing sources. Even Hūwangtaiji himself stated that the Lifanyuan is "specialized in managing the Mongol affairs."[15] Emperor Kangxi commented "in Taizong Wenhuangdi's [Hūwang Taiji] time, all [Inner] Mongol tribes came to submit [to our Qing power], [and that is why Taizong] instituted the Lifanyuan with special responsibility for the *waifan* [Mongol] affairs."[16] The use of the term *Monggo Jurgan* rather than Lifanyuan continued at least until 1722.[17] The Jiaqing edition of the *Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Qing* further concluded that the Lifanyuan came into existence due to the Manchu relations with the Mongols.[18] The urgent need for a special institution that could administer the Mongols was obvious, because settling the subdued Inner Mongol groups into the banner system was essential to the Manchu state. Fighting against the powerful Chakhar Ligdan Khagan (1604–1634), who was not defeated until 1634, and mobilizing the Inner Mongols under Manchu military command against the Ming was vital to Manchu consolidation. Communicating with the Mongol groups beyond Inner Mongolia and trying to win the Khoshud and Khalkha Mongols as allies was also imperative. The distribution of bagged game among the Mongol participants in accordance with Manchu regulations involved intense duties for the Manchu court as well.[19] All these works required administrative personnel and led to the creation of the *Monggo Jurgan*.

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[10] Donald S. Sutton, "Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2006). A theoretical outline on integration by difference vs. sameness is offered by Günther Schlee, *Ruling over Ethnic and religious Differences: A Comparative Essay on Empires* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2013). For a recent study related to Russia see Dittmar Schorkowitz, *Imperial Formations and Ethnic Diversity: Institutions, Practices, and Longue Durée Illustrated by the Example of Russia* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2015); cf. Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, trans. Alfred Clayton (Harlow: Longman, 2001); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[11] Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 3. In Manchu studies it is widely acknowledged that Qing was one of the great empires in world history with emperor Qianlong representing its golden age; see Mark Elliott, *Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 2009), xii; Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 1; Rowe, *China's Last Empire*, 1; Di Cosmo, "Qing and Inner Asia."

[12] *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, trans. by Number One Historical Archive (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1986), vol. 1, p. 321.

[13] Representative Chinese sources are the *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*, ed. Zhang Tingyu (Taibei, Shengshing shuju, 1959), 5570; *Qingchao tongdian* (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1935), 2175 and *Qingchao kaiguo fanglue*, ed. A Gui (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1773/1967), vol. 22, p. 1a. For a brief etymological discussion of the changing and varying denominations used in the Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese languages see the chapter of Michael Weiers in this volume who draws on Mongolian sources and on a recently published *dangse* collection.

With the new Manchu name of *Tulergi golo be dasara jurgan* (Ministry for Governing the outside [non-Chinese] Regions) and the new Chinese name of Lifanyuan (Ministry for the Management of the Non-Chinese Population)

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[14] *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, pp. 82–3.

[15] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), vol. 10, p. 679; cf. Di Cosmo, "Qing and Inner Asia," 339–43.

[16] *Qinghuidian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), vol. 20. In early Chinese history, the term *waifan* meant the local authority far away from but still under the central power and it was often used in Qing documents to refer to Inner Asian groups, particularly the Mongols. See Fang Xuanling, *Jinshu*, 648, vol. 19: Ritual propriety, http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/jinshu/jinshu_019.htm and Tuotuo, *Songshi*, vol. 35, especially the "Biography of Xiaozong, third" ("xiaozong benji san" under „xiaozong jizan" or comments on emperor Xiaozong, http://www.tianyabook.com/lishi2005/songshi/ssh_035.htm.

[17] *Gongzhongdang Kangxichao manwen zouzhe*, the Number One Historical Archive, Microfilm box #7, pp. 2552 and 2801.

[18] *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), vol. 534, p. 26454.

[19] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, pp. 599–604, 666, 731, 773, and 814.

from 1638 onward,[20] this institution was put on the same level as the Six Boards (*Liubu* 六部) and the Censorate (*Duchayuan* 都察院). Being jointly called the Six Boards and Two Ministries (*Liubu eryuan* 六部二院) or the Eight Yamen (*Bayamen* 八衙门),[21] these eight offices worked as key administrative agencies of the Manchu court. In the tenth month of 1638, the Lifanyuan seal began to be engraved under the supervision of the Board of Appointments, and on the ninth day of the twelfth month that year a seal-issuing ceremony at the court officially authorized this office to function under its new Manchu and Chinese names.[22]

The central importance of the Lifanyuan for the rising Manchu power is reflected by the official announcement of emperor Hūwangtaiji on the seventh day of the eighth month in 1638 that the Lifanyuan was to become part of the Three Palace Academies (*Gai lifanyuan yamen wei neisanyuan* 改理藩院衙门为内三院), which were established in the fifth month of 1636 as the emperor's immediate assistant offices. This declaration was driven by Hūwangtaiji's desire to move the Lifanyuan office physically closer not only to his own residence, but also to the Libu.[23] Even though available Qing sources do not substantiate that the institutional association of the Lifanyuan with the Three Palace Academies was put into practice, the matter reveals the increasing importance of the Lifanyuan, or the Mongol affairs, at the Hūwangtaiji court.

The Lifanyuan was the only Manchu-created institution, standing out from the eight *Yamen* (together with the Six Boards and Duchayuan). When

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[20] *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 321 and Qi Yunshi, *Huangchao fanbu yaolue* (Beijing: Xizang shehui kexueyuan, 1993), 26.

[21] *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 340. *Daqing taizong wenhuangdi shilu* (Taiwan: Huawen shuju, 1964), vol. 42, p. 21a; *Qingchao kaiguo fanglue*, vol. 2, p. 595; Zhao Lian, *Xiaoting zalu xiaotingzalu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1880/1998), 333–4; and *Zhongguo guanzhih tongshi*, ed. Zhang Jifan (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin taxue, 1992), 600–2 and 608.

[22] *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, p. 396; *Daqing taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, vol. 42, p. 2a and vol. 44, p. 24b; *Qingshigao jiaozhu*, ed. Taiwan guoshiguan (Taiwan: Xinxing shuju, 1986), vol. 84, p. 2625 and vol. 122, pp. 3283–4.

[23] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 811. The Three Palace Academies (*Neisanyuan*) were the Historiographical Academy (*Neiguoshiyuan*), the Secretariat Academy (*Neimishuyuan*), and the Academy for the Advancement of Literature (*Neihongwenyuan*), which later became the Qing Grand Secretariat (*Neige*). For details, see *Qingchao kaiguo fanglue*, 22:1a and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, pp. 612 and 623.

Hūwangtaiji adopted the Libu in 1631,[24] it had already a centuries-old tradition. It had originated in the late Zhou dynasty, become consolidated under the Sui and Tang dynasties, and served the Ming court in full function.[25] Together with the Boards of Appointments (*Libu* 吏部), Revenue (*Hubu* 户部), Military (*Bingbu* 兵部), Punishment (*Xingbu* 刑部), Public Works (*Gongbu* 工部), and the Censorate, the Board of Rites (*Libu* 礼部) was the institutional continuation of the Ming government. However, in comparison with the other *Yamen*, the responsibilities of the Lifanyuan and Libu significantly overlapped as their tasks show a certain affinity. Both had important duties in non-Chinese affairs on which other *Yamen* did not concentrate. Due to this similarity, the offices of the Lifanyuan minister and the Libu minister became a joint position when the court institutions were rearranged in 1659 under the Shunzhi emperor; that is, one minister was to head two governmental bodies. This arrangement also applied to the two vice ministers.[26] In 1661, however, the emperor withdrew his earlier decision, explaining that

> in Taizong *wenhuangdi*'s time the Lifanyuan was established to manage difficult duties in Mongol affairs which were decisive. To merge the Lifanyuan and Libu into one institution was not in line with this institutional orientation. From now on, [the Lifanyuan minister] will not be jointly appointed with Libu minister but will remain a minister in his own right. The [joint] official seal is [also] to be corrected and remoulded as the Lifanyuan seal.[27]

This quick adjustment shows that the fusion of Lifanyuan and Libu apparently did not work out well. Consequently, these two institutions were never again merged in Qing history.

In the same month when the *Monggo Jurgan* was renamed Lifanyuan in 1638, Hūwangtaiji defined the responsibilities of the Libu as keeping the institutions and peoples of the Manchu State in proper order.[28] Working with different objectives than the Lifanyuan, the Libu was in charge of implementing Chinese political tradition and Confucian moral order. Once it was directly involved in Mongol society, the Libu appointed a Mongolian administrator (*Lishiguan*) and an assistant administrator (*Fulishiguan*) to each newly organized Mongol banner in the second month of 1638.[29] Very soon, however, the Lifanyuan appointed officials with title of *Janggin* to replace the Libu administrators in the seventh month of that year.[30] Henceforth the Lifanyuan served as the major contact between the court and the Mongols. For example, the government would sent the Lifanyuan minister rather than a Libu minister to the Mongol places for household registration, such as in the eleventh month of 1636,[31] for legal case management, such as in the ninth month of 1637,[32] and for calling on the Mongol banners' military participation, such as in the twelfth month of 1637.[33] Furthermore, when Hūwangtaiji was to issue an edict the Lifanyuan rather than the Libu was assigned the duty of informing the Mongols.[34] When the Mongols suffered from poverty, which prevented a man from marrying a wife or buying horses, they came to the Lifanyuan for help.[35] And it was not the Libu minister but the Censorate Minister and the Grand Minister of the Palace Academy for the Advancement of Literature who often accompanied the Lifanyuan minister when he performed his duty for the Mongols.[36]

Very much in line with Chinese culture, the Libu was, as during the Ming dynasty, in charge of the imperial examination *Keju*. In 1634 Hūwangtaiji instructed the Libu to set up the language examination. Sixteen degree holders (*Juren*) were entitled to participate in China's provincial level exams (*Xiangshi*). Among them were Manchus who took the examination either in their native language or in the Han Chinese language, while Han Chinese who took it either in Manchu or in their native language, and Mongols who took the exam in their native language. The Libu awarded the degree holders with an official dress for scholars on behalf of the emperor and treated them with a

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[24] *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*, 5569; Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 1, p. 474, and Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), vol. 114, p. 3284.

[25] Ji Yun, *Lidai guanzhi nianbiao* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1993), vol. 9, pp. 22b–27a.

[26] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 5, p. 2025.

[27] Ibid., 2150.

[28] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 681.

[29] Ibid., 798.

[30] *Manhan dacidian*, p. 831 and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 684.

[31] *Qingchao kaiguo fanglue*, vol. 22, pp. 7b–8a, *Daqing taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, vol. 37, p. 17a, and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 629.

[32] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 664.

[33] Ibid., vol. 2, 666.

[34] *Daqing Taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, vol. 37, p. 17a and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 733.

[35] *Daqing Taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, vol. 42, p. 16a and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 682.

[36] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, pp. 629 and 664.

banquet at the court.[37] In 1641, the Libu again took full responsibility for managing the participation of Manchus and Mongols in the state examination.[38]

In religious life, Hūwangtaiji followed the Ming practice and left the temple affairs under the authority of the Libu.[39] In the fifth month of 1642, he instructed the Libu to supervise people's worship activities in Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk beliefs, which were already practiced in Manchuria.[40] In the second month of 1643, the Libu was further given authority to inspect the temple buildings and to punish infringements of moral order.[41] In contrast to Chinese religious affairs, Tibetan Buddhism was handled by the Lifanyuan, according to the records of 1638.[42]

As the Lifanyuan was fully occupied with Manchu-Mongol relationships, Hūwangtaiji assigned the Manchu-Korean relationship to the Libu,[43] which was thus following in the footsteps of the Ming Libu. Korea was then the only Asian tributary with Confucian culture and an agricultural life similar to that of China. However, this assignment gave rise to a division in the spheres of responsibilities for Qing tributaries and their respective institutions into Lifanyuan-managed Inner Asian tributaries inhabited by nomadic and non-Chinese peoples on the one side and Asian tributaries whose inhabitants were agriculturalists and had been under Chinese influence for centuries on the other. In fact, it was these two institutions that made a significant difference between Qing and Ming governance. In Ming time the Libu was the only institution in charge whenever non-Chinese affairs were concerned, whereas the Qing added another: the Lifanyuan.

3 Anthropological Perspectives and Historical Continuities

Located at the intersection of Ming and Qing world views and integration strategies, these two institutions—Libu and Lifanyuan—have always been of considerable interest not only to students of Chinese history interested in

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[37] *Daqing taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, vol. 18, pp. 17b–18a.

[38] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 748.

[39] Ibid., 780, 798.

[40] Ibid., 780.

[41] Ibid., 798.

[42] *Daqing taizong wenhuangdi shilu*, vol. 44, pp. 27b–28a and vol. 45, pp. 18a–19a.

[43] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu dianhui*, vol. 2, p. 617.

socio-cultural processes and the institutional expression of Qing policies[44] but also to history-minded anthropologists who look into the changing practices and habitus of imperial governance. While the Ming-time Libu, though still in use in late imperial China, has been frequently associated with Confucian traditions and a tribute system as part of the 'Chinese World Order'[45] the Lifanyuan was a newly invented institution managing the Qing's frontier administration in Inner Asian territories and a changing policy of tribute and trade relations as well as marriage arrangements with the court and the integration of local elites, as has been pointed out many times.

While integration strategies in multi-national empires may vary in time and space according to their historical background, their ends remain almost the same as the obvious timeless challenge: to maintain cross-epochal cohesiveness and to guarantee certain rights of national self-determination. In the case of Russia, to give a contrasting example, the urge to have 18th-century enlightened scholars from Western Europe take stock of the empire's riches, peoples, and languages led to assiduous counting and classification which paved the way for a *mission civilisatrice* and the modern nationalities question.[46] In Ming-Qing China, on the other hand, there was remarkably less interest in defining the peoples' ethnic belonging in detail. Instead, there existed a robust tradition of subsuming them under ethnocentric stereotypes (Fan, Meng, Hui, etc.) through a dichotomous perception of 'inner' (*nei*) and 'outer' (*wai*) domains accompanied by the messianic belief that Confucianism is instrumental in promoting the 'barbarians' from a lower 'raw' (*sheng*) to a higher 'cooked' (*shu*) status.[47] Western concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'race' did not reach China until close to the end of the 19th century.[48] However, independently from each other—though with some degree of mutual influence that continued into socialist times—both empires invented and developed central institutions, needed even today, to structure ethnic-cultural diversity, to govern the civilizational frontier, to design appropriate keystones for their nationalities policies, and to implement strategies of integration for the sake of imperial cohesion. And the Lifanyuan was extraordinary in its capabilities to govern culturally diverse 'social entities' from an Inner Asian periphery by means of various 'social systems,' i.e. the banner system for the Mongols, the *Dalai-Amban* system for Tibetans, the *Beg* system for Muslims of Xinjiang, and the *Tusi* system for non-Han peoples in Qinghai and the Southwest.[49]

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[44] Jacques Legrand, *L'administration dans la domination sino-mandchoue en Mongolie Qalq-A: Version mongole du Lifan Yuan Zeli* (Paris: Collège de France, 1976); Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty," (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1992); Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998).

[45] John King Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretative Essay," ibid.

[46] Dittmar Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten in Rußland. Der Integrationsprozeß der Burjaten und Kalmücken, 1822–1925* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001) and Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

[47] Magnus Fiskesjö, "On the 'Raw' and the 'Cooked' Barbarians of Imperial China," *Inner Asia* 1,2 (1999); cf. Stevan Harrell, *Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 36–7.

Anthropologists and historians alike are always keen to learn about colonial-imperial practices and integration strategies because they bring about changes in forms of indigenous socio-cultural organization, reshape legal systems, and fundamentally alter the identity of those groups that become part of the empire. Hence, explorations into state agencies "that managed ethnic diversity since the early seventeenth century can tell us how minority groups were classified in the past, with all implicit consequences for ethnic identity policies in twentieth-century socialist states"[50] and beyond. Expanding into the many different parts of Inner Asia and consolidating China's rule over a good part of East and Southeast Asia, Qing imperial concepts have changed significantly over time, reflecting shifting perceptions of 'otherness' and thereby developing a differentiated understanding of ethnicity, belonging, and 'governance.' Forms of acculturation, resilience, and other responses to the implementation of administrative tools are thus of particular interest, as are questions of elite co-optation. Hence, for the discourse on early 20th-century nation-building it is important to know whether (and to what extent) the local elite's aspirations to participate in political decision-making processes in Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and elsewhere were actually reflected and represented by these imperial institutions; after all, being governed through a social system of indirect rule meant a removal from autonomous sources of power and prestige. However, at least the Lifanyuan seemed to be an exception to the rule of Manchu-Han diarchy in

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[48] Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China," *Late Imperial China* 11,1 (1990); Rawski, *Last Emperors*.

[49] Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity*; Sayana Bairovna Namsaraeva, "Institut namestnikov tsinskogo Kitaya v Mongolii i Tibete v XVIII veke" (Avtoreferat diss., Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, 2003).

[50] Dittmar Schorkowitz, "Historical Anthropology in Eurasia '... and the Way Thither'," *History and Anthropology* 23,1 (2012): 49.

leading positions of provincial and central government posts, given the almost exclusively Manchu-Mongolian composition of its top-ranking officials.[51]

While relations and attitudes between nationalities and the state may change greatly over time, some basic features and the tension inherent in these relationships persist. When investigating these changes and continuities we are facing a historical vector that provides us with two heuristic approaches: first, the diachronic logic and causalities of historical developments in centuries-long territorial expansion and state-building; second, the dialectic expressed by the dichotomies of rule and integration, of state and communities, center and periphery, power and powerlessness, intention and effect, ideology and social reality, and the political programme and local everyday life.

Focussing on nationalities in imperial formations marks a vantage point for historical and anthropological analysis not only with regard to governmental strategies of social engineering. Besides illuminating different practices of homogenizing cultural diversity and regulating vertical relations of tax or tribute extraction, of reshaping legal systems and co-opting elites, related studies also point to a cross-epochal cohesiveness needed by empires particularly in times of social change, rupture, or revolution. Epochal breaks in modern times, as experienced by both the Chinese and Russian empires, clearly reveal the resources multi-national states have at their disposal to deal with imperial crises. As to the indicators of such cohesive power, it has been argued that 'habits' of governance helped the empire persist.[52] But we also have to concede that such habits most likely have their origin in political structures, central institutions, and dominant forms of socio-cultural organizations which—transmitting views of virtues and values—were expressed as traditions of representations and reshaped over the centuries.

Imperial formations have fostered lasting strategies for integration. Their skills in managing ethnic diversity have evolved over centuries; they have developed nationality policies and created ministries which guarantee their survival by inventing traditions, strategies, and institutions that mitigate the collapse of power and identity. The Qing-time Libu and Lifanyuan belong to this category of institutions that developed 'political techniques of patronage'[53] with sophisticated codes of reference, behaviour, and closeness, revealing a clear intention to demonstrate and consolidate ritualized forms of respect, ranking, gift exchange and subordination. For those nations and nobles integrated into the ceremonies, the Lifanyuan rituals—mainly pilgrimage to the court, imperial hunt, and tribute—provided orientation in time and space, as well as a context for premium commodity exchange. As tools of integration and unification operational in many ways, these rituals—above all—reduced cultural frictions between a Manchu-dominated Han-Chinese centre and Inner Asian frontiers. They offered identification and were essential in transforming external ('barbarian') relationships into internal (domestic) hierarchies, and thus highly instrumental in Qing empire building.[54]

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[51] Edward J.M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 2000), 45–8; cf. John King Fairbank, "The Manchu-Chinese Dyarchy in the 1840's and '50's," *Far Eastern Quarterly* 12,3 (1953); Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty," 32–3 and her chapter "Lifanyuan and Libu in Early Qing Empire Building" in this volume.

[52] Jane Burbank, "The Rights of Difference: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler et al. (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007).

The social and cultural worlds of the non-Han peoples in China were, on the other hand, subject to permanent transformation via exchange and transfer, communication and administrative acts, and often embedded in hegemonic practices. In their relationships to the state they became more and more standardized and streamlined through a value system and centralized concepts of world order as reflected in the procedures of the two agencies and their regulations, such as the *Lifanyuan zeli*, the *Libu zeli*, and the *Huijiang zeli*, or the *Menggu lüli* and *Fanren lüli*.[55] However, for the sake of state coherence Qing China was obliged to succeed in dealing with her ethnic and cultural diversity, forming governmental bodies to eventually integrate the many nationalities incorporated in the course of her expansion. Institutions do not die. With the Lifanyuan and the Libu, two important interfaces of different backgrounds were established, whose successors are today's State Nationality Affairs Commission in the People's Republic of China and, until very recently, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in Taiwan.[56]

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[53] Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, "From Personal Network to Institution Building: The Lifanyuan, Gift Exchange and the Formalization of Manchu—Mongol Relations" *History and Anthropology* 25,5 (2014).

[54] Chia Ning, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14,1 (1993); Mark Elliott and Chia Ning, "The Qing Hunt at Mulan," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James A. Millward et al. (London New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

[55] Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, *State Authority Contested along Jurisdictional Boundaries: Qing Legal Policy Towards the Mongols in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012).

[56] The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission has ceased to exist as autonomous office when it was absorbed by the Mainland Affairs Council in late 2012; see Mei-hua Lan's chapter in this volume.

4 The State of Affairs in Lifanyuan and Libu Studies: New Achievements

4.1 *Major Advances in Lifanyuan Studies*

Until the 1980s, Lifanyuan studies represented a marginal, if not a neglected field in historical research in Western scholarship and in China as well. Obvious difficulties in source collection—new documents became available only gradually over the last two to three decades—and the hardships of meticulously decoding the source language for a meaningful analysis were generally considered as main obstacles to lead Lifanyuan studies out of this impasse.

Zhao Yuntian, a Chinese scholar from the People's Republic of China whose pioneering research on the Lifanyuan during the 1980s led to a significant change and turned the situation for the better, in a summarizing essay from 1996 presented four stages in Chinese Lifanyuan studies.[57] According to Zhao Yuntian, no more than ten publications (books, articles), published in the initial stage of the 1930s and 1940s, discussed the Lifanyuan as part of a wider debate on Chinese nationalities, Qing frontier policies, frontier history, governmental systems, Qing-Russia relations, and the Qing government of Mongolia. None of these, however, had Lifanyuan in the title nor as a central topic being rather a supportive component in the discussion of related subjects. In addition, the use of historical source materials was far from complete and the comments on the Lifanyuan were not accurate from what we know today.[58]

The following stage witnessed an increase in attention and more extensive use of source materials in the 1950s–1970s as reflected in the *Outlined History of Inner Mongolia* by Tao Ketao[59] and *The Diplomatic Institutions of the Qing* by Qian Shifu.[60] Due to the political situation in the 1950s, comments on the Lifanyuan's implications for the history of the Mongols were still radically revolutionary. However, the role of the Lifanyuan in the frontier administration (with Russia in particular) was thus acknowledged for the first time and Qian Shifu's treatise marked a major advancement in this respect. The Lifanyuan was highlighted as an integral part of the Qing China's governing system.[61]

During the silent years of the 1960s when historians in China had no chance to do research and publish, Piero Corradini published a groundbreaking article using Qing official sources in Chinese. Already then, in 1965, the Italian

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[57] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," *Zhongguo bianzheng* 134 (1996).

[58] Ibid., 2–7.

[59] Tao Ketao, *Neimenggu fazhan gaishu* (Huhhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 1957).

[60] Qian Shifu, *Qingdaide waijiao jiguan* (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1959).

[61] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," 8–10.

scholar explored core issues and touched upon important questions regarding the institutional beginnings, the etymology and structural changes of the Lifanyuan as well as the ethnical composition of its officials and its temporal fusion with the Libu.[62] Two years later, Ho Ping-Ti included a discussion on the Lifanyuan in his article about the Qing[63] and in 1968 John King Fairbank in his 'Chinese World Order' had a light but still significant touch on the Lifanyuan. Even though as briefly as it was addressed in both of these publications, the Lifanyuan was on its way to emerge as a subject more notable in Western scholarship, as illustrated, for example, by the seminal investigation of the French Mongolist and anthropologist Jacques Legrand in 1976. Even though the focus of this research was on a particular segment of the Lifanyuan, namely the Mongolian version of the *Lifanyuan zeli* and its function within the Qing administration among the Khalkha Mongols, it represented an essential contribution of the mid-70s and is still of relevance today.[64]

The 1970s saw also a series of studies emerging in Taiwan, two of which were directed precisely on the Lifanyuan being a novelty for Chinese scholarship. The first was Yang Zhengxiao's study, based on an earlier master thesis, followed by an essay of Lü Shipeng on the Lifanyuan's administration among the Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims of Inner Asia.[65] However, despite their pioneering contributions to the field, they both did not make any use of archival documents. The same holds true for three monographs by the latter on the Ming-Qing political system, the Qing Mongol policies, and the Qing frontier policies, which, according to Zhao Yuntian, all included Lifanyuan research in subtitled sections. At the same time, the Mongolian historian Jin Feng published three articles in China in 1979 exploring the Qing postal stations and thereby establishing a new topic in Lifanyuan studies.[66]

Lifanyuan research in the People's Republic of China developed vividly in the post-Mao era, kick-starting in the early 1980s and producing a vast array of

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[62] Piero Corradini, "Intorno al Li-fan-yuan 堙藩院 della dinastia Ch'ing," *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 40,1 (1965); cf. Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," 24–5.

[63] Ho Ping-Ti, "The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 26,2 (1967).

[64] Legrand, *L'administration*. About the same time Robert Oxnam in his monograph stressed the importance of Lifanyuan studies in his examination of emperor Kangxi's court politics; see Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661–1669* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[65] Yang Zhengxiao, *Qingdai Lifanyuan zhi yanjiu* (Taiwan: Taibei wenhua xueyuan, 1975); Lü Shipeng, "Qingdai de lifanyuan—jianlun qingdai dui meng, zang, hui zhuzu de tongzhi," *Donghai daxue lishi xuebao* 1 (1977).

[66] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," 7–12.

publications based on published source materials accessible for the first time ever. The Lifanyuan became a separate and specialized field in Qing studies, hence representing the third stage in Zhao Yuntian's periodization who himself, being already trained in the spirit of the new era, turned into an outstanding historian and Lifanyuan specialist. Within a decade, Zhao Yuntian published nineteen Lifanyuan-focused articles, co-authored another two with Cheng Chongde, and compiled and edited a collection from Lifanyuan sources.[67] His interest was indeed broad reaching, from the institutional beginnings and the changing functions of the Lifanyuan within the government, its offices in Beijing and administrative responsibilities in Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang to Buddhist temple management in Beijing, the annual rituals for the peoples from Inner Asian, the handling of affairs with Russia, and the exploration of Lifanyuan source material.

Besides, the noted Qing and Manchu historian Wang Zhonghan[68] published an essay on Lifanyuan relationships with the Mongols as early as in 1984 and more monographs on Qing history with systemic Lifanyuan research were written by Zhang Deze, Li Pengnian, and Zhao Xiding in the 1980s. Some, like Wu Fengpei, Lü Yiran, and Ma Dazheng, compiled or supported the compilation of new Lifanyuan primary sources, mostly in the Chinese language, resulting in numerous publications on frontier nationalities and the Qing frontier administration. All these efforts, to some extent supported also by scholars from the Mao era, promoted the Lifanyuan studies significantly.[69]

With the 1990s the Lifanyuan research entered its fourth and, according to Zhao Yuntian, final stage being fully integrated in Qing historiography now. Notable achievements of this period are Shi Yun's monograph on the Lifanyuan's role in China's nationalities policy and another two significant books by Zhao Yuntian focusing on the Lifanyuan as a frontier managing institution.[70] An article devoted to the Lifanyuan's Mongol administration was presented by Cai Zhichun.[71] As more and more primary sources became available, studies on the Qing frontier legal system began to emerge, establishing yet another field in Lifanyuan research based on the *Regulations of the Lifanyuan* (*Lifanyuan zeli*). This new trend resulted in over twenty books and fifty articles summarized by Yang Xuandi[72] and encompassed also comparative studies on the *Lifanyuan zeli* and the *Mongolian Code* (*Menggu lüli*) and even the Oirat Law.[73] To sum up, even though Lifanyuan studies continued to flourish during the 1990s', many scholars in mainland China began to alter their research direction focusing more on non-Lifanyuan-related frontier topics and on legal aspects so that proper Lifanyuan publications actually decreased in number compared with the previous decade.[74]

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[67] *Qingdai Lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu, 1988) which includes: (1) the *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli*, (2) the *Qianlong chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao*, and (3) the *Jiaqing chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao*.

[68] Wang Zhonghan, "Shilun lifanyan yu menggu," in *Wang Zhonghan Qingshi lunji*, ed. Wang Zhonghan (Beijing: Zhonghau shuju, 2004).

[69] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," 12–20.

[70] Shi Yun, *Minzu shiwu guanli zhidu* (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1991); Zhao Yuntian, *Zhongguo bianjiang minu guanli jigou yangeshi* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993); Idem, *Qingdai zhili bianchui de shuniu—Lifanyuan* (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1995).

Western scholarship did not experience this kind of dynamic that had paved the way for Lifanyuan studies in the People's Republic of China since the 1980s. The situation changed eventually with a dissertation by Chia Ning, completed at the Johns Hopkins University in May, 1991, and published in 1992. Representing a comprehensive investigation into all Lifanyuan-related aspects, this work, soon followed by an essay on Inner Asian rituals, was well received and widely quoted by the scientific community, and became a milestone for further research.[75]

Today, Lifanyuan studies are well established both inside and outside China. In recent years, many Western Qing scholars, such as Nicola Di Cosmo, Pamela Kyle Crossley, Evelyn S. Rawski, Christopher Atwood, and many others, have been paying more attention to Lifanyuan research granting this agency a prominent place in their publications and history textbooks. While research in the 1980s and 1990s was much based on Chinese language sources, newly available archival documents in other languages have generated more Lifanyuan-related research and opened the field for a number of specific aspects. In addition to Manchu archives (*Zouzhe* 奏折) restored inside the Forbidden City, new Manchu materials from Lifanyuan archives, mostly official reports (*tiben* 题本) to the emperor available since 2010, provide evidence on the day-to-day business of the Lifanyuan.[76] Indeed, there is a growing number of recently published source editions, not only from Manchu[77] but also from a Mongol and Kazakh background.[78]

In the meantime, Chia Ning has extended her Lifanyuan research into several new areas. Of particular importance is the administration of the Qinghai region being a key section in Qing empire building and representing even an axis in the Qing command over Tibet and Xinjiang. Case studies helped to clarify the Lifanyuan's official routine with the Qinghai Grand Minister Resident (*Qinghai banshi dachen*) and provide an insight into Qing local governance regarding the Khoshud Mongols with their banner-league organization and the Amdo Tibetans with their traditional *Tusi* system. The imperial management of diverse social systems in Inner Asian has been further examined with a particular focus on the relationships of the Lifanyuan as a central institution with local communities.[79]

The official reports from the Lifanyuan archives (*tiben*) have stimulated Chia Ning's research and shed new light on the Mongol pilgrimage to the court ritual,[80] on Qing inheritance practices regarding Mongol noble titles, on the socio-political position of noble women inside the Qing banner-league system,[81] and on the Lifanyuan's cultural policy and its supervision of official seals in every single polity of Inner Asia, thus illuminating seal traditions of both Chinese and Inner Asian origins.[82] The Manchu *tiben* also facilitate studies on Lifanyuan responsibilities over the Evenki people of the Heilongjiang hunting communities.[83] This is of particular interest because it introduces the hunting component of extremely small minorities (Solon, Daur, Orochis) living in the Chinese-Russian borderlands adding a contrasting picture to the much better studied nomadic component of Inner Asia.

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[71] Cai Zhichun, "Qingchao Lifanyuan zhangguan Menggu shiwu chutain," *Zhongguo minzushi yanjiu* (1993).

[72] Yang Xuandi, "Jinnianlai qingchao *Lifanyuan zeli* de zhengli yanjiu gaikuang," *Neimenggu shehui kexue* 5 (1999).

[73] Zhao Yuntian, "Lifanyuan zeli he menggu lüli," *Qingshi yanjiu* 3 (1995); *Qinding lifanbu zeli*, ed. Zhang Rongzheng (Tianjin: Guji chubanshe, 1998); Yang Xuandi, "Cong *Lifanyuan zeli* yu *Weilate fadian* de bijiao kanqi minzu fangui de jichengxing," *Neimenggu shehui kexue* 6 (1998); Yang Xuandi and Jin Feng, *Yang xuandi and Jin Feng jiaozhu Lifanyuan zeli* (Hailar: Neimenggu wenhua chubanshe, 1998).

[74] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," 8–10.

[75] Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty", published as microfilm with University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Mich. 1992; Idem, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals".

[76] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmeng tiben* (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2010); *Qingchao houqi lifanyuan manmeng tiben* (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2014).

[77] Michael Weiers, "Zu den Throneingaben aus dem Lifan yuan: Eine Anleitung zu ihrer Untersuchung," *Stipes Philologiae Asiae Maioris* 9,1 (2011); Laura J. Newby, "A Preliminary Discussion of Sources in Manchu Relating to Xinjiang (c. 1760–1912)," in *Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17–20th Centuries*, ed. James A. Millward et al. (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2010).

[78] Heuschert-Laage, "From Personal Network to Institution Building"; Idem, *State Authority Contested*; Jin Noda, "Introduction," in *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*, ed. Jin Noda et al. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2010).

[79] Chia Ning, "Placing 'Qinghai Studies' in the Field of China and Inner Asia," *Southeastern Review of Asian Studies* 30 (2008), http://www.uky.edu/Centers/Asia/SECAAS/Seras/2008/11_Chia_2008.pdf; Idem, "Cong zhongguo zhenxi falü dianji jicheng zhong xining Qinghai fanyi chengli kan shaoshu minzu dianji dui shixue zhuanti de yanjiu jiazhi," in *Collection of The Third International Conference on Historical China Studies*, ed. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (Shanghai: Shanghai remin chubanshe, 2009); Idem, "Xining banshi dachen yu yongqian shiqi Qinghai duominzu quyu guanli zhidu zhi xingcheng," *Qingshi yanjiu* 3 (2012); Idem, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity*.

[80] Chia Ning, "Qingchai qianqi lifanyuan manmengwen tiben zhong menggu chojin tanjiu," in *A Collection of Qing Studies in honor of Professor Wang Zhonghan*, ed. Chen Li, pp. 497–513 (Beijing National University for Nationalities Press, 2013).

Since the turn of the 21st century, Chinese scholars have, again, reinforced their research on Lifanyuan topics in an effort to compile and publish even more legal documentation.[84] Other studies have been analysing the Lifanyuan's support to and its engagement with the Eastern Mongol communities,[85] trade regulations with the Western Mongols[86] and the Russian Empire,[87] early Qing

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[81] Chia Ning, "Manwen tiben jieshide qingdai menggu gebu guizu nuxing dui juewei chengxi shiwu de canyu: Yi qinghai menggu wei zhongxin de duibi he fenxi," *Journal of the Frontier and Nationality Studies* 8 (2014).

[82] Chia Ning, "Liangjin manwen tiben yu qingdai he zhongguo minzushi zhong de guanyin wenhua," *Xiyu lishi yuyan yanjiu jikan* 9 (2016), forthcoming.

[83] Chia Ning, "The Qing Lifanyuan and the Solon People of the 17th–18th Centuries," *Athens Journal of History* 1,4 (2015).

[84] *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli*, ed. Zhao Yuntian. Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2006; *Qinding daqing huidian shili Lifanyuan*, ed. Zhao Yuntian. Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2006; Yang Xuandi, "Cong *Lifanyuan zeli* xi qingchao dui menggu diqu lifa tedian," *Neimenggu shehui kexue* 2 (2000); Idem, "Lun qingchao dui menggu diqu de lifa," *Meimenggu shifan daxue xuebao* 5 (2000); Tuimer, "Dianjiao zhushiben Lifanyuan zeli pingshu," *Mengguxue xinxi* 1 (2000); Dalizhabu Bao, "<Menggu lüli> ji qi yu <Lifanyuan zeli> de guanxi," *Qingshi yanjiu* 4 (2003); Idem, "Luelun lifanyuan xingli de shixiaoxing," *Yuanshi ji minzu yu bianjiang yanjiu jikan* 26 (2014); Xue Yisheng, "Qingdai lifanyuan jiqi lifa yanjiu," (PhD diss., Huadong zhenfa daxue, 2010); Guo Yanfang, "Daoguan ershisannian ban lifanyuan zeli bianzuan tanxi," *Shangqiu shifan xueyuan xuebao* 29,7 (2013); Ma Qinglian, "Qingdai lifanyuan de lifa gongneng tanwei," *Zhongguo gudai lishi wang* (January 2016), http://www.wodiannao.com/news/2016/597.html.

[85] Zhu Sa, "Lifanyuan yu dongbu mengqi: Yi lishi siyuan wei zhongxin," College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Inner Mongolian University of Technology, Inner Mongolian, Huhhot (2006): 1–12, http://www.sinoss.net/qikan/uploadfile/2010/1130/6851.pdf.

[86] Naren Chaogetu, "Cong chaoben lifanyuan zeli kan Zhunga'er yu neidi hushi shidian, didian ji cuoshi," *Menggushi yanjiu*, 10 (2010).

[87] Ye Baichuan, "Shiqi shiba shiji qingchao lifanyuan dui zhong'e maoyi de jiandu yu guanli," *Qingshi yanjiu* 85,1 (2012).

administration for Tibetan Buddhism,[88] the relatedness of the Lifanyuan regulations with the Mongol law,[89] and the Lifanyuan's local agency in Shenmu.[90] Manchu and Mongolian *tiben* based research results still find their way into prominent publications[91] and another comprehensive dissertation with an institutional-historical approach appeared very recently.[92]

Japanese scholars, too, often engage with Lifanyuan issues in their studies on Manchu and Mongolian history. Their research on the Qing legal system and its implications for the Mongols demonstrate a gradually growing attention towards the Lifanyuan, although the very name does not appear in any of the titles. In his summary on relevant Japanese scholarship from 1905 to the 1980s, Zhao Yuntian listed but five books and six articles with reference to the Lifanyuan. Since the 1990s, however, Yanagisawa Akira, for example, has repeatedly used Lifanyuan materials particularly in his study on Qing-Russian relations regarding the Butha and Hulunbuir banner affairs.[93]

4.2 *Recent Studies on Libu and China's Governing Institutions*

Generally, the Board of Rites (*Libu* 礼部) is well known to Chinese historians as almost to any scholar of Chinese history. But in Chinese and Western studies on the imperial system the research on this board has always been brief and scattered, never becoming a topic in its own right. Besides a 2012 dissertation at the Nankai University by Li Riqiang and a very recent Harvard dissertation on this topic by Macabe Keliher,[94] almost no specific research has been done on this important but, alas, neglected subject.[95] Studies on imperial rituals and the tributary system, both being under the auspices of the Libu, existed for a long time,[96] but the discussion insofar has been neither specific enough to explore this board in-depth. Not only the Libu, but all governing institutions of imperial China, collectively called the Six Boards (*Liubu* 六部), have surprisingly remained an under-researched field for a long time. They are either placed under a subtitle in a monograph or marginally noted in essays focusing on the whole political system of imperial China.

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[88] Song Tong, "Qingchu lifanyuan dui zangchuan fojiao de guanli," (August 2013), http://www.aisixiang.com.

[89] Yang Xianmin, "Cong Lifanyuan zeli guiankui qingchao shiqi menggu diqu de falü," *Lantai shijie* 4 (2015).

[90] Bao Manda, "Lifanyuan zhu shenmu lishi siyuan—shenmu tongzhi yu xunbian zhidu," *Neimenggu shifan daxue xuebao*, 5 (2015).

[91] Uyunbilig and Song Tong, "Guanyu qingdai nei zhasake menggumeng de chuxing—yi lifanyuan manwen tiben wei zhongxin," in *Manwen dang'an yu qingdai bianjiang he minzu yanjiu*, pp. 62–77, ed. Uyunbilig (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2013); Guan Kang, "Lifanyuan tiben zhong de menggu faqian anli yanjiu," *Qingshi yanjiu* 4 (2013); Song Tong, "Qingchu lifanyuan tiben yanjiu," *Guangming ribao* 15 (2012); Idem, "Cong sifen lifanyuan manwen tiben zhong suojian qingdai shunzhichao tingshi zhidu," *Lishi wenxian yanjiu* 1 (2014); Idem, *Qingchu lifanyuan yanjiu: Yi shunzhichao lifanyuan manwen tiben wei zhongxin* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2015).

[92] Li Zhaoyong, "Qingdai lifanyuan shezhi yu zhineng yanbian yanjiu," (PhD diss., Zhongyang minzu daxue, 2014).

[93] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingchao lifanyuan yanjiu liushinian," 21–4. Occasional inclusion of the Lifanyuan can also be found among scholars from Russia and Mongolia in their studies on Mongolian history and Russian-Qing relationships; cf. Namsaraeva, "Institut namestnikov tsinskogo Kitaya."

This situation has changed only slowly in recent years and has seen a rise in academic publications on China's governing institutions in the People's Republic of China. A list of the most prominent publications would include Dong Shaowei's work on the Tang ministers of the Board of Appointments (*Libu* 吏部),[97] Wang Li and Hui Pengfei's investigations of the Song Board of Appointments,[98] Wang Jianfeng and Chen Linghai on the Tang Board of Punishment (*Xingbu*),[99] Gui Wei's dissertation of the Jurchen Jin dynasty's Board of Revenue (*Hubu*),[100] Zhang Jinfan and Lin Gan's studies on the *Regulations of the Board of Revenue* (*Hubu zeli*) in the Qing dynasty,[101] Yang Jiguo's dissertation on the Song Board of Public Works (*Gongbu*),[102] and two master's theses on the Ming Board of Military (*Bingbu* 兵部).[103]

Besides, there have been a few studies on the Qing Board of Punishment and the Qing legal system by Bodde & Morris, Na Silu, and Xiangyu Hu.[104] Finally and beyond the Six Boards, three publications have appeared so far on the Qing Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu* 内务府)[105] and, quite some time ago, there was an ephemeral discussion on Ming-Qing governmental censorship and supervision over the Six Board, but not on the *Liubu* itself.[106]

In conclusion, the study of the Six Boards, though in theory being an essential academic topic, is largely underrepresented in Chinese history studies. It has remained a weak field, the study of the Libu and especially the Qing Libu—the primary concern of this volume—even more so. A renewed interest in 19th century empire building and institutional history raises the possibility that the Libu, too, should be re-examined, especially with regard to its responsibilities in foreign relations during major episodes. To be better informed and comprehend how and why the Qing dynasty succeeded to unite the center with its newly acquired peripheries and the 'Locals,' hence developing a tremendous operational strength, we do need a deeper understanding of these institutions in terms of their purpose, function, evolution, and their conjunction with other agencies that governed Inner Asia.

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[94] Li Riqiang, "Mingdai libu jiaohua gongneng yanjiu," (PhD diss., Nankai University, 2012); Macabe Keliher, "The Manchu Transformation of Li: Ritual, Politics, and Law in the Making of Qing China, 1631–1690," (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2015).

[95] Sometimes however, Chinese research does include Libu related topics, as recently by the Pengbai Research Institute and its series *Faxian dongya* (Discover East Asia) where number 12 is dedicated to *Libu waijiao: 'Chaogong' zuowei quanli he wenhua* (The diplomacy of the Board of Rites: 'Tribute' as power and culture), http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1397696, published on November 18, 2015.

[96] See for instance Joseph P. McDermott (ed.), *State and Court Ritual in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Martin Kren (ed.), *Text and Ritual in Early China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015).

[97] Dong Shaowei, *Tangdai libu Shangshu yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshem 2012); from the same author five recently published online articles related to the minister of this board can be found at http://xuewen.cnki.net/CDFD-2008188296.nh.html).

[98] Wang Li, "Songdai yuanfeng guanzhi gaige hou libu yanjiu," (PhD diss., Henan University, 2014); Hui Pengfei, "Songdai libu shangshu jianguan yanjiu," *Shizhi xuekan* 1 (2015).

[99] Wang Jianfeng, "Tangdai xingbu shangshu yanjiu," (PhD diss., Shandong University, 2007); Idem, "Tangdai xingbu shangshu de chushen jieceng yu rushi tujing," *Wenshizhe* 3 (2013); Chen Linghai, *Tangdai xingbu yanjiu* (Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 2010).

[100] Gui Wei, "Jindai hubu yanjiu," (PhD diss., Jilin University, 2015).

[101] Zhang Jinfan and Lin Gan, "Hubu zeli yu qingdai minshi falu tanyuan," *Bijiaofa yanjiu*, 15 (2001).

[102] Yang Jiguo, "Songdai gongbu yanjiu," (PhD diss., Shanghai Normal University, 2013).

[103] Xiao Lijun, "Mingdai Nanjing bingbu chutan," (Master Thesis, Tianjin University, 2012); Ouyang Lei, "Mingdai Nanjing bingbu yanyiu," (Master Thesis, Hunan Normal University, 2013).

[104] Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, *Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from the Hsing-an hui-lan), with Historical, Social, and Juridical Commentaries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Na Silu, *Qingdai zhongyang sifa shenpan zhidu* (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1992); Xiangyu Hu, "The Juridical System of the Qing Dynasty in Beijing (1644–1900)," (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2011); Idem, "Qingdai xingbu yu jingshi xishi anjian de shenli," *Qingshi yanjiu* 3 (2010); Idem, "Drawing the Line between the Civil and the Criminal: A Study of Civil Cases Handled by the Board of Punishment in Qing China," *Modern China* 40,1 (2014).

[105] Preston M. Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of its Organization and Principal Function, 1662–1796* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Li Dianrong, "Qingdai neiwufu yanjiu zongshu," *Shiyuan* 2 (2004); Qi Meiqin, *Qingdai neiwufu* (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2008).

[106] Zheng Qin, "Lun mingqing shiqi guojia quanli de jiandu jizhi," *Bijiaofa yanjiu* 1 (1992).

4.3 *A Few Words on This Volume: Incentives and Achievements*

This volume offers a comprehensive overview of the Lifanyuan and the Libu in regard to their management of non-Han peoples representing the efforts of both a conference on 'Administrative and Colonial Practices in Qing-Ruled China' held at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in April, 2011, and a closely related research project.[107] In addition to revising and assessing the state of affairs in the under-researched field of Lifanyuan and Libu studies, the chapters explore the imperial policies towards and the shifting classifications of minority groups in the Qing Empire proposing fresh perspectives and raising new questions.

As pointed out earlier, most Lifanyuan studies constitute individual articles and some information based predominantly on non-archival materials can be found scattered among other publications. Though our intention is to draw it all together in one place, this volume does not duplicate already published work.[108] In fact, many of the essays provide new, detailed case study information on the Lifanyuan's actual operations, contributing to a recent trend to analyze the causal links between imperial expansion, particularly the military campaigns that led to this expansion, and the development of Qing administrative agencies.[109]

Given the scattered field of research and a lack in comparative approaches, essays on the Qing-acquired northern and western frontiers are consciously complemented by perspectives on the southern and southeastern fringes of Ming China, although the focus remains on the Lifanyuan. Looking in two directions enables us to better understand Han-Chinese perceptions of the self and the 'other' as well as processes of 'otherization' and the *longue durée* in the management of ethnic diversity, and thus to emphasize the significance of structural configurations and central agencies of the *ancien régime* which still had an impact in the republican period and beyond.

The explicit pairing and comparison of the Lifanyuan and the Libu as in some sense cognate agencies, a point that has often been noted but never been extensively explored, is regarded to be an innovative element to the field of Qing institutional history and the historical anthropology of Inner Asia as well. To date, there is simply no comparable work with such detailed comparisons of the two government agencies handling the Qing empire's dealings with its neighbours and foreign countries. This comparative and anthropological informed study elucidates how governance over the empire's new territories was established and how early Qing world order was implemented with obvious path dependencies up to the present day. Moreover, and besides a separate investigation into the evolution, duties and performances of each of the two offices, only by comparison can we discuss their division of responsibilities as well as their overlaps and forms of cooperation leading to further considerations on Qing governmentality at large.

The interplay between the Lifanyuan and the Libu seemed to be exceptionally fine-tuned. This has much to do with an obvious parallelism: the Libu's traditional role in tribute regulation with foreign powers and peoples from outside China which in a way became reduplicated by the Qing invented Lifanyuan assigned to deal with exactly the same (and more) duties in the newly acquired territories of Inner Asia.[110] This dualism adds, naturally, to the interest of a comparative investigation and calls for a fresh look also at Lifanyuan and Libu as agencies established to regulate tribute and various other relationships of ethnic minorities with the state.[111]

Given the intention of comparison, we are yet aware of a numerical imbalance regarding the focus on Libu. In fact, though it is referred to in almost all chapters there are only three that explicitly deal with this agency: Chia Ning in her opening essay on early Qing empire building and particular in her subsequent investigation into the Qing tribute system as well as Zhang Yongjiang who, though focusing on the Libu in the pre-Qing period, used Qing sources to

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[107] For a short description of the project and its contributors see Dittmar Schorkowitz, "Historical Anthropology: Ethnic Minorities and the State in Eurasia," In *Resilience and Transformation in Eurasia, 1999–2014*, ed. Jennifer Cash et. al., 22–30 (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2014).

[108] A comparable approach is perhaps *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et. al. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2006) which tackles Qing empire building through case studies of Qing policies towards specific frontier groups.

[109] See also the two other recent 'frontier' contributions by Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 2010) and Matthew W. Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

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[110] He Xinhau in her book on the Qing tribute system has two chapters separately listed for the Libu tribute administration (Libu jiqi xiangguan de guanli chaogong shiwu jigou) and the Lifanyuan tribute administration (Lifanyuan jiqi xiangguan de guanli chaogong shiwu jigou); see: He Xinhau. *Zuohou de tianchao: qingdai chaogong zhidu yuan jiu* (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 2012).

[111] John King Fairbank and Ssu-yu Têng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," *Harvard-Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6,2 (1941); Morris Rossabi, *China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day* (New York: Pica Press, 1975).

discuss the Ming Libu. Presenting the Ming dynasty precursor of Qing attitudes towards ethnic boundaries between the Han Chinese and their neighbours, Zhang Yongjiang provides the reader with an intellectual and historical introduction to the Libu, the origins of which go far more back in history, reflecting the different traditions on which the Qing could draw upon. After all, we hope that the emphasis on the Lifanyuan as the less studied agency is justified and appreciated.

The essays of this volume are structured chronologically for the sake of greater cohesion and comprehension, though other ways of combining them topic-wise have been considered. The chapters fall into different categories, from introductory (Chia Ning, Zhang Yongjiang) and more comprehensive approaches (Pamela Crossley, Chia Ning, Laura Hostetler, Dittmar Schorkowitz) to attempts to analyse the respective functions of the Libu and the Lifanyuan through case studies of Qing relations with the Mongols, Russians, Muslims, and Tibetans in the 17th and 18th centuries, highlighting the Lifanyuan's activities on Central and Inner Asian frontiers. Only a few chapters go beyond this period in an attempt to present a *longue durée* perspective and path dependencies which, to a certain degree, are perceptible even today (Mei-hua Lan, Uradyn Bulag, Dittmar Schorkowitz). Some essays report 'cutting-edge' research results based on recently published source editions or otherwise accessible archive material (Chia Ning, Michael Weiers, Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, Song Tong, Ye Baichuan & Yuan Jian, Fabienne Jagou) while others build their analyses more on secondary literature.

Much attention has been given to the tribute system opening a venue for varying assessments that calls for more detailed investigation in the future. Thus, while Chia Ning in her second essay is making attempts to distinguish 'routine' tribute states, such as the European maritime nations managed by the Libu, from 'internal' Lifanyuan managed tribute states, Russia being among them, Ye Baichuan and Yuan Jian challenge the notion that Russia was incorporated into the Qing tribute system in any way. Their suggestion that Qing relations with Russia fell into the treaty rather than tributary system questions scholarly wisdom on Qing-Russian relations, which stresses the Qing view of Russia as a land-based—not maritime—power whose activities directly affected Qing attempts to stabilize and consolidate their northern and northwestern frontiers. Laura Hostetler highlights that terms describing the visits of Central and Inner Asian peoples to the Qing court or its regional representatives show considerable variation in each group's ritual obligations, whether it be visits to Beijing for imperial audience (*rujin*), or acknowledge Qing suzerainty from a distance. Her essay investigates into the *Huang Qing zhigong tu*, an imperially commissioned 18th century work depicting over three hundred peoples with whom the Qing had diplomatic or tribute relations providing the reader with a fine illustrated overview on tributary relations in Inner Asia.

Michael Weiers in his critical assessment of traditional historiography and new sources elaborates on the later consolidation period of the Lifanyuan under Yongzheng and Qianlong providing the reader with insights into the dilemmas of Qing semi-official historiography. He makes an important point, warning scholars to treat the edited documentation of texts included in the *Siku quanshu* with caution. Drawing on recently published *Manchurian and Mongolian Memorials of the Lifanyuan*, he points out that the Qing, contrary to conventional views, granted executive posts in the Lifanyuan to some Han-Chinese ministers of the Libu as concurrent assignments from the early 1680s to the 1720s, while according to Chinese sources, used by Chia Ning in her essay (Lifanyuan and Libu in Early Qing Empire Building), the Lifanyuan figures exclusively as a Manchu-Mongol-led institution.

Pamela Crossley discusses the early evolution of the Lifanyuan from an Manchu perspective of the three pre-Qing governments: the Manchu Eight Banners or Jurchen Jin khanate, the Mongol Eight Banners or Chakhar Khanate, and the Han-Chinese Ming state. Complementing our introductory information on the Lifanyuan's institutional beginnings with a detailed picture of varying yet simultaneous bureaucracies and forms of governmentality the Qing could draw upon already in 1636, this agency is characterized here as a stability providing tool suitable particularly for the period of imperial conquest which lost more and more of its significance only with the rapid changes in the political arena of the early 19th century. Drawing the attention to the political, structural, and strategic foundations, laid before the Qing expansions into larger parts of China and Mongolia, and their lasting impact on later periods, Pamela Crossley discusses an important aspect that hasn't been given due notice in Lifanyuan studies to date.

Archival materials constitute also the basis for Dorothea Heuschert-Laage's chapter on Mongol judicial processes under the Qing. Using documents from the Judicial Department of the Lifanyuan, she depicts a process that began with adherence to the Mongol law-making tradition, determined through collective assembly, and developed over time into an eclectic legal system that included significant injections of Chinese law. The gradual long-term incorporation of Mongols into the Qing empire she describes is echoed in Uradyn Bulag's depiction of the transformation of banners and leagues into Chinese-type counties and provinces by the middle of the twentieth century.

Song Tong develops a critique on the heavily edited sources that most scholars have used to study the Qing campaigns against the Khōja. Using documents from the *Junjichu* and recently published Manchu and Mongolian-language materials emanating from the Lifanyuan for the early Qing period, he demonstrates that the Lifanyuan merely implemented policy determined by the *Junjichu*. Fabienne Jagou's essay on the Qing court's Tibet policy draws on recently published documents originally deposited in the archives in Lhasa, unpublished memoirs of the *Amban* stationed in Lhasa, and other materials to provide a provocative picture from the Tibetan perspective, one that challenges the dominance of the Lifanyuan in this arena.

The concluding chapter of Dittmar Schorkowitz puts the essays and case studies into a broader perspective by focusing on ethnic minorities and state relationships in general and introducing yet another level of comparison: the integration and nationalities policies in both imperial Russia and China. In an attempt to link modern Russian (Soviet, postsoviet) and Chinese minority policies with their historical antecedents he suggests Hechter's model of 'internal colonialism' as a fruitful analytic tool to apply to the imperial history of both countries, which constitute a major world historical example of 'continental colonialism.'

Focusing on Qing institutions, this volume illustrates the nexuses of the imperial center with its many frontier communities and their diverse sociocultural organizations. It demonstrates that the governing institutions, particularly the Lifanyuan and the Libu, operated through official routines along imperial regulations to connect the two ends. The Qing relied on the professional operation of these institutions to maintain and, regarding the Lifanyuan, develop this new form of centre-periphery relationship. In a time when borders and demarcation lines between China, Russia (at least to the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta) and most of Inner Asia's political entities were not established yet, the routines and services of the Lifanyuan regarding borderland control and the governance of peoples and cultures yet to be integrated, were truly essential in the course of Qing empire building.

5 Notes on Transliteration

The conventions of transliteration, the translation of institutional names, the spelling and notation, and mark-ups used in this volume relate to different languages. The transliteration of Chinese follows standard Pinyin romanization, Japanese is rendered using the Hepburn system, both based on the Chicago-Style Citation Guide. Russian is transliterated using the U.S. Board of Geographic Names except for some vowels (E → Ye, Ë → Yë, Й → Y) where, for the sake of simplicity and unambiguousness, the Linguistic system equivalents

are preferred (E → E, Ë → Ë and Й → J). The Mongolian transliteration generally follows the modern spelling[112] except for the chapters of Michael Weiers and Dorothea Heuschert-Laage who, for the sake of a philologically precise rendering of book titles and quotations from Uyghur-Mongolian script, use the Mostaert-Vladimirtsov system.

Given the various translations for institutions surfacing in the English and other languages over time, the different usages have been standardized and replaced in many cases by the Chinese form. To start with an exception from this rule: while one of the central institutions—the Board of Rites—is referred to as Libu (礼部) throughout this volume, a different office likewise transliterated as Libu (吏部) is rendered as Board of Appointments for the sake of clarity and distinctness.

A translation of the Chinese term Lifanyuan is even more complicated if not impossible. To begin with, it is not precise in rendering the proper meaning neither of the original Manchu—Board for the Administration of the Outer Regions (Provinces)—nor the Mongolian notion: Court of Administration (Procedures dealt with) of the Autonomous Mongolian State (Outer Mongolian Government). In addition, the Chinese form has been subject to quite a variety of interpretations, some of them with a political undercurrent not accepted by everyone.[113] Some expressions frequently used in the literature are given here for illustration: Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions, Court for the Regulations of the Frontier, Ministry for the Management of the Non-Chinese Population, Department of Tributary Territories, Court of Colonial Affairs (deemed to be politically incorrect and less favoured today).

Another Chinese notion frequently used in this connection is *Fan* (藩), a Sinocentric collective term referring to and summarizing people from the frontier, beyond control and yet under influence to a certain degree, as represented in the second character of the term Lifanyuan (理藩院). There are a few more institutions often mentioned with varying translations where we prefer to give the Chinese name: *Lifanbu* (Board ~ Ministry for the Regulations of the Frontier), *Zongli geguo shiwu yamen* (Court ~ Office in Charge of Affairs of all Nations; sometimes also referred as Central Office on Foreign Affairs), *Neige* (Grand Secretariat; or Inner Cabinet), and last but not least, the *Junjichu* (Grand Council).

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[112] Christopher P. Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire* (New York, NY: Facts On File, 2004).

[113] Nicola Di Cosmo, "From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest," *Frontiers of History in China* 7,2 (2012); cf. the chapter of Michael Weiers in this volume.

Institutional names in Mongolian, Russian, Manchu, and Pinyin are capitalized, as well as ranks and titles (Beg, Tusi, Taiji, Wang, Beile, Gong) and most other foreign terms and notions. With the exception of the prominent Lifanyuan and Libu, all non-English institutional names are italicized which is also the case when reference is made to sources within the text (e.g. *Lifanyuan zeli*) and likewise with established terms (*Mañjuśrī*) and concepts in foreign languages (*longue durée*). Quotation marks are reserved for quotations and direct speech only, while single quotes ('...') are used to highlight various notions and expressions. All institutional names, administrative notions, titles, ranks, and cultural concepts are displayed in the glossary in simplified Chinese characters. Though geographical and ethnographical names are likewise often included in the glossary, personal names are not. Their characters are, however, sometimes given in brackets following the Pinyin transliteration in the chapters.

For the standardization of Mongolian names, Christopher Atwood's Encyclopaedia was of great help while Chia Ning gave guidance in the adequate treatment of the various ways in which the names of early Manchu rulers are written; reign years of the Qing emperors and dates of Chinese dynasties are taken from William Rowe's seminal work.[114] The dates of Inner Asian rulers are checked with common reference literature, particularly the works by Peter Perdue, Michael Khodarkovsky, and Michael Weiers.[115] Finally, a perhaps necessary remark on Qing imperial chronology. As Chinese sources often give only reign name and year of the emperor without indicating year, month, and day, e.g. the 54th year of Emperor Qianlong's reign (1789), bracketed dates from the Gregorian calendar are added in these cases, referring to the widely accepted list of imperial reign years mentioned above. However, because the reign year is related to the New Year of the Chinese lunar calendar, which may begin in January or February, the year in parentheses must be taken as the best possible approximation rather than an exact date—a convincing explanation I am grateful to borrow from Laura Hostetler.[116]

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[114] Atwood, *Encyclopedia*; Chia Ning, "Transliterating the Names of the two Manchu Founding Emperors: The Status of this Issue in Qing and Manchu Studies," *Journal of the Frontier and Nationality Studies* 7 (2013); Rowe, *China's Last Empire*.

[115] Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005); Michael Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Michael Weiers, *Geschichte der Mongolen* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 2004).

[116] See her chapter in this volume.

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CHAPTER 1

Lifanyuan and Libu in Early Qing Empire Building

Chia Ning

Qing statecraft was embodied in the institutional building and rebuilding of their Imperial government. Both the Lifanyuan, the new section of the dynastic government, and the Libu, the Ming-inherited institution, which was undergoing a reassignment at the time, had fundamental influences on shaping the governmental structure. According to the *Qingshigao* (Drafted history of the Qing dynasty) which was compiled in 1927, two kinds of *Fanfu*[1]—a broad concept for the ‘subjected’ non-Chinese peoples and powers—were separately placed under either Lifanyuan or Libu authority from the beginning of the Qing dynasty. Those under the Lifanyuan included Khalkha Mongolia, Tibet, Qinghai, and Gurkha (or Gorkha, today’s central Nepal). Given the background of the early 1920s, in which Xinjiang had become a province since 1884 and Inner Mongolia was scheduled to become the Suiyuan, Chakhar, and Rehe/Jehol provinces in the Chinese administrative system, two important parts of Qing Inner Asia—Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang—were left out in the *Qingshigao*. However, they certainly belonged to the first category of *Fanfu* under the Lifanyuan prior to 1884.[2] The Lifanyuan’s most functional time in Qing history was in the process of integrating Inner Asia where the population consisted of the first *Fanfu*.

The second category of *Fanfu* included Korea, Vietnam, Laos in terms of Nanzhang,[3] Burma, Sulu (southwest of the Philippines), the Netherlands in terms of Helan, Thailand in terms of Xuanluo, and the Ryukyu Islands in terms of Liuqiu, together with a number of other historical Southeast Asian countries. The office of Receiving Ritual Guests (*Zhuke qinglisi*), one of the four Libu

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[1] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), vol. 91 *Lishi* (Ritual number ten), 730.

[2] For a discussion of the Lifanyuan’s responsibilities in all parts of Inner Asia, see Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity in Early Qing (1636–1795)* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012).

[3] Even though historical Nanzhang has been widely recognized as present-day Laos according to the *Qinghuidian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991) and Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, Li Kunrui has pointed out in his article “Nanzhang ji laoguo muoshuo kao,” *Qingshi yanjiu* 4 (2009), Nanzhang, once a small country that disappeared during Qing times, was neither Laos nor any present South-eastern Asian country.

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bureaus, was in charge of these *Fanfu*'s tributary relationships with the Qing court.[4] As becomes apparent from the fact that there were two kinds of *Fanfu* and two institutions responsible for them, the *Fanfu* categories divided these institutions, along with the division of peoples and their countries, into two geographical spheres, one in Inner Asia and one along the non-Inner Asian fringes in East and Southeast Asia. The Qing government put two institutions—Lifanyuan and Libu—in charge of managing these two spheres separately but, as the following discussion will show, in cooperation.

1 Institutional Transformations and Geopolitical Ambitions

With their basic spheres of responsibilities partitioned, both the Lifanyuan and the Libu underwent constant institutional adjustments as the Qing empire continued to expand and its population became increasingly diverse. Notwithstanding its roots in Mongolian affairs, the Lifanyuan soon transformed into a fully developed administration for all Qing-controlled regions of Inner Asia. By the time of Qianlong's reign, the population under the Lifanyuan's responsibility comprised Inner and Outer/Khalkha Mongols, the Qinghai Mongols, the Zünghars (or Western Mongols) in present-day Northern Xinjiang, the Tibetans in the heartland of Tibet, the Amdo Tibetans in Qinghai and the surrounding Gansu-Sichuan regions, as well as the Muslim Uighurs in present-day Southern Xinjiang. A Lifanyuan-managed Inner Asian zone thus emerged, surrounding 'China Proper' from the North, Northwest, West, and Southwest. As to the different societies and communities in that zone, the Lifanyuan directly interfered with their social organization, appointed court-approved officials, demarcated pastoral territories, supervised the economy, upheld legal settlements, operated transportation and postal service, and defined and assigned ritual duties of the local nobility vis-à-vis the court.[5] In the course of that process the Libu, which had formerly been fully in charge of the Ming relationships with Inner Asian peoples, gradually withdrew from its responsibilities in that region, except for its involvement in a few ritual-related affairs such as providing the temple worship supplies and restoring the returned official seals. Consequently, the Libu's activities became more and more limited to tribute affairs outside the Inner Asian zone.

In fact, the institutional growth of the Lifanyuan can be traced back to 1638 and to the semantics used to name this newcomer among the long-established Ming governmental agencies. Both the new Manchu and Chinese names reveal the intention to extend the responsibilities of that office beyond the Mongol affairs. It can be taken as almost certain that the Manchu phrase *Tulergi golo* (outer regions) and the Chinese character *Fan* (non-Chinese population) widened the institution's official scope in terms of both territory and people. The records concerning the "rectification of the *Menggu yamen* into Lifanyuan [*gengding menggu yamen wei lifanyuan*]"[6] further reflect the Manchu ambitions to include a larger population. Whenever an Inner Asian nation, Mongol or non-Mongol, came into contact with the Manchu court, the Lifanyuan was put in charge of making arrangements for tribute, negotiations concerning the relationship between these nations and the Qing, trade or market settlements, cooperation in warfare, and military operations. Political decisions implemented in this context clearly express the Qing tendency of territorial expansion, a process in which the Lifanyuan's role changed as well: from an agency for communication and mediation it turned into an institution for administration and governance.

The transformation of the Khalkha Mongols into a Qing banner population in the 1690s, being in fact a consequence of the Inner Mongols' search for alliance with the emerging Manchu (Qing) state in 1635, became a cornerstone in the expansion of the Lifanyuan's responsibilities. As early as in 1697 Emperor Kangxi began to award the Qinghai Mongols with Qing noble titles, and his successor Yongzheng continued with this integration by organizing them into the banner system in 1725.

The Tibetan population under the Tusi (indigenous chieftain) system, or Amdo Tibetans, in Qinghai as well as in parts of Gansu and Sichuan, was released by Yongzheng from Qinghai Mongol control and brought under Qing administration, keeping their Tusi system intact. In heartland Tibet, emperor Kangxi temporarily settled the instability while forcefully dealing with the Zünghar challenges in Northern Xinjiang. Eventually Yongzheng succeeded in establishing more control over Tibet by installing the Grand Minister Resident

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[4] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 91 *Lishi* (Ritual number ten), 730. In that source 'Holland' (the present Netherlands) was mixed up with the South-eastern Asian countries, a mistake in modern understanding but in line with the perception of the early Qing.

[5] Qianlong chao neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli, in *Qingdai lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjian shidi yanjiu zhongxin, 1988), 41–6, 50–6, 61–4, and 84; *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*, ed. Zhang Tingyu (Taibei: Shengshing shuju, 1959, 5127, 5155–56, 5158, 5161, 5249. See also Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan of the Early Qing Dynasty" (PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1992) and Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* vol. 14, no. 1 (1993).

[6] *Qingchao kaiguo fanglue*, ed. A Gui (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1773/1967), 25:5b and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), vol. 2, p. 679.

(Amban) in 1727, a position designated to manage Tibetan affairs on behalf of the Qing court. Emperor Qianlong finally conquered Xinjiang in the 1750s, which ended the fierce fighting with the Zünghar Mongols that had been going on since 1688; that conquest also concluded the process of early Qing efforts to integrate Inner Asia.

In that process, the Lifanyuan played a constructive role on several significant occasions. For instance, the Shunzhi government assigned the Lifanyuan to arrange the visit of the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (*1617 †1682, r.1642–1682) in Beijing in 1652–53. On behalf of the emperor, the Lifanyuan vice minister (*Shilang*) welcomed the Dalai Lama on the latter's journey to Beijing. Each of the four Boards (Revenue, Rites, Military, and Public Works) also assigned an administrator (*Lishiguan*) to be included in the vice minister's working staff.[7] From then on the Lifanyuan routinely mediated the correspondence directly between the court and Tibetan authorities until the appointment of the Amban in Lhasa in 1727, and after that indirectly through him.[8] Ming-time Libu practices of relating with Tibetan authorities—only at the court rituals and through granting certificates and seals as symbolic 'legitimation' of their authority—were no longer the major tie in this relationship. Up until the 34th year (1909) of Emperor Guangxu's reign, the Dalai Lama's memorials to the court, that is to Empress Dowager Cixi (*1835 †1908) as the ruling regent, were still sent to the minister of the *Lifanbu* (a revised name of the Lifanyuan since 1906) which was officially in charge of delivering Tibetan letters.[9]

The Lifanyuan's role in the Manchu-Khalkha relationship became predominant after contact was established with the Khalkha Setsen Khan in 1635 and with all three Khalkha Khans in 1638.[10] The Shunzhi-Kangxi governments used the Lifanyuan as the major institution responsible for their communication with the Khalkha Mongols. Before they were brought under Qing sovereignty by Kangxi in 1691, one of four Lifanyuan bureaus was specifically concerned

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[7] *Qingshilu zangzu shiliao*, ed. Gu Zucheng (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1982), vol. 1, p. 17.

[8] *Gongzhongdang Kangxichao manwen zouzhe*, the Number One Historical Archive, Microfilm box #7, microfilm #27, 2428–2458 for the Kangxi case in his 61st year. *Manwen dang'an minzulei*, (Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan), quanzong 506, no. 123, bag no. 20 for the Yongzheng case in his 4th year. *Junjichu lufu zhouzhe*, microfilm no. 27, anjuanhao [archive number] 903, for the Qianlong case in his 41st year. See also the discussion in Fabienne Jagou's chapter in this volume.

[9] *Qinggong zhencang lishi dalai lama dang'an huicui* (Beijing: The First Archives of Chinese History, 2002), 395.

[10] Qi Yunshi, *Huangchao fanbu yaolue* (Peking: Xizang shehui kexueyuan, 1993), vol. 3, p. 1b.

with Khalkha affairs. After the Dolonnuur convention of 1691, two of five Lifanyuan bureaus were put in charge of dealing with Khalkha affairs.[11]

In the eighth month of 1655, Emperor Shunzhi sent a Lifanyuan official (*Qixinlang*, this rank varied during Qing rule) to accompany the vice minister of the Board of Military to the historical region of Ganzhou in the present-day Gansu Province to resolve local complaints and to settle the trading markets in Xining.[12] In 1658 a Lifanyuan *Qixinlang* and an officer from the Board of Military were assigned to jointly manage border issues with the Khoshud leader Tsetsen Taiji[13] who is mentioned in other sources as "Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan"[14] or "Ochirtu Setsen Khan of the Khoshuud"[15] and ruled Züngharia from 1639 until 1676. To assist the court in dealing with the Zünghar (Tsoros) leader Galdan Boshogtu Khan (1670–1697), whose power play decisively affected the Tibetan, Qinghai, and Khalkha relationships with the Qing court, the Lifanyuan was heavily involved in negotiations and war planning.[16] As was the case with the Inner Mongols in Hūwangtaiji's time, all newly subdued Mongol branches were organized into the banner system and came under Lifanyuan administration as soon as they became part of the empire.

In Xinjiang, the Lifanyuan administered the Muslim polities of Hami and Turfan through a Mongol-like banner system that was established during the Kangxi-Yongzheng period. Later, Emperor Qianlong's government employed the same system after his troops had defeated the Zünghars in Northern Xinjiang in 1757, while southern Xinjiang was governed by the native *Beg* system after the Khōja rebellion was put down in 1759.[17] In this context, a new bureau especially in charge of Xinjiang affairs was established. Finally, after Qianlong's battles in Jinchuan in present-day Northwest Sichuan in 1747–1776, the Lifanyuan also resumed comprehensive responsibilities for the Tibetan population under the Tusi administrative system, as a filed record from the Grand Council's archive documented in Qianlong's 41st year (1777) tells us.[18] Embracing local traditions and political systems in Inner Asia, the Lifanyuan thus turned major official hierarchies into extensions of Qing official branches, as has been recently pointed out by Kwangwin Kim: "The new Qing empire in Central Asia was not just an alien rule of the Manchu; it was a domination of a local Muslim ruler, who expanded its reach under the patronage of a non-Muslim power."[19]

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[11] *Daqing yitongzhi* (Shanghai: 1764/1902), vol. 411, pp. 1a–b; Liu Jinzao, *Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao* (Taibei: Xinxing shuju, 1958), 7139; Qi Yunshi, *Huangchao fanbu yaolue*, preface, p. 2a. See also the charts in Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity*, 4–6.

[12] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, pp. 1865–6 and 2006–7.

[13] Ibid., 1696.

[14] Christopher Atwood, *Encyclopedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), p. 301, under "Khoshuds".

[15] Alan J.K. Sanders, *Historical Dictionary of Mongolia* (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2010), p. 287.

[16] *Gongzhongdang Kangxichao manwen zouzhe*, Microfilm box #7, microfilm #27, 111–2, 153, 252–60.

[17] Qianlong chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, in *Qingdai Lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu, 1988), 26–8 and Jiaqing chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, in *Qingdai Lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu, 1988), 108–13.

With regard to the Lifanyuan's working relations with the Libu, the Qinghai/Amdo region is a typical example to demonstrate the shift in responsibility between the two institutions. Never exercising local control, the Ming Libu was the only central institution involved in relationships with the Buddhist clergy in Tibet, based on issuing court-granted certificates and seals that tied that clergy to the Ming rituals held at the court. Through these regulations and practices the Ming government expected to achieve control from afar, but secular local Mongol groups and the Tibetan leaders were out of Ming reach. When in 1723–1724 the intervening troops of the Khoshud leader Lubsang-Danzin (one of Törö-Baikhu Güüshi Khan's grandsons) were finally defeated and expelled from Qinghai, Emperor Yongzheng designated the Lifanyuan in 1725 to fully govern that region and its population: the Qinghai Mongols, the Tibetans under their Tusi heads, and the religious leaders. These new administrative duties included the granting of titles to regional leaders, household registration, social and economic arrangements, legal regulations, and ritual assignments. The Libu was relegated to an assistant position, restoring returned official seals and receiving the regional leaders at the court rituals after the Lifanyuan had arranged for their invitation and travel.[20]

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[18] *Junjichu lufu zhouzhe*, microfilm no. 27, anjuanhao [archive number] 903.

[19] Kwangmin Kim, "Profit and Protection: Emin Khwaja and the Qing Conquest of Central Asia, 1759–1777," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71,3 (2012): 623–4. See also Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity*.

[20] Chia Ning, "Xining banshi dachen yu yongqian shiqi Qinghai duominzu quyu guanli zhidu zhi xingcheng," *Qingshi yanjiu* 3 (2012).

In 1726, Emperor Yongzheng clarified the division between the two institutions: the Lifanyuan was in charge of governing the internal Inner Asian population with the exception of the Han Chinese in 'China Proper,' while the Libu was to govern the neighbouring countries of Korea, Liuqiu, Nanzhang, Annam, Xuanluo, and Sulu in East and Southeast Asia. And the imperial order continued:

> Now that the [Tibetan Buddhist] lamas of the Inner and Khalkha Mongols are under the Lifanyuan's administration, the [Tibetan Buddhist] lama affairs in the Shaanxi province [much of Qinghai of that time] in the regions of Tao and Min [in Gansu] are also to be moved under Lifanyuan competence.[21]

When discussing the tribute regulations for the Gansu lamas in 1743, Emperor Qianlong reaffirmed these regulations.[22] These important clarifications confirmed the division of spheres of responsibility between a Lifanyuan-managed Inner Asian and a Libu-managed tribute zone of East and Southeast Asia.

The Lifanyuan's administration in Inner Asia was assisted by a number of specially appointed court officials (Ma. Amban and Ch. Dachen) and military generals (Ch. *Jiangjun*), who were dispatched to Lhasa, Xining, Kuren, Khobdo, Tarbagatai, Ili, Balikun, Hami, and the Muslim city polities in southern Xinjiang.[23] In addition, the Lifanyuan usually sent clerks to work with these officials. The effectiveness of the Lifanyuan-supervised Inner Asian hierarchies and the court-appointed officials and generals varied from region to region, but Qing statecraft in Inner Asia was well reflected in all of the regional governing systems. Both the institutional change at court level and the local administration significantly distinguished the Qing relationship with Inner Asia from Ming-time relations. The indirect control exerted by the Libu in Ming times was, again, replaced by the Lifanyuan's direct administration.

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[21] *Daqing huidian lifayuan shili* (Beijing: Center for Tibetan Studies, 1991), vol. 975, pp. 7a–b.

[22] *Qianlong chao Neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli*, 128 and 145, and *Daqing huidian lifayuan shili*, vol. 975, pp. 6b–7a. See also Chia Ning, "Xining banshi dachen yu yongqian shiqi Qinghai".

[23] *Qianlong chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao*, 29; *Jiaqing chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao*, 80–81, 85–6, 106, and 119; *Qianlong chao Neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli; Libu zeli* (Taiwan: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967), vol. 44, pp. 3a–4b and *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 5163b.

2 Nationality Ratio of the Lifanyuan and Libu Working Staff

The manifest differences of Lifanyuan and Libu also found reflection in the nationality composition of the working staff and in the institutional structures with designated administrative obligations. At almost every stage in Qing history, the Lifanyuan had more officials than the Libu. The increase of the Lifanyuan's official positions was recorded as early as in Hūwangtaiji's time, when in 1643 their number was ninety-eight, the same as for the Libu at the end of the Qing dynasty.[24] The Lifanyuan staff grew to one hundred and sixteen in 1661 and further climbed to two hundred and one in the early Qianlong reign.[25] After minor adjustments by the Jiaqing and Guangxu governments in 1799 and 1880, respectively, the Lifanyuan's bureaucracy became stabilized and numbered one hundred and seventy-seven, seventy-nine more than the Libu at the same time.[26]

Even more important than numbers, the nationality ratio of the Lifanyuan officials highlights the structure and character of this institution and shows how Manchu and Mongol elites were placed inside the Qing government. From the first year of Shunzhi's (1644) to the end of Qianlong's reign in 1795, the Manchus outnumbered the Mongols at the ministerial rank: out of altogether thirty-one ministers, twenty-three were Manchus, seven were Mongols, and only one, Sengge, was a Chinese bannerman who held the position from 1733 until 1738. However, the Mongols filled the ranks of the Lifanyuan's higher positions, providing the senior and junior vice minister (*Zuo you shilang*), extraordinary vice minister (*Ewai shilang*, a post usually given to Mongol princes), directors (*Langzhong*), vice directors (*Yuanwailang*), administrative aides (*Zhushi*), treasurers (*Siku*), department heads (*Siwu*), and transcription clerks (*Bitieshi*).[27] This nationality ratio was absolutely unique not only in comparison with the Libu but also with all other Qing institutions.

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[24] *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, trans. by Number One Historical Archive (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1986), vol. 1 (Tiancong and Chongde reigns), 340, and *Zhongguo guanzhih tongshi*, ed. Zhang Jifan (Peking: Zhongguo renmin taxue, 1992), 602 and 608.

[25] *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*, 5603.

[26] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol.114, pp. 3279–80 for Libu and vol. 115, pp. 3297–8 for Lifanyuan.

[27] Qian Shifu, Buyuan dachen nianbiao, in *Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981), 158–249 for ministers and 211–214 for Sengge.

The Libu was headed by a Manchu minister with a Han-Chinese minister appointed next to him. Each senior and junior vice minister position had a Manchu and a Chinese appointee as well.[28] Only four out of ninety-eight Libu officials were Mongols, and they were all at lower ranks—one director, an administrative aide, and two transcription clerks. The overwhelming majority (seventy-three) were Manchu, and twenty-one were Chinese, five of the latter being Han bannermen.[29] This strongly contrasts with the Lifanyuan staff, which was comprised of one hundred Mongols in various positions, sixty-four Manchus with a high rate of top positions, and no Han Chinese at all except six temporary Han bannermen at a lower rank.[30]

This picture demonstrates that the Lifanyuan was a Manchu-Mongol-led special institution. The Libu, on the other hand, like all other Boards, was a Manchu-led and Chinese-assisted Board, at least during early Qing times. None of the other Qing institutions was a Manchu-Mongol-managed institution either. Hence, the "Lifanyuan's daily working routines required language

TABLE 1.1 *Nationality ratio of Libu and Lifanyuan officials*[31]

	Libu	Lifanyuan
Number of officials	98	177[a]
Manchu	73	64
Mongol	4	100
Chinese bannermen	5	6
Han Chinese	16	—
No nationality given	—	7

a A number of one hundred seventy-two was calculated by Li Pengnian, see: *Qingdai zhongyang guojia jiguan gaishu*, ed. Li Pengnian et al. (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 1989), 227–9.

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[28] *Qinghuidian*, vol. 26, p. 1a.

[29] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 114, pp. 3279–80.

[30] Ibid., vol. 115, pp. 3297–8.

[31] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 114, *Zhi* 89 "*Zhiguan* 1 Libu" and vol. 115, *zhi* 90, "*zhiguan* 2" Lifanyuan.

abilities,"[32] as was stated by Yongzheng's Lifanyuan Minister Tegut. Language qualifications included Mongolian and, in addition, translations between Mongolian and Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese, and Mongolian and Tibetan languages. A large number of Manchu and Mongol translators and interpreters were therefore recruited after being trained and examined by the Lifanyuan. To respond to the request of Tegut to recruit qualified personnel with specific language skills, Emperor Yongzheng assigned the Lifanyuan and the Board of Appointments to promote and supervise language examinations. The two institutions jointly appointed Manchu and Mongol degree holders to official posts, mainly for the Lifanyuan but also for other Boards.[33]

3 Institutional Structure and Distinct Functions of Lifanyuan and Libu

From the Libu administration of the Ming dynasty the Qing Libu adopted four bureaus: for Ritual Regulations (*Yizhi*), for Worshipping (*Jisi*), for Receiving External Guests (*Zhuke*), and for Imperial Banquets and Ritual Food (*Jingshan*).[34] These bureaus had formerly been concerned with the Chinese-centred ritual order but were now combining Chinese with Manchu ritual orders.[35] A typical example was the imperial worship at *Tangzi* which was the Manchu deity altar and extremely important for the Manchu imperial family according to their tradition. The Mongols with noble status and tribute envoys of the upper ranks were invited to join this Manchu ritual on certain occasions. Even though the Libu was entitled to function as the ritual host, it was Lifanyuan officials who led the guests from Inner Asia through the ritual procedure, while Libu officials directed the Korean and other non-Inner Asian envoys separately.[36]

Unlike the Libu whose composition was fixed in pre-Qing times and remained unchanged, the Lifanyuan's structure was under constant adjustment and reconstruction as a result of Qing expansion in Inner Asia. As early as in 1661 the Lifanyuan was reorganized from a single office into an agency with four bureaus, each of which had specified responsibilities (*Qinglisi*):

- the Honours Bureau (*Luxunsi*) which entitled and promoted Inner Mongol nobles to the banner system
- the Reception Bureau (*Binkesi*) for the reception of Inner Mongols coming to the court
- the Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Rouyuansi*) for Khalkha Mongol affairs
- the Judicial Bureau (*Lixingsi*) for legal control over all Mongolian banners.[37]

When Khalkha Mongolia had become part of the Empire in 1691, the Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau was split into two: the Front Office (*Rouyuan qiansi*) and the Rear Office (*Rouyuan housi*). In 1757, the Honours Bureau was renamed Outer Mongolian Bureau (*Dianshusi*), the Reception Bureau became the Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Wanghuisi*), the Rear Office the Inner Mongolian Bureau (*Qijisi*), and the Front Office was renamed Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau. When Xinjiang was incorporated in 1759, the Qing government immediately adjusted the structure once more. Under Emperor Qianlong's instruction, an Eastern Turkistan Bureau (*Laiyuansi*) was added, a Chinese expression that literally meant: Bureau for Peoples Coming from Afar. After some minor changes between 1761 and 1764, the structure of the Lifanyuan with its six bureaus finally remained unchanged for the rest of the dynasty.[38]

Within the legal domain, the Lifanyuan and Libu displayed distinct functions as well. The Libu always had a weighty voice in matters of morality-based promotion or punishment but was never a legal executive agency. Once the emperor had approved of the Libu's recommendation about someone's moral merits or breaches, the Board of Appointments would carry out the promotion or the Board of Punishment would take legal action. The Lifanyuan's Judicial Bureau, however, exerted immediate legal authority in Inner Asia. When pronouncing a sentence to the Mongols, Emperor Shunzhi once reprimanded the Lifanyuan for not carefully enough practicing the Legal Regulations (*Dapitiaoli*) compiled by the Deliberative Assembly (*Yizhengwang tachen*) on the nineteenth day of the ninth month of 1658. He instructed the Ministers of the Deliberative Assembly to review the case and revise the sentence.[39]

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[32] *Shizongxian huangdi shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), vol. 73, p. 9b.

[33] Ibid., 9b–10b.

[34] For detailed information see the table "Libu and Lifanyuan: Institutional Structure and Responsibilities" at the end of my chapter "Lifanyuan and Libu in the Qing Tribute System" in this volume.

[35] Lin Yaoyu, *Libu zhigao* (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1934); *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong* (Changsha: Hannan chubanshe, 2000); *Daoguang chao qinding libu zeli erzhong* (Changsha: Hannan chubanshe, 2000) and Ji Yun, *Lidai guanzhi nianbiao* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1993), vol. 9, p. 7a.

[36] *Qianlong chao qinding Libu zeli*, vol. 99, p. 1a and vol. 107, pp. 1a–2b.

[37] Wang Xianqian, *Donghualu* (Shanghai: Jishan shuchu, 1894), Kangxi vol. 7, p. 24b and vol. 10, pp. 4a–b; *Qingshigao jiaozhu*, ed. Taiwan guoshiguan (Taiwan: Xinxing shuji, 1986), vol. 122, p. 3284; *Daqing lichao shilu* (Taiwan: Xinwenfeng chuban gongsi, 1978), 2. *Qingdai zhongyang guojia jiguan gaishu*, p. 227 (*Guangxu huidian shihli*, vol. 20).

[38] *Qingshigao jiaozhu*, vol. 122, pp. 3283–4.

As soon as the Mongol banners were established, the Manchu court designed periodical league meetings (*Huimeng*) that were to deal with legal affairs under Lifanyuan supervision. Lifanyuan officials attended the league meetings, usually once every three years, and guided legal judgement by following both Mongol traditions and Qing regulations. To fulfil its legal responsibilities, the Lifanyuan compiled the *Lifanyuan Regulations* and was instrumental in setting up the *Mongol Statutes and Precedents* (*Menggu lüli*), the *Muslim Statutes and Precedents* (*Huijiang zeli*), the *Fan Statutes and Precedents of Qinghai* (*Qinghai fanzi lüli*),[40] the *Fanze Tusi Statutes and Precedents* (*Fanzi tusi zeli*),[41] and the *Tibetan Gazetteer* (*Xizang tongzhi*) which was, at least partly, a legal document.[42] The effectiveness of these legal documents in Lifanyuan practices could vary and depended on the region. But with regard to legal authority, a great difference existed between Lifanyuan and Libu.

In fulfilling its functions to enforce Chinese moral order, the Libu was in close cooperation with the Board of Appointments for promoting moral officials, with the Board of Revenue for providing disaster relief, the Board of Public Works for implementing temple building, and the Board of Punishments for calling a halt to immoral actions and behaviour. The Lifanyuan, in contrast, largely relied on itself in dealing with all kinds of duties that went along with governing Inner Asia. Its responsibilities covered those duties jointly fulfilled by the Six Boards for 'China Proper': administrating official appointments, economic arrangements, revenue management, military mobilization, social organization, legal regulation, market and public works supervision, and more. As time went by, however, the Lifanyuan and the Six Boards became increasingly involved in cooperation. The Lifanyuan was in need of some joint official procedures, for example with the Board of Appointments for awarding official titles, with the Board of Revenue for issuing salaries and disaster relief, and

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[39] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, p. 1992.

[40] Fanmin xunchang mingdao'an rengzhao fanli banli yuan'an, in *Zhongguo zhenxi falu dianji jicheng* (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1994), 379; Zhou Xiwu, *Yushu Qinghai diaochaji* (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 1986), 117; Chia Ning, "Cong zhongguo zhenxi falü dianji jicheng zhong xining Qinghai fanyi chengli kan shaoshu minzu dianji dui shixue zhuanti de yanjiu jiazhi," in *Collection of The Third International Conference on Historical China Studies*, ed. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (Shanghai: Shanghai remin chubanshe, 2009).

[41] *Qinghuidian*, vol. 68, see under Lixingsi.

[42] For a discussion of these legal documents, see Shi Yun, *Minu shiwu guanli zhidu* (Changchun: Jilin jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), chapters 2 and 3.

with the Board of Military for military actions. Overall, however, official duties in Qing Inner Asia remained very much under the Lifanyuan's own authority.

4 Managing Moral Orders, Education & Examinations, Rules of Propriety

Lifanyuan and Libu cooperated in various official routines to govern the multinational and multi-cultural Qing empire. Aspects of early Qing statecraft demonstrate that previous Chinese institutional traditions and the various traditions of Inner Asian polities were neither abolished nor replicated but modified; this resulted in the establishment of new center-periphery connections and gave rise to specific forms of cooperation between the two agencies.

Continuing its long pre-Qing tradition, the Qing Libu's role as the imperial authority for moral control referred to five Chinese ritual orders.[43] Since education was viewed as the foundation of moral order and knowledge of morality was meticulously tested by examinations, Libu duties included the implementation of school education and imperial examination. These duties were expanded into Inner Asia through the adoption of Chinese-style examinations. At a local level, the post-1644 Lifanyuan was fully in charge of banner language schools, inter-language translations, and mutual-language examinations. In 1723, for example, Emperor Yongzheng instructed all Mongol banners to establish 'official studies' (*Guanxue*), for which the Board of Appointments together with the Lifanyuan assigned Mongolians with a gift for languages as assistant teachers. According to that instruction, educated bannermen could take an examination for a position as writing clerk and later work for governmental offices.[44] In 1731, Yongzheng instructed the *Neige* to save the Mongol elite from forgetting their own language by offering the Manchu language examination as a model. Mongol language examinations were to be held as frequently as Han examinations. He encouraged Mongol degree holders to go for the provincial (*Juren*) and the imperial degree (*Jinshi*). All these affairs were managed by the Lifanyuan, and degree holders could immediately begin to work for it.[45] In another case, Yongzheng instructed the Lifanyuan and the Grand Secretary (*Daxueshi*) to work together in the banner education for the purpose of raising more degree holders. In addition to Mongolian and Manchu translations, Emperor Yongzheng instructed the Lifanyuan to hold Tibetan language examinations and, consequently, to appoint officials with Tibetan translation skills.[46] Inside the Forbidden City, the Lifanyuan was fully in charge of running Mongolian and Western Mongolian (called 'Tuote,' i.e. *Tödö* or 'clear' script) studies. Students would later work in the Banner Academy (*Baqi xuetang*) for Manchu-Mongol language training. Some of them would also be employed at the Board of Appointments to give government positions to language degree holders. Lifanyuan officials with language excellence were selected by the Libu to grade language and translation examinations.[47]

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[43] See also the discussion in Zhang Yongjiang's chapter in this volume.

[44] *Shizongxian huangdi shilu*, vol. 13, p. 26b.

[45] Ibid., vol. 105, pp. 20b–21a.

Following Ming traditions, the surveillance of ritual protocols for those inside the empire or related to the court was a preeminent task of the Qing Libu. Evelyn Rawski rightly emphasises the significance of rituals, which, in her view, "are the major device by which rulers and ritual specialists attempt to legitimate political systems by fusing potent cultural symbols into a sequence of gesture, music, and voiced utterances that stirs our emotions."[48] When Emperor Shunzhi held a ritual for presenting his mother with a respectful title in the first month of 1651, he justified this by stating that he was following the rules of propriety (*Lizhi*).[49] These rules dominated almost all court rituals, which, first of all, legitimized the emperor's enthronement and the status of imperial family members (empress dowager, empress, emperor's wives of high ranks, the imperial heir apparent, the emperor's other sons and daughters, etc.).[50] Court rituals endorsed the emperor's worship of Heaven, Earth, Agriculture, Confucius, Ancestors, and Mountain deities according to the Chinese belief system. They also lent approval to the completion of the most important imperial documentation such as the Veritable Records (*Shilu*), the Emperor's Commandments (*Shengxun*), and the Imperial Genealogy (*Yudie*).[51] The Inner Asian nobles were included in these ritual ceremonies, which were the most important official routine for their integration into the Qing ruling circle. However, all practical arrangements were made by the Lifanyuan. From the compilation of the audience list to assembling the participants, the Lifanyuan directed the Inner Asian elites who were engaged in the ritual

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[46] Ibid., vol. 73, pp. 9b–10b and *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*, 5319, 5381, 5445–47.

[47] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 1, juan 50, pp. 4b and 21a, and *Libu zeli*, vol. 52, pp. 6a–b.

[48] Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1998), 197.

[49] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 3, p. 1365.

[50] Lin Yaoyu, *Libu zhigao*, vols. 1–5 and *Libu zeli*, vols. 13–19.

[51] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 182, pp. 1a–2a and *Libu zeli*, vol. 10, pp. 26a–27b.

procedure.[52] An essential part of Qing ritual orders was thus maintained by the Lifanyuan, in cooperation with the Libu.

The rules of propriety also included ritual items that people of noble status should use, greeting styles that people of different status should follow, and stone steles produced by the court for recording significant historical events. Libu regulations for the ritual items, such as carts, flags, drums, fans, and weapons, included those of the Mongol elite, too.[53] When Mongol nobles came to the capital and met with Manchu nobles of various ranks, the greeting manner and behaviour were standardized for each rank.[54] Erecting steles and performing the inscription on stone tablets had been a Chinese tradition for a long time. During the Qing expansion in Inner Asia, the government erected steles for every region and every major event. The Libu documents record steles for the 'Great Learning' (*Taixue*) section, which was the highest Confucian academy in Chinese tradition since Han Wudi (141–87 BCE), for the submission of Qinghai in 1725 and of Jinchuan in 1755, for the subjection of the Zünghars in 1757, for the annexation of Ili in 1758, and for the victories over the Huibu (Muslims) in 1759 and the Daxiao Jinchuan in 1776.[55] The Libu was thus also involved in Inner Asian governing affairs based on requirements that were defined by Chinese cultural traditions.

To the Chinese of 'China Proper,' the Libu was of even greater importance. Family relationships based on Confucian filial piety, ritual worship, food etiquette, and banquet protocols for marriages, funerals, festivals, naming the family inheritor, etc.—all these practices belonged to the realm of propriety and Libu-surveyed moral order.[56] The peoples of Inner Asia had, of course, their own traditions in all these aspects of cultural life, to which the Lifanyuan adapted its regulations in line with each people's cultural heritage.[57] Whenever Inner Asians were part of the ritual court audience and a particular Inner Asian traditional ritual or etiquette was to be performed, the Lifanyuan communicated the matter to the emperor. Upon the emperor's instruction, the Libu then supervised the proper performance of these customs according to the suggestions of the Lifanyuan. Inner Asian ritual rules and etiquette were thus performed in the name of Chinese rules of propriety but served the particular needs of those coming from the Inner Asian periphery of the empire.[58]

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[52] For details see Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals".

[53] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 33, p. 4b.

[54] Ibid., vol. 35, pp. 1a–3a.

[55] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 39, p. 3a.

[56] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 114, p. 3280.

[57] *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli*, 37–8.

The management of the official seals also belonged to the rules of propriety. Since official seals were regarded as the utmost political symbol of imperial authority with both great ritual significance and operational power, the Libu supervised the engraving of new seals and the returning of old seals, which was important to keep bureaucracy under court control. The correct use of the calendar, which was a matter of following the will of Heaven, and the relief from natural disaster, which demonstrated Confucian moral benevolence on the part of the government towards the common people, also fell into the Libu's surveillance of moral orders.[59] Positioned beyond the Chinese cultural world, the Lifanyuan served as the official link between Inner Asia and the Chinese moral order in all these affairs. As the Libu issued the court-approved calendar (*Shixianshu*) to the Chinese, the Lifanyuan did the same for Inner Asians.[60] As the court carried out relief actions for the Chinese population based on Libu suggestions and processed by the Board of Revenue, the Lifanyuan managed the complete disaster relief in Inner Asia: it reported the problem, inspected the degree of the disaster, decided on relief methods, and issued the relief itself.[61] On all these matters, the Lifanyuan and Libu reported to the emperor separately according to their lines of administration but cooperated on the level of imperial governance.

5 Administering Religious Life

The Libu directed Chinese practices of Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and folk beliefs, which were considered a core part of the empire's moral order. The religious affairs of Inner Asian peoples, first of all Tibetan Buddhism but later also Islam after the Xinjiang Muslims had become part of the empire, belonged to the Lifanyuan's administrative sphere. In 1651, Emperor Shunzhi clearly defined the separate responsibilities of Lifanyuan and Libu in religious life. According to his instructions, the Libu was to regulate the Buddhist and Daoist clergies and suggest the necessary punishment for those who did not dress properly, for instance Chinese Buddhist monks (*Sengren*) or Daoist priests (*Daoshi*) who dressed like Tibetan lamas. The Lifanyuan, in turn, was

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[58] *Libu zeli*, vol. 201, p. 4a.

[59] Lin Yaoyu, *Libu zhigao* and *Libu zeli*.

[60] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 135, pp. 1a–3a and 5b.

[61] Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan of the Early Qing Dynasty," chapter 8.

to limit the number of disciples in the Tibetan Buddhist temples surrounding Beijing and to ban women from worshiping there unless accompanied by their husbands. The emperor authorized the Lifanyuan to discipline those lamas who violated the rules.[62] In the third month of 1659, the banner heads from Guihua City (Hohhot) petitioned to the court for recognition of their third Shireet Khutugtu (*Khutagt*) who had just been reincarnated. The petition was sent by the Lifanyuan to Emperor Shunzhi asking him for instructions. In the same month, the Libu was instructed by the emperor to prepare for his and the empress dowager's worship of the Manchu ancestors at the New Year ritual.[63] A clear line was drawn between the Libu's responsibility for court rituals and Chinese religious affairs on the one side and the Lifanyuan's management of religious affairs in Inner Asia on the other.

There were cases when Lifanyuan and Libu worked hand in hand but with separate tasks and representatives. In 1652, when the Lifanyuan vice minister as the highest court official was sent to welcome the Dalai Lama on his way to Beijing, the Libu took care of the welcome protocol upon the Dalai Lama's arrival at court.[64] On the Dalai Lama's return journey, the Libu minister and the Lifanyuan vice minister went to Daiga in present-day Inner Mongolia where they jointly presented a golden certificate and a golden seal to him on behalf of Emperor Shunzhi.[65] In 1659, the Lifanyuan mediated the communication between the court and the Dalai Lama, and it was again the Libu that received the Dalai Lama's envoys once they arrived at the court.[66]

In 1655, Emperor Shunzhi received a proposal from Bandi, the Grand Nomin Khan (or *Fawang*, a Chinese religious title), who was the Tibetan Buddhist master resident in Beijing. The proposal was about raising financial supplies at court for worship at the Tibetan Buddhist temples in Beijing, in the Tangut region and the Wutai Mountains, and in Shengjing (Mukden). The emperor forwarded the matter to the Grand Minister of the Imperial Household Department (*Neitachen*) and to the Lifanyuan for discussion. A point of concern was the Libu's responsibility for providing food supplies to these temples,[67] showing that this agency was involved in Tibetan Buddhism without, however, having a decision-making position. When the Grand Nomin Khan soon after requested to be released from official duties and to leave Beijing for Inner

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[62] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, pp. 1530–1.

[63] Ibid., 2020.

[64] *Qingshilu zangzu shiliao*, vol. 1, p. 17.

[65] Ibid., 25 and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, p. 1591.

[66] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, p. 1377.

[67] Ibid., 1909.

Mongolia due to his health, the emperor again turned the matter to the Grand Minister and the Lifanyuan, without the Libu being involved.[68]

6 Dispatching Court Rituals

Already in the time of Hūwangtaiji's reign, in-law Mongol families of the emperor inevitably became participants in many important Manchu court rituals,[69] given the fact that Hūwangtaiji's five principal wives were all Mongol and there was much intermarriage between his close family members and Mongol women.[70] Under Shunzhi, more and more Inner Asian nobles joined these rituals, establishing vital ties between centre and periphery. The Libu, being in charge of the court's ritual management, relied on the Lifanyuan's services in registering Mongolian in-law nobles before inviting them to the court.[71] The major court rituals included the Court Greetings (*Chaohe*) in which all court officials performed as an audience to greet the emperor,[72] the Edict Issuing (*Banzhao*) in which the emperor released the most important edicts,[73] the New Year's celebration[74] with guests from Inner Asia and tribute envoys from all directions, the Imperial Banquet (*Lidian*) for Inner Asian guests, and the marriages and funerals of the imperial family members.[75] These rituals afforded an opportunity to assemble imperial family members, Manchu officials, Inner Asians, Han Chinese officials, and tribute envoys from other countries, all of whom could hardly meet at any other place or occasion. In these ritual procedures, it was the Lifanyuan that directed the participants from Inner Asia to their appropriate places in the proper manner while the Libu was directing all other participants, as at the wedding ceremony for emperor Qianlong's daughter, Princess Hejing (*1731 †1792), and her in-law families from the Mongolian Borjigid clan.[76]

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[68] Ibid., 1871.

[69] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, 2:4a, vol. 3, p. 4b, and 267:9b, and *Daoguang chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, 5:6a–b and193:5a.

[70] Du Jiaji, *Qingchao manmeng lianyin yenjiu* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003).

[71] *Daoguang chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 5, p. 6a.

[72] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vols. 1–2 and 3, pp. 4a–b, and *Libu zeli*, vol. 2, pp. 4b and 5a–b.

[73] *Libu zeli* vol. 2, p. 5a and vol. 12, p. 1b.

[74] *Libu zeli*, vol. 198, pp. 1a–3b.

[75] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vols. 142–7 and 184–8, and Qianlong chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, 14.

[76] *Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli erzhong*, vol. 22, pp. 25a and 26b.

Whenever a nation of Inner Asia became part of the Qing Empire, the Libu documented the regulations pertaining to their elite's ritual duties and the Lifanyuan organized the performance of such duties by arranging their rotation in annual turns. To this end the Lifanyuan provided background information to rank the ritual status of the nobles, issued financial aid and journey assistance for their travel to the court, accommodated their stay in the capital, accompanied them through the court rituals with the appropriate clothing and etiquette, and translated their documents to other court offices.[77] For Inner Asian guests, a participation in the Libu-hosted rituals without consulting the Lifanyuan was simply impossible. When the ceremonies were over, it was again the Lifanyuan that kept the records of the annual turns, status and titles of the participants, gifts presented and granted, names and families in the Manchu-Mongol marriages, and the genealogical documentation of the participants. These records served the emperor and the court as first-hand reference aid for later decisions regarding the ritual status and official appointments of the Inner Asian nobility.

7 Governing Local Communities

Below court level, the Lifanyuan nominated local officials in Inner Asia, processed their appointments after approval by the court, bridged the communication between periphery and the centre, and was instrumental in solving any kind of problems.[78] For example, a Taiji from Qinghai once came to the court and complained about difficulties in transportation and the lack of food supplies in west Xining. Emperor Shunzhi immediately instructed the Lifanyuan to discuss the issue and to come up with a solution.[79] In 1661, the Libu reported on a drought affecting the population of 'China Proper' and suggested to Emperor Shunzhi that new temples be built in the names of famous mountains, rivers, and ancient sages in order to appease Heaven's will for better weather.[80] In the same year the Lifanyuan informed the emperor about Khalkha affairs and received permission to announce that when the Khalkha khans come to the court to pay the 'Nine Whites' (a fixed form of tribute), the Beile (prince of the third rank) and the upper rank Taijis who managed the banner affairs were allowed to serve as tribute envoys. Lower rank Taijis and lamas, however, did not have the appropriate status for such privilege.[81] These two reports clearly reflect how local communities and populations of 'China Proper' and Inner Asia were differently governed by the two agencies.

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[77] *Libu zeli*, vol. 4, pp. 8a–9b and vol. 198, pp. 1a–3b.

[78] *Qinding lifanbu zeli* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguab suowei wenxian fuzhi zhongxin, 1992), see "General directory 1" [Tongli xia 通例上], "General directory 2" [Tongli xia 通例下], and the "Catalog" [Mulu 目录].

[79] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, p. 1910.

[80] Ibid., 2103.

The Lifanyuan routinely sent officials to Inner Asia to carry out various administrative operations, such as household registration, pastureland demarcation, market openings, tax collection, disaster relief, transportation management, public project setup, awarding of titles to nobles and officials, inheritance of titles and property, supervision of the Mongol league meetings, resolution of disputes and legal cases, maintenance of the social order, genealogical record keeping, important wedding celebrations, important funeral attendance, land and livestock management, post station operation, ritual duties at the court with annual turns, and military mobilization in war situations.[82] The emperor could initiate special investigations and sent Lifanyuan officials to meet Inner Asian leaders, in order to inspect and deal with local incidents, judge critical legal cases, negotiate relationships or plan military expeditions.[83]

As in the cases discussed above, the Libu again shared some Inner Asia-related responsibilities in governing local communities, even though indirectly and from a court-centred point of view. On the thirteenth day of the first month of Qianlong's 28th year (1764), for instance, the emperor reprimanded the Libu Minister for not having listed some recently appointed *Begs* from Xinjiang in a document that was apparently important. Emperor Qianlong insisted that the names of Emin Khōja (Emin Khwāja 额敏和卓), a prominent Muslim leader from Turfan and long-time Qing ally, and Yusuf (or Yusubu 玉素卜), who served in Hami as Jasag, be included.[84] In another letter from the following month the emperor instructed the Libu minister that Muslim *Begs* below the fifth rank (*Pin*) no longer be asked to come to the capital for pilgrimage.[85] Qianlong's letters to the Lifanyuan minister dating from the same time, on the other hand, addressed top political and administrative matters for Xinjiang and beyond: the reception of the envoy from Aiwuhan in present-day Afghanistan and his invitation to Yarkant,[86] the command of local military affairs,[87] local affairs regarding Emin Khōja,[88] and the latter's report to the court concerning the situation in the region.[89] Again, it becomes clear from this that Lifanyuan and Libu did have separate communication lines with the emperor and were put in charge of different governing tasks.

8 Shaping Geopolitical and Mental Maps

When Inner Asia became an integral part of the Qing Empire, a Chinese concept of frontier emerged, termed 'frontier defence' (*Bianfang*), which according to the *Regulations of the Board of Appointments* (Guangxu edition from 1887) actually defined three regions distinct from other parts of Inner Asia:

1. the Miao frontiers in Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Guangxi[90]
2. the regions of the 'cooked' and 'uncooked' aborigines (*Fan*) in Taiwan[91] and
3. the Tusi and Tuguan regions managed by indigenous elites (officials) in Hunan and Guangxi.[92]

In the time of Qianlong and Jiaqing,[93] the regions under the responsibility of the Lifanyuan—Inner and Khalkha Mongolia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet—were referred to and recorded as such without any association with the 'frontier defence' category.

Further institutional differentiation and divisions were found in regions with a culturally mixed population: the Lifanyuan was responsible for nomadic communities associated with Inner Asia, while the Board of Appointments was in charge of non-Chinese populations associated with agriculture. In Yunnan, for example, Tibetans were governed by their Tusi administration under Lifanyuan supervision, while the Tusi administration of the Miao was supervised by the Board of Appointments. With regard to Xinjiang, the Zünghar Mongols in the North, the Muslims under their *Begs* in the South, and the banners in Hami and Turfan in the East all belonged to the Lifanyuan sphere of administration. But when Xinjiang became a place for exiled Han Chinese criminals, disciplinary measures against officials who were not able to prevent the flight of such Han residents from exile were carried out by the Board of Appointments.[94] Such a division of functions further strengthened the Lifanyuan's role in governing the nations and communities of Inner Asia, be they nomadic or urban.

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[81] Ibid., 2116.

[82] *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli*, pp. 8, 12–3, 19–20, 26–9, 37–45, 51–5, and 62–5; *Daqing lichao shilu*, Gaozong, vol. 635, pp. 23–4.

[83] *Daching shichao shengxun* (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, Shengzu, 1965), 42.

[84] Wang Xiaohong and Guan Xiaolian, *Qianlongchao manwen jixindang yibian* (Changsha: Yulushushe, 2010), vol. 4, no. 413, pp. 471–2.

[85] Ibid., vol. 4, no. 429, p. 483.

[86] Ibid., vol. 4, no. 408, p. 469.

[87] Ibid., vol. 4, no. 410, pp. 470–1.

[88] Ibid., vol. 4, no. 411, pp. 471–2.

[89] Ibid., vol. 4, no. 345, 486 and no. 487, p. 487. See also the discussion in Song Tong's and Laura Hostetler's chapters in this volume.

[90] *Libu zeli*, vol. 40, pp. 1a–3b, 7a–8a, and 17b–18a.

[91] Ibid., 18a–b.

[92] Ibid., 4a–12a.

[93] *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi*, see "Guide to the reader" (*fanli* 凡例) and "Catalogue" (*mulu* 目录).

With all these institutional and administrative settings that reflect Qing expansion since the early 17th century, the political map of the empire became radically different from that of Ming times, opening up into all directions beyond the Great Wall. Ming emperors, lacking military success and administrative infrastructure in Inner Asia, could not even think of including this part into China's political and mental maps. The Qing, in contrast, as a result of early alliance-building with the Mongols and the desire to gradually establish control over Inner Asia, successfully established a unique administration by which the empire could lay a lasting claim on most of Inner Asia.[95] Given the broad variety of administrative duties, the Lifanyuan served as a major informant for the editors of the *Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Qing*, which impressively illustrates the political and mental map of Qianlong's reign. There was simply no Qing institution other than the Lifanyuan able to offer detailed information on Inner Asia, derived from all sorts of sources.

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[94] *Libu zeli*, vol. 40, pp. 17a–b.

[95] *The Cambridge History of China: the Ch'ing Empire to 1800*, vol. 9,1, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), map 1, iv; *The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911,* vol. 10,1, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), map 1, xii; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1999), map "Qing Empire Boundaries in the Qianlong Period, 1736–95"; Mark Elliott, *Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 2009), map "The Qing Empire ca. 1780", 15; Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), map "The Qing, c. 1820, Showing Guizhou Province", 103; Rawski, *Last Emperors*, map "The Qing empire, circa 1820"; William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), map "The Qing Empire, 1800"; Conrad Schirokauer and Donald Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), figure 2.1 „The Qing Empire, 1775", 23; Nicola Di Cosmo, "The Qing and Inner Asia: 1636–1800," in: *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 343, 354–62.

4 Conclusion

This essay on two Qing governing institutions—Lifanyuan and Libu—shows their political and administrative impact on Qing empire building from its early formation to later imperial expansion. It highlights that institution-building at the court and at the periphery went hand in hand in all territories incorporated by the Qing. Taking a look at institutional history enhances our understanding not only of Qing statecraft but, above all, of the mechanism of internal integration in Inner Asia. A focus on administrative procedures, duties, and responsibilities shows the system at work and reveals institutional operations; the examination of these factors provides insights into Qing governance over communities with various cultural and social backgrounds.

By inventing and developing the Lifanyuan as a central agency for Inner Asia, the Qing replaced the Libu (Board of Rites) that was formerly the primary responsible institution for relations with Inner Asia. While the Lifanyuan implemented a new mechanism of governance for a non-Chinese region, the Libu continued and promoted Ming traditions and thus preserved China's heritage. Showing a considerable degree of administrative divergence, both institutions did, however, cooperate in separate or related operations to carry out imperial instructions. Together, the newly founded Lifanyuan and the reoriented Libu played a central role in the Qing transformation of the Ming government represented by selective continuity, profound changes, and functional differentiations with significant effects on cultural and spatial categorisation even in modern China.

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CHAPTER 2

The Lifanyuan: A Review Based on New Sources and Traditional Historiography

Michael Weiers

1 On the Manchu and Mongol Origins of the Lifanyuan

The establishment of the Mongol Office[1] and its transformation into an agency, which the Chinese called Lifanyuan (Court for the Regulations of the Frontier),[2] was organized by Hūwangtaiji of the Jurchen (Jušen)-Manchu Aisin Gioro clan in 1638. This clan belonged ethnically to a Tungusic group referred to as Jianzhou Nuzhen (建洲女真) by Chinese chroniclers. They were sedentary agriculturalists living around the area northeast of the Yalu River.[3] Consequently, both the Mongol Office and the Lifanyuan were institutions of non-Chinese origin.

The Nuzhen (女真) had been very well known to the Chinese for a long time. Under the leadership of Aguda (*1068 †1123), who in 1115 had proclaimed (in 1117 he was entitled Dasheng 大聖, 'Great Sage') a dynasty called Jin (Gold[en]) by Chinese chroniclers, they conquered the northern territories of the Chinese Great Song (*Da Song*) dynasty—the Northern Song in later historical records. This conquest divided China in two parts—the Southern Song in the South and the Jin dynasty in the North—and was the turning point from a politically free and independent China to a country divided and ultimately governed by the Mongols from 1279 to 1368.

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[1] Mo. *mongγol-un yabudal-un yamun* (Court for the Affairs of the Mongols); ma. *monggo yamun*; chin. *menggu yamen* (Court for the Mongols). For the original contemporary Mongolian term for the Mongol Office, see *Čing ulus-un dotoγadu narin bičig-ün yamun-u Mongγol dangsa ebkemel-ün emkidkel*, eds. Čimeddorǰi et al. (Öbör mongγol-un arad-un keblel-ün qoriy-a: 2003), vol. 1, p. 181, fol. 0035:4–7 (in the following abbreviated as MDEE; facsimiles of 1,067 compiled Mongolian text copies covering the years of 1636–1638, 1640–1660, 1662–1667, and 1669–1670. The whereabouts of the originals are unknown).

[2] For the term *Li* (regulations) see Ulrich Unger, *Grundbegriffe der altchinesischen Philosophie: Ein Wörterbuch für die klassische Periode* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2000), 55–6. Chin. *Fan* (frontier) means borderland with a population of mostly non-Chinese culture and civilization. This court's name is in mo. *γadaγadu mongγol törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun* (Court for the Affairs Regulating the Outer Mongolian Government).

[3] Their full name is: *Zuo jianzhou nuzhen* 左建洲女真 (Nuzhen of the left established community), see *Huang Ming Jiubiankao*, ed. Wei Huan (Huawen shuju, 1968), 2, 15b (in the following abbreviated as HMJ).

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With the establishment of the Chinese Ming (Enlightened) dynasty, China regained its independency. The first emperors tried to pacify the Mongolian and Nuzhen neighbours to the north. When this endeavour failed and the Oirat Mongols attacked China, and when Esen Taishi (1440–1455) made the Zhengtong Emperor (1435–1449) a prisoner during the battle of Tumu in 1449, Ming China decided to build a wall in order to keep out the 'Barbarians' (*Yi*) of the north and northeast. As a result, Ming China got less and less information about events in the territories *extra muros* (beyond the walls), and did not notice that during the last decade of the 16th and first decade of the 17th century, a member of the Aisin Gioro clan of the Jianzhou Nuzhen by the name of Nurhaci (*1559 †1626) was very successful in his marriage politics with the Mongols and in unifying the different groups of the Nuzhen, who at that time called themselves Jušen (mo. J̌ürčen, pl. J̌ürčed).[4]

In February, 1616, Nurhaci established a Nuzhen-Mongolian state which, in reference to their Nuzhen ancestors and to the former Jin dynasty of the 12th and 13th century, was called Aisin gurun (Gold State). From its outset, the state struggled not only against the Mongols who were not allied with the Nuzhen, but also against Ming China whose power was rapidly dwindling at that time. Nonetheless, the Ming court looked upon the Aisin as rebels disobedient to China and as robbers. Under the leadership of Hūwangtaiji, Nurhaci's eighth son and successor, the Aisin state's continuously increasing power and influence induced many Mongols, as well as some peoples in Ming China, to join the Aisin. After a successful campaign against the Mongols in 1632, the Nuzhen changed their ethnic name into Manchu in 1635, and in early 1636 most of the Mongols living in the neighbourhood of the Aisin decided to place themselves under Manchurian rule. It was in consequence of this surrender to the Manchurian Aisin state that the Mongol Office was founded. On May 19th, 1636, Hūwangtaiji proclaimed a new dynasty called Qing (Clear, Pure), modelled on the example of Chinese dynasties. The Manchurian device '*Wesihun erdemungge*' (Provided with Superior Effectiveness) was the name of his reign.[5]

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[4] For this name see Henry Serruys, *Sino-J̌ürčed Relations during the Yung-lo Period (1403–1424)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1955), VII, note 1.

[5] Mo. *Degedü erdemtü*; chin. *Chongde* 崇德. On the foundation of the Qing Dynasty, based on contemporaneous original *Dangse* material, see Britta-Maria Gruber, *Zur Entwicklung der Herrschaft im Aisin-Staat, 1616–1636* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 129–138.

The Chinese Ming never recognized the newly founded dynasty as a legitimate government. Hence, the Lifanyuan, established as an offspring of the Mongol Office, existed as a parallel non-Chinese institution concurrently with the Chinese Libu. Only the Libu, however, was acknowledged in the Chinese Court during the period of the so-called Southern Ming as a legitimate Chinese ministry. The Lifanyuan performed some of the functions of the Libu.

2 The Development and Consolidation of the Lifanyuan

If we look at the definition suggested by sinologist Charles Hucker for the Lifanyuan, we read that it was "... a top-echelon agency in the central government managing relations with the Mongols, Tibet, Kokonor [Kökenuur], and tribal chiefs of Eastern Turkistan; organized like a Ministry (*Pu*) and headed by a Minister..."[6] However, such a characterization of the Lifanyuan may be acceptable only for the time after 1764 when the organization of that office was already completed. Beginning in the year of 1638 and the 130 years that followed, Hucker's definition is not entirely correct. If we consider the Qing dynasty's political and economic stages of development between 1638 and 1764, the organization and structure of the Lifanyuan must have been deeply influenced by these, and subject to several profound changes.

The first important stage of development is marked by the additional incorporation of Mongolian tribes living west of the Khingan Mountain Range into the Qing state and the establishment of relations with Tibet and the Oirat-Mongolian Khoshud in the West during the 1650s. As a result, in 1661 the Lifanyuan began to administrate the Mongols in four newly established bureaus: Bureau for Honours, Bureau for Receptions, Bureau for Outer Mongolian Receptions, and Bureau for Jurisdiction. Under the authority of the *Neige*, the Mongolian Hall (*Menggu tang*)[7] office was founded in 1670. It was in charge of drafting Manchurian and Mongolian documents and translating documents from the peoples of the northern and western frontier into the Manchurian and Mongolian languages.[8]

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[6] Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Taipei: Taiwan Edition, 1986), 304a, No. 3603.

[7] Ma. *monggo bithei ba* (Office of Mongolian Documents); mo. *mongγol bičig-ün ger* (Hall of Mongolian Documents).

[8] For a published collection of its documents, see *Daičing gürün-ü dotoγadu yamun-u mongγol bičig-ün ger-ün dangsa*, eds. J̌iγačidai Buyandelger and Borǰigidai Oyunbilig (Öbör

After the 'Revolt of the three Feudatories' (*Sanfan zhiluan*) in the early 1680s, the Qing government, according to hints in documents of the MMAD (see reference section), granted executive posts in the Lifanyuan to some Chinese ministers of the Libu as concurrent assignments until the 1720s. Events that had a political and economic impact on the Qing state, such as the treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia in 1689, the submission of the northern Khalkha Mongols in 1691, and the triumph over the Oirat-Mongolian army of Galdan Boshogtu Khan (1670–1697) in 1696 resulted in an internal reorganization of the Lifanyuan in the early 1700s. The former Bureau for Outer Mongolian Receptions was split in two: one Office for the Front and one for the Rear.[9] When war flared up again between the Qing state and the Zünghars[10] in the early 1710s, the Lifanyuan jointly with the Mongolian Hall became the center of official correspondence between the two warring sides.[11] With the beginning of Yongzheng's autocratic rule[12] in 1723, executive posts in the Lifanyuan were filled with Manchurian and Mongolian princes and dukes. In 1727, new territorial regulations such as the Leagues (*Čiγulγan*) for the so-called Inner Mongols were introduced.[13] The

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mongγol-un arad-un keblel-ün qoriy-a, 2005) (in the following abbreviated as MBGD; copies of texts covering the years of 1662–1795. The whereabouts of the originals are unknown).

[9] For official Manchurian and Mongolian documents of the Qing government that may provide evidence for this stage of development see MDEE and MBGD. See also *Daičing gürün-ü ekin üy-e-yin γadaγadu mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u manǰu mongγol ayiladγal-un debterüüd*, eds. Borǰigidai Oyunbilig et al. (Öbör mongγol-un arad-un keblel-ün qoriy-a, 2010) (in the following abbreviated as MMAD; 1,329 copies of Manchurian and Mongolian documents covering the years of 1653–1795 the originals of which do not exist anymore). *Gongzhong dang Kangxi chao zouzhe* (Taipei: National Palace Museum Shih-Lin, 1977) (in the following abbreviated as GDKZ; 539 and 201 Manchurian documents in facsimile). *Bayantala meng shi zi liaojicheng*, ed. Gō Minoru (Zhangjiakou: *Ōsaka Tanshiki insatsu kabushiki kaisha* [1942]) (in the following abbreviated as BMS; facsimiles of 286 Manchurian, Mongolian, and Chinese documents, many from the Lifanyuan, dated 1665 to 1931. It is not known where the originals of the facsimiles are being kept).

[10] Mo. *ǰegün γar* 'left wing', kh. *züün gar*, simplified: Zünghar.

[11] For Manchurian documents covering the years from 1715 to 1724 and referring particularly to the Qing-Zünghar war in the Kangxi and Yongzheng era, see Eva S. Kraft, *Zum Dsungarenkrieg im 18. Jahrhundert. Berichte des Generals Funingga* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1953) and *Qing dai zhunga'er shiliao chu bian, yi zhu*, trans. Zhuang Jifa (Taibei, 1977) (in the following abbreviated as QDZS).

[12] Pei Huang, *Autocracy at Work: A Study of the Yung-cheng Period, 1723–1735* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).

[13] Particulars are found in the documents of the Yongzheng period preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris); see below footnote 29.

tense political and military situation caused by Qing expeditions to the west in the late Kangxi (conquest of Lhasa in 1720) and during the Yongzheng era (expeditions conducted by the commander-in-chief Nian Gengyao 年羹尧 in Kökenuur, i.e. today's Qinghai province),[14] as well as the treaties of Bura and Kyakhta with Russia[15] in 1727, prompted the Qing government to install the Office for the Current Situation of the Army (ma. *Coohai nashūn-i ba*), i.e. the Office for Military Emergencies (*Junjichu*), in 1730.

During the Zünghar war, the increasing political power and importance of the *Junjichu* doubtlessly had a significant impact upon the Lifanyuan. However, the extent of this impact cannot be exactly specified until the rich Manchurian and Mongolian documental material of the Yongzheng[16] and Qianlong (乾隆)[17] eras, which has been published over the past decades, has been studied and examined. The special regulations concerning the Buddhist Church of the Dalai Lama in Xizang (Western Zang, i.e. Tibet),[18] which were modified in 1750–1751 and pushed the Tibetans and the Mongols of the Jibzundamba Khutugtu[19] and Jangjiya Khutugtu[20] into one single unit administered by the Lifanyuan, as well as the already predictable final military victory over the

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[14] *Nian Gengyao zouzhe* (Taipei: National Palace Museum Shih-Lin, 1971) (in the following abbreviated as NGYZ; 548 facsimiles of Manchurian and Chinese memorials covering the years of 1717–1727). Shu-hui Wu, *Die Eroberung von Qinghai unter Berücksichtigung von Tibet und Khams 1717–1727 anhand der Throneingaben des Großfeldherrn Nian Gengyao* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995).

[15] See *Die Verträge zwischen Rußland und China 1689–1881*, hrsg. u. eingel. v. Michael Weiers (Bonn: Wehling, 1979), V–VI, 11–26 (in the following abbreviated as VRC), and Michael Weiers, "Der russisch-chinesische Vertrag von Burinsk vom Jahre 1727", in *Florilegia Manjurica in Memoriam Walter Fuchs*, ed. Michael Weiers and Giovanni Stary (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1982).

[16] *The Bordered Red Banner Archives: Yung-cheng Period*, ed. Kanda Nobuo et al. (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1972) (in the following abbreviated as BRBAY; 54 Manchurian memorials covering the years of 1723–1734, romanized and translated into Japanese). MBGD, vol. 21; *Gongzhong dang Yongzheng chao zouzhe* (Taipei: National Palace Museum Shih-Lin, 1980) (in the following abbreviated as GDYZ; five volumes with 188, 246, 147, 93, and 302 Manchurian memorials in facsimile).

[17] *The Bordered Red Banner Archives in the Toyo Bunko, vol. 1: Introduction and Catalogue*, ed. Kanda Nobuo (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2001) (in the following abbreviated as BRBA; transcription of 131 Qianlong Documents); MBGD, vol. 22; MMAD.

[18] The Chinese syllable *zang* in the Chinese term for Tibet derives from tib. *gTsaṅ*, which is the name of a province in Central Tibet.

[19] Tib.-mo. *rǰe-bcun dam-pa Qutuγtu* (His Holiness the Holy Reverend). This was the title of the Buddhist spiritual leaders of the Mongols in Outer Mongolia since 1650.

[20] Tib.-mo. *lČaṅ-skya Qutuγtu* (His Holiness from Jangjiya). This was the title of the Buddhist spiritual leaders of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia since 1693.

Zünghars, resulted in still another reorganization of the Lifanyuan in 1757: the Bureau for Honours became the Bureau of Outer Mongolia, the Bureau for Receptions became the Bureau for Inner Mongolian Receptions, the Office of the Rear became the Bureau of Inner Mongolia, and the Office of the Front was again designated as the Bureau for Outer Mongolian Receptions.

With the extinction of the Oirat-Mongolian polity and the deportation of the remaining Zünghars to the east to Jehol (today's Chengde), the Bureau for Inner Mongolia and the Bureau for Outer Mongolian Receptions were consolidated into the Bureau for Mongolian Receptions in 1761. At the same time, a new Bureau for People Coming from Afar (Eastern Turkestan) was established. In 1762, the Bureau for Inner Mongolian Receptions was temporarily reduced into the two former bureaus: the Bureau of Outer Mongolia and Bureau for Receptions. In 1764, the two bureaus changed their names. Six bureaus were ultimately established that thenceforth consolidated the position of the Lifanyuan as the center for the regulation of the northern, northwestern, and western realms of the Qing dominion.[21]

3 About the Sources

Almost all Manchurian and Mongolian materials referred to in the notes above belong to the official correspondence of the Qing government. Their original documents were prepared, written down, revised, and transacted autonomously by Manchurian and Mongolian staff who continued the work of the Manchurian founders, organizers, and administrators of the Lifanyuan. These source materials, most of which were published in recent years and decades, comprise over sixty volumes with more than 8,000 Manchurian and Mongolian official documents. Without question, a meticulous examination of this comprehensive material will yield new perspectives and direct insights into the Lifanyuan's daily practices and problems. Other historical sources[22] and frequently consulted source material composed or published in the later Qianlong era will, by contrast, not yield such immediate insights.

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[21] These were the Bureau for Inner Mongolia, the Bureau for Inner Mongolian Receptions, the Bureau for Outer Mongolia, the Bureau for Outer Mongolian Receptions, the Bureau for People Coming from Afar, and the Bureau for Jurisdiction. For a full enumeration of the Lifanyuan offices and departments see Veronika Veit, *Die vier Qane von Qalqa. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der politischen Bedeutung der nordmongolischen Aristokratie in den Regierungsperioden K'ang-hsi bis Ch'ien-lung (1661–1796) anhand des biographischen Handbuches Iledkel šastir aus dem Jahre 1795* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1990), 40–50, and Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty" (PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1992).

[22] *ǰarliγ-iyar toγtaγaγsan γadaγadu muǰi-yin mongγol qotong ayimaγ-un wang güng-üd-ün iledkel šastir* (1795) (in the following abbreviated as Iledkel Šastir); *Daicing gurun-i fukjin*

This limitation is due to the views, thoughts, and attitudes held by the Qianlong Emperor himself. In his Manchurian foreword to the *Zhigong tu* (Pictures of Tributaries),[23] dated August/September 1761, he presented himself in relation to the Emperor Da Yu (大禹, c. 2200–2100 BCE) of the mythical Xia dynasty. Consequently, he considered all nations known to him, and hence most of the European nations and peoples, as tributaries that were already subjugated (*Toktobuhangge*). In addition, Qianlong viewed history as an enduring and consistent continuum, and in this harmonious continuum, which was thought to have begun with the Xia dynasty, there was no room for disturbing elements such as a non-Chinese and primitive descent from northern barbarians. Hence, any nation or people from far away with whom the Qing had contact were to be harmonized, at least by virtual submission.

Such were the views and thoughts introduced by Qianlong into his compilation project *Complete Library in Four Branches of Literature* (*Siku Quanshu*), which he initiated in 1772. With this project he followed the example of Emperor Xuanzong (玄宗, 712–756) of the Tang dynasty, and the compilation was thus meant to give evidence of the continuum between a harmonious past, which had emerged in legendary and mythical times, and the beginning of a future that would follow along the same lines. This project and Qianlong's views did widely influence historiography as well, such as the volumes pertaining to the operational plans,[24] of which the *Daicing gurun-i fukjin doro neihe bodogon-i bithe* is an example. This important piece of historiography published and revised in the later Qianlong era is generally used by most historians as a basic text. However, many historical events and processes first mentioned in the original contemporary source material and other publications of earlier periods are rendered by these compilations in abridged and altered wording.[25]

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doro neihe bodogon-i bithe, ed. Agui et al. (Taibei, 1968) (in the following abbreviated as DGFDN).

[23] *Xiesui «zhigong tu» manwen tushuo jiaozhu*, ed. Zhuang Jifa (Taibei: National Palace Museum, 1989), 38–39 (in the following abbreviated as Zhigong tu; 642 pages with 304 reproduced items, each with Manchurian and Chinese description and commentary ordered by the Qianlong Emperor in 1751). On the *Zhigong tu* see the chapter of Laura Hostetler in this volume.

[24] Ma. *bodogon-i bithe*; mo. *bodoly-a-yin bičig*; chin. *fanglüe*. This rich genre of historiography deals with foreign nations and their submission and regulation.

[25] Borǰigidai Oyunbilig, *Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Berichts über den persönlichen Feldzug des Kangxi Kaisers gegen Galdan (1696–1697)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999).

Consequently, such texts have also altered historical facts.[26] The Aisin gurun (Gold) state, for instance, became changed into a Chinese dynasty called Later Jin (*Houjin*). Nurhaci was posthumously bestowed with the Chinese reign title of 'Mandate of Heaven' (*Tianming*) as well as with the Chinese temple name of 'Reverend Ancestor' (*Taizu* 太祖), a title which is normally only given to the first emperor of a new Chinese dynasty. Nurhaci himself and his successors, with the probable exception of the Qianlong Emperor, had never heard anything about Nurhaci being a Chinese Taizu and founder of a Chinese dynasty named Houjin. This type of amendment became widely accepted in future historical research, with the result that, to this day, only very few historians have paid attention to the earlier original Manchurian and Mongolian source materials or to such text documents that agree with the originals. Hence, we have to admit that our knowledge about the everyday practice and the problems of the Lifanyuan is quite superficial.

Historians who, in spite of the textual alterations, use source material influenced by the views of the *Siku Quanshu* project for their studies should always bear in mind that this material was written with the intention to harmonize and reconcile the events of the past with the intentions of Qianlong's time; it served to furnish evidence for a historical continuum of considerable length. It was Qianlong who, with his *Siku Quanshu* project, introduced such a long-term perspective into Qing historiography, intending to present Qing China as part of a Chinese harmonious whole. However, such historical representations ignore information that might prove the opposite, and is very likely to be found in original and genuine 'barbaric' Manchurian and Mongolian sources. Hence, the study and examination of the original Manchurian and Mongolian primary sources dealing with the Lifanyuan is doubtlessly overdue.[27]

Apart from the edited documents discussed so far, there exist several yet unpublished Manchurian document collections. One of these, the *Records of the Court for the History of the State*, is preserved in the First Historical Archives of China in Beijing.[28] Another collection covering the years of 1723–1727 and 1731–1734 is kept at the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale.[29] A translation of Kangxi era memorials and annotations into Chinese was published by the First Historical Archives of China in 1996; it should be noted, however, that this collection did not include the original texts but merely paraphrases of these.[30] Some publications of Manchurian and Mongolian documents[31] may also serve as historical background information for events and procedures the Lifanyuan had to deal with in connection with different Oirat-Mongol groups, the Zünghars and Khoshuds, with Koreans, Manchu-Tungusic Sibe, Russians and Tibetans, and later with Eastern-Turkic groups and the Daurs of former Eastern Turkestan. Official Manchurian documents from the 19th century, most of them memorials, are known and catalogued but not yet published or studied.[32]

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[26] This can be observed in divergent Lifanyuan publications compiled between 1779 and 1795 (see Iledkel Šastir) and in many passages of DGFDN and *Jiu manzhou dang*, ed. Chen Jie-xian (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1969) (in the following abbreviated as JMZD; ten volumes comprising 5,377 folios and covering the years of 1607–1632 and 1635–1637. Apart from *Dangse* texts, some copies of original documents and some facsimiles of documents are included).

[27] On problems of Chinese historiography in the 17th and 18th centuries in connection with historical sciences in general, see Boris Grigor'evich Doronin, *Kitaj XVII–XVIII vekov: Problemy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniya* (Leningrad: Leningradskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 1988).

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[28] This collection of original, handwritten, and contemporaneous Manchurian *Dangse* documents in 277 books (*debtelin*) is known under the modern Manchurian title *Gurun-i suduri yamun-i dangse* (in the following abbreviated as GSYD) and covers the years from 1632 to 1661. Several years are incomplete or completely lost. However, a multi-volume catalogue of the archive does exist, see: *Qingdai bianjiang Manwen dang'an mulu* (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999) (in the following referred to as First Historical Archives of China).

[29] Jeanne-Marie Puyraimond, *Catalogue du fonds Mandchou* (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1979, Nos. 155–156). The collection comprises some hundred documents in sixteen books.

[30] *Kangxi zhao manwen zhupi zouzhe quanyi* (Beijing: First Historical Archives of China, 1996) (in the following abbreviated as KMZQ; a collection of 1,727 pages with 4,297 text items in Chinese language that paraphrase Manchurian and Mongolian documents published as facsimiles in GDKZ, MDEE, MBGD, and MMAD).

[31] Khödöögijn Pėrlėė, "Khalkhyn shinė oldson tsaaz-ėrkhėmzhijn dursgalt bichig," In *Mongol ba töv azijn ornuudyn soëlyn tüükhėnd kholbogdokh khoër khovor survalzh bichig*, ed. Khödöögijn Pėrlėė (Ulaanbaatar, 1974); this paper presents romanized and commented copies of ten juridical texts from the years of 1614–1639 that were originally written on birch bark. See also *Arban doloduγar ǰaγun-u emün-e qaγas-tu qolboγdaqu mongγol üsüg-ün bičig debter*, ed. Erdeniǰab-un Li Bouwen (Beijing: Tōng xiàn diànzǐ wàiwén, 1997) (in the following abbreviated as MYBD; 91 Mongolian facsimile documents dated 1628–1650. The originals are kept in the First Historical Archives of China). *Cing gurun-i dangse-ci sonjome banjibuha sibe-i suduri mutun*, (Urumqi: Sinjiang niyalma irgen chubanshe, 1987) (in the following abbreviated as SSM; 389 text copies referring to the years of 1593–1782. No information is given on the whereabouts of the originals).

[32] These documents cover several governmental periods: Jiaqing with 1,031 items, Daoguang with 1,398 items, Xianfeng with 416 items, Tongzhi with 428 items, and Guangxu with 720 items (the last dates from 1898), in total 3,993 items. Further material see: Giovanni Stary, *Manchu Studies: An International Bibliography. Vol. 1: Catalogues, Bibliographies, Geography, Ethnography, Religion, History* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1990), 1–15, Nos. 1–80.

4 From the 18th to the Early 20th Century

During the long reign of the Qianlong Emperor, Tibet, which was under the leadership of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama,[33] as well as Outer and Inner Mongolia, which were under the religious surveillance of the Jibzundamba Khutugtu and the Jangjiya Khutugtu, were administrated as if they were one single administrative unit that was regulated by the Lifanyuan. The attitude of the two Lamas and the two Khutugtus towards the Qing emperor and his rule was friendly and loyal, they were obliged to deliver certain items—large silk scarves, twine strands of coral rosary beads, prayer wheels—as duties to the Qing.[34] The loyalty of the Mongolian Khutugtus to the Qing emperor guaranteed them a position that gave them much influence on the Mongols. Under these circumstances, the deep-rooted discontent of many Mongols with Qing rule could not be expressed in effective military operations, as becomes apparent from Chinggünjab's failed rebellion in the Zasagtu Khan Aimag of Outer Mongolia in 1756–57 (which, as may be mentioned in passing, was also badly prepared and disorganized).[35] Subsequently, the Lifanyuan worked very successfully along the borders fixed by the treaties of Nerchinsk and Bura-Kyakhta, and along the northwestern and western frontiers. Due to the presence of Chinese refugees who, belonging to the sect of the White Lotus forbidden in China, fled China in the late 16th century, and due to Chinese mobile traders, the life ways in parts of southern Mongolia regulated by the Lifanyuan began to gradually absorb Chinese characteristics, and to convey the impression that the region was part of Inner China. This can well be observed when studying, for instance, the documents of the Inner Mongolian Bayantala League.[36]

In the first decades of the 19th century, the Lifanyuan laid down an extensive legislation for the Mongols in a voluminous code.[37] This code, *Lifanyuan zeli*,

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Giovanni Stary, *Manchu Studies: An International Bibliography. Vol. 4: 1988–2002* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2003), 1–9, Nos. 4399–4453.

[33] Tib. *paṇ-čhen* (Great Teacher). His succession traces back to the 5th Dalai Lama (1617–1682).

[34] For a precise list of these items, see Michael Weiers, *Zu den mongolischen und mandschurischen Akten und Schriftstücken des 17. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Sankt Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag, 1983), 32–7 and facsimile 51.

[35] For Mongolian resistance viewed from a Mongol's perspective, see Shirap Bodievich Chimitdorzhiev, *Antiman'chzhurskaya osvoboditel'naya bor'ba mongol'skogo naroda (XVII–XVIII vv.)*, (Ulan-Udė: Buryatskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1974).

[36] See BMS.

[37] *Qinding Lifanyuan zeli*, (1817/26) (in the following abbreviated as LYZ), cf. Jacques Legrand, *L'administration dans la domination Sino-Mandchoue en Mongolie Qalq-a. Version mongole du Lifan Yuan Zeli* (Paris: Collège de France, 1976).

was published in 1817 and 1826 in three languages. The Mongolian-language edition alone comprised 64 volumes. With regard to the Russian Empire, the Lifanyuan remained the most important Qing institution throughout the 19th century,[38] while the Libu was intensely, though unsuccessfully, dealing with an increasing influence of western countries on Qing China's economy.

When later, in May, 1858, the Chinese-Russian treaty of Aigun was concluded, Qing China lost nearly 232,000 square miles of its territory to the Russian Empire. The Lifanyuan may have been held responsible for this loss, and the Qing court, which was forced to cooperate with the foreign western powers that penetrated China, thus decided *bona fide* in 1861 to put a new office called Court in Charge of Affairs of all Nations (*Zongli geguo shiwu yamen*)[39] in charge of part of the Lifanyuan's responsibilities. The new court was particularly designed to manage Qing international affairs with foreign western powers, while the Lifanyuan remained entrusted with the difficult affairs regarding Russia and Inner Asia that can be well observed in the different Russian-Qing border protocols after 1861.[40] In addition to the losses resulting from the treaty of Aigun, after 1861 the Qing Empire again had to face heavy losses of territories still regulated by the Lifanyuan at that time: about 328,000 square miles were ceded to Russia in accordance with the protocol of the conference of Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) in October, 1864.[41] Then, in 1869,[42] 1870,[43] and between 1881 and 1884 an additional 15,445 square miles were lost to Russia.[44] In consequence of all these territorial cessions and in order to prevent more

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[38] For Qing China and Russia at that time, see Ivan Platonovich Barsukov, *Graf Nikolaj Nikolaevich Murav'ev-Amurskij po ego pis'am, official'nym dokumentam, razskazam sovremennikov i pechatnym istochnikam: Materialy dlya biografii* (Moskva: Sinodal'naya Tipografiya, 1891), vol. 2, 17–321, documents 2–162. Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, *The Ch'ing Empire and the Russian State in the 17th Century* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985). *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XIX veke: Materialy i dokumenty, tom 1, 1803–1807* (Moskva: Rossijskaya Akademiya Nauk, 1995) (in the following abbreviated as RKO).

[39] Ma. *geren gurun-i baita-be uherileme icihiyara yamun.*

[40] Michael Strupp, *Chinas Grenzen mit Birma und mit der Sowjetunion. Völkerrechtliche Theorie und Praxis der Volksrepublik China* (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1987), 223–228. Horst Pommerening, *Der chinesisch-sowjetische Grenzkonflikt: Das Erbe der ungleichen Verträge* (Olten, Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter, 1968), 129–46. Rosemary Kathleen Quested, *Sino Russian Relations: A Short History* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 71–89.

[41] Strupp, *Chinas Grenzen*, 223.

[42] See the border protocol of Uliastai (Uliyasutai) from 4th July and the protocol of Khowd (Kobdo) from 13th August, cf. Strupp, *Chinas Grenzen*, 223–4.

[43] For the border agreement of Tarbagatai see Strupp, *Chinas Grenzen*, 224.

[44] Strupp, *Chinas Grenzen*, 224–8.

losses particularly in the 'far west,' the Qing Empire established a province of nearly 641,000 square miles called Xinjiang (New Frontier) in 1884 in the region formerly referred to by the unspecified term Xiyu (Western Regions).

In order to reform Qing China's political organization and its scope of activities, the designation of the Lifanyuan (ma. *Jurgan*, mo. *Yamun*, chin. *Yuan*, i.e. Court) was changed (ma. *Tanggin*, mo. *Tangkim*, chin. *Bu*, i.e. Board ~ Ministry) by an imperial edict of 6th November 1906.[45] In the newly renamed *Lifanbu* the former six bureaus of the Lifanyuan were left unchanged. In accordance with a memorial sanctioned by the emperor on 3rd of January, 1907, a Department of Design and Production (*Zhi chan si*) for Mongolia and a Department of Frontier Protection (*Bian wei si*) were additionally established. In 1909, the Hall of the School for the Design and Frontier [Departments] (*Zhi bian xue tang*) with a Section of the Mongolian Board (*Mengbuke*) and a Section for the Protection of Tibet (*Zangweike*) were added.[46] The hall and the two sections were installed in order to ensure that Inner and Outer Mongolia, as well as Tibet, would continue to exist as a one single administrative unit in the future. The Qing viewed such a unit as a pledge of political stability in the northern and western realms of their dominion.

5 Beyond the Lifanyuan

With the official end of Qing dynasty on February 12, 1912, the dynastic period of imperial China ended after 2,132 years of its outset in 221 BC. As a result, many archived Qing documents, including the original autochthonous Manchurian and Mongolian documents dealing with the Lifanyuan, were either destroyed or fell into disregard.[47] A series of events in the first half of the 20th century shattered the Lifanyuan administrated units in Inner Asia and contributed to the oblivion of Qing domination and the historical role the Lifanyuan once played. These events include the Tibetan and Mongolian declarations of independence and the attempt to return to a separate statehood in 1913, the establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) in Outer Mongolia in 1924, a new administrative division introduced in the MPR after 1931, the 'Islamic Republic Eastern Turkistan' of 1933–34, and the issue of Tibetan independence until the 1950s. After 1912, the Lifanyuan and Lifanbu were thus all but forgotten.

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[45] The complete new designation of the Lifanyuan was as follows: ma. *tulergi golo-be dasara tanggin* (Board ~ Ministry Administering the Outer Marches); mo. *γadaγadu mongγol törö-yi jasaqu yabudal-un tangkim* (Board ~ Ministry for the Affairs Regulating the Outer Mongolian Government); chin. *Lifanbu* (Board ~ Ministry for the Regulations of the Frontier).

[46] H. [Ippolit] S[emenovich] Brunnert and V[iktor] V[ladimirovich] Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organisation of China*, trans. A. Beltchenko and E.E. Moran, rev. N.Th. Kolessoff (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1912), No. 499.

[47] Endymion Wilkinson, *Chinese History: A Manual* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Asia Centre, 2000), 900–3.

Traces of the Lifanyuan lingered on, however, during the Chinese republican era in the northern territories of the so-called North China (*Huabei*)[48] and in the Northeast (*Dongbei*), including the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. Alongside a huge majority of Han-Chinese population, over 10 million people classified as 'Minority Nationalities' (*Shaoshu minzu*) who identify as Manchurian (*Manzu*)[49] and 3,995,349 Mongolian people (*Menggu zu*)[50] are living in these territories even today. This is all the more surprising given the many catastrophes encountered by these regions during the first half of the 20th century: the Warlords periods (*Junfa*) from 1916 to 1930; the Northern Expedition (*Beifa*) from 1926 to 1930; the establishment of the puppet state Manchukuo (*Manzhouguo*) by Japan in 1932; and the confusion and disappointment about Mongolian territory and Mongolian political independence brought about in Inner Mongolia by a supporter for Mongolian independence, Demchugdongrub, between 1935 and 1945.[51] In spite of the civil war which resulted in the foundation of the communist Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia in 1947, the regional administration of league (mo. *Čiγulγan*, chin. *Meng*), banner (mo. *Qosiγun*, chin. *Qi*), and aimag remained almost the same as in the times of the Lifanyuan. Neither did the many far-reaching revolutionary changes in the decades following the proclamation of the Chinese Peoples Republic in October, 1949, abolish the traditional main levels for the territorial administration introduced by the Lifanyuan as a tool for the regulation of the Mongolian and Manchurian people; they persisted until the 1980s. Against this background we can say that administrative tools of the Lifanyuan have survived until very recently.

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[48] Includes the northern part of the Hebei province and the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia.

[49] *2000 Nian renkou pucha zhongguo minzu renkou ziliao* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2003) (in the following abbreviated as Tabulation), *sub loco*: Hebei 2118711; Liaoning 5385287; Jilin 939112; Heilongjiang 1037080; Inner Mongolia 499911; Beijing 250286 = 10.230,387 people of Manzu. The *Data of 2010 China Population Census* (China Statistics Press, 2012), see ISBN 9787503765070, counts 10.410,585 people of *Manzu*.

[50] Tabulation, *sub loco*.

[51] E[van] F[ordyce] Carlson, "The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyuan," *Pacific Affairs* 12,3 (1939): 278–284.

TABLE 2.1 *Traditional Lifanyuan-leagues and their modern substitutions*

Lifanyuan-Leagues	Abolished	Substituted by
J̌uu Uda (Zhaowuda)	10-10-1983	*Chifeng diji shi* (Chifeng regional-level city)
J̌irim (Zhelimu)	01-13-1999	Tongliao *diji shi* (Tongliao regional-level city)
Yekhe J̌uu (Yikezhao)	02-26-2001	*E'erduosi diji shi* (Ordos regional-level city)
Qulunbuir (Hulunbei'er)	10-10-2001	Hulunbei'er *diji shi* (Qulunbuir regional-level city)
Bayannuur (Bayannao'er)	12-01-2003	Bayannao'er *diji shi* (Bayannuur regional-level city)
Ulaanchab (Wulanchabu)	12-01-2003	Wulanchabu *diji shi* (Ulaanchab regional-level city)

Since the early 1980s, however, a newly established system of administrative units and governmental levels has been challenging the former regulation tools of the Lifanyuan. It is obvious that this still uncompleted process is considerably reducing the political competency of the Mongolian and Manchurian Minority Nationalities of China's north and northeast.

The table above shows what kind of administrative entities former Lifanyuan-based units, such as the leagues, have been substituted for since the 1980s in Inner Mongolia. In these new entities, former Lifanyuan-based administrative-territorial units such as the banner are transformed and downgraded into much lower levels, with the result that the influence of ethnic minorities and Inner Mongolia's 'autonomy' are being hollowed out as well.

6 Conclusion

Starting out with a glance at the history of the J̌ürčen (chin. Nuzhen), this contribution has presented evidence to the point that the Lifanyuan represented an enhancement of the Mongol Office and that it was founded parallel to the traditional and highly reputed Chinese Libu ministry. In the second part, I have outlined our present knowledge about the development of the Lifanyuan's bureaus in connection with related historical events until the consolidation of the Lifanyuan in 1764. The third part discussed the Manchurian and Mongolian documents produced by the Lifanyuan in terms of their historical value, and explained the differences between this source material and other sources. Some data on yet unpublished sources and historical background information concluded that section. The fourth part presented the historical events and developments that determined the manner in which the Lifanyuan carried out its day-to-day regulations of the Qing dominion's northern and northwestern boundaries and frontiers from the 18th century until its abolition in early 1912. The last section looked at the aftermath of the Lifanyuan up to recent times when the remaining traces of the Lifanyuan began to be abolished.

In light of this brief historical survey and keeping the current interests in a revision of administrative and colonial practices in Qing-ruled China in mind, I would like to encourage further research on the state agencies of Lifanyuan and Libu that were established to regulate the various relationships between ethnic minorities and the state, institutions that have a long tradition both in imperial China and Russia. In particular, I would like to suggest a combined method of ethnological and historical studies where field research ought to focus on the new regulations between ethnic minorities (*Shaoshu minzu*) and the state in China's north and northeast for purposes of comparison with former Lifanyuan regulations. This should be accompanied by studies on Manchurian and Mongolian primary sources covering the period of the Lifanyuan's existence from 1638 to 1912. Such research will shed new light on our knowledge about the Lifanyuan as a tool of former Manchurian aristocratic (until 1722) and Manchurian autocratic (since 1723) governmental regulations for ethnic minorities on the northern and northeastern frontiers of China's historical past.

Finally, it is worthwhile to recall that the Lifanyuan was an agency which, for more than 200 years, administered a frontier that at times stretched for more than 3,000 miles, surrounded by very different ethnic groups: Russians, Eastern Turks, Tibetans, Daurs, Manchu-Tungusic Sibe, the West Mongolian Zünghars and Khoshud-Oirat, the Northern Mongols, Tungusic tribes, Koreans, and Chinese. An analysis of its techniques, practices, and adaption to a rapidly developing and centralizing empire may yield possible resolutions to some of the political and economic difficulties and problems that result from similar ethnic diversities along frontiers and borders in our world today.

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GSYD: *Gurun-i suduri yamun-i dangse* [Dangse of the Court for the History of the State].

HMJ: *Huang Ming Jiubiankao* 皇明九邊考 [Review of the nine frontiers of the Great Ming]. Edited by Wei Huan 魏煥. Repr., 華文書局. Huawen shuju: 1968.

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Appendix: A Lifanyuan Memorial from 1653

This appendix presents a memorial with transcription and word-for-word translation to give an exampel of language usage and style in Lifanyuan's offices and of the kind of affairs the Lifanyuan was obliged to settle. The document is taken from MMAD, vol. 1, page 1, and refers to the early 1650s. At those times the relations between the Qing and Tibet including the Oirat-Mongolian Khoshud (Ūlet) had started already.

Handwritten imperial notice at the left margin at the beginning of the document:

gisurehe songkoi obu

Proceed in accordance to what was said [by the Court]!

(1) *wesimburengge*
Inscription of the seal stamps above *wesimburengge* in line (1) and above the dating in line (13):
Left side of the seal stamps:
(1) *tulergi golo* (2) *be dasara* (3) *jurgan-i doron*
Seal of the Court administering the outer marches.



ILLUSTRATION 2.1 *A Lifanyuan Memorial from 1653.*

Right side of the seal stamps (written in Chinese quadratic seal form):
(1) *Lifan* 理藩 (2) *yuan yin* 院印
Seal of the Court for the regulations of the frontier.

(2) ◦ *tulergi golo-be dasara jurgan-i aliha amban nikan sei gingguleme*
(3) *wesimburengge:*
(4) *dele alban benjihe · ūlet-i gusi han-i hojigon* (sic!) *nomci taiji-i ilan tanggū*
(5) *morin : orin temen · jihe elcin damba ombur orin morin : juwe temen :*
(6) *nomci taiji-i deo dorji taiji-i juwe tanggū morin : juwan jakūn*
(7) *temen : jihe elcin biligtu hiya-i juwan morin : emu temen : erei hoki*
(8) *gūsin sunja niyalma jifi jang jiya keo-i duka-de bi seme dukai niyalma*
(9) *alanjihabi : erebe jurgan-i gisurehengge · ūlet ·muse-de daci sain-be*
(10) *dahame jihe-be tuwame dosimbumbihe : uttu ofi an-i dosimbuki*
(11) *sembi : erei jalin*
(12) *hese-be baime gingguleme wesimbumbi :*
(13) *ijishūn dasan-i juwanci aniya juwe biyai juwan ninggun :*

(1) Memorial
(2–3) ◦ Respectful memorial of the minister Nikan and his staff of the Court administering the outer marches.
(4) The tribute to the Highest (Emperor) were brought here. From Nomci Taiji, son-in-law of Gusi Khan of the Ūlet, three hundred
(5) horses and twenty camels. From the messenger Damba Ombur who came twenty horses and two camels.
(6) From Dorji Taiji, younger brother of Nomci Taiji, two hundred horses and eighteen
(7) camels. From the messenger Biligtu Hiya who came ten horses and one camel. When besides these a support staff of
(8) thirty fife people arrived, a man from the door saying "They are at the door of Zhangjiakou"
(9) came for report. In regard to this [event] the words of the Court are the following ones: The Ūlet were towards us right from the start well
(10) behaved and they took care to come [in order to bring the tribute] and we let them enter. Because it was so, we should let them enter as usual!
(11) [So] we say. Therefore
(12) asking for an Imperial Order we memorialize respectfully.
(13) The sixteenth of the second month of the tenth year of Ijishūn Dasan [chin. Shunzhi 順治] (= 15th of March 1653).

CHAPTER 3

The Lifanyuan and Stability during Qing Imperial Expansion

Pamela Kyle Crossley

Though the Qing imperial rulership is sometimes described as generating new and innovative institutions for administering a large and diverse population,[1] it is of some historical importance that the Qing empire was founded upon, and its rulership in large part generated by, three governments that existed before the promulgation of the empire in 1636 and continued to exist within one state for well over a century. The fact that these structures existed before the great Qing expansions into China and Mongolia explains some of the stability which the small state achieved during the explosive growth if its territory, and modifies to some degree the idea that the Qing state grew primarily in response to the development of its conquest enterprise. In the unusual structure of the state, the Lifanyuan provided unique capacities for negotiating and administering the imperial littoral. But as the conquests drew to a close and international pressures for clear boundaries and unqualified sovereignty intensified, the Lifanyuan was eroded in substance as well as in jurisdiction. After about 1760 the Lifanyuan was revised to accommodate what proved to be the final territorial acquisition of the Qing, and after 1811 gradually eroded as a distinct entity until its replacement in 1906 by the *Lifanbu* which despite the similarity in name was based upon very different principles of bureaucratic practice.

1 Three Governments and Imperial Simultaneity

The Qing decision to continue the Ming tradition of a light state appears to have been premised on both the competence of the three governments it had brought to China and the political exigencies of the continuing conquests. Low taxes were not only a reliable method of restoring the economy that had been damaged by two decades of fighting in some parts of China, the warfare that accompanied the Qing conquest of north China and the Yangtze delta, and the war to suppress the occupation governors of the south. They were also an overt means by which the Qing emperors ingratiated themselves with landowners, particularly in the Yangtze Delta. Even after illegal shifting of the tax burden from elites to the farming population, the effective tax rate through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries remained modest. In 1713 the court announced a permanent freeze on the head tax and corvée labour. In the ensuing decades the freeze remained in effect even when the reserves of the government shrank. The Qing government until the nineteenth century successfully predicated its expansion and occupation on resting relatively lightly on its conquered territories and keeping land and commercial taxes low. The strategies were remarkably successful to two centuries, before the state fell prey to the very forces it had both depended upon and feared.[2] Part of the ability of the conquests to expand so rapidly under the management of such a small state was that the state itself rested on three relatively self-sufficient governments.

2 The Three Governments and Simultaneous Emperorship

In 1616 the inchoate regime of Nurhaci (Nurgaci, *1559 †1626) became acknowledged as a khanate by those it dominated—that is, Nurhaci became a khan, and declared a state with the name of Jin (Aisin). In 1618 the khanate declared war on Ming China, and by 1621 had seized Shenyang, the Ming provincial capital of Liaodong. When Nurhaci died in 1626 he was succeeded by his fourth son Hung Taiji (Hong Taiji, Hūwangtaiji)[3] as khan, and the war continued. Hung Taiji not only fought to pry the western territories of Liaodong from Ming, but also continued hostilities against the Chakhar Khaganate of eastern Mongolia, led by Ligdan Khagan[4] from 1604 to 1634, when it collapsed as a result of a

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[1] See for instance Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels, vol. 2, Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 515–16 or Michael Adas, "Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 375.

[2] See also William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 30–33; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Wobbling Pivot, China since 1800: An Interpretive History* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), xi–xiv.

[3] Kam Tak-sing points out that the proper spelling should be Hong Taiji or Xong Tayiji. I choose to continue my use of Hung Taiji for the simple reason that Hong Taiji is indistinguishable from the Chinese romanization for the characters involved; Hung Taiji, while technically incorrect, is conventional and clearly indicates the Manchu name. See also Kam Tak-sing, "The Romanization of Early Manchu Regnal Names," *Studia Orientalia* 87 (1999).

[4] Ligdan succeeded in 1604 to the throne of the so-called Northern Yuan or Chakhar Khaganate, the last direct Chinggisid rulership in Mongolia. In the sixteenth century the Khaganate had

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variety of self-induced misfortunes. Ligdan's symbols of power, his populations and capital, and his sons were all taken by Hung Taiji, who used them to craft a new form of rule in Liaodong. Between 1634 and 1636 the state was reorganized and portions of it renominalized, a process of leading to attestation of the Lifanyuan and its antecedent. In 1636 the empire was declared, and Hung Taiji became an emperor (*Hûwangdi, Huangdi*). It was both in its subject populations and in its rulership an amalgam of the Chakhar Khaganate of the Mongols and the Jin khanate of the Jurchens.

The Qing empire as constituted in 1636 was composed of a court and its dependent administrative offices resting atop three governments of different origins, all of which would retain significant functionality for at least a century and a half. The court was in essence a collective expression of the rulership, and the rulership itself had a quality I have called 'simultaneous'.[5] That is to say, the rulership and the codes of legitimacy underlying it were simultaneously but discretely expressed in court cosmology, rhetoric, ritual and historical authority. This simultaneous quality of rulership, not unique to the Qing but taking on a particularly well-defined form in the eighteenth century, was a direct product of the process of conquest. The populations who had putatively facilitated the conquest and acknowledged Qing rule were historically narrated as constituencies of the emperorship and ceremonially invoked through performance of their languages, scripts, religions, and architectures.[6]

The orientations of the performed rulerships toward the cultures and descendants of Qing imperial facilitators were specific. In 1606 eastern Khorchin and Kharachin Mongols hoping to escape the interference and domination of Ligdan had volunteered to acknowledge the first Jin ruler, Nurhaci, as Khagan, a title (as khan) he later used to elevate himself in the Jurchen political order and made the underlying prescription for his state in 1616. These and later Mongol adherents became part of the earliest aristocracy within the khanate, as they married with women of the khan's lineage. In 1634, as Hung Taiji appropriated the remnants of the Chakhar rulership, he literally absorbed Ligdan's claims as heir of the Chinggisid khans, in both its political and its religious aspects. From that point forward, the khan of the Jin was not only a khan in the sense that the term had been used among the Jurchens, but also a Khagan[7] in the universal style of Chinggis, and a cakravartin, a wheel-turning Buddhist monarch in a line descending from Asoka through Qubilai (1260–1294) and Ligdan.[8] In these same years of 1634–1636, the emerging emperorship took on a third major aspect. Hung Taiji publicly pursued his war against the Ming as an aspiring practitioner of traditional Chinese benevolent government, and as the rightful curator of Chinese civilization. By the time the empire was promulgated in 1636, it not only communicated its meanings in Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese, but presented a different face to each portion of the population. Through the eighteenth century, the court would continue to refine the performance—both in the emperor's person and in the resonance of ritual and administrative practices through the state—of this simultaneity. The imperial simultaneity that was so marked as early as 1636 was reinforced by—and in part generated by—the accommodation of distinct governments within the new state.

The earliest of these governments was the Eight Banners (*Jakûn gûsa, Baqi*).[9] Late sixteenth-century documents from Korea as well as Ming China suggest that these organizations were already in force, perhaps functioning as bodyguards of the Qing ancestral headmen and their families.[10] Later documents show that in the first years of the seventeenth century these units were formalized into four large divisions, and by time the khanate was created in 1616 their number was fixed at eight, which was retained for the remaining life of the empire. What made them essential to governance was that they were comprehensive instruments for control of the whole population, since the families of all bodyguards or soldiers were enrolled. In 1634 the process began of constructing parallel banner organizations for the Mongols. That is, each of the Eight Banners subsequently was constituted of both a Manchu and a Mongol variant (e.g. Manchu Bordered Yellow, Mongol Bordered Yellow). Groups and individuals who had been the regime's earliest adherents from eastern Mongolia (including Khorchin, Kharachin, and a few Tümed Mongols) as well as the absorbed population of Chakhar were for general administrative

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united nearly all of Mongolia, but Ligdan spent most of his career attempting and failing to impose Northern Yuan rule upon groups formerly attached to it. For background see Walther Heissig, *Die Zeit des letzten mongolischen Großkhans Ligdan (1604–1634)* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1979) and Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 130, 149–53.

[5] Pamela Kyle Crossley, "The Rulerships of China: A Review Article," *American Historical Review* 97,5 (1992): 1471–72.

[6] Crossley, "Rulerships of China," 1469–73 and Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California, 1999), 11–4.

[7] David Farquhar, "Mongolian versus Chinese Elements in the Early Manchu State," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i* 2,6 (1971); see also Rawski, *Last Emperors*, 50, 209.

[8] Rawski, *Last Emperors*, 130, 208. Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*, 211–3.

[9] Mark Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 39–41. Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building Before 1644," in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9, part one, The Ch'ing Dynasty to 1800*, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 34–5.

[10] Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*, 95–6.

purposes thereafter nominalised as Mongols of the Eight Banners.[11] A few of the early Mongol adherent lineages were actually enrolled in the Manchu banners and afterward considered Manchu. There was a categorical parallel to this in the creation of the Chinese-martial (*Hanjun*) banners—for Chinese-speaking descendants of Chinese, Koreans or Jurchens who had joined or come into the possession of the early regime—in 1642, at which point some politically-favoured lineages of the Chinese-martial were also made Manchu.[12]

Once the khanate's campaigns against Ming Liaodong had begun, the function and status of the Eight Banners changed greatly. From being a means of administering the entire population in the early period to being a means of controlling the distinct population of occupiers in China after 1644, the Eight Banners remained an intact and essential government within the Qing state. Its documentation was in the languages of its components (Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese) with a pre-eminent place for Manchu.[13] It is probable that for most of the Qing period the Eight Banners government remained the largest of the three governments on which the empire rested, having perhaps in excess of ten thousand officials.[14]

By the time of the establishment of the new Jin khanate capital at Shenyang (after 1634 called Mukden) in the 1620s, the acquisition of the Ming provincial government—its buildings, some of its documents, and a large number of officials—led to the initiation of new Qing government based upon the Chinese bureaucracies, a process culminating in 1631 with creation of the Six Boards. In the early stages this government was primarily responsible for management of civil law proclamations, the civil courts, census-taking among the Liaodong conquered population, and the writing of history. It also undertook responsibility for the administration of an examination system, in principle modelled on the traditional examination system by which Chinese officials were made eligible for employment. A board (headed by Manchus) overseeing the examinations was first established in 1634 and along with this a new department handling civil official appointments. This civil government had built within it a tradition, method and locality for the reception of foreign visitors (the Board of Rites, Libu). 'Guest ritual' (*Binli*) rooted in Chinese classical history was the method by which ambassadors from foreign states or federated peoples at

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[11] For background see Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Making Mongols," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

[12] Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*, 286–90.

[13] Elliott, *Manchu Way*, xvi.

[14] Ibid., 135.

the borders of states based in China were received at court. The offices managing visits to this court included a translation bureau, whose efficacy during the Ming and the Qing is dubious. The ceremonies were a representation of, but not the substance of, a loose network of trade, patronage, political alliance and occasionally strategic relationships across East and Southeast Asia.[15]

Since all three of these governments were clearly subordinate to the Qing court and its immediate appendages, the value of considering them as separate governments within a single state may be unclear. This conceit is based, first, upon the observation that each government had comprehensive responsibility for administration of distinct populations (with complications for the Mongols, to be considered below), and the identities of these populations remained stable over the dynastic period, perhaps in rough coincidence with the survival of the original governments. All three governments had dedicated or at least distinct revenue lines, law codes, appointment processes, and access to the imperial court. The Eight Banners, the oldest of the governments, preceded the emperorship by a minimum of thirty years. The civil government preceded it by a decade, and the Lifanyuan (in the form of its predecessor the *Monggo yamun*) by perhaps eighteen months, though as this chapter will suggest its functional history was much older. This means that the construction of the empire was literally predicated on these existing governments. Even court finances were not drawn in significant measure from these governments in the earlier Qing period; the court had also to construct its own revenue streams from domestic and foreign tribute, certain monopolies (including silk, salt and ginseng), and import tariffs. Understanding this helps to account for some of the stability of the Qing state, which between 1636 and 1755 expanded some 1500 percent in area and probably 3000 percent in population. Each government continued its functions with experienced personnel, distributing the stresses and the expenses of conquest and occupation.

3 The Lifanyuan as a Historical Enigma

The Lifanyuan has suffered an apparent documentary loss that leaves us regarding it largely from the perspective of its companion governments, each of which was self-documenting in its own right. Documents generated by the

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[15] John E. Wills, Jr., *Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K'ang-hsi, 1666–1687* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). James Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

Lifanyuan and held in the Number One Archives number only a little over 5000 for the entire Qing period.[16] One evident cause is that among Qing institutions, the Lifanyuan was unusual first because of its work language. While most Qing offices operated on the principle of 'simultaneous' documentation (合璧形式的书) in Manchu and Chinese (and occasionally Mongolian as a third language), the Lifanyuan worked on the principle of Manchu as a first language, with a proportion—usually a distinctly minor proportion—of documents being simultaneous in Manchu and Mongolian (the first in 1681); Lifanyuan documents simultaneous in Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese exist, but are very rare.[17] It appears that from the time of the Jiaqing era collation and revision of documents relating to Lifanyuan jurisdiction, the original documents may have been deliberately destroyed. In the Guangxu era, during collation of documents related to the Lifanyuan, the editors commented that original documents, whether in Manchu on in draft translation to Chinese, were few, as a large portion had been destroyed.[18]

A second factor appears to be the way in which the functions of the Lifanyuan overlapped with those of other offices, particularly the Board or War and the Board of Rites. Chia Ning has suggested elsewhere that the attested dispersal of documents to other Qing departments as part of the conquests and occupation administrations of the seventeenth and eighteenth century may be largely the cause of the paucity of Lifanyuan archives.[19] This functional factor was also unique to the Lifanyuan (as suggested above, it was connected to the disintegration of the Lifanyuan's standing as a separate government), and may be part of the explanation why destruction or loss of Lifanyuan documents appears to exceed the rate of loss of any other Qing institution.[20] Finally, records for critical events such as the treaty negotiations with Russia or the campaigns against Galdan Boshogtu khan (*1678 †1697) could have been kept apart from

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[16] See also the discussion in Michael Weiers' chapter in this volume. My numbers here are limited to documents generated by the Lifanyuan and now preserved in the Number One Archives, as presented in *Dayičing gürün-ü ekin üy-e-yin γadaγadu mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u manǰu mongγol ayiladqal-un debter-üd*, ed. Borǰigidai Oyunbilig et al. (Hohhot: Nei Menggu renmin chubanshe, 2010).

[17] See Wu Yuanfeng, "Qian yan," in *Dayičing gürün-ü ekin üy-e-yin γadaγadu mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u manǰu mongγol ayiladqal-un debter-üd*, ed. Borǰigidai Oyunbilig et al. (Hohhot: Nei Menggu renmin chubanshe, 2010), vol. 1, p. 1.

[18] Chia Ning, "Cong zhongguo zhenxi falu dianji jicheng zhong 'xining Qinghai fanyi chengli' kan shaoshu minzu dianji dui shixue zhuanti de yanjiu jiaozhe," *Journal of Historical China Studies* 6 (2009): 448.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

the normal archives or moved at some point, and destroyed in some events such as the sack of Beijing in 1860, the Boxer fighting and Allied occupation of 1901, the warehouse fires of 1923, or any of a number of disasters during the invasion by Japan. The apparent low rate of document survival for documents generated by the Lifanyuan leaves us dependent upon the perspective of collections such as the *Daqing huidian* and the *Qing shilu* instead of through its own records, rendering some aspects of Lifanyuan functions almost irremediably enigmatic.[21]

Reports (*Tiben*) from the Lifanyuan to the imperial court currently held in the Number One archives in Beijing suggest what the original documentation might have been like. For reasons that are unclear, the *Tiben* archives begin only in 1653 (the year before a major reorganization of the bureaucratic offices) and cease in 1898, even though the business of the Lifanyuan continued to 1906. Despite the increase in Lifanyuan tasks and augmentation of staff in 1730,[22] there are no surviving *Tiben* from the entire Yongzheng period. From the Kangxi period only a total of 130, or an average of about two a year, survive.[23] In fact the Kangxi records are not distributed equally but are missing in batches of sequential years. Kangxi 6–8 [1668–1670], 10–14 [1672–1676],

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[21] *Da Qing huidian*, editions of Kangxi 1690, Yongzheng 1732, Qianlong 1748, Jiaqing 1818, and Guangxu 1899. *Da Qing huidian shili*, editions of Jiaqing 1818, and Guangxu 1899. *Qing shilu*, 1986–1987.

[22] Zhang Shi, "Lifanyuan de xingcheng yu lish bianqian—Lifanyuan zuzhi jigou de bianhua jin tongyi duo minzu guojia de gonggu he fazhan," *China Nationalities Report*, August 17, 2012, http://www.mzzjw.cn/zgmzb/html/2012-08/17/content_87276.htm, para 4.

[23] Figures are given in Wu Yuanfeng, "Qian yan," 2. The total of *Tiben* is 5606, beginning in 1653 (Shunzhi 10), ending in 1898 (Guangxu 24). For the entire Shunzhi period there are 149 *Tiben*, all in Manchu; for the Kangxi period there are 130, of which 119 are in Manchu, and 11 are simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian; for the Qianlong there are 1334, of which 649 are in Manchu and 685 are simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian; for the Jiaqing period there are 1031, of which 799 are in Manchu and 232 are simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian; for the Daoguang period there are 1398, of which 1154 are in Manchu and 244 simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian; for the Xianfeng period there are 416, of which 284 are in Manchu and 132 simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian; for the Tongzhi period there are 428, of which 343 are in Manchu and 85 are simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian; and for the Guangxu period there are 720, of which 638 are in Manchu and 82 are simultaneously Manchu-Mongolian. This means that in the aggregate about 75% of extant Lifanyuan *Tiben* are in Manchu only, but that the percentage of Manchu-only *Tiben* differed markedly from reign period to reign period—with the Qianlong period having the lowest percentage of Manchu-only documents by far, at less than 50%, as contrasted to the courts of the nineteenth century, when the vast majority of *Tiben* were in Manchu only.

16 [1678], 18–21 [1680–1683], 23–25 [1686–1687], 27–29 [1689–1691], 32–35 [1694–1697], 38 [1700], 40 [1702], 42–60 [1704–1722] are absent, and few other years are represented by more than a couple of documents.[24] The collection of regulations often cited as the *Lifanyuan zeli* is actually a sort of Jiaqing period back-importation from the *Menggu lüli*.[25] This suggests that prior to the concoction of *Lifanyuan zeli* the Lifanyuan was tasked with administration of the Mongol regulations and was not itself regulated by a similar set of prescriptions; in any event what appears at first glance to be a document directly describing Lifanyuan functions has, in fact, an indirect relationship. We know that the Lifanyuan was a factor in both the Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta, though we may never know the degree of involvement. We can also be fairly confident that the Lifanyuan with the Libu played a role—perhaps the primary role—in providing materials for the *Huang Qing Zhigong tu*, though we may never have the materials necessary to understand the origin of the work completely.[26] The loss of Lifanyuan documentation not only hampers historical investigation but is ironic, given that one of the purposes of the Lifanyuan, from beginning to end, was to generate documents that were critical to initiation of the empire and of its expansion.

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[24] *Dayičing gürün-ü ekin üy-e-yin γadaγadu mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u manǰu mongγol ayiladqal-un debter-üd*, 1–18.

[25] *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben <Lifanyuan zeli>*, ed. Labapingcuo (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006), cf. Su Qin, "'Lifanyuan zeli'" xingzhi chucao," *Minzu yanjiu*. 2 (1992). The 'Regulations of the Lifanyuan' were commissioned in 1811 and printed in 1815. There were subsequent editions in the Daoguang and Guangxu periods. On the relationship to *Menggu lüli* see Dalizhabu Bao, "'Menggu lüli' ji qi yu 'Lifanyuan zeli' de guanxi," *Zhonghua wenshi gang*, April 13, 2009, http://jds.cass.cn/Item/7905.aspx. Before the Jiaqing publication of the collection now called *Lifanyuan zeli* there was a set of regulations based upon Kangxi-era precedents; the unprinted regulations copied by Neiwufu officials in the Qianlong era are now available as *Qianlong chao neiwufu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli* at http://wenxian.fanren8.com/06/10/2/. The title is applied retrospectively; the material is based on the *Menggu lüli* mentioned in the *shilu* for 1742 (清高宗实录, 乾隆六年十二月丙午); the same manuscript may have been the source for the Lifanyuan section of the Qianlong edition (1748) of *Da Qing huidian*. On the background see Dalizhabu Bao, "Menggu lüli ji qi yu Lifanyuan zeli de guanxi," and Dalizhabu Bao, "Youguan Qianlong chao "Daqing huidian zeli: Lifanyuanzeli" bengao," in *Proceedings of the Research Seminar on Qing Period Political System and Nationalities Cultures* 2010-09-04, accessed March 20, 2013, http://lib.cnki.net/cpfd/ BSMX201009001008.html.

[26] See Zhuang Jifa, *Xie Sui "Zhigong tu" Manwen tushuo jiaozhu* (Taibei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1989) and the essay by Laura Hostetler in this volume. See also the comments by Michael Weiers in his chapter for this volume.

4 Reconstruction of Lifanyuan Origins

In the most concrete terms the Lifanyuan (*Tulergi golo be dasara jurgan*) was the last of the Qing governments to be created in 1638. Conventionally we trace the Lifanyuan to the Mongol Department (*Monggo yamun*), dated to its first mention in imperial documents in 1636,[27] which administered tribute reception and communications from Mongol populations not already incorporated into the Eight Banners—that is, primarily, the Tümed, and the Khalkha populations, as well as the Kazakh minority of Mongolia and eventually the remnant Oirat populations of western Mongolia and Xinjiang. The term *Monggo jurgan* is found in documents relating to 1634, and may suggest that a Mongol office of some kind was already in place.[28] But *Jurgan* can mean 'services' generally, and the reference of 1634 may be to those providing 'Mongol services' and not necessarily to a formal office, as would be denoted by the use of *Bu* or *Yamen*. The ostensible creation date of 1636 is evidently an artefact of the many altered and newly-recorded institutional designations of this time of state transformation during the absorption of Chakhar populations and symbols, and the possible patterning of the *Monggo yamun* upon some of the institutions of the Chakhar Khaganate. The group of officials mentioned in connection with the *Monggo yamun* in 1636 had been performing tasks characteristic of the Lifanyuan, in a systematic and possibly professional manner, for decades.

The distinction between functions and institutions is useful because whatever the date for the *Monggo yamun* creation, it roots were deep, stretching back to written communications and bilingual oaths, reception rituals, marriage connections, titles granted to the early Mongol adherents and other Mongol 'services', even before creation of the Jin khanate in 1616. From the inception of these functions, the generation and preservation of documents relating to Mongols are both a clue and an obstacle to fully understand the functions, jurisdiction and staffing of the Mongol Office and subsequently the Lifanyuan in 1638. The evidence suggests that at least from Nurhaci's first loose organization of the state in 1601, and certainly by the time of the creation of the khanate in 1616, certain officials were designated as specialists in Mongolian communications, and they intervened to make Mongolian communications systematic and parallel to communications received by the court from Chinese and Korean communicants.

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[27] Wu Yuanfeng, "Qian yan," 1. For background see Chia Ning, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14 (1993).

[28] See also Zhao Yuntian, "Qingdai Lifanyuan chucao," *Journal of the Central Minorities Institute* 1 (1982): 1.

One of the best indications of this proto-history of the Lifanyuan functions lies in the discipline introduced to written communications from Mongol headmen to the Jin and, later, Qing rulers. Mamoru Hagihara, upon a review of both the original documents and a long list of published scholarship on juridical documents in particular, found that a distinct template became characteristic of these documents in the Qing period, marking a break with traditional Mongolian formats—actually two distinct breaks, the first dating from a late sixteenth-century communication from Altan Khan to Nurhaci, and the second dating to the Shunzhi period. The meaning, in Hagihara's view, was that Mongolian juridical and other documents of the Qing period had been distinctly influenced by Chinese documentary templates, contrary to the suggestion of some previous scholars.[29] Such changes could only have been effected by officials of the Lifanyuan. Of more interest to the present discussion, the documents show clear and consistent intervention by scribes who deleted some traditional Mongolian conventions, imposed some consistency upon the greeting lines, and used Manchu to annotate the documents as to date and sender. Hagihara finds that this function continued seamlessly to the later introduction, by officials of the Lifanyuan, of the distinctly Chinese template of multi-level quotations for contextualizing judicial decisions.

In this instance there is a concrete documentary proof of the early functioning of a Mongol services component developing as the Jin khanate emerged. The incorporation of Mongols into the Jin and Qing aristocracies, the negotiation of tribute and military obligations, and registering of land rights were obviously also handled by specialists who had been functioning for decades before 1634. This discipline and revision of Mongol communications is also evident in the collection of documents edited by Nicola di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, in which approximately two-thirds of the documents have been annotated in some way in Manchu. Of a 1627 communication to Khong Bagatur of the Naimans[30] from Hung Taiji, the editors comment, "This particular document is clearly a draft rather than a copy of the final letter. Reading is made difficult by a series of corrections, deletions and additions that show that the document has been revised by a Manchu scribe."[31] Officials of the Jin court could even intervene in communications among federated Mongol groups: a 1628 letter from the Kharachin noble Dügüreng Güyeng to the Jin court "was made in all likelihood by a scribe at the Manchu court, probably to be sent to other Mongol chiefs to inform them of the [Kharachin] position."[32] These are among the clearly defined functions of the *Monggo yamun* after it becomes visible in 1636, yet even the small amount of remaining documentation suggests that these functions were well established before 1634. We know something of the specialists who performed these tasks. Asi Darkhan, who was named as director of the *Monggo yamun* in 1634,[33] was acting as early as 1629 as the enunciator of military regulations to the Khorchin and other Mongol groups, and Sonin and Aluqu are mentioned more than once as envoys between the Jin court and various Mongol leaders.[34] The same men and their associates were responsible for receiving Mongol dignitaries at Hung Taiji's capital.[35] We understand better the importance of the later Lifanyuan as a venue of external communications and diplomacy when we realize that in the Jin period, Mongols federated to Jin acted as intermediaries in negotiations with Ming China.[36]

5 Indirect Rule and the Lifanyuan

The jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan appears from one perspective to be very simple in concept. Most of its early functions were extensions by one means or another of its long history in the management of Mongol affairs. But 'Mongols' in Qing experience was a complex, contradictory, and externally illimitable

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[29] Mamoru Hagihara, "The Formats of Juridical Documents in Mongolia during the Qing Period and Their Origins," *Memoirs of the Tôyô Bunko* 64 (2006).

[30] For "Khong Baatur" see also Johan Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 25.

[31] Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 30. The documents are largely derived from facsimile reproductions, by Li Baowen, of the same documents in the First Historical Archives. Hagihara's documents have a substantial overlap with this collection.

[32] Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 43.

[33] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingdai Lifanyuan chucao," 2; Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 167.

[34] Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Baio, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 66.

[35] *Qingshi gao*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978), juan 91, regarding *binli*, states that in the early Qing receptions were divided between the Lifanyuan and the *zhukesi*. The reference is to a period before the Libu (which succeeded to the *zhukesi* functions), suggesting that the functions of the Lifanyuan long predated the formal designation of the office.

[36] See for example Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations*, 73–5.

concept,[37] and the Lifanyuan tended to mirror this plasticity in its zones of jurisdiction. Eight Banner Mongols were under the governance of the Eight Banners, but a small portion of the Eight Banner Mongols retained herding rights in nomadic territories, and these were administered through the Lifanyuan, especially in cases of legal disputes. Outside the Eight Banners, the Mongol populations were further striated. The Chakhars and Tümeds, adherents from the period of creation of the empire in 1634–1636, were jointly administered by the Lifanyuan and the Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu*), as they were under the direct patronage of the Qing court. Mongols, mostly of Khorchin descent, headed departments of the civil government in the 1630s. High-ranking Mongols from the federations, primarily Khalkha, were often directed to the Libu for their court presentations. The Lifanyuan was not in any important sense an institution governing Mongols, but a government for Mongols not placed in other segments of the state, and many peoples whose place or status was ambiguous or at least temporarily unresolved.

In its earliest phase—before the conquests of China, Mongolia, Tibet or Xinjiang—the subjects of the Lifanyuan were defined by their language and their ability to transgress lines of political affiliation. During the Hung Taiji reigns, Mongols who became wholly subject to the Jin khanate became the founders of the Mongol Eight Banners; Mongols who resisted incorporation without exhibiting hostility toward the Jin, or who faced both the Jin and the Ming (or, earlier the Chakhar Khaganate) as potential trade partners, allies or enemies, were addressed by the Lifanyuan. In the late 1630s, as the Qing empire took shape, the Lifanyuan became the venue for negotiating the interests of Mongols—some of them bannermen, some not—whose herds and normal pasture territories intersected with the prospective frontiers of Qing expansion. Unlike its two companion governments, the Lifanyuan was born in ambiguities of sovereignty and affiliation, and into the late eighteenth century it remained capable of navigating ambiguous ground.

The seventeenth-century terms by which different Mongol groups entered into communications with the Jin and Qing courts may have provided the fundamental jurisdictional and structural constitution of the Lifanyuan. David Sneath, Johan Elverskog and Lkhamsuren Munkh-Erdene are among the scholars recently examining—by different terms and comparisons—the issues of sovereignty as they related to alliances among Mongol political groups and between Mongol political groups and imperial states.[38] While all disagree on

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[37] See Crossley, "Making Mongols."

[38] David Sneath, *The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007);

the exact foundation of and stability of political cohesion within and among Mongol political groups, all agree that Mongol connections to outside empires were not seen by the Mongols or expressed by the Mongols as alliances between states, compromises of sovereignty, or establishment of unitary authority. In my reading of their scholarship these authors seem more or less in agreement that *Törö*, which we might normally read as 'Law' and which several scholars accept as 'state', means something like comity; two corporate entities undertake to "join—törü," in Munkh-Erdene's phrase,[39] by means of an express instrument sworn or written (*Caghaja*), which obliges them to observe specified rules, perhaps existing laws, protecting the interests of the other party. In this context, *Törö* was the product of the recognition of legitimacy of both parties, manifested in ritual and in language, but was distinct from an alliance of war or defence (*Eye-e*). Such mutual subscriptions were, in the terms used both by Mongol correspondents and by the Hung Taiji court, the substance of the relations with the Tümed and other groups. The consequent fungibility of sovereignty and fluidity in recognition of leadership among Mongol clients likely kept the Lifanyuan itself in a fluid and to certain extent informal condition well into the eighteenth century. As the Qing court after 1650 applied continuous pressure to formalize and manipulate administrative configurations among the affiliated—and ultimately among the conquered—Mongols,[40] the Lifanyuan took on more fixed structure itself.

Nevertheless, the original constitution of the Lifanyuan as a government of unstable jurisdiction responding to political magnates whose jurisdictions were also to some degree unstable was handily extended to other segments of the pacified, indirectly administered littoral of the Qing domain. The Lifanyuan became the primary Qing instrument of indirect rule, which is evidently what causes many modern scholars to associate it with distinct rule of 'minority nationalities' (*Shaoshu minzu*) before the twentieth century.[41] Appointment or confirmation of Mongolian, Turkestani or Tibetan clerics, tax and tribute collection, and adjudication of disputes, delivery of condolences, monitoring of public health, and distribution of imperial citations for these populations were all under the jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan, though the earliest and

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Elverskog, *Our Great Qing*; Lkhamsuren Munkh-Erdene, "The 1640 Great Code: An Inner Asian Parallel to the Treaty of Westphalia," *Central Asian Survey* 29,3 (2010).

[39] Munkh-Erdene, "The 1640 Great Code," 274–5; cf. Elverskog, *Our Great Qing*, 22–33, 29.

[40] See also Elverskog, *Our Great Qing*, 7–8 and the essay by Uradyn Bulag in this volume.

[41] See for instance Zhang Shi, "Lifanyuan de xingcheng"; Zhao Yuntian, "Qingdai Lifanyuan chucao"; Wu Yuanfeng, "Jin bainian lai Manwen dang'an bianyi chuban zongshu," *Manyu yanjiu* 53,2 (2011): 45.

possibly most frequent task was to provide instructors in ritual and guides for Mongol and Kazakh leaders visiting the court.[42] In this respect, the Lifanyuan was essential to Qing stability during the years of expansion. Indirect rule over newly-pacified areas was a means of decreasing strategic uncertainties in these areas with a maximum of speed and a minimum of expense. In its ability to mitigate possible foreign sympathies of Qing subjects and consolidate relations with elites from across the boundaries, the Lifanyuan was an essential tool for stabilization of the frontiers and continued expansion of Qing territory.[43]

In parts of Xinjiang, in Qinghai, in Tibet and in Mongolia the Lifanyuan remained the channel through which *Tusi* communicated with the Qing court.[44] In the mid-eighteenth century occupation of Xinjiang, for example, the court's reluctance to extend the civil government to Xinjiang by means of provincial incorporation left the Lifanyuan with responsibility for administering the special military districts created at the frontier.[45] For as long as the Jurchens/Manchus had had a political connection with Mongolia, the Mongols had used a joint religious and social hierarchy to form some of their own governments, and the Tibetan religious clerisy was regarded as essential to dominance of Mongolia. Partly through this connection, the Lifanyuan became the locus for appointment of Tibetan religious hierarchs and Qing commissioners in Tibet. During the wars against the Zünghars, Qing military planners were impressed with the geographical, cultural and strategic continuities with eastern Turkestan, which made the Lifanyuan an essential partner with the Eight Banners in the military occupation of Xinjiang. Similarly, the role of the Lifanyuan in Xinjiang was a logical extension of the zone of contingently-defined boundaries and conditional affiliations. After 1761 and for the remainder of the nineteenth century the sub-office of Laiyuansi (*Laiyuan qingli si*)[46] defined the capacity of the Lifanyuan to receive and manage communications with the *Khojas* and *Tusi* of Xinjiang (including the Tarim basin). The function of the Lifanyuan in the administration of Xinjiang was clear enough among Turkestanis that the Kokand khan, 'Ālim Pāshāh, attempted to pursue his negotiations with the Qing through the Lifanyuan in the middle nineteenth century.[47]

The centrality of Mongol affairs to the Qing and the external illimitability of the Mongol zone may have been primarily what brought communication and negotiation with Russia under jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan. For the most part, communications in the early Qing with the Russian government were handled distinctly from those of the states whose embassies exclusively reported to the Board of Rites (Libu) venues of the civil government. There may have been two reasons for this. First, the Qing and Russian empires had been competing for dominance of the Amur River region since the middle seventeenth century. The Qing were victorious until the later nineteenth century, but the history of conflict had constructed a sense of imperial rivalry and a concept of equality between the empires that was partly reflected in the political language of the Lifanyuan.[48] But of greater importance was Russian involvement in Mongolian trade, which was of sufficient volume that disputes in the trade zone were frequent. Mongols subject to the Qing sometimes strayed into Russian territory, Russians sometimes violated Qing borders. Russian merchants based in cities of Mongolia such as Urga complained of thefts, swindles and assaults, while Chinese and Mongol merchants lodged charges of Russian misconduct. Tariffs and transport taxes were often under negotiation. This made the Lifanyuan the natural venue in many ways for negotiation and ratification of the Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1727) that marked the borders, established the sanctions for violation of the borders, and regulated trade across the borders. Nevertheless, Russian delegations to Beijing to begin negotiations of the Nerchinsk Treaty and complete the Kyakhta treaty included visits to the guest ritual courts, the Libu, of the civilian government.

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[42] Wu Yuanfeng, "Qian yan"; Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 300–1. Hagihara, "Formats of Juridical Documents".

[43] For background see Zhao Yuntian, *Qingdai zhili bianchui de shuniu—Lifanyuan* (Urumqi: Xinjiang People's Press, 1999).

[44] The administration of the "Qinghai Oirats," remnant Zünghars, Muslims, and other nomadic peoples of Qinghai by the Lifanyuan created a distinctive administrative history for the province, showing on the one hand the role of the Lifanyuan in administering internal as well as external frontiers, but also the infinite flexibility that the Lifanyuan permitted the Qing in the stabilization of sensitive areas. See Chia Ning, "Placing 'Qinghai Studies' in the Field of China and Inner Asia," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 30 (2008) and from the same author, "Xining banshi dachen yu Yong Qiang shiji Qinghai duo minzu quyu guanli zhidu zhi xingcheng, *Qinghsi yanjiu* 3 (2012).

[45] Laura Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 17, 198.

[46] *Da Qing huidian shili*, juan 20, states that in 1761 (QL 26) from the five offices of the Lifanyuan one was identified an office dedicated to the affairs of the Muslim Sector (*Huibu*), which was to deliberate on local official names, manage lists of local officials, manage daily affairs and submit reports. The office was shortly after known as the Laiyuansi. See also Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity in Early Qing (1636–1795)* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012), 3–6.

[47] Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, 196–8.

[48] Mark Mancall, *Russia and China, Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

The jurisdictional indefiniteness of the Lifanyuan was a product of the seventeenth-century concepts and practices of graduated sovereignty, indirect governance, and in some measure the predominance of custom over institution.[49] Its role in conquest, even the conquest of China, was essential; the Qing court attempted to subordinate the Lifanyuan to the Libu in 1659, but after the death of the Shunzhi emperor in 1661 the Kangxi regents restored the independence of the Lifanyuan and its leadership in communications with non-Banner Mongols and other border peoples.[50] A century and a half later, as the traditional terms of political affiliation and territorial definition receded under pressure from Europeans and Russians to abide by European concepts of absolute sovereignty and precise determination of administrative territory, the jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan shrank. The treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta had obviated much of the role of the Lifanyuan in the administration of Mongolia; disputes were thereafter resolved according to the set prescriptions of the treaties, and the Lifanyuan became a small claims court for pastoral and commercial disputes among Mongols. Russia continued to press for formal claim on Qing territory, and in the nineteenth century joined the Europeans and Americans as signatories of the unequal treaties. As internal and external boundaries hardened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Lifanyuan's previous ability to address those populations of the interstices became no longer an advantage, but a liability. Its jurisdiction inevitably contracted.

In this respect, Chia Ning has questioned the wisdom of characterizing the Lifanyuan as an instrument of Qing colonialism or imperialism;[51] her doubts are eminently reasonable. Institutions of imperialism are usually premised upon the extension of externally-imposed formality and legality to what had been informal and subject to cultural negotiation by native peoples—usually for purposes of undermining native authority. On a micro-geographical scale, it is undeniable that the Qing were engaged in such colonial or imperial enterprises in the localities of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Yunnan, Taiwan and parts of Sichuan and Guangxi. In some instances—as in the attempts to formalize and manipulate clerical appointments in Tibet—the Lifanyuan was essential to this process, but more often the colonizing measures were led by the Board of War and the Grand Council.[52] The Lifanyuan dealt in the dynamics of indirect rule that intentionally or unintentionally preserved some degree of local autonomy, contrary to the usual agenda of imperialism. And in the macro-geography of imperial definition, it was the Qing that was forced by other powers to formalize and specify territorial rights in Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan that the court would have preferred to remain negotiable and ambiguous. That process of formalization was lethal to the purpose of the Lifanyuan as a distinct government within the state, and undoubtedly contributed to its virtual demise in the nineteenth century.

6 Qing Transformation and the Death of Ambiguous Sovereignty

The 1811 publication of the *Lifanyuan zeli* for the first time represented the Lifanyuan as regulated—and not as a government regulating others. As the conquests spread through Mongolia, East Turkestan, the Tarim Basin, Tibet and Yunnan, the Lifanyuan took primary responsibility for communications with newly-recognized *Tusi*. Cooperative local elites were confirmed and recognized through the Lifanyuan, laws were administered through its legal bureaucracy, tribute and taxes were collected, commercial licenses granted, hunting and herding were regulated, and local elites were trained in Qing court etiquette and transported to Beijing or Chengde for occasional audiences. Until the middle nineteenth century the Lifanyuan coordinated the political and economic integration of large zones federated to the empire without sustained and thorough military confrontation and occupation until the middle nineteenth century. But as the pace of conquest slowed and newly-conquered zones evolved from military occupation to direct administration by the Board of War and Board of Punishments, the scope of Lifanyuan activity narrowed.

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[49] The summary in the *Qingshi gao* makes clear that the reception of *Fanguo* tribute was a joint task of the Libu and the Lifanyuan. Khalkha, Tibet, Qinghai, Gurkha reported to the Lifanyuan and others reported to the Libu. But roles could be altered, narrowed, or widened by command of the court. Occasionally Europeans were directed to the Lifanyuan for certain matters and Mongols were sent to the Libu; see *Qingshi gao*, juan 91, zhi 66, binli.

[50] Zhang Shi, "Lifanyuan de xingcheng," para 2–3.

[51] Chia Ning, *Management of Population Diversity*, 3.

[52] Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 20–1.

Administrative business continued, which can be confirmed at least through 1898, but was gradually confined to managing small-scale tribute, visits to court and petty disputes.

Something of the changing influence of the Lifanyuan over the civil government and the Eight Banners is suggested by the professional affiliations of its presidents (*Shangshu*). Between the establishment of the capital at Beijing in 1644 and the end of the Lifanyuan in 1906, there were a hundred presidents. The Lifanyuan's initial directors (till 1654) were all promoted from within the Lifanyuan itself, and in later times six more, giving a total of nine appointments from within. Fifteen of those appointed from without came directly from high military command (*Dutong* or *Jiangjun*) within the Eight Banners. Four presidents were officials in the Board of War and an additional two came from the regional occupation commissions established in Xinjiang, meaning that about twenty per cent of the Lifanyuan presidents came from the professional military sectors. But they were equalled, over the long course of Qing history, by former presidents of the Censorate itself—the council to which each of the Boards reported. Presidency of the Lifanyuan was clearly not regarded as a peripheral appointment before the nineteenth century, and was frequently awarded to officials who were among the most distinguished in the empire. More significant, the comprehensive functions of the Lifanyuan made it a critical transition point in the careers of officials specializing in law, war and foreign relations; it was not regarded as a graceful resting place for superannuated bureaucrats. The Board of War, for instance, supplied two presidents to the Lifanyuan, but eleven Lifanyuan presidents proceeded to the Board of War. The Board of Rites supplied three presidents, but received eight. And the Board of Punishments supplied one, but received six.[53]

The reduction of the Lifanyuan to a normal department of the imperial state in the later nineteenth century was vividly evinced in the huge influx of senior censors (*Zuodu yushi*) into the presidency, indicating that in contrast to previous years presidency of the Lifanyuan had become a sinecure. The first presidential appointment from the Censorate was in 1690, and for a century afterward there were no more. However, between 1816 and 1905, 19 senior censors were appointed to the post; most of them served after 1855, and between 1871 and 1905, half of all Lifanyuan presidents were former senior censors.[54]

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[53] Qian Shifu, *Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980).

[54] Ibid.

Overall, the Lifanyuan was by then a normal bureaucratic career path; the only residue of the ancient government it had once been was in the continuing requirement that appointees be aristocrats or bannermen.

The overall Qing strategy of keeping each of its ancestral governments on its own bottom and dedicated to its own functions unravelled over time. The pressures weakening the distinctions of the governments came partly from the complexities of settling Eight Banner soldiers and their families within the civilian spaces of the Chinese provinces; the exploitation of Mongolia, in which Chinese, Mongol and Russian individuals and economic practices generated conflicts that were not easily resolved entirely within the Lifanyuan; the administrative transitions of southern and southwest China from indirect rule to direct rule by the civil government; and the increasing costs of military mobilization (due partly to corruption and partly to the actual increasing size of armies) through the eighteenth century. The result was that by the end of the eighteenth century the Ministry of Finance and the Grand Council were, with the imperial court itself, transcendent over the state's separate governments; Eight Banners administration had been parsed among the Ministry of War, Ministry of Finance, and parts of the imperial inner bureaucracy; and the Lifanyuan had lost some functions to the Ministry of War, others to the civil government.

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CHAPTER 4

The Libu and Qing Perception, Classification and Administration of Non-Han People

Zhang Yongjiang

While being in the service of the Manchu state, many political institutions of the Qing were inherited from the Ming dynasty. The Libu, for instance, assumed much the same responsibilities as its Ming predecessor: overseeing rituals of investiture, ancestral sacrifice, banquets, and the imperial civil service exams. As the Libu's scope of responsibilities pertained to 'all under heaven', it did not only deal with a myriad of internal affairs but also handled 'foreign affairs' with vassal states and foreign governments. There were, however, significant differences between the Ming and the Qing Libu. Ming-time governments had no special institutions to deal with the affairs of non-Han groups on Chinese territory. Therefore, the Ming Libu was responsible for those Mongols who lived within the Ming realm as well as for aboriginal groups in the southwest. By contrast, the Qing established a special office to deal with matters related to Mongols, Tibetans, Muslims, and other ethnic groups in the north: the Lifanyuan.

Despite the existence of this new institution, however, the Qing Libu still oversaw many ritual matters concerning the court's non-Han subjects in the north and northwest, particularly the handling of tribute, investiture, religious sacrifices, and banquets. Hence, the duties and responsibilities of the Lifanyuan and the Libu were distinct but overlapped in certain respects. For example, the Lifanyuan supervised vassals and foreign states from the continental boundaries of Inner Asia, while the Libu administered Korea as well as the oceanic vassals and foreign states. Ethnic and cultural perceptions of the Qing administration were thus reflected in the classification of 'Inner and Outer' (*Hua—Yi*), a scheme that became the basis for a policy of differentiated treatment of the inner and outer ethnic groups and cultures of the Qing empire. The design was part and parcel of a political culture, closely linked with other components such as the tribute and ritual systems which played a significant role for cohesion and stability in society.

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1 Confucian Ethic Order and the Governmentality of *'Li'* in Chinese History

The word *Li* is a component of the institutional names and represents the philosophical foundation of both the Libu and the Lifanyuan; hence, it should be pointed out first of all that *Li* reflects an expression of value that was prominent in ancient Chinese culture. Etymological research has shown that its earliest traces go back to oracle bone inscriptions of the Shang dynasty. According to an early explanation in the first Han-Chinese dictionary *Shuowen jiezi*, "Li, which verbally means 'to carry out', refers to the rendering of service to gods and the invocation of blessing [礼, 履也, 所以事神致福也]".[1] The basic meaning thus refers to the concept and act of rendering service to gods. The literal meaning of *Li* was subsequently extended to first include 'respect' and then the rituals of showing respect. By no later than the Spring and Autumn period (ca. 722–481 BCE), the notion of *Li* was generally invoked to represent all norms of morals and behaviour in human society, i.e., institutions and rites. As a cultural practice, *Li* is a ritual used by people in antiquity to offer sacrifices to gods and to ask blessings from gods; it can thus be described as the first behaviour-instructing system in China. However, with the emergence of ancient states (Xia, Shang, Zhou, etc.) the notion of *Li* gradually changed and became exploited by their rulers. The connotation of *Li* became transformed from a mere ancient ritual into behavioural norms restricting all kinds of social relationships including marriage, lineage, adoption, and ruler-subject relations.

The first use of *Li* as a principle to rule a country appeared with the Western Zhou dynasty during the reign of the Duke of Zhou (Zhou Gong, 11th c. BCE): "Duke Zhou designed the Zhou Li."[2] However, according to the Zhou-time *Record of Rites* (*Liji*) the Five *Li* system, involving all aspects of social life and regulating the relationships among humans and between humans and nature, was already well-organized and rather sophisticated at that time. This suggests that the Zhou *Li* was not created by Duke Zhou alone but rather represents the result of a longer process. The *Book of Documents* (*Shujing* or *Shangshu*) recorded in its chapter *Shun Dian* that Shun created the Five *Li* (*Wuli*) system. Confucius, too, said that the Xia *Li*, Yin *Li*, and Zhou *Li* were linked by a relationship of succession.[3] Hence, Qing-time scholars came to the conclusion that "the name of Five Li appeared with the 'Yu Book' [虞书], while the content of Five Li was written in 'Zhou Guan' [周官]."[4] There is thus good reason to assume that *Li* as a political institution originated in the Xia dynasty and was completed by a relationship of succession during the Zhou dynasty.

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[1] Xu Shen, Shuowen jiezi, in: Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), juan 1 shang, 223:73.

[2] Zuo Qiuming, Zuozhuan, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu*, commented by Du Yu and annotated by Kong Yingda as Zuozhuan zhushu (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 43:447, the 18th year of Duke Wen, Chunqiu zuozhuan zhushu 春秋左传注疏 [Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals]. Likewise, the *Book of Yi Zhou* mentions that "Duke Zhou created Li and Yue, and enacted measurements. Then the country became well-organized"; see Yi Zhou Shu, in *Sibu beiyao* (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936), juan 6, the 55th mingtangjie, shibu 史部 [History Part], 56.

The Five *Li* system consisted of *Ji, Xiong, Jun, Bin, and Jia*. *Ji Li* was used to manage the country's ghosts and gods affairs (i.e., sacrifices). *Xiong Li* was used to mourn the grief and disasters suffered in the country (i.e., mourning). *Jun Li* was used when territories were being conquered or expeditions prepared. *Bin Li* was used to show mercy to other countries; this also included pilgrimage. Finally, *Jia Li* was used to show mercy to the people, referring to life cycle rituals for elderly people, maturity, and marriage (*Guanhun*). The practice of *Li* and its sphere of application were almost all-embracing:

> Morality and ethics cannot be established without Li. Teaching and instructions cannot distinguish good from evil without Li. Fights and arguments cannot be judged without Li. The relationship between monarch and subjects, between higher positions and lower positions, between fathers and sons, between the elder and the younger cannot be defined without Li. The close relationship between officials and their teachers cannot be established without Li. The authorities cannot set up prestige when establishing the court hierarchy, the military command, and law enforcement without Li. The rituals for sacrificing and praying cannot be formal and sincere without Li.[5]

The core principle of *Li* was to distinguish between the noble and the humble and between high and low positions in society. It expressed rules according to the social hierarchy, comprised the whole world, and thereby built a stable and united empire on the basis of hierarchical politics. Following these principles, Song dynasty Emperor Zhao Ji (1101–1125) made further explanations:

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[3] Lunyu, in *Lunyu yizhu*, ed. Yang Bojun (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), the 14th Weizheng: 22–3.

[4] Qin Huitian. Wuli tongkao, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), Fan Li 凡例 [Notes on the use of the work], 135:62.

[5] Liji quli, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 115:29.

> [Five Li] can put human relations in the right order, differentiate the status from high to low, distinguish the noble from the humble. Thus there are norms for rulers and subjects, for father and son [...]. The husband proposes and the wife obeys, the elder brother behaves in a friendly manner and the younger brother acts respectfully. All orders are obeyed and all ethics are complied with. Those in higher social positions are not allowed to use coercion on those in lower positions, while those in lower social positions cannot usurp powers of those in higher positions. The powerful are not allowed to exploit the powerless, while the powerless cannot place themselves over their masters. If nobody breaks these rules, the upper-lower order will become substantiated. The court, the country, the locals, and communities will then abide by the laws, rules, ethics, regulations, and principles, and the order is upheld with no disturbance. Thus, the noble and the humble can be distinguished.[6]

Chinese society became unstable during the Spring and Autumn and the subsequent Warring States (476–221 BCE) periods; in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, this is described as "Li collapsed and music [*Yue*] deteriorated."[7] Yet the circles of ideology were still flourishing and diverse. The Confucians proposed a full set of social values comprising the individual, family, society, and state; in other words: an ethics-centred social order.

The contents of the Confucian value system can be roughly outlined as follows: one part is the order for social roles and duties expressed as the principle "a monarch, a subject, a father and a son should all behave properly in their own defined roles",[8] which requires everyone to act accordingly in society. Another part of the value system is the 'Five Ethics' (*Wulun*) which refers to the relationship between father and son, ruler and subject, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and between friends: "These five kinds of relationships keep a person on the tracks of wisdom under heaven."[9] The general principle to deal with these five ethics is:

> A father and a son should keep emotional bonds with each other; a monarch and a subject should treat each other with justice; a husband and

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[6] Zhao Ji, Da Guan Wu Li Zhi Ji Bei, in *Daming fuzhi*, ed. Zhu Ying (Beijing: Tushuguan chubanshe, 2002), 5:1; the stele of the five Li was erected in 1108 and is displayed at the Stele Museum in Daming County, Heibei Province.

[7] Lunyu, in *Lunyu yizhu*, 188.

[8] Ibid., 128.

[9] Zhu Xi, Zhongyong zhangju, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 197:207.

> a wife should respect the inherent difference between them; brothers should know the distinction between their age and role in the family; friends should remain honest when they interact with one another.[10]

This echoes what is said in the *Yi Zhuan*, that "if fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers, husbands and wives all behave properly in their respective roles, the family will run well, and thus the whole world will run well."[11] The highest ideal of the Confucians is the pursuit of universal harmony where everyone behaves for the benefit of the whole society. However, this ideal is very hard to put into practice. Therefore, the Confucians contented themselves with a minor goal, the pursuit of a prospering world where everyone behaves for the benefit of their families. It was hoped that the value they proposed would help the world to reach a state where everyone

> uses Li as a principle to justify the relationship between ruler and subjects, to dearly unite fathers and sons, to create harmony between brothers and peace between husbands and wives, to implement a system of rules, to allocate land and houses, to praise people with courage and intelligence, to attain achievements for oneself.[12]

In the Confucian value system, the most important part is the primary and secondary relationship between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, which in later times was called the 'Three Cardinal Guides' (*Sangang*). Meanwhile, the Confucians put forward some crucial moral concepts including *Ren, Yi, Li, Zhi*, and *Xin* which were called the 'Five Constant Virtues' (*Wuchang*) by later generations. Both the 'Three Cardinal Guides' and the 'Five Constant Virtues' constituted the well-ruled world in the Confucians' ideal conception. The Confucians advised the people "to put integrity into their heart, to behave honestly, to cultivate a moral character, to manage their own family well, to govern the country properly, and to keep the world in peace."[13]

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[10] Meng Zi, "Teng Wengong Shang," in *Mengzi jizhu*, ed. Zhu Xi (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), cf. Mengzi jizhu, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu*, vol. 3 (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 197:128.

[11] Yi Zhuan Jing Jie, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu*, vol. 4, commented by Zixia yizhuan (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 7:54.

[12] Zhu Xi, Daxue zhangju, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 197: 4–5.

[13] Liji daxue, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 116:475–76.

They believed that moral values could provide the citizens with ideal human quality, thus building a harmonious and stable society.

The concept was considered to be perfectly suited for a dynasty based on agricultural production and a social organization based on patriarchal clans. However, the question of how to best rule a country was discussed by many ancient scholars. Confucius, who admired the Zhou, advocated governance by *Li* and believed that "people will not find their positions in society if they do not learn Li."[14] The legalist school argued that the country should 'be ruled by the law' (法治). Xun Zi (ca. 312–230 BCE), the Confucians' innovator, proposed that the authorities should integrate the advantages of both theories, that is "to emphasize Li as well as the value of law [*longli zhongfa* 隆礼重法]";[15] this had great influence on later generations.

Because the Confucian concept of *Li* helped to stabilize the social order and to enhance autocracy, it was considered the basic principle of governance by rulers and political theorists alike through the ages. Emperor Wu (141–87 BCE) of the Han dynasty "abolished all other theories of ruling a country and simply referred to Confucianism."[16] From then onward, Confucianism became the orthodox political theory in China, and the principle of 'Governance by *Li*' (*Weiguo yili*) became the Chinese traditional mode of ruling a country. The idea is strikingly expressed in the *Zuozhuan*: "Li is a ruler's most important principle [...] Li is something that can rule the country well, keep the society stable, maintain order among the citizens, and benefit later generations."[17] Later dynasties all inherited the governmentality of *Li* and continued perfecting it until the Qing dynasty.[18]

Being aware of the strong governmental power of *Li*, the Manchu rulers, who were good at fighting on horseback, accepted traditional Han-Chinese political culture as soon as they had conquered the Central Plains and replaced the Ming dynasty:

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[14] Kongqiu, Lunyu, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 197:89.

[15] Xun Kuang, Xunzi: Tianlunpian, in *Jingyin wenyuange sikuquanshu* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1986), 695:221.

[16] Huang Kaiguo, *Jingxue guankui* (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 2005), 7 and 10.

[17] Zuo Qiuming, Zuozhuan, vol. 3 on the 13th year of King Yin and vol. 47 on the 15th year of King Zhao, 143: 105 and 144:394.

[18] This was also recorded in Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), vol. 82, zhi 75, Li 1, 2483.

> After conquering Beijing, Emperor Shunzhi obeyed the Mandate and created the institutions. In 1646, the emperor asked the ministers in charge of Li to consult the Ming documents and to compile books of Li. This set up the regulations for citizens to abide by.[19]

Of course, by that time fifteen years had already passed since the Qing rulers had established their Board of Rites and created the *Li* system—time enough to gain sufficient experience to form traditional rituals of their own. The new Qing *Li* system thus represented an integration of the Manchu *Li* and the Ming dynasty *Li* system. However, this conscious move in transforming and combining Manchu with Ming *Li* traditions resulted in a new Qing *Li* system that consolidated existing distinctions with regard to nomadic groups of Inner Asia. Moreover, the new frontiers of the ever expanding empire and the constant influx of non-Han groups strengthened these features and made them even more manifest.

2 Qing Classifications of Inner vs. Outer Ethnic Groups and Preferential Treatment

2.1 *The Board of Rites in a World of Two Hemispheres*

From a modern perspective, the Libu dealt only with limited affairs and would not be rated as very significant. In Qing times, however, it was one of the most important state institutions, and ranked third within the six imperial boards. According to the *Collected Statutes of the Great Qing* the Libu was "in charge of ritual and music, religious sacrifice, official endowments, tribute, banquet, and imperial examinations."[20] It consisted of four bureaus, and even if we add the subsidiary bodies there were no more than seven offices altogether and only 45 officials of high and middle rank. Drawing up the principles of etiquette and taking part in less practical matters, the Libu officials often played the role of masters of ceremonies (*Libu tangsiguan*). In traditional China, however, celebrations, rituals, and military affairs were of equal importance, as is stated in the *Zuozhuan* where it is said that the most important affairs of the state are sacrifices and the military.[21]

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Daqing huidian, Kangxi edition (1690), vol. 40, 'Libu 1', in *Daqing wuchao huidian* (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2006), 1:497.

[21] Zuo Qiuming, Zuozhuan, 143:581.

Regarding 'all under heaven' as its sphere of governance and claim to power, the Qing dynasty expressed greater sovereignty than its predecessor, because the territory under military and political control, the imperial domain, was much bigger than during Ming times. Since the Qing domain of influence was strongly associated with Qing *Li* culture, mainly through ceremonial control, it can be called the '*Li* cultural space'. Boundaries between the imperial territory and the '*Li* cultural space' could change—that is, decrease or grow—under certain circumstances.

With Inner Asia entering the empire, the early Qing greatly expanded not only the first tier of its domain but also its '*Li* cultural space' reaching as far as Central Asia and present Xinjiang in the northwest. However, in the later part of the 19th century significant parts of the 'cultural space' collapsed. In 1911, for instance, Outer Mongolia, which had entered the sphere of governance in 1691, no longer belonged to the imperial domain. The ways in which the Qing controlled the two hemispheres differed significantly. The mode for the former was comprehensive, using political, military, economic and cultural means, while for the latter it was simply ritual.

The political objectives of the territorial and the ritual cultural space were not of the same kind. Of course, they overlapped and criss-crossed, mainly with regard to certain rituals such as tribute and reception. This underlines that the expansion of the imperial domain was a continuous process, and that the political process itself reflected a transitional semi-autonomy to which governmental policy needed time to adapt. With the on-going expansion into new frontiers, new ethnic groups with their own cultural systems and characteristics entered the ritual cultural space as well, and it was likely that they could comply with the same etiquette. Institutions like the Libu do not always reflect results, but they can often illustrate a process.

2.2 *Classifying Ethnic Groups and the Many Ways of 'Civilizing'*

While military success and territorial expansion gave the Qing emperors indeed reason to be proud of and satisfied with their endeavours in empire building, the government faced increasing difficulties in civilizing 'all people under heaven' (*Tianxia wanmin*). However, the Qing inherited the political philosophy of 'The king has it all' (普天之下，莫非王土) and definitely upheld the Manchu claim to power. The *Collected Statutes of the Great Qing* recorded:

> The unity of the empire has been successfully accomplished, and the ancient times have been left behind. [People] of all directions submit [to the Qing] as subjects. Those who pay tribute are so many that they cannot be counted. All Mongol groups are placed under the governance

> of the Lifanyuan, and others under the Tusi system of the Board of War. Those who are managed under the [Libu] Guest Bureau [*Zhukesi*] and the Bureau of Interpreters [*Huitongguan*] pay tribute in specified years, with a given number of envoys and permitted items. They receive rewards according to their ranks.[22]

This was a classification from the perspective of tribute ceremonies concerning the two types of tributaries under the Lifanyuan and Libu, respectively. Being the ruling ethnic group, the Manchus were, of course, not included. The description is, however, not comprehensive since the Lifanyuan supervised relationships with Russia, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia. Seventy years later, another edition of the *Collected Statutes of the Great Qing* specified that

> [the Libu is responsible for] all subordinate tribute states surrounding China: Korea in the east, Liuqiu and Sulu in the southeast, Annam and Siam in the south, and Xiyang, Myanmar, and Nanzhang in the southwest. Meanwhile, the tribes and foreign states in the northwest are under the Lifanyuan.[23]

This classification was further described later in *The Drafted History of the Qing Dynasty*:

> At the beginning of the Qing, the subdued vassal tribes or states constituted two kinds, being governed separately by the Lifanyuan and the [Libu] Guest Bureau. Those under the Lifanyuan were the Mongols, the Khalkha, the Tibetans, the Qinghai, and the Ghurkha. Those under the [Guest] Bureau were Korea, Vietnam, Nanzhang, Myanmar, Sulu, the Netherlands, Siam, and Liuqiu. Even though they differ from one another, they all belong to the same Li [ritual]. The Western countries were classified among these vassals at the beginning. But in the European wind and the Asian storm, since the Xian[feng] and Tong[zhi] reigns they have been very aggressive in the course of the diplomatic come-and-go and the treaty negotiations and assignments. In terms of the Li [ritual], however, they are [our] enemies.[24]

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[22] Daqing huidian, Kangxi edition, vol. 72, 1:973.

[23] Daqing huidian, Qianlong edition (1764), vol. 56, 'Libu', in *Daqing wuchao huidian* (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2006), 11:484.

[24] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 91, 2674.

Facing so many different groups and cultures, including Russia and the European Powers, the Qing structured and managed their various relations by means of a sophisticated classification which found its expression not only in the respective executive authorities involved, but also in a differentiated etiquette. The basic classificatory principle was to rank the various relationships with the Qing in political, cultural, and emotional terms.

The Libu's principle in civilizing the many ethnic groups was rituals which included at least two parts. First, the ceremony itself reflected the concept and attitude of the Qing's self-perception. Second, there was the symbolic and performative act of the ceremony with its necessary tools and paraphernalia, including food, costumes, guards of honour, official seals, money, musical instruments, as well as text, music, and dance. While the way of civilizing was reflected in many respects, the focus was clearly on distinguishing high and low status relations and expressing forms of different affinity.

2.2.1 The Ceremony Rites

Belonging to the *Jia Li* series, the most important ceremony was the celebration of the emperor's ascension to the throne during which the 'arrays and positions' (*Banwei*) were extremely important. In early Qing times, the court ordered the Korean and Mongolian envoys to be positioned behind all other officials. According to the regulations of 1632, the Mongolian Beile were positioned behind the Manchu Beile during the New Year's Day court ceremony, and the Korean envoy at the end. These two positions were, however, reversed under Hūwangtaiji.[25] Later, with the reign of Emperor Shunzhi, a new format, the *Nianban* system, was established for Mongolian nobles who now had to perform annual pilgrimages (*Chaojin*) to the emperor at the appointed time but were no longer obliged to participate in the New Year's Day court ceremony. The Mongolian husband (Efu) of the emperor's elder sister resided in Beijing, and the Mongol nobles (Taiji) had a regular audience with the emperor on the 5th, 15th, and 25th day of each month. Korean envoys, by contrast, could attend only special court ceremonies in Mukden. They were positioned behind all officials, while the Mongol nobles followed after the Manchu princes.[26] After the defeat of the Zünghars in 1757, the queue in the court ceremony gradually came to include Kazakh Khans, Muslims Begs, Yunnan local chieftains, envoys from Central Asia, and the King of Annam. Because the pilgrims were of different cultural identities, the government had to adjust the order of array and position.

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[25] Daqing huidian, Kangxi edition (1690), vol. 40, 1:502–3.

[26] Kun Gang, *Daqing huidian shili*, Guanxu edition (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), vol. 296, 'Libu', 470–1.

After 1760, the regulation was adjusted: the Kazakh nobility joined the Mongols at the appropriate position, followed by the nobles of the Huibu or Xinjiang Muslims. In 1770, the envoy from Kokand (Huohan) arrived at Beijing and joined the pilgrimage ritual with a position at the end of the third rank group. Among the Mongol nobles was the prince of the second rank (Junwang) Celengdeleke (策楞德勒克). The Tusi of Yunnan Menggong Xingtangzha (兴堂扎) was placed at the end of five classes. Usually, foreign envoys from Korea, Liuqiu, Nanzhang, and Siam were seated at the end of all Chinese officials. But this time the Annam king in Beijing was placed right after the Heshuo—the highest Mongol noble rank. This position reflected his status, which was bestowed by the Qing court and significantly higher than that of an envoy. In 1827 Emperor Daoguang issued strict and clear provisions:

> The Mongolian Taijis have always come for the celebration ritual of the New Year's Day at specified annual turns. Because the Lifanyuan did not send officials familiar with the ritual ceremony, mistakes often happened. At the New Year's Day celebration, the Mongolian Khan, the Wang, Beile, Beize, and Gong should from now on perform their ritual etiquette next to the Wang and Gong from China proper. Those below the ranks of Jasagh [Zhasake] and Taiji should do so by lining up on the East, according to their ranks, and among the officials from China proper. Separately, the Muslim Begs and Tusi heads should be grouped together and lined up in the West following the Chinese officials. If Ghurkha envoys come, place them at the end of the Muslim Begs and the Tusi heads as it was before. The Lifanyuan should select among its officials in advance those who know the ritual ceremonies well and can master the Mongolian language, two for each ritual and two for the language. Let them lead the etiquette performance.[27]

Thus, we can clearly see the order of the imperial audience on New Year's Day: Manchu princes → Mongol princes → Kazakh envoys → Huibu Begs → Chinese ministers on East side → Mongolian Jasagh and Taiji → Chinese ministers on the West side → Huibu Begs and Tusi → Ghurkha envoys → envoys from Korea, Liuqiu, Nanzhang, Siam. The ethno-political order in the ritual cultural space is clear at a glance from this ceremonial ranking. The relationship between ritual and politics is self-evident.

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[27] Ibid., vol. 296, 4:471–2.

2.2.2 The Confirmation Ceremony

Belonging to the *Jia Li* series, this ceremony for the Mongol Taiji was implemented by the Lifanyuan. The Mongolian noble's wife (Fujin) and daughter (Gege) received imperial confirmation documents of their ranks every five years, delivered by a Libu envoy. Later, after the defeat of the Zünghars in 1755, the Mongol nobles of Qinghai, Outer Mongolia and other Mongolian areas, male and female alike, all received their imperial documents via the Lifanyuan.[28] Relatives of Huibu nobles were bestowed with confirmations in the case of military activities and support. In 1800 the mother and Fujin of second prince Beile Hadir received their confirmation, as did the Fujin of second prince Besir (†1869) in 1802.[29] There are no records with regard to other ethnic groups.

2.2.3 The 'Issuing-of-the-Calendar' Ceremony

(*Banshuo*) was a kind of *Jia Li* ceremony which in ancient times had a strong political connotation and was celebrated at dawn on the first day of the tenth month each year outside the Meridian Gate. Having the format of a national ceremony, all princes as well as the civil and military officials had to attend the *Banshuo* ceremony. In case of absence they faced punishment. Korea would send an envoy. The participants knelt down one after the other to accept the calendar, thus expressing their subordination. The calendar

> was made public and any forgery would be punished according to the law. To the Mongolian tribes of both the Inner and Outer Jasaghs and to the other non-Chinese peoples along the frontiers, [the calendar] was issued by delivery through the postal stations.[30]

In addition to dates and solar term information, the Qing statutory calendar book included news on current affairs. New territories brought under the imperial domain during the Qianlong reign were to be recorded and described, as was the case with the Zünghars after their integration in 1755. In 1757, the solar terms of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Songyuan (Boduna), Sansing, Nerchinsk (Nibuchu), Ili (Yili), Barköl, and Turfan (Turpan) were added to the calendar book, together with twenty-six Huibu places. When in 1772 the Torghuds returned from Russia to China, the latitude and altitude information of their new places was added. In the following year a revision of geographical and other names took place.[31] In 1777, place names as well as latitude and altitude information on the Jinchuan hill people (*Fanzi*), an Amdo-Tibetan related group, and on the Tusi were added.

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[28] Ibid., vol. 307, 4:627.

[29] Ibid., vol. 307, 4:628–9.

[30] Ibid., vol. 315, 4:710; besides Qinghai and Dörbet (Dörvöd or Duerbote) tribes the source mentions Mongolian groups including the twenty-four Jasaghs from Inner Mongolia and fifteen Jasaghs from Outer Mongolia.

The calendar book also collected information on the astronomy and geography of provinces and even vassal states. In 1775, for instance, it recorded the latitude and altitude of Anhui, Hunan and Gansu, and in 1789 that of Annam. In 1803, Emperor Jiaqing ordered the Astronomical Department to have the name of Annam permanently changed into Vietnam. Solar term information of Liuqiu found its way into the records only in 1809.[32] The Qing calendar book can thus be seen as an imperial collection and symbolic representation of the two hemispheres of territorial and ritual cultural spaces, and it is not surprising that the court paid close attention to the 'Issuing-of-the-Calendar' ceremony which was taken seriously in political terms.

2.2.4 Banquet Ceremony

Belonging to the *Jia Li* series, this ceremony was hosted by the Libu on the occasion of a number of festivities, including: the New Year's Day Feast (*Yuanriyan*), the Winter Solstice Feast (*Dongzhiyan*), the First Day Feast (*Yuanhuiyan*), the Birthday Feast (*Qianqiuyan*), the Triumphant Feast (*Kaixuanyan*), and the Feast of the Outlying Prefectures (*Waifanyan*).

Since the Mukden period, a large banquet was held on New Year's Day at noon after the court ceremony, the participants of which were mainly Manchu princes and Mongol nobles. Meals and drinks (meat, liquor, etc.) were served by the participants themselves, providing ample opportunities to meet, pay respect, and exchange compliments. Later, arguably since the time of Kangxi, the banquet was organized by the government alone. In 1726 the ceremony was arranged in the following manner:

At nine o'clock, the Manchu and Mongol nobles, wearing court dress, gathered at the Gate of Supreme Harmony (*Taihemen*) while Manchu and Han civil and military officials gathered at the Meridian Gate (*Wumen*). The banquet was held before the emperor's throne. The minister of the Imperial Household and the officials of Libu and Lifanyuan would inspect the banquet arrangement.

In front of the palace, above the steps, a strap of yellow cloth was fixed. Below the steps metal containers were placed, and a piece of black cloth was put behind the Emperor's guard of honour. Then officials from the Court of State Ceremonial (*Honglusi*) led the Chinese civil and military officials in, while the Lifanyuan official escorted the nobles from Inner Asia (*Waifan wanggong*).

After the emperor had entered the Supreme Harmony Temple (*Taihe*) and taken his place, *Zhongheshaoyue* music was played. The nobles from Inner Asia took their seats in the palace, while civil officials higher than third rank (Wensanpin) and military officials higher than second rank (Wuerpin) sat on the steps in front of the palace. All others were seated at the black cloth. Before they sat down, everyone was expected to kowtow towards the emperor. While the music was playing, food and liquor would be distributed for every guest, a procedure obviously very akin to the ceremony of serving tea. Then, Mongolian music and songs were played followed by Manchu dancers who were accompanied by singers and danced for the emperor and the guests. Then *Warka* music was played accompanied by Mongolian singers, and the dancers became more expressive. With every step backward they would bow towards the emperor.

However, this ceremonial procedure was slightly changed by Emperor Qianlong after suppressing the Jinchuan rebellion (1771–1776). At five o'clock, all the princes, the Beile, Beize, Taijis, and the imperial sons-in-law (Tabunang), wearing court dress, gathered at Taihemen while the civil and military officials, also wearing court dress, gathered at Wumen together with the envoys from Korea. The minister of the Imperial Household and the officials of Libu and Lifanyuan would inspect the banquet arrangement. Then, the master of ceremonies called the *Qinglongwu* dancers to dance on the steps in front of the palace accompanied by *Sizhang* songs. After various dancers had finished their performance, the man who had blown the *Jia* instrument entered the palace and played Mongolian music. The master of ceremonies then introduced Korean and Muslim acrobats, as well as artists from Jinchuan. After the performance all guests in rank below a king but above a duke and all the officials and envoys saluted in their seats, showing courtesy by kneeling down once and making three kowtows. Foreign diplomats and agents were only observers.

The Winter Solstice Feast, even though seldom held, was established during the reign of Emperor Shunzhi, and its performance closely resembled the New Year's Day banquet. The First Day Feast was also held on the first day of the year but only in specific years, and the participants were mainly officials and ministers. The banquet music was provided by different groups from the Outlying Prefectures. Singers appeared accompanied by the *Jia*, a whole orchestra of foreign instruments, the Korean drum, and Hui and Jinchuan children acrobats.

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[31] The revision had to apply the regulations of the *Qinding qinghan duiyin zishi*. See Qinding qinghan duiyin zishi, Wuyindian edition (1723), in *Daqing huidian shili*, ed. Kun Gang 昆冈. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991, vol. 315, 'Libu', 'Banshuo' [Issuing-of-the-calendar], 4:712–4.

[32] Kun Gang, *Daqing huidian shili*, vol. 515, 'Libu', 'Yanli' [Rite of banquets], 4:959.

Banquets for Birthday Feasts were held for elderly people over 60 years old, mostly in the Garden of Eternal Spring (*Changchun Yuan*) and sometimes in the Palace of Heavenly Purity (*Qianqing Gong*). Among the participants were usually representatives from various ethnic groups of China Proper and envoys from vassal countries. In 1785, for example, on the occasion of Qianlong's 50th year of reign a banquet was held in the Palace of Heavenly Purity with more than 3,000 people over 60 years old from all segments of society, including envoys from Korea.

The celebration of the Triumphant Feast was initiated in 1643, the 7th year of Hūwangtaiji's reign, and declared an official ceremony for generals who returned victorious from campaigns by Emperor Shunzhi in 1656. This feast was granted by Emperor Qianlong three times: in Yingtai after the suppression of the first Jinchuan rebellion (1747–1749), in Fengze Yuan after the suppression of the Hui rebellion, and in the Hall of Purple Light (*Ziguang Ge*) after the second Jinchuan rebellion (1771–1776). Among the war prisoners deported by the victorious troops were also children who were later ordered to perform and dance the *Guozhuang* and *Jiasilu*.

There were two kinds of Outlying Prefectures Feasts; the first kind included a feast organized by the Imperial Household and the Lifanyuan for Mongolian nobles on every lunar New Year's Eve (30th of the twelfth month) and the Lantern Festival (15th of the first month). The banquet was held at the Hall of Preserved Harmony (*Baohedian*) and consisted of a welcome, the severing of tea and food, the pledging of toasts, performances, and thanksgivings; the procedure was very much the same as in the New Year's Day Feast.

The other kind was reserved for envoys from tributary countries such as Korea, Annam, Liuqiu, or the Netherlands. In Qianlong's time, the envoy of Burma was given a banquet at the Ten Thousand Tree Garden of Chengde (*Wanshuyuan*); on that occasion a new music format was presented, performed by five different Burmese instruments. From then on, this became the standard, and the following banquets had to provide for performances of the music of the Zünghars and Hui, of Annam, Burma, and Ghurkha. Although both Mongolian and Korean representatives were invited, the difference between the two was significant. For example, Korean envoys who attended the banquet were very few. Moreover, in banquet specifications the Mongols enjoyed a four-level seat, Koreans only a five-level seat.

Indeed, civilizing non-Han peoples was a complex project for which ceremonies alone were not sufficient. To achieve this goal, more effective and comprehensible symbolic tools were needed even in material form, e.g., official seals, dress, weaponry, temples including memorial tablet statues, and imperial edicts. Some tools were invisible and abstract, such as language, music, and dance.



ILLUSTRATION 4.1 *Banquet given by Emperor Qianlong in the Wanshuyuan Garden of Chengde Mountain Resort, ca. 1755.*[33]

A conspicuous tool was the official seal, which unmistakably expressed Qing authority. These seals, bestowed by the emperor to tributary vassals and expressing varying degrees of political status, were to use Manchu script; this even pertained to the seals for the Korean and Liuqiu kings. The seals for the Mongolian nobility and the central government were engraved with both Manchu and Chinese characters. The Lifanyuan seal, in contrast, showed characters of Manchu, Mongolian and Tibetan script. The seals of local officials differed as well. For example, the seals of the Mongolian authorities had both Manchu and Mongolian script, while the seals of all other officials dealing with Mongolia either featured Classical Mongolian or the Western Mongolian (Oirat) *Todo bichig*. In contrast to other ethnic groups, only the Mongols were allowed to use their own language along with the Manchu and Chinese inscription. The Khutukhtu and Dzassak Lama seals were engraved in either Manchu, Mongolian and Chinese, or simply Manchu and Chinese. The Hui Begs from Eastern Turkestan had no official seals, though they were bestowed with ranks.

As the ceremonies played a significant role in the Qing's *mission civilisatrice* of the remote and recently subdued areas, particular attention was paid to music and dance as an indispensable part of all the various banquets, ceremonies, and worships. Since it was believed that music and dance could facilitate communication between man and god and create harmony in society between high and low status groups, a special Libu bureau was in charge of dealing with all music affairs. Thus, the Qing reorganized traditional Chinese music such as *Zhongheshaoyue* and *Danbidayue*, which they transformed for their own purposes, adding traditional music of Mongolian, Korean, Warka, Hui, Jinchuan, Ghurkha, and even Annamese and Burmese origin. This new music was called *Yanyanyue*. It was played on various occasions and organized by the Libu's musical bureau and the Imperial Household.

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[33] Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Banquet_in_Wanshuyuan_Garden.jpg.

There were nine different kinds of *Yanyanyue*, Mongolian music being the first played with instruments like the *Jia*, the *Huqin*, a harmonica (琴), and the six-string *Liuxianzheng* (六弦筝). The whole ensemble comprised a set of gongs (云锣), the *Xiao*, a flute (笛), a tube (管), the *Sheng*, the *Zheng* (筝), the *Pipa*, the *Samisen*, two strings (二弦), the *Yukin*, a *Tiqin*, a roll-over *Zhazheng* (轧筝), the *Huobusi*, and the *Paiban*.

The second type of *Yanyanyue* was Korean music played with a flute, a tube, and the Korean drum. The third was Warka music performed with *Li* and *Xi Qin* instruments. Hui Music from Eastern Turkestan was the fourth kind. Typical instruments were the *Dabu, Na ga la, Haer zhake, Kar Nai, Saitar, La Babu, Para Man* and *Suer Nai*. The fifth type of *Yanyanyue* was *Fanzi* music with *Deli* and *Paiqierdelewo* instruments from Jinchuan, *Deli* from Panchen, *Longsimardelewo, Bawang,* and *Cangqing*. The sixth kind was Ghurkha music played with the typical Ghurkha *Salangji*, a *Danbula, Dala*, and *Gongguli*. The seventh was traditional Annamese music until its performance was stopped due to Emperor Jiaqing's decree of renaming the country to Vietnam. The last type was Burmese traditional music played with *Jieneitadouhu, Jiwanxieku, Niedoujiang, Nieniedoujiang, Jiemangniedoubu, Badala, Bangzha, Zonggaoji, Miqiongzong, Deyuezong, Bulei*, and *Jiezu*.

Through the invention of *Yanyanyue* music performances, local traditions and ethnic belonging were displayed at almost all official ceremonies (weddings and funerals, sacrifices, paying of tribute, envoy receptions, etc.). By demonstrating and stressing cultural differences, the relationship between national elites and the emperor became more immediate and intimate. The closer this relationship, it was hoped, the better the chances to civilize the 'other' cultures.

2.3 *Preferential Treatment: Integrating the Mongols by Means of Rituals*

As is well known, in the early Qing political system the Mongolian nobility enjoyed an exclusively high position next to the Manchu. While their factual influence could not compare with that of Han culture, the Mongols' cultural

position, established by the Qing court, by far exceeded that of the Han at the time. This preferential treatment originated from a long confederate relationship and Manchu-Mongolian marriage alliances dating back to Nurhaci.[34] Governing China by conquest and military expeditions, Manchu and Mongol nobles formed an integral relationship in blood, politics, and even culture.

There existed, of course, great differences and political oppositions among the various Mongol polities especially with regard to the Qinghai and Oirat who, due to eternal feuds between Western and Eastern Mongols, unlike Inner Mongolia did not enter into close relations with the Qing court. While Outer Mongolia (Khalkha Mongolia) was both geographically and politically situated between West and East Mongolia, Qinghai (Kökenuur), once governed by the Khoshud branch of the Oirat, was bordering on Tibet in the South and Khalkha Mongolia in the North. To integrate all of Mongolia with its internal contradictions represented thus a challenge to the Qing for a long time, and early progress made there was seen as a model applicable to other nations of the empire.

Compared to other groups of the imperial domain, Mongolia enjoyed the highest degree of political autonomy supervised mainly by the Lifanyuan, a governmental agency that spent more than 70% of its time on managing Mongolian affairs. However, in the present context there will be no focus on the Lifanyuan's duties and responsibilities, as they are discussed in detail in other chapters to this volume. Instead, attention is drawn to the preferential treatment granted the Mongols in the activities of the Libu.

2.3.1 The Status of Mongolian Language

The Mongolian language ranked third as official language. The Mongolian House (*Menggufang*) was a special translation bureau for all kinds of documents, including Tibetan and languages of Muslim minorities. It was located in the *Neige*, the central governmental institution. The Mongolian language was widely used in official seals, palace tablets, edicts, and national historiography, in the imperially confirmed Chinese Buddhist Canon (*Dazangjing*), and in officially compiled dictionaries.[35] The imperial calendar (*Shixianshu*) was also printed in Mongolian, whereas Korea and Vietnam could use the Chinese edition only. A special translation examination (*Mengwen fanyi ke*) was established for the Mongols of the Eight Banners.[36] From public schools (*Taixue*) to private (or charity) schools (*Yixue*), the Qing Mongolian language education system was established in a way to train the Mongols in various professions.[37]

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[34] Du Jiaji, *Qingchao manmeng lianyin yanjiu* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), 577–93.

[35] Kun Gang, *Daqing huidian shili*, vol. 13 and 15, 'Neige', 1:164 and 205–7.

[36] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 138, 3170.

2.3.2 Garments (*Guanfu*) and Ceremonial Items (*Yizhang*)

The court had decided that descendants of Mongolian nobles—Tabunangs and Taijis with no official duties—were entitled to official ranks upon reaching the age of sixteen. This provision exceeded even the right of imperial clansmen, much to the surprise of Emperor Qianlong who remarked:

> Besides imperial clansmen who have inherited their official ranks, there has been no case to grant official ranks to the clansmen with no official duties. [...] From now on [however] the descendants of imperial princes, Beile, Beize, Duke, and imperial clansmen with no official duties may receive official ranks when they reach the age of maturity.[38]

With regard to ceremonial items, Mongolian nobles enjoyed the rank next to the Manchu. They could use different kinds of umbrellas, guns and flags while hunting or in the battlefield. However, their bridle reins were not to be of the golden or purple colours reserved for imperial clansmen. Enjoying imperial status, the Mongolian son-in-law (Efu) of the Manchu emperor was, of course, exempted from this rule.[39]

2.3.3 Rules Concerning Rituals and Sacrifices

Three levels of Qing national sacrificing ceremonies were performed: grand, middle, and group ceremonies. Mongolians took positions on all levels. For example, at the grand ceremonies during the Qianlong reign, the first-degree paramount brave prince Tsering (超勇亲王策凌) from the outer Mongolian Sain Noyan branch and prince of the first degree Boduolegetai Sengge Rinchen from the inner Mongolian Khorchin Left Wing Rear Banner, who both rendered outstanding services to the Qing dynasty, were allowed to stand at the east and the west side respectively. Besides the two Mongols and a group of Manchu nobles only one Han official was present, the politician and historian Zhang Tingyu (张廷玉, *1672 †1755).

Middle ceremonies included sacrifices for deceased emperors and prominent rulers in the Temple of Ancient Monarchs (*Lidai diwang miao*). In

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[37] Zhang Yongjiang, "Qingdai baqi menggu guanxue," *National Studies* 6 (1990).

[38] Kun Gang, *Daqing huidian shili*, vol. 326, 'Libu', 'Guanfu' [costume], 4:867.

[39] Daqing huidian, Guangxu edition, in *Daqing wuchao huidian* (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2006), vol. 29, 'Libu 4', 16:246.

contrast to Ming emperors, who believed that they had inherited their power legitimately and thus from among the northern emperors paid homage only to Qubilai Khan (1260–1294), the Qing adjusted their lineage according to the ideological needs of the new empire. During Emperor Shunzhi's reign, eminent rulers of Mongolian origin and from the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties were added, such as Chinggis Khan (1206–1227), Muqali (1170–1223), and Bayan. Emperor Jiaqing offered sacrifices to the tombs of Chinggis Khan and Qubilai Khan.

Group sacrificing ceremonies included not only the Ancestral Temple of Xianliang and the Zhaozhong Ancestral Hall where sacrifices were offered to man, but also offerings to natural spirits, such as the spirit of mountain (*Yue*), the spirit of land (*Zhen*), the spirit of ocean (*Hai*), the spirit of ditch (*Du*), and other prominent mountain and river spirits. While homage was paid to the abovementioned Tsering at the Xianliang Temple in Beijing, the famous Sengge Rinchen was honoured at the Zhaozhong Temple in Beijing and at his own Xianzhong Temple. Even in Heze (Caozhou) in the Shandong province, in Mengcheng in the Anhui province, in Tianjin and Fengtian in the northeast, Sengge Rinchen had his own memorial temples. When Qing emperors travelled to Mukden, they would have the Lifanyuan choose a high-ranking official to hold a memorial ceremony for the Mongolian Efu and meritorious statesmen.

In order to represent authority in their newly integrated territories, the Qing constructed special memorial temples in frontier regions. A Zhangzhong Temple was founded, for example, in Kashgar (Kashige'er) by Emperor Jiaqing, and a Panwancai memorial temple in the Mongolian banners by Emperor Puyi (Xuantong).[40] The same policy can be observed with regard to natural spirits, for instance: the Changbai mountain spirit in the northeast on the border to Korea, the Abula mountain spirits in Ili (Xinjiang), or the Wahe mountain spirits of Tibet. The majority of natural spirits were, however, located on Mongol land, for example: the Xieyizhaoling Khingan mountain spirit who was offered sacrifices at the Mulan Hunting Ground in Chengde, the Bogda Shan mountain spirit of the eastern Tian Shan in Xinjiang, the Gedeng and four other mountain spirits to whom sacrifices were made in Yinli, the Tacheng or Chuhuchu and two other mountain spirits who received sacrifices in the Tarbagatai mountain range in the north-western parts of Xinjiang, the Bogd Khan and Kentey mountain spirits who were given sacrifices at Urga, the river fountain and the Xingsu Sea spirit to whom sacrifices were made close to

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[40] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao*, vol. 87, 2608.

Xingningkou, and the Lingxian Xuanwei Qinghai spirit who received sacrifices in the Xining prefecture of Qinghai.[41]

2.3.4 Preferential Treatment

When Mongol nobles went to court, they were received with preferential treatment. As has been said before, they could join all kinds of state banquets. Especially on the occasion of the emperor's marriage or birthday and the princesses' marriages, they were invited to join the ceremonies. When a Mongolian noble, particularly the Bogd Gegeen, passed away, the court would give order to the Libu and Lifanyuan to have their officials participate and express condolence. As part of the court memorial honour to the deceased, the emperor would bestow sheep and oxen as a pension which, of course, could be changed into silver *Taels*, as was quite often the case.

Moreover, at the Lantern Festival (*Shangyuan*) on the fifteenth day of the first month in the lunar calendar the emperor would give a banquet to entertain the Mongols in particular. He himself would be present together with officials from the Imperial Household, the Libu and the Lifanyuan which were in charge of the reception rituals. Banquets were also granted every year to the princes of the lower five banners resident in Beijing, arranged by the Libu and the Court of the Imperial Clan (*Zongren Fu*):

> For the Mongol nobles who came to the court to congratulate [the emperor], the Libu presented a memorial to the emperor with the request to give five banquets at the five banners princes' residences after New Year's Day. The Libu would appoint a time for the banquets and list the numbers of sheep and wine necessary for the rituals, and then consult with the Court of the Imperial Clan to request the princes' residences to take care of the banquet.[42]

The custom to entertain the Mongolian nobility of the eight banners can be traced back to as early as 1636. The banquet was arranged according to specific regulations and often held after New Year's Day:

> Whenever the banquet for a prince is set up, each prince's household has a banquet table. The princes of the first rank [Qinwang], second rank [Junwang], Beile, Beize, Duke [Gong], and the imperial son-in-law [Efu] are each honoured by a table of their own. As to Taijis and Tabunangs, two will be honoured by one table. The bodyguards [Shiwei] accompanying the nobles will have ten people at a table. One Mongolian sheep will be provided to two tables. One bottle of alcohol will be provided to three tables. In addition, there will be three large Mongolian sheep to be offered [to the whole banquet]. An auspicious day will be chosen after New Year's Day to hold a banquet for each Plain Red Banner, Bordered White Banner, Bordered Red Banner, Plain Blue Banner, and Bordered Blue Banner separately. The main table of this banquet is set at the resident home of the prince of the first or second rank. The other nobles in the same Banner with Wang, Beile, Beize, and Gong titles but in the lower ranks should go to that home and attend the banquet.[43]

If the court for any reason could not arrange for the banquet, the emperor would bestow the same number of sheep and bottles of alcohol to the Mongolian nobility. The banquet's meat supplies were delivered from local Mongol markets.

When the Mongolian or Tibetan Living Buddha visited the court, they were provided with rich and generous food according to their days of stay. The Jibzundamba Khutugtu or Bogd Gegeen, for example, was granted one Mongolian sheep, two geese, three chicken, and seven buckets of milk every day. Every ten days he would be provided with one oxen, 150 bags of yellow tea, five *Jin* of butter, eight *Liang* of cotton, 18 cans of salt, fifty pieces of yellow candles, ten cans of lamp oil, 10 cans of chestnuts and dates, 100 apples and persimmons, 150 pears, 15 cans of grapes, 300 pieces of walnuts, as well as sauce and vinegar. For his return journey he would be supplied with one and a half oxen, 100 bags of *Tianchi* tea, five cans of butter, 50 yellow candles, and 24 cans of salt. The Lama, Taiji, Zaisang, and guards who accompanied him would receive silver according to their ranks.[44]

Along with the norms of *Li* and material privileges, the principles of discipline (regulate, direct, encourage) and punishment (forbid, punish) were applied and adapted to Mongolian customs. In 1788, for instance, when a veteran named Modorcin was believed to have reached the age of 103 and was still in good health, Emperor Qianlong instructed the Libu to check the laws in order to have him awarded for his longevity. His long life span represented a welcome symbol for empire-wide peace and order among the Mongols.[45]

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[41] Kun Gang, *Daqing huidian shili*, vol. 36, 'Libu' 11, 16:314–6.

[42] Ibid., vol. 40, 'Libu', 15, 16:360.

[43] Ibid., vol. 518, 'Libu', 'Yanli', 6:999.

[44] Ibid., vol. 521 'Libu', 'Fengjiao' [Custom rites], 5: 533.

[45] Ibid., vol. 405, 'Libu', 'Fengjiao', 5:547.

In 1807, when the wife of a Mongolian soldier, named Cuyijab, gave birth to male triplets at the Chakhar (Chahaer) postal station,

> the Libu submitted routine memorials [to the emperor] asking to reward the two of them with five Picul of rice and ten bolts of cloth according to the regulations for province populations. [However,] since the Mongols depend on cattle for living, to reward them with rice and cloth was not appropriate. We thus ordered the Commander-in-chief (Dutong) to check the value of five Picul of rice and ten bolts of cloth and have these changed into horses, oxen and sheep of the same value to support them financially. From now on, whenever a Mongolian gives birth to three sons at the same time, rewards [to the family] should be in accordance with this rule.[46]

If there was any indication of a development running counter to Mongolian tradition, the Qing court would prevent and correct that trend in time. In 1828, for example, when customs among some Mongolian groups became too pretentious, Emperor Daoguang ordered the Jasagh who was in charge of banners affairs to stop this and make the ceremonies return to 'simple and old tradition'. On the basis of this policy, in 1853 Emperor Xianfeng imposed a ban for Mongols to learn Chinese and use Han-Chinese names, which had become common due to the Lifanyuan's interactions and influence:

> Yushu submitted a memorial on prohibiting Mongol adaptation of Chinese customs, which alienated them from their own tradition, and asked [the emperor] to issue such a decree. [Life of the] Mongols was originally simple and plain. In recent years, [however,] the Mongols have adopted Chinese names, written Chinese characters, learned Chinese arts, [thus] losing their own system. According to Yushu's memorial, the Mongols even used Chinese in law suits, which is even more unacceptable. There is no doubt that this has to be stopped. Hence, [I ordered] the Lifanyuan to make known to the Inner and Outer Mongol Jasagh tribes that as Mongols you must learn Mongolian rather than Chinese in order to meet my high expectation that you keep up the Mongol custom of honesty and simplicity.[47]

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[46] Ibid., vol. 406, 'Libu', 'Fengjiao', 5:467.

[47] Ibid., vol. 400, 'Libu', 'Fengjiao', 5:473.

3 Ideological Resources: Variations of *'Hua'* and *'Yi'* and the Perception of 'Inner and Outer'

As mentioned before, a distinctive feature of the Qing *Li* system was that it encompassed many different ethnic groups, whereas the Ming *Li* system was based on the concept that the Han-Chinese should be distinguished from other cultures. Frontier ethnic groups were thus no longer mere subordinate participants or bystanders, but took a prominent role in many Qing rituals. On the one hand, this change in political attitudes and cultural practice was triggered by the Qing's demand for new forms of governmentality in order to keep pace with growing political domination; on the other hand, the transformation of the *Li* system reflected the fact that the Manchu, being the ruling ethnic group originating from Northeast Asia, had a strong esteem for their own culture and values, as well as for other groups from border regions.

This double and to some extent controversial approach resulted in a repositioning of the *Hua* and *Yi* 'Inner and Outer' concept. Although the Manchus, being themselves a non-Han group and stereotyped by the Han—who called themselves *'Hua Xia'*—as 'barbarians' in the Chinese terms of *Yi* and *Di*, had overthrown the Han-dominated Ming dynasty, the cultural conflict between Han-Chinese and non-Han groups continued in new form during early Qing times. Compared to the military confrontation, this conflict seemed even more challenging.

The Qing finally won two battles in this cultural conflict, one of which was a debate about *'Hua Yi'* between Emperor Yongzheng and Zeng Jing (曾静, *1679 †1736) in the early years of the former's reign. Zeng Jing defended a provocative statement of his Han-Chinese teacher Lü Liuliang (吕留良, *1629 †1683) that

> The difference between *Hua* and *Yi* [referring to Han Chinese and non-Han barbarians, respectively] was more important than the difference between a ruler and his subjects. *Hua* and *Yi* carry the distinction between human beings and material objects, and should be considered as the first matter in [our] domain.[48]

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[48] Yongzheng, Dayi Juemi Lu, vol. 1, in *Qingshi ziliao* (Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing House, 1983), 21–2. Lü's original sentence was "Hua-Yi zhi fen da yu jun-chen zhi yi", according to Lydia He Liu, *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 84. See also Jonathan D. Spence, *Treason by the Book* (New York: Viking, 2001), and Yuri Pines, "Beasts or Humans: Pre-Imperial Origins of Sino-Barbarian Dichotomy," in *Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, ed. Reuven Amitai et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

Arguing against such a notion by which the Manchus were to be considered barbarians or beasts, Emperor Yongzheng pointed out that the only difference between *Hua* and *Yi* was in their location of residency, which had nothing to do with the quality or the social position of the two cultures. Therefore, *Hua* and *Yi* should be treated as equals. Moreover, Yongzheng stressed the Manchu's contribution of creating an empire with a vast territory uniting many tribes of Mongolia and thereby integrating the Han-Chinese with other, non-Chinese groups. There should be no longer any difference between *Hua* and *Yi* in their social positions. By quoting Mencius (Meng Zi, ca. 372–289 BCE), "those who do not respect their father and sovereign should be considered animal not human", Yongzheng stressed that "those who do not follow the rules between a sovereign and his subjects are the true animals"[49] and that "Manchu, Han and Mongols should be considered equal human beings."[50] He emphasized that all nations and ethnic groups should be treated equally. This implied that not only Manchu and Mongols but also all other groups inside the Qing domain should not be viewed as *Yi* but as equal citizens.

Emperor Qianlong, considering the notion of '*Yi Han*' in a document drafted by Manchu minister E-ling-e (阿灵阿), remarked in 1749 that "to conceive of the Mongols who have submitted [to the Qing] for about a hundred years as barbarians does not only distort their names but also hurts the Mongols' hearts."[51] In 1755, Gansu governor E-chang (鄂昌) was convicted and even sentenced to death because in one of his poems he referred to the Mongols as *Hu*, another Chinese term for barbarians.[52] By that time the concept took shape that all non-Chinese groups in the Manchu-ruled domain should belong to the Qing empire. Only people who were 'hostile' from the Qing perspective, such as the Zünghars, and countries beyond the borders, such as Russia, were still considered *Yi*. Thus, the early Qing transformation of the *Yi Di* notion became a new ideological resource for the Qing Li system and for societal development in general.

Another much heated debate, which also had an impact on the Qing *Li* system, was on the reshaping and construction of Manchu group awareness, including elements from Manchu, Mongolian, and even Han-Chinese cultures in order to create a new hybrid 'Manchu Culture' serving for and centring on the banners. Official writings on this issue not only carefully tried to

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[49] Yongzheng, Dayi Juemi Lu, vol. 1, 21–2.

[50] *Qingshizong shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), the 4th day of the 4th month of the 11th year of Yongzheng's reign, vol. 130, 7691.

[51] Ibid., vol. 354, 13072.

[52] Ibid., vol. 485, 14679 and vol. 489, 14735.

reconcile existing conflicts between the different ethnic groups and cultures of the empire, but also focussed on the two hemispheres, the imperial and the 'cultural space', based on and bridged by the Qing *Li* system, thus envisioning a multi-ethnic cultural whole. Obviously, these efforts at constructing culture were meant to enhance the legitimacy and political power of the Qing government both within and beyond imperial boundaries.

With the arrival of the Western Powers, their expectations and demands, Emperor Qianlong, who referred to the Macartney embassy of 1793 as *Yi*, realized by the end of his reign that new challenges were on the horizon. Increasing tensions between the Qing Empire and the West strengthened this perceptional dichotomy by which people from all western counties were considered as the new *Yi*.[53] In the course of this development the meaning of the notion 'barbarian', in terms of *Yi* and *Di*, underwent another round of transformation. Korea, for instance, an 'outer' vassal for ages, was no longer considered *Yi* but addressed as a 'foreign country' (外国) or 'outer *Fan*' (*waifan*) at worst. Modern conflicts in international politics and global competition brought rapid changes in traditional culture and customs. The *Li* system, the magic tool of China's attempts of self-civilizing applied for some thousand years to enhance political domination, eventually became obsolete and the Qing *Li* culture slowly faded away.

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[53] For striking examples compiled during the reigns of Daoguang, Xianfeng and Tongzhi see Wen Qing, Jia Zhen, and Bao Yun, *Sanchao chouban yiwu shimuo* (Beijing: Gugong buowuyuan yingyin chuban, 1929–1930. Cf. also Kun Gang, *Daqing huidian shili*, vol. 503, 'Libu', 'Chaogong' [tribute], 6:828.

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CHAPTER 5

Lifanyuan and Libu in the Qing Tribute System

Chia Ning

The Lifanyuan and Libu were the two major tribute-managing institutions of the Qing court. Their administration greatly helped to define and uphold the Qing world order through ritual-centred official routines. In this chapter attention is given to the institutional side of the Qing tribute system, with particular reference to the distinct as well as cooperative functions of the Lifanyuan and Libu.

In Chinese history, the 'Tribute' (*Chaogong*) literally means 'to come to the court to present tribute'. The tribute system required a ritual performance by the presenters in accordance with the ideology of the Chinese Middle Kingdom. At the upper end of the ritual procedure was the grand ceremony at the court where tribute envoys on behalf of their own rulers (and occasionally those rulers themselves) submitted their local riches to the emperor who, in return, bestowed them, i.e. the tribute countries, with material rewards often many times higher in value. The political relationship was built around the symbolic ritual encounter between the superior receiver and inferior presenters. With regard to China's most intimate tribute countries in East Asia—Korea, Annam (Vietnam), and Liuqiu (Ryukyu)—the emperor bestowed their kings either at the court ritual or by sending his envoys to do so. Regarding the Mongols, Tibetans, and Turkic speaking peoples in China's Inner Asian frontiers, the emperor heavily relied on tribute in order to regulate and control the relationship. Receiving tribute even from many other countries in which the rulers were neither obliged nor entitled by the Chinese court was also perceived as an important political gain. The ritual performance of tribute duties served as a necessary requirement, besides and below the court level, for the much desired trade inside the capital and the markets along the border. Up to early Qing times, the tribute belonged to the three essential Qing rituals performed in Inner Asia together with the pilgrimage to the emperor (*Chaojin*) and the imperial hunt (*Weilie*).[1] Like in pre-Qing times, the tribute administration covered three core elements: the court ritual, the entitlement of political authority over the most important tribute countries, and the court-regulated commerce.

Since its establishment in the Sui-Tang period, the Libu had its Bureau of Receiving Ritual Guests (*Zhuke qinglisi*) acting as the sole tribute institution until the end of the Ming dynasty. The Lifanyuan represented the other new important tribute institution, invented by the Qing court, that changed China's tribute system remarkably. Among the numerous Qing tribute studies, specialized research on these two tribute-managing institutions has largely remained absent from the agenda. Mark Mancall's description of the Lifanyuan's sphere of responsibilities in the 'northwest crescent' of Inner Asia vs. the Libu's in the 'south-eastern crescent' of East Asia yet with shared ritual procedures[2] and Chen Shangsheng's comments that this institutional separation reflected the Qing administrative differentiation of internal non-Chinese polities (*Fanbu*) from external subordinate nations (*Shuguo*)[3] have insightfully touched on the subject. However, a focused exploration is something still needed. An inquiry into both the Libu and Lifanyuan raises two questions: how were the pre-Qing and the Qing tribute systems interrelated and, more importantly, how did the Qing tribute system work during its most effective stage until the end of the 18th century?[4]

1 From Pre-Qing to Qing Tribute: Recent Discussions

Like in other empires, configuring contacts with neighbouring peoples or distant powers was instrumental to delimiting and safeguarding China's imperial domain and her influence beyond her border. Thus, originating in the cultural views of the Western Zhou dynasty, the tribute system in China pursued such governmental functions practically since the Han dynasty.[5] Bruce Loyd

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[1] Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14,1 (1993).

[2] Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 73–5.

[3] Chen Shangsheng, "Shilun Qingchao qianqi fengguong tixi de jiben tezheng," *Qingshi yanjiu* 2 (2010): 91–2.

[4] John Wills has pointed out that "the basic policies of the Qing state toward maritime Europeans still seemed reasonably functional and successful" around 1800. This holds true for the tributaries in the Qing world as well. See John E. Wills, Jr., "Introduction," in *China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions*, ed. John E. Wills, Jr. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1.

[5] Fu Baichen, *Zhongchao lidai chaogong zhidu yanjiu* (Changchun: Jilin remin chubanshe, 2008), 2–3.

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Batten in his study on the relations between China and Japan has presented the ideological framework of China's governance as the setting of inner-outer relationships:

> In its original form, this ideology [of the Middle Kingdom] placed China at the center of the world, both politically and culturally. China was ruled by the 'son of heaven' on the basis of 'virtue' (*de*), 'ritual' (*li*), and 'law' (*fa*). Outlying regions beyond the 'son of heaven's' direct control were viewed as 'uncivilized,' inhabited by the 'barbarians of the four directions.' However, these regions were not seen as fully independent of China; although they had their own rulers, these rulers were thought to be politically subordinate to the 'son of heaven.' Moreover, there was a basic assumption that outlying regions could in principle be incorporated within the sphere of 'civilization' through the geographical spread of 'virtue', 'ritual', and 'law.' In short, the 'middle kingdom ideology' was an ethnocentric vision of the universal state or universal empire, and in this sense it was fundamentally similar to the worldview of ancient Rome.[6]

Against this ideological backdrop, the core of the tribute system consisted of the ritual delivery of China's superior civilization to non-Chinese inferior or barbaric cultures. While the modern concept of national borders—a line between nations—did not exist, an invisible 'ritual line' differentiated the internal-external or Chinese and non-Chinese status. The physical manifestation of this line in the superior-inferior relationship demanded that the tribute envoys at the ritual "kneeled before the Son of Heaven in a series of prescribed prostrations known as the *ketou* (later Westernized as *kowtow*, literally *bang head*, on the floor, as a token of respect)."[7] Huang Lianzhi's profound study has even proposed to frame China's tribute relations as a "ritual system of heavenly court" (*Tianchao lizhi tixi*).[8]

The "tribute system" has, according to Zhang Feng, become a "main organizing concept"[9] in the study of China's foreign relationships since Fairbank's and

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[6] Bruce Loyd Batten, *To the Ends of Japan: Premodern Frontiers, Boundaries, and Interactions* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 28.

[7] Rhoads Murphey, *East Asia: A New History* (New York: Longman, 2010), 127.

[8] Huang Lianzhi, *Yazhoude huaxia zhixu-zhongguo yu yazhou guojia guanxi xingtailun* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1992), see introduction.

[9] Zhang Feng, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System': Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2,4 (2009): 549, doi:10.1093/cjip/pop010.

Teng's seminal article (1941) and the former's volume on the Chinese World Order (1968).[10] Studies in recent decades have, however, questioned Fairbank's model and provided exemptions to the outlined picture of foreign relationships throughout China's history before the final breakdown in the second half of the 19th century, which was much due to Western challenge and the rise of Japan.[11] For example, regarding Western Han and Xiongnu relationships, the cultural rejection of Chinese superiority is reflected in the Xiongnu's humiliating manner of writing to the Han along with the latter's policy shift and the transfer of material goods to the former through intermarriage agreements. In this case, Li Yunquan argues, it was rather the Han who presented tribute to the Xiongnu.[12] Morris Rossabi in his volume discusses cases of China's Northern and Southern Song dynasties which reluctantly agreed to provide material goods to the Khitan Liao, the Jurchen Jin, and Tanggut Xixia. Foreign relation policies of the Song were thus in accordance with the dynasty's military weakness, representing a high degree of flexibility regarding the Chinese view of the world order.[13] Zhang Feng's study shows that the Fairbank model of the Chinese tribute system does not apply to the Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese, and Sino-Mongol relations in early Ming.[14] Fu Baichen's comparative study reveals a broad variation of tribute relationships in terms of loyalty and stability, Korea being China's most stable and loyal tributary client and Japan quite the opposite.[15] James A. Anderson in his recent study highlights waves of strong

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[10] John K. Fairbank and S.Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tribute System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6,2 (1941). *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[11] "In the nineteenth century the heritage of regional hegemony (influence) embodied in the tribute system led the Qing dynasty into unsuccessful resistance to French conquest in Vietnam and Japanese conquest in Korea. Siam made its own transition to modern diplomatic standards and stopped sending embassies. The Ryukyus were fully incorporated into the Japanese state. European nations and the United States established resident diplomatic missions in Beijing after 1860 and were intensely opposed to any bit of language or protocol that might be a distant echo of the days when all foreign envoys reaching the capital would prostrate themselves in the great court before the Taihe Hall of the Palaces." See John E. Wills, Jr., "Tribute System (Cháogòng zhìdù 朝贡制度)," in *Berkshire Encyclopedia of China*, ed. Berkshire Publishing Group LLC (2009): 2329, http://chinaconnectu.com/wp-content/pdf/TributeSystem.pdf.

[12] Li Yunquan, *Chaogong zhidu shilun* (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 2004), 15.

[13] China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[14] Zhang Feng, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System'," 560–7.

[15] Fu Baichen, *Zhongchao lidai chaogong zhidu yanjiu*, 12 (Korea), 269 (Japan), and 244–6 (various Asian countries).

China/weak Vietnam, weak China/strong Vietnam, and strong China/strong Vietnam during different stages in history.[16] As to Joseph Fletcher's theory building on Ming-Central Asian relationships, Zsombor Rajkai has noticed that it "reveals the reality behind the ideal Confucian way of how to behave" and is thus in a way directed "against the tribute theory"[17] of the Fairbank model, even though Fletcher contributed to the influential Fairbank volume. John Wills even questioned the existence of a tribute system and stated that "only for a long century of the Ming, about 1425 to 1550, did a unified tribute system provide the matrix for all of China's foreign relations."[18] Zhuang Guotu went even further to assert that the historical tribute system in China, including the Qing tribute policies toward the Dutch during the seventeenth century, was a political fantasy of the Chinese court rather than a real functioning system.[19]

The concern in Western scholarship over outdated perceptions in China's tribute studies has been concisely summarized by William T. Rowe who critically pinpointed the notion of Chinese cultural superiority, diplomatic relationships based on "systematic inequality and hegemony," and the attribution of the tribute trade to "the entirety of the late Chinese empire's international exchange."[20] Among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars, studies by Yu Changsen (2000), Li Yunquan (2004), Quan Hexiu (2005) as well as Zhuang Guotu (2005), Qi Meiqin (2006), Fu Baichen (2008), He Xinhua (2012), and others, share this common concern though with a mixture of new concepts and mutual disagreements of various kinds.

In spite of facing tremendous challenge, 'tribute' as a cultural as well as a political concept and 'tribute system' as a functioning state mechanism or analytical category have still received general recognition one way or another. In James Hevia's discussion, in John Wills' revision of Fairbank's tribute theory, and in Brantly Womack's asymmetrical theory, the historians' approach that

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[16] James A. Anderson, "Distinguishing Between China and Vietnam: Three Relational Equilibriums in Sino-Vietnamese Relations," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13,2 (2013): 259.

[17] Zsombor Rajkai, "Early Fifteenth-Century Sino-Central Asian Relations: The Timurids and Ming China," in *Frontiers and Boundaries: Encounters on China's Margins*, ed. Zsombor Rajkai et al. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012), 91. Cf. Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia, 1368–1884," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[18] John E. Wills, Jr., "Did China have a tribute system?," *Asian Studies Newsletter* 44,2 (1999): 12–3 and Wills, "Tribute System".

[19] Zhuang Guotu, "Luelun changgong zhidu de xuhuan: yi gudai zhongguo yu dongnanya de chaogong guanxi weili," *Nanyang wenti yanjiu* 123,3 (2005).

[20] William Rowe, *China's Last Empire: The Great Qing* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 133–5.

tribute "was at the heart of the relationship"[21] particularly in the Qing world order was not replaced. Despite his critical remarks that not all relationships between historical China and other countries were Sinocentric and tributary in nature, Zhang Feng still views the Fairbank model as offering a "basic reference point for discussion of traditional China's foreign relations," and states that his own criticism does not "in general try to replace his [Fairbank's] tribute system model with any new explanatory frameworks."[22]

Supportive voices can be found in Lin Xiaoting's recent summary of Western scholarship[23] and Chang Teng-chi and Ying-hsi Chen's proposal that the pre-modern East Asian order was largely a China tribute order based on the 'Under-Heaven System'.[24] Though this ritual-centred tribute order clearly emphasized the non-Chinese participants' political subordination, Yang Jiali argues that China did never look for concrete political authority inside her tribute countries.[25]

As the tribute system concept still figures prominently in Chinese and Qing studies, its transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty has attracted much attention. Coinciding with Li Yunquan's conclusion that China's tribute system developed to its supreme phase under the Ming,[26] a good number of monographs in the West have described the thriving Ming tribute based on its ideological and historical foundation, and these depictions have found their way into the textbooks. Rhoads Murphey, for example, stated that the Ming dynasty enlarged the traditional Chinese tribute system and thus asserted Chinese influence over neighbouring countries:

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[21] James Hevia, "Tribute, Asymmetry, and Imperial Formations: Rethinking Relations of Power in East Asia," in *Past and Present in China's Foreign Policy*, ed. John E. Wills (Portland, MN: Merwin Asia, 2011), 64–8, and 72.

[22] Zhang Feng, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System'," 546–8 (note 8), 551, 554–5, 562, and 565–7.

[23] Lin Xiaoting, "Chaogong zhidu yu lishi xiangxiang: liangbai nianlai de zhongguo yu kanjudi (1761–1963)," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjusuo jikan* 74 (2012): 43–4.

[24] Chang Teng-chi and Ying-hsi Chen, "Chaogong tixi zaixian yu 'tienxia tisi' de xingqi? Zhongguo waijiao de anli yanjiu yu lilun fanxi," *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* 55,4 (2013): 94.

[25] Yang Jiali, "Chaogong tixi dui dangjin dongya yitihua zhidu jianshe de xiaoji yingxiang," *Zhengming yu tantao* 440,6 (2010): 92. See also Valerie Hansen's "Review of Kang, David C., *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute*," *H-Asia, H-Net Reviews*, September, 2011, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=33436, which she calls a "cogent defence of the tribute system" even though Kang did not cite "John King Fairbank's field-defining model of tributary relations."

[26] Li Yunquan, Chaogong zhidu shilun, 7.

> Recognizing China's supremacy cost them little; as long as they did not try to challenge it, they were left to manage their own affairs [...] At its modern height, first under the Ming and later in early Qing, the tributary system involved over 40 states, including Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, Japan, Java, the Philippines, Burma, Siam (Thailand), Ceylon, Malacca, and a number of others, in addition to many central Asian kingdoms.[27]

Focusing on historical Korea and Vietnam, Conrad Schirokauer and Donald Clark specified that

> [b]y 1600, both states had long participated in China's tributary system, sending envoys acknowledging Chinese hegemony and bearing 'tribute,' but receiving handsome gifts befitting the generosity of a superior toward an inferior. Frequently such embassies became occasions for engaging in trade. Korea and Vietnam thus valued the Chinese connection even as they avoided Chinese interference.[28]

Mark Elliott, in his comprehensive comment on both the Qing and pre-Qing tribute ritual, stressed that it was "a hierarchical and ritualized business" which, rather than being only "an act of personal humiliation" by "kowtowing before the emperor", could actually lead to "an outcome favourable to the lesser state"; the tribute order thus being "perceived to bring prestige, honor, and material benefits to all who participated."[29] Fu Baichen, in a congenial approach, concludes that Korea as the most stable and loyal tribute country received the largest benefits from pre-Qing and Qing China both politically and economically,[30] and Brantly Womack's research on Sino-Vietnamese relationships (2006) shows that "both China and Vietnam had something to gain from this tributary relationship beyond the associated trade."[31] Chen Guobao further points out that the Vietnamese rulers' active tribute participation was based on Vietnam's political culture which legitimized their kings and successions by Chinese authorization, often taking place at the tribute ceremonies.[32] Being in an inferior position and offering tribute as a vassal to the Qing emperor thus was a rational choice, for example, to Nguyễn Phúc Ánh (*1762 †1820) who established the rule of the Nguyễn Dynasty in 1802. At the same time, however, the Vietnamese rulers perceived the two countries as being on equal footing, and did not recognize a real subordination to the Qing. In a follow-up of Wu Yuanfeng's systematic examination of Manchu archives regarding the Liuqiu (Ryukyu) tribute and the Qing rewards to the Liuqiu king,[33] He Xinhua's study points to the fact that the Liuqiu islands insisted on continuing to pay tribute once every two years while the Qing government wanted to change it into once every four years.[34] Numerous polities from Southeast Asia, even though the Chinese court was less favourable to them, still followed the Korean and Vietnamese tribute model encouraged by the political advantage based on China's recognition and the economic gain from the emperor's rewards and the tribute trade.[35]

An explanation for the success and the development of the tribute system can be found in the fact that the emperor's support for a new king, his wife and heir was significant to the leadership of a tribute-offering country. In addition, the tribute network provided the most effective channel for official communication of the time which often served the promotion of peace rather than war.[36] Informing a tribute paying clientele about new political developments and succession changes inside China was equally important.[37] From an economic perspective, the policy of 'giving more than receiving' (*Houwang bolai* or *Chaozhi huici*)[38] offered valuable profits along with political honour. In the

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[27] Murphey, *East Asia*, 126–7.

[28] Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. Clark, *Modern East Asia: A Brief History* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), 8 and 107.

[29] Mark Elliott, *Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World* (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 2009), 129.

[30] Fu Baichen, Zhongchao lidai chaogong zhidu yanjiu, 7, 245–76.

[31] James A. Anderson, "[Review] China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry by Brantly Womack," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 4,3 (2009), http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/J_Anderson_ChinaandVietnam_2009.pdf.

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[32] Chen Guobao, "Yuenan shichen yu qingdai zhongyue zongfan zhixu," *Qingshi yanjiu* 86,2 (2012).

[33] Wu Yuanfeng, "Xinjin faxian de qingdai zhongliu guanxi manhanwen dang'an jiqi jiazhi," *Qingshi yanjiu* 1 (1998).

[34] He Xinhua, *Zuihoude tianchao: qingdai chaogong zhidu yanjiu* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2012), 77–8 and 175. There was also a request from Korea, Liuqiu, and Vietnam to have imperial envoys coming to their countries for throne entitlement.

[35] Fu Baichen, *Zhongchao lidai chaogong zhidu yanjiu*, 271–3; Yu Changsen, "Shilun chaogong zhidu de yanbian," *Nanyang wenti yanjiu* 101,1 (2000): 55, 60; Wang Shoudong, "Zhongfei wenhua jiaoliu yu sulu wanghouyi—dezhou an、 wen jiazu de xingcheng," *Qilu wenhua yanjiu zhongxin*, http://www.qlwh.com/jidi/xinshu.asp?id=1037.

[36] Fu Baichen, Zhongchao lidai chaogong zhidu yanjiu, 11, and He Xinhua, Zuihoude tianchao: qingdai chaogong zhidu yanjiu, 43–5 and 49–50.

[37] Yu Changsen, "Shilun chaogong zhidu de yanbian," 60.

[38] Fu Baichen, *Zhongchao lidai chaogong zhidu yanjiu*, 271–3, and He Xinhua, *Zuihoude tianchao: qingdai chaogong zhidu yanjiu*, 40. See also Yu Changsen, "Shilun chaogong

early Qing period, for example, the Khalkha Mongol nobility received "profitable items of trade" in return for presenting the "Nine Whites (*jiubai*)"—one white camel and eight white horses—to the Manchu emperor even before they became part of the Qing internal population in 1691: "Tribute presentations served as a flexible means of using economic incentives to secure border control."[39]

Tracing the time-tested practice of the tribute system, Qing scholarship has shown that the tribute system was in full performance during the early Qing, preserving its pre-Qing characteristics, i.e. aspects of the emperor's superiority, a ritual core, 'authorizing' the tribute country rulers, material and commercial components, official communication with other polities, and state-regulated management routines. Records from the Lifanyuan and Libu confirm the establishment of the tribute system during the reigns of Hūwangtaiji and Shunzhi followed by an entirely organizational improvement by the High Qing court under the emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong.[40] At the same time, leading Qing historians continued to question the Fairbank model, offering new evidence which further challenged the Sinocentric tribute concept and addressed the previously disregarded complexity of the system.[41] Tong Ying, for instance, in his study on the *Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributaries* (*Huangqing zhigongtu*) draws our attention to the need of more differentiation, pointing to the more than three hundred peoples known to the Qianlong court in terms of tribute relations. Among these, seven—Korea, Liuqiu, Annam, Xianluo, Sulu, Nanzhang, and Miandian (see table below)—would fit the definition of politically subordinate nations (*Shuguo*) to China, three of which (Korea, Annam, and Liuqiu) stabilized their relationship on a permanent base. The overwhelming number, Tong argues, belonged to the categories of either a trading or ambiguous relationship.[42] This implies that the majority of Qing tribute polities did actually not have ideology-based political ties—the core of the tribute system—with China. Furthermore, both Qi Meiqin and Chen Shangsheng, while disagreeing in their conclusions, suggest to make a differentiation between Qing and Ming tribute.[43]

Reassessing the tribute economy, William Rowe argues that while "the tribute-trade mode was not necessarily wrong", studies covering the Han to Ming dynasties have proven that "tribute-related commerce had made up only a very small percentage of the empire's overall foreign trade."[44] From Ming to early Qing, Rowe concludes, there was much maritime trade conducted with Western nations as well as private legal trading by Chinese merchants, while the tribute-trade and foreign commerce at the border markets was inconstant, insecure, and often shut down for political reasons. Moreover, the Vietnamese case in Sun Hongnian's study illustrates that the tribute-trade often served the exchange of luxury goods among the elite alone, not the economic needs of the common people.[45] This tribute exchange, like the material awards from the emperor, was clearly not of a commercial nature, representing basically political behaviour rather than an economic mechanism.[46]

Quan Hexiu in his examination of worldwide contributions to China's tribute studies claimed that research on the tribute system remained in a preliminary stage as late as 2005, being unable to comprehend this old and complex system in Chinese history.[47] Recent publications have, however, advanced the tribute studies significantly, though much more effort is needed to clarify the tribute system and its related world order to solve this "enduring historical puzzle."[48]

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zhidu de yanbian," 55, 60 and Sun Hongnian, *Qingdai zhongyue zongfan guanxi yanjiu* (Ha'erbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006), 119, 161.

[39] Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 139, 142.

[40] For the Mongol tribute under Hūwangtaiji, see Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing conquest: A Documentary History* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), part two, "Mongol Tribute Missions to the Qing (1643)", 171–226. The tribute after Hūwangtaiji's reign is recorded in the *Lifanyuan zeli* (Regulations of Lifanyuan) and *Libu zeli* (Regulations of Libu).

[41] See the discussion on tribute and frontier trade in Perdue, *China Marches West*, 402–3, with references to James Millward, John E. Wills, Jr., and Nicola Di Cosmo.

[42] Tong Ying, "Qingdai qianqi chaogong guanxi kaobian—cong Huangqing zhigongtu shuoqi," *Manyu yanjiu* 52,1 (2011): 30–1; see also the chapter of Laura Hostetler in this volume.

[43] Qi Meiqin, "Dui Qingdai chaogong tizhi diwei de zai renshi," *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 1 (2006): 52; Chen Shangsheng, "Shilun Qingchao qianqi fenggong tixi de jiben tezheng," 90–2. According to Qi, the Qing tribute focused essentially on political relationships, i.e. the superiority of the Qing court over subordinate tribute countries, while the Ming focused on trade relations because the majority of their "tributaries" came for trade without an interest in political ties. Chen, on the contrary, argued that the High Qing emperors abandoned the unrealistic Ming tribute ideology of a "heavenly ruler over all", but used the tribute system for security reasons along the Qing border in all directions. The trading component, according to Chen, increased and even succeeded the Ming tribute trade.

[44] Rowe, China's Last Empire, 135–7.

[45] Sun Hongnian, Qingdai zhongyue zongfan guanxi yanjiu, 160–3.

[46] Qi Meiqin, "Dui Qingdai chaogong tizhi diwei de zai renshi," 52–3.

[47] Quan Hexiu, "Zhongguo guodai changgong guanxi yanjiu pingshu," *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 15,3 (2005): 132–3.

[48] Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan, "The Tribute System as International Society in Theory and Practice," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5,1 (2012), http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/1/3.full#fn-7.

This essay explores some of the open questions by looking at Qing institution-building in tribute affairs and inquiring about how the tribute system actually worked through the administration of both the Lifanyuan and Libu.

2 Adjusting Tribute Institutions in the Ming-Qing Transition Period

Two governmental institutions, Lifanyuan and Libu, represented the pillars of the Qing tribute system. Performing the highest authority in ritual affairs, moral control, empire-wide education, and imperial examinations, the Libu's responsibilities, like previously under the Ming dynasty, attached a highly moral significance and etiquette to tribute arrangements, even though they included many pragmatic components as well. In a remarkable response to the integration of submitted Inner Asian peoples, starting with various Mongol branches, the Qing established first the *Monggo yamun* (1634) and shortly afterwards the Lifanyuan (1638), thereby replacing the tribute duties of the Libu in all Inner Asian frontier regions. From then on, these two institutions administered the tribute system cooperatively but separately in two tribute zones: the Lifanyuan zone (Inner Asia) and the Libu zone (Korea and Southeast Asia)—a reform that changed China's traditional tribute system fundamentally.

To arrange tribute missions to the capital from all directions every year—or, as in the case of the Mongols and Koreans, every season during the Hūwangtaiji-Shunzhi period—implied a strict adherence to cumbersome administrative particulars. These particulars were important to keep the Qing predominance in place in East and Inner Asia. The court obviously relied on a valid administration to deal with tribute affairs.

The early Qing court classified the tributaries along three categories: people with internal status from Inner Asia, people of surrounding tribute countries (*Gongguo*) in Asia and Central Asia, and people from the Western Ocean (*Xiyang*), i.e. distant foreigners. On the surface, nations from the first group continued their Ming tribute ties with the Qing court in a similar way, attending the grand tribute rituals at the court together with external tributaries from Asia and Europe. Their tribute duties, however, had become lawful obligations, and managing their tribute affairs became part of the internal administration by the Lifanyuan. Embracing this directly administered section of frontier groups, the Qing discarded the Ming policy of loose control (*Jimi*) upon the Inner Asian frontier, which did not exercise authority over autonomous polities but rather relied on tribute trade and rewards to regulate relationships.[49] This inner section also differed from the Han-Chinese *gong* which provided for the presentation of food and other material goods (gifts) by the locals to the court along the county-provincial-court chain, sidestepping the grand ritual ceremony. The new section was critical for the making of the Qing Empire, reflecting the importance of Inner Asia to the Empire.

The Libu, on the other hand, managed the tributaries from the second and third group without much difference to the pre-Qing model, i.e. by framing relationships in tribute terms and having the tribute envoys attend the court ritual. The increasing frequency and scale of early Qing contacts with the Europeans furthered a new situation in tribute affairs. Even though being treated as tributaries under Qing regulations, Europeans from various countries primarily focused on trading relations and showed ambitions to break up the syncretic order of tribute and trade. The Qing court was aware of their differing interests and assigned a special position within the tribute system to them. All three categories of tribute groups mentioned before were, therefore, governed along three administrative models. Although the common term for the tribute ritual (*Chaogong*) went unchanged, which may lead to confusion due to a blurring of the boundaries between the three models, important changes took place in the Qing tribute system namely in four areas: tributaries were fit into two tribute zones; tribute relations no longer exclusively reflected a diplomatic mechanism but encompassed a crucial part of the inner administration; the imperial court now had two managing institutions rather than one to operate the tribute system; and the three sectors of the system generated three modes of operation.

3 Two Tribute Zones under Two Institutions

The differentiation between a Lifanyuan and a Libu tribute zone, as demonstrated in the table below, occurred during the Hūwangtaiji-Qianlong period. The Libu was transformed from a former Ming tribute managing agency into an institution cooperating with the Lifanyuan in Inner Asia. In the Lifanyuan zone, the Inner Asian nations were clearly distinct from the Chinese in culture, language, belief, social organization, leadership style, agricultural mode, living habits, etc. The contrast to the Libu zone is obvious, where

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[49] For the Ming tribute and the *jimi* policy, see Hu Fan, "Lun Mingshizong dui meng 'juegong' zhengce yu jiajing nianjian de nongmu wenhua chongtu," *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 15,4 (2005): 45.

> Interaction with non-Chinese peoples in Korea and on the southern crescent of China's coastal and land frontiers, in countries such as Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Ryukyu Islands was supervised by officials in the Ministry of Rituals. These countries shared many of the basic values of Chinese culture, a Chinese-style calendrical system, some form of script adapted from Chinese models, similar types of food and dress, the practice of Confucianism and Buddhism, and the outlines of Chinese bureaucratic organization.[50]

As the Lifanyuan zone became an internal zone due to the Manchu relationships with Inner Asian peoples, the Libu zone remained external continuing previous traditions.

The Lifanyuan established its administration over the Ming 'foreign countries' (*Waiguo*) and 'western lands' (*Xiyu*), both beyond the Ming terrain. Foreign countries included Mongol groups, addressed as Tatar (鞑靼) of the Later Yuan (Houyuan) or Northern Yuan (Beiyuan), the Oirats (Wala) of present-day Northern Xinjiang, and Douyan in present-day Southern Heilongjiang along with traditional Ming neighbours such as Korea, Annam, Japan, Liuqiu, Xuanluo, and other Southeast Asian polities.[51] Western lands comprised Hami and Turfan of East Xinjiang together with nearby Liucheng (Lukchak) and Huozhou, the Tibetans of heartland Tibet and Qinghai, the Mongols of the Qinghai-Gansu region, and polities further west in Central Asia.[52] The transition from previous Ming external self-determined to Qing internal obligated tributaries can be best observed with reference to the Zünghars under Galdan Boshogtu Khan (1670–1697) who had to decide between resuming or ending tribute relations with the Kangxi court.[53] After the annexation of Xinjiang by Qianlong, a free choice in tribute offering to the Qing court was no longer an option for Inner Asian nations. If court-recognized nobles and court-appointed officials would now violate governmental regulations of annual tribute turns or were reluctant to comply with schedules and ritual rules, they ran the risk of losing ranks, titles, salaries, status of family members, and inheritable

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[50] Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York, London: w. w. Norton & Company, 1990), 118.

[51] Zhang Tingyu, *Mingshi* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), vols. 320–8.

[52] Ibid., vols. 329–32.

[53] Wang Zhichun, *Qingchao rouyuanji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1891/1989), 40–2; Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyishi* (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1991), 84–7.

TABLE 5.1 *The Lifanyuan and Libu tribute zones*

Inner Asian groups under Lifanyuan supervision by 1756[a]	**'Subordinated Countries' under Libu supervision by 1784**[b]
Inner Mongols	Korea
Khalkha Mongols	Liuqiu (The Ryukyu Islands)
Qinghai Mongols	Annam (Vietnam)
Zünghar Mongols in Northern Xinjiang	Nanzhang (a polity in present northeastern Thailand, western Annam, and bordering Yunnan)[c]
Torghud Mongols	Xianluo (Thailand)
Tibetans in heartland Tibet	Sulu (A chain of islands located in Southwest Philippines)
Amdo Tibetans in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan	Miandian (Burma or Myanmar)
Hami and Turfan in Eastern Xinjiang	
Muslim Uighurs in Southern Xinjiang	Helan (Holland)
The *Fan* people in Junchuan	Xiyang zhuguo (countries in the Western Ocean)—Yidaliya (Italy) and Bo'erduka'er (Portugal)
Sulon and Elunchun	

a *Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli* (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian weisuo fuzhi zhongxin, 2010), vol. 1, pp. 1, 13–9, 49, 51, 71–7, 80–2, 88, 92, 99–101, 104–10, 194–202, 227, 448. For the year 1756, see Qingdai lifanyuan, lifanyuan ziliao he lifanyuan yanjiu, in *Qingdai lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, 1988), 10. For how and when these countries became officially recognized Qing tributaries, see Chen Shangsheng, "Shilun Qingchao qianqi fenggong tixi de jiben tezheng," 88–9.

b *Qinding libu zeli* (Qianlong chao) (Beijing: Fuchi shuyuan, 2004), vols. 167–76. *Qinding libu zeli erzhong* (Changsha: Hainan chubanshe, 2000), for the Qianlong reign see vols. 167–75, for the Daoguang reign vols. 172–80, for the year 1784 see preface, 5b.

c Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 43.

rights.[54] For the Libu tributaries, concern and leverage were conditioned differently and limited to China's confirmation of political authority and trade exchange.

Since the Ming classification of Inner Asian nations and polities was no longer used by the Qing government, their tribute ties were no longer managed by the Libu but by the Lifanyuan. However, the Libu kept some of its main functions: hosting the court tribute rituals, the stipulation of tribute regulations, the authorization of tribute embassies from Inner Asia and of the ritual procedures.[55] The Lifanyuan provided the Libu with a list of annual visits and arrival and departure schedules. Additionally, it supplied the tribute embassies with travel documents, road guidance, journey supplies, and accommodations in the capital. At court, it guided the mission participants through the procedures, took care of language translations for ritual-related communications, and settled all details of the welcome banquets.[56] The Qing Libu, for its part, was in the same way responsible for its own tributaries but with different routines.[57] Furthermore, it managed quite a fewer number of tributaries. In contrast to the sixty-four Asian tributaries recorded in the *History of the Ming*,[58] the Qing list of tributary countries (*Chaogong geguo*) was reduced to forty-three during the reigns of Qianlong and Jiaqing.[59]

Proceeding in their relations with the Qing government much in the way they did during Ming time, the Libu-zone tribute envoys appeared at the court ritual to represent the rulers of their home countries in contrast to Inner Asian representatives whose tribute duty was obligatory, as they were direct subjects of the Qing emperor. The concept of foreign countries (*Waiguo*) as opposed to China (*Zhongguo*) was applied to Libu tributaries beyond the coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, at least in emperor Yongzheng's time. These

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[54] *Qinghuidian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), vol. 65, p. 603 and vol. 66; Qianlong chao neifu chaoben lifanyuan zeli, in *Qingdai lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin, 1988), 65–7, 130–3, and 141–5; Kangxi chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, in Ibid., 19–21; Yongzhen chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, in Ibid., 35–8; Qianlong chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, in Ibid., 14; Jiaqing chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao, in Ibid., 45. For a detailed discussion see Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals".

[55] *Qinding libu zeli* (Taiwan: Chengwen chubanshe, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 5a–b.

[56] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Daoguang reign, vol. 198, pp. 1a–14a.

[57] Ibid., Qianlong reign, vol. 3, pp. 4b–5a, and Daoguang reign, vol. 4, pp. 8a and 9b.

[58] Zhang Tingyu, *Mingshi*, vols. 320–6 listed sixty-seven names, three of which were from Europe: Italy, France, and the Netherlands.

[59] *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), vols. 550–3, and 555–60.

Southeast Asian countries were called "rice producing countries,"[60] and their trade with Chinese merchants was classified as foreign trade. The Qianlong court used this concept (*Waiguo*) with regard to Korea, Liuqiu and Vietnam,[61] and called their tribute emissaries 'foreign envoys' (*Waiguo gongshi*).[62] Official records of the Daoguang reign still continued thinking in these categories.[63] The Lifanyuan thus reflected the new identity of an ethnically diverse empire while the Libu continued to perform China's historical tradition, now in the service of the Qing as a superior empire over all human beings under heaven.

Another differentiation between Inner Asian internal and the Libu's external tributaries is manifest in the fact that Lifanyuan tributaries were engaged in both rituals, the offering of the tribute (*Chaogong*) and the pilgrimage to the emperor (*Chaojin*), whereas rituals in the Libu zone were restricted to the tribute only. The pilgrimage ritual, whose tradition goes back to the Western Zhou dynasty, required the internal feudatories to travel from their distant manors to the Zhou court seasonally, while the tribute ritual was a performative act for envoys who arrived as guests from foreign countries to show submission.[64] Under the Qing dynasty, the pilgrimage was reserved for the most respected Inner Asian nobles who came to the court as internal guests to participate in the most important rituals. Those with middle and lower ranks were, in contrast, only participating in tribute rituals. The New Year's Pilgrimage to the Emperor (*Nianli koubai*, ma. *aniya doroi hengkileme*) was the most prominent event among the pilgrimage rituals, first introduced by Hūwangtaiji in 1641 after the submission of the Eastern Mongols.[65] Whenever a nation from Inner Asia submitted to the Qing, their highest-ranking nobles participated in both the pilgrimage and tribute, which discerned them politically from Libu zone countries whose envoys came to the Qing only to offer tribute.[66]

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[60] "[C]ha waiguojie chanmi zhidi bu jiziyu zhongguo 查外国皆产米之地不籍资于中国 [According to our investigations, the foreign countries are all living on rice productive land and do not rely on Chinese resources]", see *Shizong xian huangdi shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), vol. 54, p. 20a.

[61] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vol. 163, pp. 1a–b and vol. 182, p. 3b, and Daoguang reign, vol. 171, pp. 1b–2b.

[62] Ibid., Qianlong reign, vol. 166, p. 1b, and Daoguang reign vol. 171, p. 1b.

[63] Ibid., Daoguang reign, vol. 171.

[64] Zhouli zhushu, in *Shisanjing zhushu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 759–60.

[65] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmengwen tiben*, ed. Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2010), vol. 1,92, p. 141, upper half, line 1–12.

[66] Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), vol. 2, p. 811. For a discussion of *chaojin* and *chaogong* in the Qing administration, see Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan".

In practice, however, both rituals were sometimes pooled together.[67] When Inner Asia had become part of the empire and local elites were obliged to comply with pilgrimage and tribute duties, their appearance at court for combined rituals became more conventional.[68] Libu zone envoys, even the Vietnamese king himself, sometimes joined the audience of the combined ritual if their tribute schedule met the pilgrimage schedule. Though a mixed usage of *gong* (short for *Chaogong*) and *jin* (short for *Chaojin*) appeared more often in the records towards the middle and particularly the late Qing, the two rituals still belonged to separate political concepts stressing their importance for the Qing world order.[69]

The Libu was entitled to host Qing rituals of all kinds, pilgrimage and tribute being two of them. For communication and organizing the participation and ritual procedures, the Lifanyuan and Libu acted separately in accordance to the official routine of their tribute zones, thus forming a typical pattern of division and cooperation in daily administration.

4 Bifurcated Tribute Administration—Shared Procedures and Responsibilities

Among the four Libu bureaus one was in charge of tribute affairs. Lifanyuan tribute matters, however, were distributed among three of altogether six bureaus: the Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Wanghuisi*), the Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Rouyuansi*), and the Eastern Turkistan Bureau (*Laiyuansi*). The Qing thus increased the number of operational agencies to strengthen their capability of tribute management.[70]

Backed by the central authorities, Lifanyuan officials routinely visited Inner Asian polities and supervised the appointment of local officials, household registrations, legal settlements, economic arrangements, disaster relief, genealogy recording, school establishment, transportation management, etc. Libu

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[67] *Qingshizu shilu* (Taiwan: Wenhua shuju, 1978), vol. 35 (Shunzhi 4th year dinghai 12th month jiashu) and vol. 42 (Shunzhi 6th year yichou 2nd month gengzi); see also *Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli*, vol. 1, pp. 3–16, 49–53 and Wu Yanshao, *Qingdai mengzang huibu huidian*, vol. 4, p. 1865 and vol. 5, p. 1938.

[68] Such cases are recorded for the Inner and Khalkha Mongols, and for the Tibetan *fan* in Shaanxi-Gansu, see *Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli*, vol. 1, pp. 13, 27, 49, 51, 53, 93, 98 and 109–10.

[69] Ibid., pp. 76–7 for pilgrimage and pp. 92–3 and 99–109 for tribute.

[70] See the table "Libu and Lifanyuan: Institutional Structure and Responsibilities" at the end of this chapter.

officials, on the other hand, served as high-ranking ambassadors who delivered the emperor's decrees only to a few tribute countries occasionally and did not interfere in the latter's internal affairs. Tribute relationships between the court and the nations of the Libu zone surfaced almost exclusively during court rituals where three distinctive features can be observed.

First of all, the most favoured Libu tributaries were granted seals as a symbol of imperial recognition and the Qing's symbolic authorization for a 'legitimate' king or ruler. The bestowal of seals was also part of the Lifanyuan's administrative routine during the investiture of Inner Asian leaders, but outside the rituals. Secondly, Inner Asian nobles and officials were received and treated at the rituals according to their ranks and titles (Wang, Beile, Beize, Gong, and Taiji), whereas envoys under Libu supervision were introduced by their personal names without official titles. The emperor-authorized title was, instead, reserved for their king or king's heir only. In other words, it was his country's relationship to the Qing court that ranked a tribute envoy's place at the ritual ceremony rather than that envoy's own status inside Qing officialdom.[71] Thirdly, Inner Asian participants were positioned behind Manchu nobles during the ritual procedure directed by Lifanyuan officials, and were lined up at the eastern side of the emperor who was seated at the ritual centre. Envoys from the Libu zone, in contrast, were guided through the procedure by Libu officials and lined up behind Chinese officials at the western side.[72] Beginning with arrangements for who would be invited to the court ritual—the starting point of the procedure—to banquet menu preparations, the farewell celebration, and the closing ceremony of the ritual procedure, Lifanyuan and Libu organized their reception lists and took care of every detail separately.[73]

Tribute ties between the court and its tributaries went far beyond the designated rituals and implied a larger context of political and social relationships. When the emperor or important members of his family passed away, the Lifanyuan invited Inner Asian nobles to attend the memorial service at the capital while the Libu contacted the Koreans to do so.[74] At the funeral of a Mongol noble, who could either be a male title-holder or his wife if she was a Manchu imperial daughter, the Lifanyuan selected the sacrificial offerings and had its own officials attend the local memorial service.[75] In the case of the funeral of a king or one of his family members from the Libu zone, Libu officials went to the country with sacrificial offerings.[76] If a tribute envoy passed away on his journey to the court or during court rituals, it was the Lifanyuan that made provisions for those from Inner Asia and the Libu for those from its tribute zone. Such cases are recorded for Korean, Vietnamese, Miandian (Burmese), and Liuqiu envoys.[77]

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[71] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Daoguang reign, vol. 174, pp. 1a–b.

[72] Ibid., Qianlong reign, vol. 166, pp. 6b–10a and vol. 184, p. 7b, and Daoguang reign, vol. 171, pp. 2:4b.

[73] Ibid., Daoguang reign, vol. 198, p. 1b. For details on the separate arrangements of the Lifanyuan and Libu for banquets after the ritual ceremonies, see *ibid.*, Qianlong reign, vol. 163, pp. 1a–4b, vol. 166, p. 5a, vol. 184, p. 2a, vol. 192, p. 6a, vol. 198, pp. 3a–b, and *Qinding libu zeli*, vol. 199, pp. 2b–8b.

[74] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vol. 146, p. 12a.

A closer look into the bureaucratic procedures further reveals how sophisticated the division of labour in tribute management between Lifanyuan, Libu and other involved agencies actually was. When the emperor issued an edict to 'all under heaven', the Libu delivered a copy to the Grand Secretariat (*Neige*) which then passed a Mongol version to the Lifanyuan where language-trained clerks hand-copied the Mongol version in the required quantity which the Grand Secretariat then transferred to the Libu. From there the copies were distributed to the Board of Military, and postage troops delivered them to the Mongol banners. Such very edicts, however, were delivered to the Koreans[78] and to other tributaries of the Libu zone by the Libu directly. In compliance with its duties, the Lifanyuan relied on a Manchu, Mongol, and Han-Chinese archive staff trained in languages and conducting the correspondence between central and Inner Asian local offices. During ritual procedures, the Lifanyuan provided translators (*Tongshi*) to ensure communication between visitors from Inner Asia and those responsible for ritual arrangements. The Court of Imperial Entertainment (*Guanglusi*), being entrusted with banquet settings, was also dependent on Lifanyuan translators.[79] Regarding the Libu routine, a tribute envoy, once he had entered the Qing coastal province, would present the king's letter together with a register of tribute goods to the regional governor who had his Chinese language specialists do the translation work. Carrying Chinese copies of these translated documents with them to the capital, the tribute envoys presented the documents to a Libu official who would pass them to the Department of Household (*Neiwufu*) for further processing.[80]

The Qing tribute system was split up into an expanding internal Lifanyuan and an external Libu zone. It can hardly be understood correctly if we only

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[75] Ibid., vol. 158, p. 7b and vol. 159, p. 3b.

[76] Ibid., vol. 163, pp. 1a–3b.

[77] Ibid., pp. 4a-b and *Qinding libu zeli*, vol. 171, pp. 8b–9a.

[78] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Daoguang reign, vol. 12, pp. 8a–b.

[79] *Qinding libu zeli*, vol. 198, p. 14a.

[80] Ibid., vol. 171, pp. 2b and 11b.

look at the ritual audience without considering its strictly divided internal and external status in relation to the Qing court and acknowledging the different management in the two governing institutions. These differentiations are crucial not only for an adequate approach towards understanding the Qing tribute system but also for defining the Qing political space with its internal and external conceptualization.

5 Russia vis-à-vis the European Countries—European versus Asian Tributaries

Granting Western Ocean Countries (*Xiyangguo* or *Xiyangzhuguo*)[81] a distinguished place within the Libu zone led to a further classification of early Qing Libu tributaries into subordinate countries (*Shuguo*) in Asia and ally countries (*Yuguo*) from Europe.[82] As a matter of fact, this was not an exact definition of European countries as that category only emerged later, in the twentieth century. The otherwise clear division between Lifanyuan *Fanfu* and Libu *Fanfu*,[83] however, became blurred in the case of Russia which was assigned to the Lifanyuan zone.[84]

Russians differed from other Europeans in relationship to the Qing in several ways. While pre-nineteenth century Europeans arrived in China mainly along the Southeast coast, Russia, in the course of her eastward expansion, established inland contacts via Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. Unlike early contacts with European countries in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, Qing-Russian relationships were full of conflict over territorial boundaries, military campaigns, trading relations, and the affiliation of border populations—issues that were to be settled in the treaty resolutions of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1728)—while treaties were not yet an option for other European countries. Delegation exchange on state level was another unique Russian prerogative in Qing-Russian relationships. A first official Russian embassy arrived in the Qing capital in 1656, headed by Fëdor Isakovich Bajkov (c. *1612 †1663), and was welcomed by Lifanyuan officials. Emperor Kangxi sent a delegation to Russia in 1712, led by Yinzhana, the secretarial academician reader-in-waiting (*Shidu xueshi*), in order to conduct talks with the Torghud Mongols along the Volga River. Since the well-known Tulishen (图理琛, *1667 †1741) was a member of the delegation and published the *Journey to Torghuds* in 1723 (Chinese title: *Yiyulu*), the delegation has often been referred to as the Tulishen delegation.[85] The 1725 Russian delegation to the Qing, headed by Count Savva Lukich Vladislavich-Raguzinsky (*1669 †1738), and the two Qing courtesy delegations to Russia in 1729, led by Tuoshi and Mantai, opened the way for a modern type of diplomatic exchange on equal footing.[86] Delegation visits and exchanges continued until the Jiaqing reign.[87]

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[81] Zhao Erxun, *Qingshigao* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), vol. 91, lishi "binli" 730.

[82] Ibid.

[83] A clarification of the notion of this term is given by this author in her chapter "Lifanyuan and Libu in Early Qing Empire Building" in this volume.

[84] *Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli*, vol. 1, pp. 52 and 87 mentions Russians in tribute affairs. The Qianlong chao qinding libu zeli in *Qinding libu zeli erzhong* does not include Russia in its records on European tributaries. Representative examples can be found in *Shizongxian huangdi shilu*, vol. 62, p. 10a and vol. 110, p. 9b.

Disputes over ritual courtesy accompanied Qing-Russian relationships since 1656 when Bajkov's delegation arrived at Emperor Shunzhi's court,[88] in contrast to the Portuguese and Dutch who followed the Qing *Ketou* ritual in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Serious conflicts over rituals with other European countries did not occur until the Macartney Embassy of King George III in 1793.[89] Even though the format of the Qing-Russian delegation exchange did not fit the ideology of the Middle Kingdom, early Qing documents still exclusively used the tribute concept to define this relationship. Furthermore, while the European countries did not engage themselves with Qing-ruled Inner Asian nations, Russia was deeply involved in Qing Mongol affairs.[90] This explains, at least in general terms, why the Qing court assigned the Lifanyuan to be responsible for relationships with Russia.

Some other aspects further distinguished Russia from European countries in her relationship with China. Since the late Kangxi years tribute missions from Russia were allowed to trade in Beijing for six to twelve months, while the Europeans were given only three to five days.[91] Russia received permission to open an Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing, first temporarily under Kangxi, then permanently according to the Kyakhta treaty.[92] Emperor Yongzheng even changed the policy of Kangxi, whose government had stipulated in 1693 that Russian tribute missions who came to the capital and were accommodated in the Russian House (*E luo si guan*) were not to be given any financial aid.[93] In 1728 the court decided to provide Russian monks and students with financial support on a daily basis.[94] In fact, Russia was privileged in these relationships with the Qing court when compared to other European countries.

This institutional complexity regarding Russia and European countries had, however, no effect either on the Lifanyuan's primary responsibilities in Inner Asia or on the early Qing division between Lifanyuan and Libu in tribute affairs. It was not until 1861, after the Central Office on Foreign Affairs (*Zongli geguo shiwu yamen*) had become the internationally recognized diplomatic agency and was exclusively in charge of European countries, that Russia was fully aligned with the Western Powers, sharing the same institutional affiliation as the treaty countries (*Youyue zhiguo*).[95]

The Jiaqing edition of the *Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Qing* (JCY—CGG), compiled from 1712 to 1742 with information updated until 1820, listed Russia as a tributary country (*Chaogongguo*) together with Holland, the Western Ocean, England, and France. Records for the European countries were very limited, usually misinformed, and mixed with entries for Southeast Asian countries. As an exception, the record for Russia was given a whole individual chapter,[96] reflecting the differing degree of knowledge the Qing court had in the 1820s about Russia and Europe.

Even though the European countries were perceived, recorded, and grouped with Asian tribute countries, distinct lines in Libu management can still be found between the two groups. Thus, the Qing court legitimized only the rule of the king, his wife, and his heir among the intimate Asian tributaries.[97] The

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[85] Zhao Erxun, vol. 283, "Liezhuan 70" 2621. A discussion of this delegation can be found in Guo Meilan, Mingqing dang'an yu shidi tanwei (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2012), 16–8, and Yi Changchun, "Tulichen shituan chushi Torghud bu zhi shiming tanxi," *Heilongjiang minzu congkan* 96,1 (2007).

[86] Deng Peiyong, "Yongzheng shiqi de zhong'e guanxi jiqi lishi zuoyong," *Border Economy and Culture* 92,8 (2011): 169.

[87] Chen Weixin, "Jiaqing shiqi zhong'e waijiao liyizhi jiaoshe—yi 'fenggong tizhi' fenxi," *Eluosi xuebao* 6 (2007).

[88] Wang Kaixi, *Qingdai waijiao liyi de jiaoshe yu lunzheng* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2009), 100.

[89] Ibid., pp. 81 and 86. Niu Daosheng, *Yingyu dui zhongguo de lishixing yingxiang* (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2013), 26.

[90] *Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli*, vol. 1, p. 141. See also Gang Yangshu, "Guanyu kulun banshi dachen de kaocha," transl. Oyungerel, *Mengguxue xinxi* 6 (1997).

[91] Li Yunquan, Chaogong zhidu shilun, 243.

[92] Liu Xiaomeng, "Qingdai Beijing de eluosi qiren," http://www2.scu.edu.tw/history/PDF/lec-Lau95011401.pdf, 2–3.

[93] Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli, vol. 1, p. 171.

[94] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 87.

[95] *Qinghuidian*, vol. 99, pp. 897–8.

[96] *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi*, vols. 550–60, for Russia see vol. 554.

[97] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vols. 176–7 and Daoguang reign, vols. 181–3.

TABLE 5.2 *European 'Tributary Countries' (according to the* JCY—CGG)

European countries	Volume numbers with countries indicated	Amount of Chinese pages	Reprinted volume and page numbers
Holland	vol. 551 Liuqiu (Ryukyu) Helan (Holland)	6 pages with additional lines	34:27145–27151
Western Ocean	vol. 552 Italy and 10 country names (not identical with modern European names)	17 pages with additional lines	34:27153–27170
Russia	vol. 554 Russia	22 pages with additional lines	34:27233–27255
England	vol. 556 Miandian (Burma) Yingjili (England) Zhengqian Uluguo Machen	6 pages with additional lines	34:20407–20411
France	vol. 560 Kalaba Boni Mayeweng Jiugang Falanxi (France)	4 pages with additional lines	34:20407–20411

bestowal, including the presentation of seals and certificates, took place either at the court tribute ritual or inside the tributary country by an imperial envoy.[98] The Qing court did, however, never award a European ruler with a title or a seal or send an envoy to his country.[99] The amount and intervals of tribute offering

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[98] The JCY—CGG reports meticulously the handover of golden or silver seals, see *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi*, vol. 550, p. 5b for Korea, vol. 551, pp. 3a–4a for Liuqiu, vol. 553, pp. 4a, 6a, 8b, and 9b for Vietnam, vol. 555, pp. 2a–b for Nanzhang, and vol. 556, p. 3b for Miandian.

[99] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vols. 167–77 and Daoguang reign, vols. 172–83.

were, furthermore, not fixed for Europeans in contrast to Asian countries.[100] Financial and material support provided by the court to Asian tributaries for their journeys to the Qing capital was also given to the Dutch but to no other Western Ocean countries.[101]

According to Libu documents, the Dutch first appeared during the reign of Emperor Shunzhi in 1652 and were perceived as a people both paying tribute and engaging in trade when landing in Fujian.[102] The Italian missionaries came from the Western Ocean and their history was not traceable. Some of them served at the court with religious orientation and some came to pay tribute during Emperor Yongzheng's reign in 1724.[103] Great Britain was described as a trading (*Hushi*) country located near Holland beyond the ocean. The British came during Kangxi's reign but did not show up at the court until Yongzheng's 7th year (1730) when they restored trade relations with the Qing.[104] France was known as a country that "never had been in contact with China"[105] until it bullied Ming Chinese coastal areas. It is described as a trading nation known to the Qing since Shunzhi's time. According to Niu Daosheng, almost two years after the first Opium War (1839–1842) Emperor Daoguang still did not have a clue where Great Britain was,[106] and this may apply to other European countries as well. Despite this humble knowledge, European envoys, categorized as foreign tribute envoys (*Waiguo gongshi*),[107] were lined up at the court tribute ritual together with the envoys of all other Libu-managed Asian countries, opposite the Lifanyuan- managed Inner Asian representatives.[108]

Russian envoys are described as coming from a faraway foreign country as early as 1693 and ignorant of the ritual proprieties to be observed in China. The

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[100] *Qinding libu zeli*, vol. 180, pp. 1a–2a.

[101] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Daoguang reign, vols. 199 and 200.

[102] Ibid., Qianlong reign, vol. 173, pp. 1a–b. The *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi*, vol. 551, records that the Dutch first arrived in 1656, not earlier. The knowledge about the Dutch at the Jiaqing court was clearly limited, highlighting that their ancestors lived in an "abandoned wild land" far away from China, that there was no way to examine their history, that their ruler was a king, that they first came to China during the years of Ming emperor Wanli (1572–1620), and kept coming periodically since Shunzhi's time.

[103] *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi*, vol. 552 and *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vol. 175, p. 3a.

[104] Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi, vol. 556.

[105] Ibid., vol. 560.

[106] Niu Daosheng, Yingyu dui zhongguo de lishixing yingxiang, 39–40.

[107] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vol. 179, pp. 1a–b.

[108] *Qinding libu zeli*, vol. 199, pp. 4a–8b and vol. 200, pp. 1b–8a.

Kangxi court accused them of not corresponding in the proper manner and lacking the writing courtesy expected from all foreigners; hence, it sent their tribute memorials back and requested them to be re-written in accordance to the appropriate language etiquette. Even with such a violation, according to the Lifanyuan record, the "Manchu emperor's grace was granted to the Russian envoy at his ritual audience and the tribute rewards were bestowed on him as well."[109] The Jiaqing court wrote about Russia that this "land was blocked by the desert during the Ming time, so [the Russians] could not contact the Middle Kingdom. [It was in] this dynasty when, in Shunzhi's 12th year [1656], [the Russian] Chagan [Tsagan] Khan began to send envoys to present tribute," and considering them as foreigners entering civilization (*Waibang conghua*), the Manchu emperor "generously tolerated them."[110] These excerpts from the records show that up until the Jiaqing reign, the Qing were likely to treat Russia as a foreign country not different from other European countries; what made a difference was her institutional assignment under Lifanyuan supervision.

In the early Qing world view, there was no need to classify the European countries in any other way than as tributary countries, even though various specific features distinguished them from traditional Asian tributary countries. Only during the later course of the first Opium War, when the Qing concept of Europe changed, did the Libu zone become sub-classified into trading countries (*Maoyiguo*) and treaty countries (*Youyueguo*).

6 Central Asian 'Tributaries'

Another complication in the Qing tribute system was the position of thirteen Central Asian polities beyond Western Xinjiang[111] and of the Ghurkha beyond the Tibetan heartland. According to the Qing classification they were neither tributary countries (*Chaogong guo*), even though they paid tribute to the Qing, nor foreign countries (*Waiguo*) although they were not under direct Qing rule. Consequently, a new category emerged: newly submitted non-Chinese (*Xinfu waifan*). For example, in 1758 the Eastern Kazakh branches along the western edge of Xinjiang "call themselves subordinates [of the Qing] and come to pay

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[109] Qianlong neifu chaoben Lifanyuan zeli, vol. 1, pp. 171–2.

[110] Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi, vol. 554, p. 2b.

[111] Zhang Yongjiang and Ye Zimin, "Lielun Qingdai de shuguo," *Qingshi yanjiu*, 4 (1999): 52, point out that towards the late Qianlong reign thirteen Central Asian and twenty-five polities from the coastal side were listed as Qing subordinated countries.

tribute [*Chengchen rugong*]"[112]. This event became Emperor Qianlong's great pride because, according to the *Records of the Qing Accepting Peoples From Afar*, no Kazakhs had ever submitted to China even during Han Wudi's great expedition into Central Asia. From 1757 to 1827, Kazakh nobles attended Qing tribute rituals more frequently and were granted much higher ranks than any other tribute envoys from Central Asia.[113] The Qing, however, had only a limited influence on the Kazakhs and could hardly interfere in their internal affairs.

Another category of newly submitted foreign countries (*Xinfu waiguo*) seems to have included the Kokand Khanate (Huohan) in the eastern part of the Fergana valley whose tribute visits to the Qianlong court were recorded for 1786 and 1792. The kingdom of Nepal (Ghurkha), being defeated after the 1788 and 1791 attacks on Tibet and obliged to attend the court tribute ritual, belonged to this category as well.[114] The Kyrgyz (Bulute) from the Andijon Viloyat (Anjiyan) and other Central Asian polities were placed under this category, too. In the Qing records they appear either as being integrated as Qing population (*Neifu*), like the Left Kazakh and the East and West Kyrgyz,[115] as having submitted themselves (*Guifu*), like the Right Kazakh,[116] or as submitting themselves to become part of the internal population (*Toucheng neifu*).[117] Tellingly, the oversimplifying records do not reflect any Lifanyuan responsibilities vis-à-vis these groups except their tribute ritual attendance. Nor did the Lifanyuan perform any administrative duties inside their societies. At the court rituals, Central Asian envoys were positioned at the end of the participants' list and their line-up shifted between Lifanyuan and Libu tributaries over the years,[118] further reflecting the uncertainty of their status. With no intentions to establish governance over these nations, their tribute obligation seems to have satisfied the Qing court as a sign of political submission, and their uncertain tribute status would not cause any concern as long as they did not interfere in Qing Xinjiang.

The Central Asian polities belonged to a frontier zone, reflecting thus a fuzzy section of the Qing tribute system if we follow Qing categorization, terminology, and the official records at court level. They were, however, still clearly integrated in the nested hierarchy of the tributary relationships. No matter how vague or confusing their status was, for a general understanding they should be included in the Qing tribute system.

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[112] Qingchao rouyuanji, pp. 101–2.

[113] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Daoguang reign, vol. 2, pp. 5a-b and vol. 7, p. 2b; see also the discussion of Laura Hostetler in this volume.

[114] Ibid., Daoguang reign, vol. 7, pp. 2a-b.

[115] *Jiaqing chongxiu yitongzhi*, vol. 529, pp. 26295, 26318, and 26321.

[116] Ibid., p. 26304.

[117] Ibid., vols. 529–31.

[118] *Qinding libu zeli erzhong*, Qianlong reign, vol. 5, p. 2a, and Daoguang reign, vol. 2, pp. 4b–5b for the Kazakhs and Fergana.

7 Conclusion

Adapting to a rapidly changing world, the Qing reshaped the Ming tribute administration for the demands of their growing empire. In contrast to Ming concepts and their management of tribute relationships, the early Qing established two different tribute zones: external and internal, with fundamental changes in institution building. The tribute system continued to serve the court in formalizing relationships. However, the tributaries were classified according to different political criteria and then affiliated with different governing institutions. Peoples of the Lifanyuan tribute zone—Mongols, Tibetans, Xinjiang Muslims, the Qinghai and Jinchuan *Tusi* population—belonged to the 'internal type' of tribute relationship. By the middle of Qianlong's reign all of them were no longer external tributaries. By official regulations and through Lifanyuan-managed routines, their leaders and elites were obliged to comply with Qing tribute duties as court-appointed nobles and officials. They and their successors, in return, became privileged and received material awards according to their ranks as long as they were loyal to the court.

The tributary countries of the Libu zone were divided into three types based on the different nature of their relationships to the Qing court. The 'ideal type' referred to the most intimate tributaries, particularly Korea, Liuqiu, and Vietnam. The Qing government bestowed authority on their kings but did not interfere in their internal affairs. In the Libu tribute countries, China's traditional Confucian culture provided guidance to both leadership and people's life on various levels. The Qing's superiority was better recognized, the tribute presentation to the emperor was more willingly pursued, and court officials were sent out as a form of political influence outside the court ritual.

Relationships with the large number of other Southeast Asian tributaries can be labelled as 'ordinary'. Located at greater distance to the empire both physically and culturally, these tributaries, except a few nearby countries such as Miandian, Sianluo, and Nanzhang, experienced only limited or no Qing influence, with rare or no transfer of imperial legitimation, seal granting, and imperial envoys. In terms of imperial attention they could compete neither with the tributaries of the 'internal type' from the Lifanyuan zone nor with those of the 'ideal type' from the Libu zone. As the Qing welcomed their tribute politically, their own interest in offering tribute was, in general, spurred by the hope for improvement of their economic and political situation.

The 'trading type' of relationships applies to European countries. Unlike the Asian tributaries, little was known about the remote European nations. The Qing court cautiously watched their behaviour and activities regarding China but had no intentions to influence their countries. Their relevance for the Qing tribute system was increasing because of their more frequent appearance. But they were not given the same ritual status as the internal tributaries from Inner Asia, nor were they equal to Qing-favoured Asian tributaries. The essential honours of awarding political legitimation were not applicable in these relationships.

The 'exceptional type' describes the relationship between Qing China and Russia. Given her expectations for direct communication between the two governments and delegation exchanges, Russia's obvious refusal to acknowledge the Qing emperor's superiority was perceived by the Manchu as exceptional and being not in accordance with the Qing world order. The relationship was conflict-laden with regard to diplomatic courtesy, territorial demarcation, border market trade, and border population distribution. Russia positioned herself as the only negotiating power which signed treaties for conflict resolution with the Qing. Being unsatisfied with her institutional affiliation to the Lifanyuan, Russia appealed to a higher ranking Qing institution, such as the *Neige*, for equal treatment in bilateral diplomatic communications. In the Qing world order, Russia was not grouped together with the European countries, nor with Inner Asian polities or Asian tributaries. Russia's unique position in the tribute system is also reflected by privileges which other European countries did not enjoy: a longer trading period after the tribute ritual and the permission to maintain a language school and a church in the Qing capital.

Finally, Qing relationships with Central Asian polities bordering Xinjiang and Tibet can be characterized as 'marginal' ones. The Qing categorized them as integrated internal tributaries and affiliated them with the Lifanyuan. In sharp contrast to the Qing Inner Asian polities, however, the Lifanyuan's responsibilities were limited in this case to recording their visits for rituals and archiving official correspondence. In daily practice beginning already in the last decades of Qianlong's reign, these relationships were managed locally by Qing generals from Xinjiang and the *Amban* of Tibet. Such polities had much more freedom in their tribute presentation which actually depended on their own need for trade and on Qing military pressure.

The proposed relationship types illustrate the hierarchy and complexity of the multi-layered Qing tribute system. The Qing world order was much built upon this system, which did not only comprise the ideological and cultural worldviews as well as the ritual and trade relationships, but also, or more practically, the institution-operated and cooperated governing system involving political categories of the polities in relation with the Qing court. Even though the same term *Gong* was applied to all tributaries, the criteria by which they were categorized and received by the Qing court invested them with different grades of courtesy and assigned them a particular rank in a hierarchic system. They were issued awards of varying quality and quantity, they encountered different degrees of interference in their internal affairs, their tribute presentations were scheduled with different intervals, and their trade opportunities—and thus their profits—differed. The tributaries, in turn, all had their own concepts, interests, and forms of compliance—political consolidation by external legitimation and economic profits being among the most common reasons for participating in the Chinese tribute system. Evidently, the ideology behind the tribute system was multi-facetted and flexible, being challenged to adapt to a variety of relationships and, hence, under constant change in history. It is also clear that the dynastic centre, at least until the end of Qianlong's reign, relied on the tribute system as an "organized device"[119] based on a superiority-to-inferiority ideology and an internally-to-externally structured dichotomy to maintain relationships of various kinds.

The institutional exploration of the tribute system helps to clarify the combination of different components, types of relationships, and layers of engagement that framed the Qing tribute system. This approach seems to be suitable to reduce the current confusion in the field, and is hoped to move the controversy towards a resolution, at least one step. If studied in isolation, each single component will not give a comprehensive picture of the tribute system—and neither will a 'one-size-fits-all approach'. During the Ming-Qing transition, the new Manchu dynasty reformed the traditional system to strengthen its statecraft. With their partitioned zones of responsibility and yet shared management of the tribute rituals, the Lifanyuan and Libu demonstrate an institutional adaptation to the new challenges of early Qing expansion. While the Lifanyuan implemented new mechanisms of geopolitical governance in non-Chinese regions of Inner Asia, the Libu very much preserved a Ming heritage and perpetuated traditional tribute ties with East and Southeast Asia, extending them even to all arriving West European nations. Even though tribute rituals have long been abandoned and the tribute system became dysfunctional with the fall of the dynasty, its functions which once worked at defining the empire and the two institutions which once executed the tribute policies have left an impact on modern China, a country much following the dividing lines of internal and external boundaries based on early Qing experience.

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[119] Rowe, China's Last Empire, 136.

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TABLE 5.3 *Libu and Lifanyuan: Institutional Structure and Responsibilities*

Libu	Lifanyuan
Yizhi qinglisi, Bureau of Ritual Regulations • All court rituals (imperial family, Chinese officials who meet the emperor, Inner Asian participants in court rituals, tribute envoys who perform in ritual ceremonies, etc.) • Rituals in Han Chinese society • Empire-wide school education and imperial examinations • Emperor's edict-issuing ritual • Imperial archive (*Huangshicheng*) management and imperial genealogy (*Yudie*) completion • Ritual ceremonies for marriages, funerals, festival celebrations, dressing styles, ritual food preparations, social etiquettes, etc.	**Qijisi**, Inner Mongolian Bureau • Administration of the six Inner Mongol leagues (comprising forty-nine banners), Hohhot (Guihua), and the nomadic peoples along the Amur River in Manchuria (e.g. Oroqen = Elunchun) • Supervision of territory demarcations for each banner • Awarding noble status and classifying official ranks • Land and population distribution • Compiling family trees and recording genealogies • Organization of corvée, services, tax collection, and household registration • Issuing marriage and inheritance regulations • Processing disaster relief • Supervision of the league meetings • Ordering military actions • Management of transportation and post station (*Yizhan*) networks, etc.
Jisi qinglisi, Bureau for Worshipping Affairs • Hosting the imperial worship for Heaven, Earth, previous emperors, mountain and river gods, etc. • Management of all mourning ceremonies at the court • Directing family worship and the worship of folk gods • Stipulation of provisions for officials' funeral leaves (both Chinese and non-Chinese inside the capital) according to family relationships	**Wanghuisi**, Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau • Administration of the financial affairs of the Inner Mongol nobles • Devising officials' ritual duties during pilgrimages and tribute offerings at the court • Distribution of the emperor's rewarding gifts to the nobles of Inner Mongolia • Issuing annual instructions at the court to the Mongol leagues
Zhuke qinglisi, Bureau of Receiving Ritual Guests • In charge of non-Chinese affairs from all directions • Design and regulation of tribute rituals	**Dianshusi**, Outer Mongolian Bureau • Administration of the Outer/Khalkha Mongol banners, maintaining relations between the court and the Zünghars of northern Xinjiang, the Mongols in Kökenuur (Qinghai), Gansu, and the Helan Mountain (Ningxia) regions

(cont.)

Libu	Lifanyuan
• Invitation of and accommodation for Libu tributaries who come to the capital • Reception of all tributaries at the court • Issuing awards to the compilers of the 'Qing Veritable Records' (*Shilu*) and the 'Imperial genealogy' (*Yudie*)	• Delimitation of nomadic territories • Granting noble and official titles according to the distribution of their land and people • Organization of the league meeting • Regulation of inheritance and recording of genealogies • Running transport stations • Management of military farming (*Tuntian*) affairs in the Urumqi-Ili region in Xinjiang and trade activities in Outer Mongolia • Management of the border markets in Urga (Kuren) and Kyakhta in Outer Mongolia • Supervision of religious affairs of Tibetan Buddhism throughout Tibet, in Inner and Outer Mongolia • Awarding ranks to the lamas by issuing certificates and seals • Administration of Russian affairs
Jingshan qinglisi, Bureau of Imperial Banquets and Ritual Food • Arranging food supplies according to ritual participants' status at the imperial banquets • Organization of ritual participants for the ceremonies, including court and provincial officials, Lifanyuan-entitled Inner Asians, tribute envoys and European countries under Libu • Holding banquets with proper protocols according to the court rituals	**Rouyuansi**, Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau • Organizing pilgrimages and tribute rituals for the Khalkha, Oirat, and Kökenuur (Qinghai) Mongols • Issuing official salaries to the entitled Mongols • Organization of court receptions for the Khalkha Mongols • Hosting Tibetan Buddhist lamas resident in the capital • Guiding the Mongols through ritual procedures at the court
• Arranging food and banquet orders	• Reception and record of tribute goods from Khalkha nobles and Tibetan lamas • Granting and keeping record of the emperor's gifts to the tributaries
	Laiyuansi, Eastern Turkistan Bureau (Bureau of Calling Distant People to Submit), (since 1761) • Administration of the newly acquired Western Muslim Territories (Xinjiang) • Instruction of Muslim city officials, arranging for their tribute to the emperor and the yearly ritual duties for their pilgrimage to the capital • Compilation of genealogies • Checking household registrations • Issuing government documents and salaries to local officials • Collection of local taxes • Overseeing migrations and relations between the nomads and sedentary population in Xinjiang
	Lixingsi, Judicial Bureau • Civil and criminal cases in Inner Asia • Development and implementation of legal codes for the Mongolian, Tibetan, and Muslim peoples
Zhuyinju, Seal Office • Regulation of the engraving, issuing, use, and restoration of official seals	**Dangyuechu**, Seal Office • Dating, certifying, and sealing court documents. Each of the six Lifanyuan bureaus had an authorized document office which received correspondence from various offices in the capital, summarized or outlined them, and reported or transferred them to the other court offices.

(cont.)

Libu	Lifanyuan
Huangshicheng, Imperial Archive • Storage of the most important written documents for the Qing emperor and his family, including the imperial genealogy	**Mandangfang**, Manchu Archive • A translation and archival agency to which each Lifanyuan Bureau transferred all official documents every five days. When the archive officials had read, classified, and registered these documents, they reported their content to the relevant offices at the court.
	Handangfang, Chinese Archive • A translation and archival agency handling all Lifanyuan Manchu memorials, translating them into Chinese, and restoring the Manchu documents.
	Mengdangfang, Mongol Archive • A translation and archival agency processing Mongolian documents, translating Western Mongol *Todo bichig* and Tangut (Tibetan) language documents.
	Siwuting, General Services Office • Communications between the Lifanyuan and Mongol banners (Jasag) and officials stationed in Mongolia and Xinjiang. The clerks copied, translated, and summarized each document and delivered it to the Censorate. In addition to logging and transmitting these communications, this office hired all Mongolian interpreters, sergeants-at-arms, guards, runners, lesser clerks (*Shuli*) and housekeepers employed by the Lifanyuan. It also handled the funds for their maintenance.
	Yinku, Silver Treasury (since 1707) • Distribution of funds defrayed by the Board of Revenue, for sustenance of the Mongols when they visited the court. (In the *Comprehensive Gazetteer of the Great Qing* it is listed as a sub-branch of the General Services Office.)
Huitong siyiguan, Institute for Interpreters and Translators • Organization of hotel accommodations for tributary envoys, translation of works for different languages (created in 1748 by combining the previously separate *Huitongguan*, Interpreters Institute, and *Siyiguan*, Translators Institute)	**Bitieshi**, Transcript Clerks • The title name for the transcript clerks is the Chinese equivalent of the Manchu word "*Baksi*" meaning "teacher," or "scholar," or "the educated." The office had a group of language professionals doing translation work. Until the middle of the Qianlong period, there were thirty-six to thirty-eight Manchus, fifty-five Mongols, and six Chinese working as the transcription clerks in the Lifanyuan.
Libu muchang, Pastureland of Libu	**Other offices** Tanggut (Tibetan) Studies *Tödö* Studies *Neiguan*—Inner Hostel *Waiguan*—Outer Hostel Headquarter of the Mulan Hunting Ground Chief Lama Seal Office Regulation Compiling Office Russian School


RUSSIAN FEDERATION
KAZAKHSTAN
Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture
Tarbagatai Prefecture
MONGOLIA
Hulunbir Prefecture
Heilongjiang
Jilin
Inner Mongolia
Liaoning
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Xinjiang
C H I N A
Qinghai
Ningxia
Hebei
Shandong
SOUTH KOREA
NORTH KOREA
JAPAN
Gansu
Shaanxi
Xizang (Tibet)
Ü - T s a n g
A m d o
K h a m
Sichuan
NEPAL
BHUTAN
INDIA
Guizhou
Hunan
Yunnan
BURMA
Guangxi
Guangdong
TAIWAN
VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
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Major places:
1 Irkutsk
2 Semipalatinsk
3 Selenginsk
4 Kyakhta
5 Nerchinsk
6 Albazin
7 Tsurukhaitu
8 Uliastai
9 Ulaanbaatar
10 Qiqihar
11 Heilongjiang
12 Khiva
13 Bukhara
14 Kokand
15 Andijon
16 Fergana
17 Ush
18 Kashgar
19 Yarkant
20 Khotan
21 Aksu
22 Kucha
23 Urumqi
24 Turfan
25 Barköl
26 Hami
27 Xining
28 Wuhai
29 Hohhot
30 Huozhou
31 Datong
32 Zhangjiakou
33 Beijing
34 Chengde
35 Tianjin
36 Shenyang
37 Kabul
38 Kandahar
39 Kathmandu
40 Lhasa
41 Chamdo
42 Batang
43 Litang
44 Kangding
45 Liucheng
46 Canton
47 Nanjing
national border
Chinese province border
administrative border
Tibetan Region

Cartography: Jutta Turner
Base maps: Esri, USGS, NOAA; ESRI ® Data and Maps: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarbagatay_District; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ili_Kazakh_Autonomous_Prefecture; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hulunbuir; http://tibetoffice.com.au/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/tibmap.gif; (accessed June 9, 2016)
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Modern Map of China, with adjacent areas.

CHAPTER 6

The Qing Court and Peoples of Central and Inner Asia: Representations of Tributary Relationships from the *Huang Qing Zhigong tu*

Laura Hostetler

1 The *Zhigong tu* as a Mirror of Imperial Expansion

In 1751 the Qianlong emperor commissioned the *Huang Qing zhigong*, or *Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples*.[1] The work is a descriptive ethnography of over 300 peoples, including Europeans, Koreans, Southeast Asians, and non-Han peoples from south-western border provinces, with whom the Qing had diplomatic or tributary relations. Allusions to earlier versions of illustrated records of tributary peoples, or *Zhigong tu*, can be found in the historical record for as early as the sixth century during the Liang dynasty. However, the Qianlong compilation is best understood not only as a revival of an earlier Chinese genre, but also in the context of early modern imperial expansion in which increasing contact between cultures, and an emergent emphasis on visual observation as a way to classify people and categorize knowledge, led to the development this type of ethnographic compendia.[2] In some ways the

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[1] I would like to express my sincere thanks to Wu Xuemei and to Ying Liu for their assistance with translation and transliteration, and Dittmar Schorkowitz for his guidance and excellent editorial advice. While the Qianlong emperor was actually enthroned on the 18th of October, 1735, it was standard Chinese practice to officially begin the dating of imperial reign periods on the first of the new lunar year. Hence the beginning of the Qianlong reign is conventionally dated 1736. Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 15, 19.

[2] For an entrée into the literature on the increasing importance of visuality and direct observation during this period, both in Europe and in Asia see Craig Clunas, *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Emma Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); Timon Screech, *The Western Scientific Gaze and Popular Imagery in Later Edo Japan: The Lens Within the Heart* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Pamela H. Smith and Paula Findlen, "Commerce and the Representation of Nature in Art and Science," in *Merchants & Marvels: Commerce, Science and Art in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Pamela H. Smith et al. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 1–25;

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Huang Qing Zhigong tu (henceforth *Zhigong tu*) is comparable to European *Trachtenbücher*, or costume books, in that it identified different groups of people and tied them to their regional homelands through detailed attention to distinctions in dress. Johann Gottlieb Georgi's *Beschreibung aller Nationen des Rußischen Reichs*, which attempts to identify and categorize the various peoples of the Russian empire, is a good example of the European genre.[3] The two works are similar in that illustrations depict men and women in distinctive native garb. The biggest difference is the overt way in which Qing imperial authority is asserted in the *Zhigong tu*. For the Qianlong emperor the *Zhigong tu* was a vehicle to demonstrate the diversity and extent of the empire, both of which mirrored the splendour of the realm in general and his reign in particular.[4]

The compendium combines representations of foreign peoples, tributaries (both external and internal), and subjects of the Qing administered under both the Lifanyuan and the Libu.[5] The Libu, or Board of Ritual, was inherited from the Ming administration. It dealt with tribute and tributaries as a form of imperial ritual, and during the Qing dynasty continued to take responsibility

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and Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), esp. chapters three (81–100) and five (127–57). The Qing used western-trained Jesuit artists to record its accomplishments and also to paint portraits of victorious generals in the western campaigns; it remains uncertain what kind of direct influence they may have had on projects of ethnographic representation more generally. For more on the role of Jesuit painters in Qing diplomacy see Deborah Sommer, "The Art and Politics of Painting Qianlong at Chengde," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James A. Millward (New York: Routledge, Curzon, 2004), 136–45, and Deborah Sommer, "A Letter from a Jesuit Painter in Qianlong's Court at Chengde," in Ibid., 171–84; Veronika Veit, "Jean Denis Attiret: Ein Jesuitenmaler Am Hofe Qianlongs," in *Europa und die Kaiser von China (1240–1816)*, ed. Hendrik Budde (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1985), and, from the same author, "Die in Deutschland befindlichen Porträts der von Ch'ienlung 1754–55 unterworfenen Ölötenfürsten," *Zentralasiatische Studien des Seminars für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens der Universität Bonn* 4 (1970).

[3] Johann Gottlieb Georgi, *Beschreibung aller Nationen des Rußischen Reichs, ihrer Lebensart, Religion, Gebräuche, Wohnungen, Kleidungen und übrigen Merkwürdigkeiten* (St. Petersburg: Carl Wilhelm Müller, 1776–1780).

[4] For more on the *Huang Qing zhigong tu*, and the ideology of the Qianlong emperor see Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 42–9. For more on ethnography in the early modern period see Laura Hostetler, "Early Modern Ethnography in Comparative Historical Perspective," in *The Art of Ethnography: A Chinese "Miao Album"*, ed. David M. Deal et al. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), xvii-lxvii.

[5] The variety of diplomatic relationships represented in the *Huang Qing zhigong tu* is also commented on by Tong Ying, "Qingdai qianqi chaogong guanxi kaoban," *Manchu Studies* 52,1 (2011).

for those groups who had paid tribute, or engaged in diplomatic relations with the Ming. The Lifanyuan was created in 1638, two years after the establishment of the Qing, but before its conquest of Ming China, as a vehicle to manage relationships with the Mongols. Often referred to in translation as the Court of Colonial Affairs, it may more appropriately be rendered "court for the administration of the outer provinces."[6] After the establishment of the Qing in China, the institution would be retained alongside the Libu (Board of Ritual), which was inherited from the Ming administration. The Lifanyuan would be responsible for the administration of Central and Inner Asia, and the Libu for established tribute relationships with East and Southeast Asia, and other groups who approached China from its southeast coast. The structure of the Lifanyuan would grow and adapt over time as the Qing extended its reach into Inner Asia.[7]

A significant portion of the *Zhigong tu* is devoted to descriptions of residents of Central and Inner Asia. In fact, the Qianlong emperor's campaigns and conquests in the northwest seem to have been a major factor in the commissioning of the scroll. Through this project the emperor sought to showcase not only the geographical expanse of Qing foreign relations, but also highlight his most recent conquests by including evidence of the westernmost extent of Qing influence through the inclusion of those peoples who had most recently submitted to or recognized Qing authority. As the project was on-going, Inner Asians who had submitted in the decade following the document's commissioning in 1751 were also included in the project—as were Central Asians with whom the Qing had some relationship, but who had not actually been conquered. Geographically, the scope of the Central and Inner Asian portions of the scroll ranges from Tibet to Xinjiang (termed Ili in the *Zhigong tu*), to Gansu province, and regions even further west—including locations in present day Afghanistan and those described as being beyond Yunnan province.

2 Overview of the Western Conquests

Before turning to the content of the *Zhigong tu* itself, a brief overview of Qing westward expansion will provide some useful contextualization. Broadly speaking, those most affected by Qing expansion and conquest were Mongol, Tibetan, and Turkic Muslim peoples. The Mongol picture is the most complicated.[8] To simplify, the Mongols can be divided into Eastern and Western Mongols, both groups being distinct from the Inner Mongols whose name reflects the position they had within the Qing Banners from early on. The Eastern, or Khalkha, Mongols established tributary relations with the Qing already in the 1630s although they remained independent until the 1690s when, under increasing pressures from the Zünghar Mongols from the west, they allied themselves more closely with the Qing, to which they pledged allegiance in 1691. At that time, their chiefs Tüshiyetu Khan, and Setsen Khan acknowledged themselves as vassals of the Qing state, and in return received an imperial pension. The event was celebrated with a meeting and feast in Dolonnuur, which is located about 250 kilometres north of Beijing. From this time on their tribute was combined with ritual pilgrimage, the significance of which is further described below. Their final submission to the Qing was sealed with the death of the Zünghar leader Galdan Boshogtu Khan in 1697.[9]

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[6] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 294–5.

[7] For a close look at this process and how the Lifanyuan responded to the needs of Qing administration in outlying regions see Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity in Early Qing (1636–1795)* (Halle (Saale): Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012.

The Western Mongols consisted chiefly of the Oirats (or Kalmyks) with their various divisions. The Oirats were termed Kalmyks by the Russians, and Qalmaq by their Turkic-speaking neighbours. In China they were also known as Eleuth or Zünghars. However, as James Millward has concisely stated, "while all Zunghars were Oirats, not all Oirats were Zunghars."[10] The Zünghars, were

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[8] As Pamela Crossley notes, Qing sources, and the Qing histories in particular "carry a very complex nomenclature for various groups that modern scholars construct as 'Mongols.'" In the *Qingshi gao* "peoples of parts of Mongolia and Xinjiang are not called Mongols at all (that was reserved for bannermen and the incorporated Chahar and Khalkha) but *fanbu* (dependent tribes)." Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Thinking About Ethnicity in Early Modern China," *Late Imperial China* 11,1 (1990): 24 including note 46.

[9] For more on the Khalkha see Chia Ning, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14,1 (1993): 70; Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 291, and Nicola Di Cosmo, "Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift-Exchange?," in *Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries and Human Geographies in Chinese History*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo et al. (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2003), 352; René Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes: a History of Central Asia* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 528–30; and Veronika Veit, *Die vier Qane von Qalqa: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der politischen Bedeutung der nordmongolischen Aristokratie in den Regierungsperioden K'ang-hsi bis Ch'ien-lung (1661–1796) anhand des biographischen Handbuches Iledkel šastir aus dem Jahre 1795: Teil I: Untersuchungen (Iledkel šastir Hefte 45–76)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1990), 48–53 for administrative positions among the Khalkha.

[10] James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 88–9. For additional sources on naming, on which I have also

a group of Oirat tribes that coalesced under Zünghar leadership at roughly the same time that the Manchus were themselves busy forming alliances that would bring them to power. (The Torghuds referred to in the *Zhigong tu* were also Oirats; those that migrated to the region of the Volga would become known as Kalmyks in Russia.)

According to most accounts it was concern about Zünghar power that prompted westward expansion by the Qing. Zünghar incursions into Tibet in 1717 led to the Kangxi emperor's decision to send in troops. The Qing presence would be strengthened with administrative changes in 1727 that involved placing Kökenuur (now Qinghai) under the Lifanyuan, and incorporating eastern Khams into Sichuan province. In the same year, the Qing initiated a residency system whereby two high-ranking bannermen, referred to as *Ambans*, were be stationed in Tibet. This increased presence would support the Regent Polhanas until his death in 1747.[11]

The Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz were also troubled by the rise of Zünghars. Both groups were brought into the orbit of Qing power in the course of the final annihilation campaigns of the 1750s. The Kazakhs, who were of Turkic origin, had their own Khanate, which was divided into three groups or Hordes (*Zhus, jüz*), each of which was led by one or two Khans. Ablai Khan, also known as Abilmansur Khan, who was the leader of the Middle Horde would recognize Qing sovereignty in 1757, but in the nested hierarchy of the tributary relationship would remain only loosely connected to the empire. The Kyrgyz, who were called Bulute by the Chinese, were located between Xinjiang and the Khanate of Kokand. They also became involved in Qing affairs in Central Asia in the middle of the eighteenth century under similar circumstances. They too would remain only loosely connected to the empire.[12]

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drawn here, see: Paul Pelliot, *Notes critiques d'histoire Kalmouke*, Oeuvres posthumes, publ. sous les auspices de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres et avec le concours du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1960), vol. 1, 3–5, and Dittmar Schorkowitz, *Die soziale und politische Organisation bei den Kalmücken (Oiraten) und Prozesse der Akkulturation vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ethnohistorische Untersuchungen über die mongolischen Völkerschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992), 47–9.

[11] Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 292, 299, and 305. On the establishment of Qing presence in Tibet see also Grousset, *Empire of the Steppes*, 532–36, and Hugh Edward Richardson, *Ch'ing Dynasty Inscriptions at Lhasa* (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1974). On Qing administration of Tibetan Amdo tribes via Xining and Tibet see Chia Ning, "Placing 'Qinghai Studies' in the Field of China and Inner Asia," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 30 (2008), 155–6.

[12] Di Cosmo, "Kirghiz Nomads".

3 On Qing Tributary Relationships in the *Zhigong tu*

The Qing conquest of the Zünghars in the 1750s resulted in the culmination of Qing expansion and may have provided the impetus for the commissioning of the *Zhigong tu*. Unlike other portions of the work that describe longer tributary relationships with the imperial polity and were compiled from earlier documents and sources, the textual content concerning the most recent conquests was composed contemporary with its commissioning. In light of the incorporation of various parts of Inner Asia into the Qing polity, how then are these peoples depicted in relation to the larger Qing empire, in relation to each other, and in relation to other groups in the scroll?

Given that the *Zhigong tu* is a largely symbolic representation of Qing centrality, the nitty-gritty details of conquest, administration, and even ethnographic observation, are more closely detailed in other genres. Yet, the *Zhigong tu* offered a unique opportunity to create and to crystallize the court's vision of its own centrality and to record history in ways that highlighted the particular narrative of Qing expansion that it wanted to convey. The creation of a narrative in which people voluntarily turned toward the imperial centre necessitated inclusion of only the broadest outlines of conquest and daily administration of frontier peoples. Power relationships are made evident here primarily by recording the granting and recognition of titles, detailing the variety of types of tributary audiences and relationships established, and displaying familiarity with the customs and history of expanded margins of empire by creating a pictorial and textual record of its inhabitants.

While scholars use the shorthand of the 'tribute system' to categorize imperial China's foreign relations,[13] there was in fact no single or simple system, but rather an almost infinitely complex set of relationships, regulations, and rituals that governed aspects of both foreign relations and trade during the Qing period. Chia Ning's research on the Lifanyuan and use of ritual with regard to Inner Asia during the early Qing has furthered our understanding of some of the nuances within the larger 'tribute system'. She has demonstrated that the Lifanyuan oversaw three different rituals: tribute, pilgrimage, and the hunt that each entailed different levels of submission, recognition, and or reciprocal relationships with the Qing court.[14] Given her findings, I also bring to my research on the Central and Inner Asian portions of the *Zhigong tu* the question of how the specific language in the work resonates with or reflects her findings, especially given the representation within this geographical area of such a wide variety of peoples with varying relationships to the Qing polity. Following her lead, this chapter pays special attention to the vocabulary used to describe the payment of tribute or offering of submission. This close attention is rewarded by the emergence of evidence of an extremely complex web of relationships between the court and those included in the scroll as 'tributaries'. The picture that emerges demonstrates that fine but important distinctions were made based on a multiplicity of factors elaborated more closely in the pages that follow.

In order to uncover these distinctions, we must develop a sense of how the different Central and Inner Asian groups were categorized, understood, and administered at the time the scroll was being composed. From the organization and content of the *Zhigong tu*, we can tell that, at least prior to 1760, different groups were administered, and categorized, in different ways. A variety of overlapping and cross-cutting categories are used to describe twenty-nine different peoples of Central and Inner Asia, including a combination of geographical location, tribal and/or religious affiliation, and type of local leadership or administration. The organization, while seemingly somewhat chaotic, gives a very good sense of a moment in time when a number of frontier areas in the northwest were first coming into contact with the Qing or first coming under Qing administrative control. To be clear, some of the areas described in

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[13] John K. Fairbank and S.Y. Têng, "On The Ch'ing Tributary System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6,2 (1941); John K. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Mark Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1984). See also John E. Wills, "Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas About Mid-Qing Foreign Relations," *American Neptune* 48 (1988); James Louis Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), and James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 48–49. Finally, it is important to note that tribute was not exacted only by the Qing and Russian empires, but also by other Central and Inner Asian powers. See Dittmar Schorkowitz, "The Ranked Tributary Client System (*Kyshtym*) in Southern Siberia as the Decisive Point in the Foreign Relations of the Kalmuks and the Oyrats in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century," *Russian History* 19,1–4 (1992). For the role of imperial banquets "as a means used by the Qing emperors to assert their supremacy over the Inner Asian peoples" see Renqiu Yu, "Imperial Banquets in the Wanshu Yuan," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James A. Millward, (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 84–90.

[14] Chia Ning, "Inner Asian Rituals".

the scroll did not come under actual Qing administration, but were included on the basis of past diplomatic contact of one sort or another. Other areas had already been considered part of the Qing since soon after the empire's founding.

4 Organizational Categories in the *Zhigong tu*

In additional to basic geographic distribution, administrative status was one way to categorize frontier peoples. The broad categorical terms employed in the *Zhigong tu* vary considerably. Within Tibet we see the terms dependent frontier subjects (*Fanmin*) and dependent frontier peoples (*Fanren*).[15] In Ili we see people grouped according to their administrative rank, whether Taiji, Zaisang, or common subject (*Minren*)[16]; or as Hui—or Muslim—peoples (*Huiren*); Headmen (*Toumu*); and Hui Headmen (*Huimu*). Within each of these categories, further subdivisions are based variously on geography or tribal affiliation.

5 Tibet

The portion of the scroll devoted to Central and Inner Asia begins with seven illustrations and textual entries that are all in some way or another presented in reference to Tibet. I will refer to these paired groupings of text and illustrations as 'entries' throughout. The first three entries refer to people living in places under the jurisdiction of Tibet (*Xizang suoshu*); the fourth and fifth to peoples within Tibet but not identified as being under its jurisdiction; and the last two entries to peoples beyond Tibet. Of the different ethnicities that are mentioned by name in the Tibetan section of the *Zhigong tu*, only two can be identified and equated with groups still recognized today: the Mu'anba and the Gurkha. The Mu'anba are the Moinba (also Monba, and Mamba); The Gurkha are not Tibetan, but rather from Nepal. In 1769 they had conquered the Mallas thereby taking over the rulership of Nepal. In 1788 they made armed incursions into Tibet, touching off a war with Qing China.[17] The other ethnic groups mentioned in the *Zhigong tu* in relation to Tibet have either since been subsumed into the larger category of 'Tibetan', or now live beyond its borders.

The Qing court had a long and complex relationship with Tibet. The Qing emperors actively patronized Tibetan Buddhism, as did the Zünghar Mongols.[18] In the face of internal Tibetan instability and the external threat of expanding Zünghar Mongol influence, the Kangxi emperor sent in troops in 1720. From this time the Qing would seek to take an active role in the temporal governance of Tibet.[19] Once the Mongol threat was annihilated, Qing influence was perpetuated in varying degrees until the end of the dynasty.[20]

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[15] My translation of *Fanmin* and *Fanren* into English as 'dependent frontier subjects' and 'dependent frontier peoples' is a loose and compromise rendering of a word for which we do not have a clear equivalent in English. The word is used in a general way to denote peoples living to the west of 'China Proper'. *Fan* is sometimes translated 'vassal' as in *Waifan*, 'outer vassal' and *Neifan*, 'inner vassal' or as dependency, as in *Fanbu* 'dependent tribe'. The term definitely carries a connotation of 'other', as in non-native, which does not obviate the possibility of being a vassal or even a subject. The significant distinction in this text is not so much between the geographically oriented 'inner' and 'outer', but between the administrative distinctions of *'Min'* and *'Ren'*. For more on the term *Fan* see Laura Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 3, note 6, and Fairbank, "Preliminary Framework," 9–10. For *Fanbu* as 'dependent tribes' see Crossley, "Thinking About Ethnicity," 24, note 46.

[16] Taiji was an indigenous title for nobility that the Qing recognized. Zaisang was an administrative term that designated those responsible for tax collection, among other duties. Paula G. Rubel, *The Kalmyk Mongols; a Study in Continuity and Change* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 59.

[17] Hugh Edward Richardson, *Tibet and its History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 68–72.

[18] For more on the relationship between emperors and Lamas see Elisabeth Bernard, "The Qianlong Emperor and Tibetan Buddhism," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengdu*, ed. James A. Millward (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2004); Nima Dorjee Ragnubs, "The Third Panchen Lama's Visit to Chengdu," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengdu*, ed. James A. Millward (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2004); and James Louis Hevia, "Lamas, Emperors, and Rituals: Political Implications in Qing Imperial Ceremonies," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 16,2 (1993). A much older, but still useful source is William Woodville Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China, 1644–1908," *T'oung Pao* 11,1, second series (1910).

[19] The Yongzheng emperor would initially seek to reverse his father's decision to commit troops to Tibet, but later changed his policies. Dai Yingcong, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 3. See also Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1950), 236–8.

[20] Other useful sources on the history of Tibet are: Christopher I. Beckwith, *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power Among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese During the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Charles Alfred Bell, *The People of Tibet* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928) for everyday life in the early 20th century; Matthew Kapstein, *The Tibetans* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006) for a general overview from earliest times to the present; *The History*

The first entry, or annotation, on Tibet is the only one that refers to the people in question as dependent frontier subjects (*Fanmin*), as opposed to dependent frontier peoples (*Fanren*). Entitled "*Fanmin* under the jurisdiction of Wei, Zang, Ali and Kamu in Tibet,"[21] the first entry begins by locating Tibet in relation to dynastic China both geographically and historically. Tibet in ancient times, the reader learns, "referred to lands of tribes located in the south-western regions beyond the borders. During the Tang and Song the area was under the control of the Turfan tribes, but now it follows the Dalai Lama."[22] The entry records that the Qing sent imperial troops to garrison Tibet, which was divided administratively into four parts. Today 'Wei' and 'Zang' together constitute the Ü-Tsang region. 'Ali' and 'Kamu' are the Chinese names for Mnga'-ris (Ngari) and Khams, respectively. Mnga'-ris was located in far western Tibet, and Khams in the south-eastern portion of the Tibetan plateau. It included the western-most portion of what is now Sichuan province. Altogether more than sixty towns are said to have been controlled by the Qing garrisons.[23] Having established the relationship of the Qing to the area, the text moves on to an ethnographic description of the people.

This first entry on Tibet demonstrates Qing familiarity with the inhabitants of the areas where garrisons were prevalent. The fact that the people are identified as *Min*, subjects, is significant. In the illustration they appear affluent. They are dressed in brocade, wear shoes, and display heavy ornamentation. The woman holds what appear to be several bolts of cloth that she has presumably woven (see illustration below). Learning about the physical appearance of the women, their economic contributions to the group, and how they displayed their wealth would have required relatively close proximity to the group on the part of the outside observers responsible for the compilation of the *Zhigong tu*.

The second and third entries in this portion of the scroll are on the Bulukeba ('Brug-pa) and Mu'anba *Fanren*—as opposed to *Fanmin*—of Bhutan and Tibet. The difference in suffix indicates that while they were still under the jurisdiction of Tibet (*Xizang suoshu*), they were not settled in towns like the *Fanmin*, and presumably did not pay tax to the Qing. Both the Bulukeba and Mu'anba

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of Tibet, vol. 1–3, ed. Alex McKay (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2003); Petech, *China and Tibet*; and Richardson, *Tibet*, for the period of 630 to 1959.

[21] All quotations from the *Zhigong tu* are from the Xie Sui edition as reprinted by National Palace Museum, Taipei: Zhuang Jifa, *Xie Sui "Zhigong tu" manwen tushuo jiaoahu* (Taibei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1989), 115.

[22] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 115.

[23] Ibid.



ILLUSTRATION 6.1 *Dependent frontier subjects from Ü-Tsang, Mnga'-ris, and Khams under the jurisdiction of Tibet.*[24]

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[24] By courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan. Note the red hats mentioned in the text, the lavish clothing, and the bolts of cloth that the woman carries. The man carries a sword. This pair is the most lavishly dressed of all the peoples from in and around Tibet represented in the scroll. As seen here, each illustration is accompanied by textual description in both Chinese and Manchu.

are referred to specifically as tribes (*Buluo*). As such, their social organization was different from the *Fanmin*, and they may have been nomadic, although this is not specifically noted.

The Bulukeba, we learn, were formerly under the jurisdiction of lands farther west, but that Lord Poluonai of Tibet (西藏郡王颇罗鼐), known in the English language literature as Regent Polhanas (r. 1728–1747), first received their submission.[25] At the time of writing, they sent envoys to Tibet annually to ritually pay their respects and express their wishes for his holy majesty's good health (*Gongqing shengan*). They are described as adherents of the Red sect of Tibetan Buddhism (*Hong jiao*). Both according to the textual description, and according to the illustration, their dress was quite different from Tibet's *Fanmin*. Unlike for the *Fanmin* who lived in the garrisoned areas, the text gives no information on the general means of livelihood for men or women.

The Mu'anba, like the Bulukeba, are described as *Fanren* who were earlier under the jurisdiction of lands west of *Fanguo*.[26] However, the scroll makes no mention of tribute or formal visitation to Tibet of any sort. Rather we learn simply that because their lands adjoined those of the Bulukeba that they frequently went to Tibet. Presumably they were located quite a bit farther out and were less well known.[27]

At this point the scroll moves on to discuss two more groups both described as peoples of Tibet (Xizang *Fanren*), but not as under the jurisdiction of or 'belonging to' (*Suoshu*) Tibet. The Baliekamu are specifically described as a tribe (*Buluo*) in the text, but this language is not used for the Miniyake. Both were located in the eastern part of the Tsang region, the Baliekamu having jurisdiction of Litang (Li'ang), Batang (Bada'ang), and Chamdo (Chamuda'ao), and the Miniyake residing beyond Dajianlu.[28] Both are mentioned as adhering primarily to the Red sect of Tibetan Buddhism. The dress of both the men and

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[25] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 117.

[26] Ibid., 119. *Fanguo* is sometimes translated as India. *Fan* also means Sanskrit or Pali, and relates to Brahma. It can also be used in combination with other characters to refer to Buddhist institutions and objects.

[27] For additional ethnographic detail from this and other entries from the Central and Inner Asian portion of the *Zhigong tu* see Laura Hostetler, "Central Asians in the Eighteenth Century Qing Illustrations of Tributary Peoples," in *Writing Travel in Central Asian History*, ed. Nile Green (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014).

[28] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 121, 123. Dajianlu is now known as Kangding in Chinese or Dardo/Darzedo for the Tibetan. The area is now under the administration of Kangding city located in western Sichuan. According to Richardson, *Ch'ing Dynasty Inscriptions*, 9, "Litang, Batang, and Chamdo [Kham] were made tributary to China for the first time, in 1718."



ILLUSTRATION 6.2 *Miniyake Fanren from beyond the Dajianlu pass.*[29]

women of the Baliekamu tribe is described fairly extensively. In contrast to the depiction of the Baliekamu, the men of the Miniyake tribe are portrayed as fierce and warlike. They are described as mainly hunters and as wearing armour and carrying both knives and bow and arrow, an image echoed in the illustration (see illustration above). The entry ends by remarking that they may be related to the *Miaoman* peoples in Sichuan province.[30]

The last two groups mentioned in relation to Tibet are the Lukabuzha, and the Balebu headmen, or Gurkha, both of which actually resided beyond Tibet. The Lukabuzha, denoted as *Fanren*, are also specifically described as a tribe

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[29] By courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan. In stark contrast to the *Fanmin* of Tibet, the Miniyake *Fanren* are represented as being somewhat fierce, and apparently dangerous, as well as being good hunters. Note the bare feet of both the man and woman, as well as the bow and arrow that the man carries. It appears that his right hand may also be grasping the hilt of a knife. The woman is clad is loose-fitting green robes and wears a blue kerchief on her head. Her complexion is lighter than that of her male companion.

[30] Part of eastern Tibet would later come under the jurisdiction of Sichuan province. The term *miaoman* as used here is not an allusion to a specific ethnic group of Miao, but relates more broadly to non-Han peoples living in southern regions of the empire generally, including Sichuan.

(*Buluo*). Living several tens of thousands of *Li* to the southwest of Tibet they were truly beyond the pale. The region where they lived is not named, but is described only as "a wild and desolate place where people are foolish and stubborn."[31] As if to bring home this point, the text adds that "they are not [even] aware of Buddhist teachings."[32] In a trope somewhat familiar from the Miao albums of southwest China used to describe the most wild or strange (*sheng*) of all the *Miaoman* groups,[33] we are told that both men and women wear animal skins in the winter and leaves in summer, and they catch different types of poisonous insects for food. So remote are they that they do not even travel to Tibet. No mention at all is made of any kind of actual relationship with the Qing.

A Balebu headman, or Gurkha, and his servant, are the topic of the final entry in this section. According to the text the Balebu are located to the west of posterior Tibet,[34] approximately 20,000 *Li* from the capital, in a region that used to be home to four separate tribes: the Yangbu, Guokamu, Yiling, and Mugong, who had more recently been united by the Gurkha King.[35] The *Zhigong* tu records that in the 54th year of the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1790)[36] the Balebu/Gurkha sent two envoys to have an audience (*Rujin*). This

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[31] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 125.

[32] Ibid.

[33] For more on the Miao Albums of Guizhou Province see *The Art of Ethnography: A Chinese "Miao Album"*, trans. David M. Deal, and Laura Hostetler (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), esp. 148–9; Nicholas Tapp and Don Cohn, *The Tribal Peoples of Southwest China: Chinese Views of the Other Within* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2003); and Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, chapters five, six, and seven.

[34] The terms 'Front' and 'Back' Tibet, also rendered in English as 'anterior' and 'posterior' or 'ulterior', date from the reign of the Yongzheng emperor, and were used primarily by the Qing rather than in Tibet itself. Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm before the Storm, 1951–55* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 266.

[35] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 127. Those interested in a historical account of Qing interactions with the Balebu should see *Qinding Balebu jilüe. Xizang lishi hanwen wenxian congkan*, ed. Ji Yuanyuan (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chu ban she, 2006). This is an account dating from the 53rd and 54th years of the Qianlong reign, just prior to the Gurkha campaigns.

[36] Dates in the standard western calendar appear alongside those given according to Chinese reign name and year. However, because the year of the reign is calculated according to the beginning of the new year in the Chinese lunar calendar, which may begin variously in late January or early February, the year given in the western calendar must be taken as the best possible approximation rather than an exact date. For example, events occurring in early January of 1737 would be considered as occurring in the first, rather than the second year of the Qianlong emperor's reign. Since in most instances months and days are not given in the text of the *Zhigong tu* this imprecision is unavoidable.

visit took place on the eve of the outbreak of the Qianlong campaigns against the Gurkhas (1790–1792).

In 1788, Gurkha forces had crossed over the frontier into Tibet occupying several districts. In response, the Tibetan government dispatched a force to keep the Gurkhas in check, and simultaneously the Qing residents in Tibet made a report to the emperor. It was agreed locally in 1789 that the Gurkhas would withdraw but that Tibet should pay them a yearly tribute. Not surprisingly, the Qing emperor was not apprised of these particular tributary arrangements. However, as part of these same talks it was agreed that a Gurkha mission would also visit Peking. This is the visit alluded to in the *Zhigong tu*.[37] When it became evident a year later that the Tibetans had no intention of following through on paying tribute, the Gurkha attacked again. The second attack prompted the Qianlong emperor to send in his own forces under the leadership of Fu Kang'an, who reached Tibet in 1792. He routed the invading Gurkhas, pursuing them almost all the way to Kathmandu. After their defeat the Gurkha agreed to a provision to send tribute to the Qing every five years.[38]

6 Qing Administration in Ili

At this point the scroll leaves Tibet behind and moves north to Ili, which forms the geographical focus of the next four entries. By way of introduction the reader is told that "Ili refers to the ancient Quli [屈里] land that used to belong to the Eleuth tribes,"[39] but that in the 20th year of the Qianlong emperor's reign (1756) Qing troops pacified and settled (*Pingding*) the area, after which time Ili was considered Qing territory (*Libantu*)—literally becoming 'attached to the map'. The term Ili is clearly being used in a broad sense to include the area that would later form Xinjiang province.

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[37] This audience may be the reason that, despite the great distance, unlike for the entries regarding other far-flung areas outside Tibet, a fair amount of ethnographic detail is included as well as information on local products. Nonetheless it should be noted that the clothing shown bears no resemblance to what we think of as Gurkha garb today, and may have been no more accurate for the time.

[38] Richardson, *Ch'ing Dynasty Inscriptions*, 30–5.

[39] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 129. See Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 410–1, for this interpretation of *Pingding*. The Eleuth are a branch of the Oirats, as such will be referred to generally at Oirats below. For more on their origins and the relationship of these two groups see Schorkowitz, *Soziale und politische Organisation*. An older but still useful source is Ch'i-yü Wu, "Who Were the Oirats?," *Yenching Journal of Social Studies* 3,2 (1941), who concludes that the Oirat peoples were of Turkic extraction (219).

At the time, what is now Xinjiang was divided into distinct administrative regions. The area north of the Tianshan mountain range, known during the period of Zünghar ascendancy as Züngharia, was commonly referred to in Qing sources as *Beijiang*, the northern territories. *Beijiang* was settled by Qing military colonists sent to help provide sustenance for the troops.[40] After the conquest its Mongol population was administered under a system of Taiji and Zaisang. The region south of the Tianshan range, sometimes referred to Qing sources as Nanjiang, the southern territories, was populated by Turkic speaking Muslims and administered under the Begs. This southern region is also known as Altishahr. Literally meaning 'six cities' Altishahr comprised the region that included Yarkand, Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha, Aksu and Ush. This general region is also sometimes referred to as Kashgaria, or Little Bukhara. The easternmost portion of Xinjiang, including Hami and Turfan, although also under the authority of the Lifanyuan, was divided administratively according to prefectures and districts reflecting the divisions of the interior of the country. However, all of these regions of Xinjiang are simply termed 'Ili' in the *Zhigong tu*.[41]

The first three entries of the scroll relating to Ili depict different levels of administration, namely the Taiji, Zaisang, and commoners (*Minren*) respectively found in the northern regions. The scroll then moves south and depicts the Muslim populations, which are referred to as Hui people (*Ren*) from various regions. It then moves on to discuss various headmen (*Toumu* and *Huimu*) who lived further west.

The first textual description regarding Ili is the longest as it deals both with the conquest, and with general information applicable to the Western Mongols: Taiji, Zaisang, and commoners (see illustration below). The people are described as nomadic, having no fixed habitation but moving according to the season. Some irrigation is provided by snowmelt, and some hire Hui people to help them to cultivate the land. We further learn that the region produces millet and wheat, melons and grapes, as well as peaches, plums, pears, and apricots. The leaders are called Taiji. Their costume is pictured in the accompanying illustrations and described in detail:

> A Taiji wears a tall, red-tasselled, flat-edged terai hat and a pearl earring in his left ear. His clothing and belt are made of brocade. He wears a small knife by his waist, which is also hung with a bowl and towel. His boots are made of red Yak leather. The wife of a Taiji braids her hair in two plaits that are tied with red silk and pearl accessories. She wears pearl earrings in both ears. Her clothes are made of brocade and embroidered. Her hat and boots are the same as those of the Taiji.[43]



ILLUSTRATION 6.3 *Taiji and Zaisang from Ili and other places.*[42]

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[40] Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 298. For a description of Qing administration of Xinjiang see also Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 97–102.

[41] In other usage Ili can refer specifically to Beijiang.

[42] By courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan. A series of three illustrations shows the socio-political tiers of frontier society in Ili. Taiji and Zaisang are pictured here. The commoners or *Minren*, pictured in the following illustration, have costumes that are similar in design, but are made from pieces of sheepskin sewn together. Notice the embroidered boots of the Taiji, the non-embroidered but colourful (red) boots of the Zaisang. Commoners are depicted wearing plain brown boots.

[43] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 129. A terai hat is a flat-brimmed felt hat. Variants were also used by British Gurkha regiments, and are still in Tibet use today. Often one side of the brim can be bent up and attached to the crown, although that does not appear to be the case in this instance.

The Zaisang, who merit their own entry (as do the common people), are described as being under the leadership of the Taiji and responsible for administering the commoners, with functions and powers varying according to the size of the area they were assigned to manage. Their dress, and that of their wives, is described as being quite like that of the Taiji. Commoners wear sheepskin hats and clothing, and bronze rather than pearl earrings. Commoners are described as not engaging in agriculture, but depending entirely on the Hui for food.

The Hui are clearly in a different category from other residents of Ili as far as Qing administrators were concerned. Already it has become apparent that they were better with agriculture than their nomadic neighbours, but that does not necessarily mean they were entirely sedentary. At the very beginning of the textual description we learn that the "Hui people who engage in trade in Ili with the Eleuth [Oirat] have various tribal surnames and come from a variety of places."[44] The entry also states that besides those dwelling in and around Ta'erqi[45] and Qagan Usu (Chahanwusu),[46] there were five other groups of Hui in locations as far flung as Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, Kashgar, and Khotan. Each of these groups has its own walled town where they made a living as farmers and herdsmen.

The text reiterates that in the 20th year of the Qianlong emperor (1756) imperial troops pacified (*Pingding*) and settled Ili. However, the language of the subsequent description of submission and administration is quite different from other groups. According to the text, Adisi Beg (阿迪斯伯克) and Wusupu (乌苏卜)[47] surrendered and submitted to Qing rule (*Shucheng xianghua*). They went on a pilgrimage to Rehe to have an audience with the emperor (*Fu rehe chaojin*) where they were bestowed with rewards and sent back (*Cilai qiangui*). The language of this description is quite significant in that it is the only time in the Central and Inner Asian section of the scroll, that the term *Chaojin* is used. (As we will see below *Rujin* is used in regard to the Gurkha, and also for the Torghuds who returned from the Volga region.) As Chia Ning

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[44] Ibid., 135.

[45] Ta'erqi, which is located in the eastern part of current day Qinghai province, served as one of five garrisons for Green Standard troops in Ili during the Qing. Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 77.

[46] Also known as Qagan Usu, Chahanwusu is also located in the eastern part of present day Qinghai Province.

[47] These are most likely Khōjas of Uch-Turfan, and Yusuf of Hami who led the first mission, which consisted of forty-six Begs. For an account of this mission see Laura Newby, "The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61,2 (1998): 291.

has helped us to understand, the term *Chaojin* refers to a special pilgrimage to the court that distinguished Inner Asians who were under the authority of the emperor, from those who merely presented tribute. Theirs was in that sense a subject position, but also one that enjoyed certain privileges of reciprocity—signalled by use of the term *Cilai* for the bestowal of the emperor's return gifts.

7 Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Badakhshani Headmen

The next five entries of the *Zhigong tu* are organized around Muslim Headmen, namely *Toumu* and *Huimu*. The term *Toumu* refers specifically to the leaders of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz (Bulute) in northwest and southwest Züngharia respectively. The *Huimu* are more far-flung, one from what is now central Xinjiang around the region of Ush, Aksu, and Kucha; one from Badakhshan (Badashan) in present day Afghanistan; and one from Andijan (Anjiyan), more than 1000 *Li* to the northwest of Kashgar, bordering on present day Kyrgyzstan. I treat them together here as does the *Zhigong tu*.

Kazakh, we learn from the scroll was called Dayuan during the Han. It "had no contact with China even from ancient times,"[48] however,

> in the twenty-second year of the Qianlong reign [1758], two leaders, Abu'erbanbite from East Kazakh,[49] and Abilisi from West Kazakh[50] successively came over and sincerely submitted [*Shuaizhong guicheng*]. They sent their son and nephew respectively to the capital to look upon [the emperor] with reverence [*Fujing zhanyang*]. Moreover, they presented horses [*Jinxianmapi*]. [The Kazakh] were thereupon subordinated to our territory [*Sui libantu*]" or, more literally, "became attached to the map.[51]

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[48] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 137.

[49] Probably: Abulmambet or Abilmambet (r. 1734–1771) from the Kazakh Orta juz (middle Horde).

[50] Most probably: Abylaj or Ablai (Abilmansur) Khan (*1711 †1781) (r. 1771–1781) also from the Kazakh Orta juz.

[51] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 137. For more on mapping the northwest under the Qianlong emperor see Laura Hostetler, "Early Modern Mapping at the Qing Court: Survey Maps from the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong Reign Periods," in *Chinese History in Geographical Perspective*, ed. Du Yongtao et al. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013).

The scroll tells a similar narrative about the leaders of the Kyrgyz. Located in the southwest of Züngharia, its two leaders, Mahmud Quli[52] and Karaboto Bey,[53] from the 'left' and 'right' parts of the area respectively, also "successively led their tribes to come over and sincerely submit."[54] The same language (*Guicheng*) is used as for the leaders of Kazakh. Furthermore, like the Kazakh they each sent envoys to the capital to "look upon [the emperor] with reverence [*Fujing zhanyang*], whereupon their territory was incorporated into the empire," or "attached to the map [*Sui libantu*]."[55]

In order to develop a sense of the nuances of different types of Qing rule in frontier areas we need to pay close attention to both the vocabulary employed and rituals referred to. In the instances of both Kazakh and Kyrgyz, envoys were sent to the capital (*Jing*), but not to Rehe as in the case of the pilgrimage of the *Huiren* described above. Return gifts from the emperor are not mentioned, and the territory was thereafter incorporated into the Qing. Yet, the Kazakhs offered (*Xian*) horses whereas no mention of gifts or offerings appears under the discussion of the Kyrgyz. The *Huiren* from Ili had been received in ritual pilgrimage at Rehe, The leaders of Kazakh and Kyrgyz sent envoys to the capital—with or without offering gifts, and their territory was subsequently incorporated into the Qing empire. How do the language and procedures compare in the case of the *Huimu*?

The first annotation on the Hui leaders presents some geographical overlap with the earlier entry on Hui people (*Ren*) in Ili. The *Huimu* are said to be from of Ush, Kucha, and Aksu; The annotation on the *Huiren*, described above, also named the walled towns of Aksu, and Kucha.[56] That entry, however, was more of a follow up to include Hui populations not specifically mentioned in the headings organized around non-Muslim leadership positions (Taiji, Zaisang). Here, by contrast, we are provided with more detailed information on the administration of specifically Muslim populations. The Hui leaders (*Huimu*) are called Hezhuomu, or Khōjas (Khwājas), and each town is governed by a Boke, or Beg.[57]

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[52] Mamutekuli (玛母特库里). On the rendering of his name in Chinese see Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, 24.

[53] Halabotuo (哈拉博讬).

[54] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 139.

[55] Ibid.

[56] A number of additional walled towns are mentioned in the text, all in Hutian, which had formed part of the ancient Yutian (Hotan, Khotan) kingdom.

[57] The original pronunciation would have been closer to Baihe. On the Beg system in Xinjiang see Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 278–97, and Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads*, 100–2.

Having outlined this basic administrative organization, the narrative now turns to what has become a recurring theme in this part of Inner Asia—surrender to the Qianlong emperor.

> In the twenty-third year of the reign of the Qianlong emperor [1759], Khoja [Khwāja] Sir Beg[58] of Ush had his son Muzaffar[59] come to the capital to look upon the emperor with reverence [*Laijing zhanyang*].[60]

The next part of the text reads like a moving tableau of his appearance, and clearly records a scene from the audience:

> Muzaffar wrapped his head with a brocade scarf, inserted gold sticks on the top, which were shaped like flowers and leaves. When he walked, his accessories created a tinkling sound. His clothes and band were made of brocade. He wore leather boots with decorative design.[61]

The remainder of the text includes a description of the dress of both nobility and commoners, means of livelihood, and local products. Men plough and women weave; the Hui in this area grown the five grains, melons, and fruit, and raise various animals including camels, horses, cows, and sheep. No mention is made of specific gifts to the emperor, return gifts, or of the incorporation of this territory into the map. Of course Ili had already been 'attached to the map'. However, the Muslim areas seem to have been administered separately from those areas under the Taiji and Zaisang.

Amir Sultān Shāh, the Hui leader of Badakhshan,[62] which is located more than 2,000 *Li* west of Kashgar, in the Pamirs is mentioned in relation to the military alliance they made with the Qing in the 24th year of the Qianlong reign (1760), when imperial troops arrived in the area while pursuing two rebel Muslim leaders.[63] More specifically, he is remembered here for sealing off the

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[58] Houjisi (霍集斯) boke.

[59] Mozapa'er (莫杂帕尔).

[60] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 141. See also Amanbed Jalilov and Yasushi Shinmen, "Addendum to the Turkic Translation of *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* by Khwāja Muhammad Sharīf," in *Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17–20th Centuries*, ed. James A. Millward et al. (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2010), 38–40.

[61] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 141.

[62] Su'ertansha (素尔坦沙) in Chinese, (r. 1747/48–1765/68).

[63] The two unnamed leaders were Burhān al-Dīn (Burhān ad-Dīn Khōja, Khwāja Burhān al-Dīn, Chin. Bulanidun) and Khwāja Jahān (Khōja-Jahān, Khwāja Jihan, Chin. Juojizhan). For additional details on their rebellion, flight to Badakhshan, and ultimate demise see



ILLUSTRATION 6.4 *Huimu from Badakhshan.*[64]

passage of the rebels, "killing their leaders, cutting off their left ears, and subsequently presenting them to the commanding Qing general."[65] Amir Sultān Shāh the reader is told, then "sincerely submitted and entered dependency [*Shucheng neishu*]".[66] This victory at the far western reaches of the empire was commemorated in paintings and in the conquest engravings that the Qianlong

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Takahiro Onuma, "Political Relations between the Qing Dynasty and Kazakh Nomads in the Mid-18th Century: Promotion of the '*ejen-albatu* Relationship' in Central Asia," in *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty*, ed. Jin Noda et al. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2010), 109–110. See also Jalilov and Shinmen, "Addendum," 34–40, and Perdue, *China Marches West*, 289–292.

[64] By courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan. Although the text does not comment on his distinctive costume, the headman wears an unusual purple patterned brocade robe and a distinctive head covering that also covers the back of his neck. His wife's dress, while ornate, is less distinctive. The flame-like pattern on her hat matches his, although her hat has no corresponding neck covering.

[65] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 143.

[66] Ibid.

emperor had engraved in Paris.[67] Subsequently Amir Sultān also "sent envoys to the capital to look upon the emperor with reverence [*Zhanyang*], and to offer tribute [*Gongxian*] of horses, dogs, and weapons."[68] Moreover, when they heard the news, "Hui people in the neighbouring town of Bolor [Poluo'er] also submitted [*Wenfeng xianghua*]."[69] After a brief description of clothing and diet, described as identical to that of Hui customs in other towns such as Kashgar, the final lines on Badakhshan mention that their language is called *Pa'erxiyu*—or Parsi (see illustration above).

The last entry devoted to a Hui leader is for the region of Andijan, located over one thousand *Li* to the northwest of Kashgar, bordering on present day Kyrgyzstan, an area where many different Hui people went for trade. In the 24th year of the Qianlong emperor's reign (1760) their leader Irdana Bij (Erdeni Beg 厄尔得尼伯克)[70] surrendered following the pacification and settlement of the area: "Subsequently he submitted and made payment [*Nakuan guicheng*]".[71] This is the only instance in which we see the term *Nakuan* used, when tribute is paid in the field without travel to the capital being involved.[72]

8 *Huimin* in Western Gansu Province

At this juncture the scroll moves from describing Hui leaders in distant regions to Hui subjects (*Huimin*) who lived a bit closer to home. The different entries describe those located in Anxi and Suzhou respectively. Anxi and Suzhou are both located in Gansu Province. Unlike the Hui described earlier in the scroll, these peoples all came under the sway of the Qing before the Qianlong reign. Their administrative status is indicated by the suffix *Min* in a way that parallels the use of *Min* in the discussion of Tibet's *Fanmin* above. Perhaps for this reason, a fairly extensive synopsis of their relationship with imperial China is given. The reader learns that the "Hami [Kumul, Qumul] Huimin are descendants of the Uighur Khaganate's Huihe of the Tang dynasty", and that "during the Ming the government established a military station in Hami [Hamiwei], whose descendants later came under the jurisdiction of the Zünghars."[73] Ever since the founding of the Qing, the reader is told,

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[67] For a reproduction of the painting "The Khan of Badakhshan Asks to Surrender", see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ File:The_Khan_of_Badakhsan_Asks_to_Surrender.jpg, accessed December 14, 2012. For more on the Qianlong conquest engravings, and the particulars of how they came to be engraved in Paris, see Laura Newby, "Copper Plates for the Qianlong Emperor: From Paris to Peking via Canton," *Journal of Early Modern History* 16,2 (2012).

[68] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 143.

[69] Ibid.

[70] (*1720 †1764), ruler of the Kokand khanate (1750–1764). For more on the history of Irdana Bij see Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, 25, and 32.

[71] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 145. For more on Irdana Bij's communications with the Qing see Onuma, "Political Relations," 108–109.

[72] See Cheng Chongde, "*Qingchao yu Zhongya de 'fanshu' de guanxi*," *Minzu shi yanjiu* (March 2002): 318–28.

> the Huimin have been submitting tribute and inheriting feudal titles [*Fenggong xifeng*]. During the Kangxi reign troops were sent to the west to establish garrisons for the military and officials, thus making Hami strategically important.[74]

After giving a description of men's and women's clothing, the text records that "every year they send Hami melons and other items as tribute [*Suigong hamigua dengwu*].[75] The text also mentions that it was "during the Yongzheng reign that the Huimin in Guazhou surrendered and were assigned [*Touchen ancha*, i.e. into banners]."[76]

The second group of *Huimin* to be pictured and described are Hui lineages from the Luguqing and Jintasi military stations, characterized as Turpan (Turfan) tribes. Like the *Huimin* from Anxi they are presented as descendants of the Huihe people of the Tang dynasty. The text says that in the 4th year of the Yongzheng emperor's reign (1727) they sincerely surrendered and were made part of the interior (*Toucheng neifu*). They were assigned to Suzhou's Jintasi military station (安插于肃州之金塔寺威鲁堡), and agricultural lands were given to them for their support. The dress of men and women is described somewhat cursorily, their diet and other customs said to be like those of Hui subjects in the interior.

9 Aiwuhan

The five succeeding annotated illustrations, all deal with Muslim peoples (*Huiren*) from the general region of Aiwuhan in current day Afghanistan. Prior

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[73] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 147.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid. Perdue, *China Marches West*, 339, notes that the "Muslims in Hami and Turfan were organized, unusually, as banners."

to these five illustrations a textual entry serves as an overall introduction to the section, which was apparently inserted after the scroll had already been completed. A note at the end explains that at the time of writing, there was no illustration available for inclusion, and no room left in the scroll. Therefore the emperor issued an edict to append a drawing at the end of the work. The note also serves to indicate where the annotated illustrations would have come in proper sequence. Aiwuhan is described as "more than three months journey from Badakhshan."[77] Representatives of the five different groups portrayed in the *Zhigong tu* apparently travelled together, arriving at the end of the 28th year of the Qianlong emperor's reign (1764) to present tribute (*Fengbiao rugong*). The general annotation states that the Khan of Aiwuhan and the leaders of the Kazakh Kişi juz (Qiqiyusu), or lesser Horde, and the Argyn (Wu'ergenqi) of the Kazakh middle Horde all brought foals to offer (*Yi xian*). This event was considered significant enough that the court artist Guiseppe Castiglione was commissioned to paint the tribute horses.[78]

The illustration devoted to the Aiwuhan *Huiren* is accompanied by a fairly long textual annotation. The text relates that the Aiwuhan Hui are a tribe from the extreme west. Reiterating what was expressed in the previous passage, the reader is told that heading southwest from Badakhshan it takes another three months to reach the area, which boasts three major towns: Kabul (Habu'er), Mechet (Mashate), and Kandahar (Kaidaha'er). The entry is long and detailed, probably because it records the first-ever tributary visit from this distant land. Below are the portions relevant to Qing administrative concerns:

> The Khan, Aihamotesha [Ahmad Shah], lives in the walled town of Kandahar. Aiwuhan is surrounded by mountains on all sides. It is full of rich fields. The people engage in agriculture. Local residents build their own houses and live spread out from each other. There is no record of a census having been made [...]. Among the Hui tribes they have long been declared powerful and prosperous. Recently again they annexed a neighbouring tribe, Hindustan. They are growing bigger and stronger.
>
> In the twelfth month of the twenty-seventh year of the Qianlong emperor's reign [1763], looking up to [the emperor's] majesty and virtue [*Qinyang weide*], Aihamotesha [Ahmad Shah] sent the envoy Hezhuomi'erhan with tribute horses [*Jianshi... Gongma*]. Their letter to the emperor was respectfully written on gold paper, and it had to be

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[77] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 151.

[78] A reproduction of the illustration can be found in *Qianlong huangdi de wenhua daji* (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1991), 130–131.

> translated by the *Siyiguan*. [...] The region produces good horses. The four horses of their tribute are all seven *Chi* tall and eight *Chi* long.[79]

The court may have been particularly interested in the Aiwuhan *Huiren* because of the fact that they were an expanding tribe, noted here for annexing neighbouring territory.

Kokand (Huohan), the topic of the next entry, was described as being just as far away as Aiwuhan, but located 3,000 *Li* to the northeast of Badakhshan. Its people were known for bringing sheep and horses to trade in Yarkant (Ye'erqiang) and Kashgar. After imparting this information, the scroll recounts that in the 24th year of the Qianlong reign (1760) imperial troops reached Badakhshan. Their leader Irdana Bij sent envoys to the military camp to ritually pay his respects, and express their wishes for his holy majesty's good health (*Gongqing shengan*). We have seen this phrase before, in the context of the Bulukeba *Fanren* who would travel to Tibet rather than all the way to the capital, to inquire after his majesty's health. This form of recognition of Qing imperial sovereignty is clearly distinct from the payment of tribute at the court. We have also seen the name of Irdana (Erdeni) before, in the context of the entry on the Hui leader of Andijan, in which it was recounted that he surrendered during the pacification of the area and that he subsequently made payment (*Nakuan guicheng*). Ritually paying one's respects, and expressing wishes for his holy majesty's good health (*Gongqing shengan*) was expected of one who has submitted, but not through free choice, and who makes some form of restitution on site, rather than via a trip to the capital.

Returning to the description of Kokand, we learn that several years later, in the 27th year of the Qianlong emperor (1763), envoys were sent to submit tribute (*Rugong*), presumably arriving with the group from Aiwuhan in the 28th year of the Qianlong emperor's reign (1764). As is customary, the scroll describes the clothing of both men and women. We learn also that the region boasts city walls and houses, but that people also live as nomads.

The next three entries on the *Huiren* are more cursory. All three pertain to groups that were part of West Kazakh, but not all three actually paid tribute.

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[79] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 153. Hezhuomi'erhan is possibly Khwāja Jahān. The *Siyiguan* is rendered as 'Translators Institute' by Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 448, entry 5656. This office, which was merged in 1748 with the 'Interpreters Institute', served to handle correspondence with foreign states. Three *Chi* are equal to 100 cm.

In the 27th year of the Qianlong reign (1763), Batyr Khan (r. 1748–1785)[80] and Nuraly Khan (r. 1748–1786)[81] sent envoys with tribute (*Qianshi rugong*).[82] The third entry on the Western Kazakh, the Hayabu of the Argyn tribe[83] does not specifically mention tribute, although according to the introductory text to this section they travelled together with the other groups from West Kazakh and together with them submitted foals. This latter group is simply described as a branch of West Kazakh whose nomadic area is close to that of the Kişi juz, being more than 2,000 *Li* from Ili, who sometimes travel with other Hui people from neighbouring tribes to Ili and other places to engage in trade.[84]

10 The *Zhigong tu* on the Torghuds

The story of the Torghuds is one of the most intriguing of the Qing relationship with polities from Central or Inner Asia. This branch of the Oirats left their homeland in the early seventeenth century under pressure from the expanding Zünghar confederacy, eventually settling along the Volga. As the Russian polity expanded they gradually lost the independence and freedom of movement they sought through their move. Over the course of the eighteenth century the Torghuds who had moved north would stay in touch with the Qing empire. Ayuki Khan, their leader, sent an envoy to the Qing court in 1712, and in return the Kangxi emperor sent an embassy to the Torghuds led by a Manchu by the name of Tulishen.[85] After the Qing conquest of the Zünghars most of the group would leave Russia and return to Qing territory, to the delight of the Qianlong emperor, but not to all of those who would need to make room for these returning tribes.[86] In January of 1771 their leader, Ubashi Khan,[87] left Russia with over 30,000 tents and over 150,000 people and headed for Ili. It was a difficult passage complicated by weather, the pursuit of Russian troops, and hostilities from Kazakh tribes who did not support their passage. He would lose half of his company before making contact with Qing officials.[88]

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[80] Referred to in the Chinese text as "Batu-er [巴图尔] of the Batu-er Qiqiyusu [启齐玉苏]," and also known as Sultan Batyr Janibeg, from the Kişi juz (lesser Horde), legitimized by the Kazakh elder's assembly.

[81] Referred to in the Chinese text as "Nulali [努喇丽] of the Nulali Qiqiyusu", Nuraly Khan (*1704 †1790) also was from the Kişi juz (legitimized by Russia).

[82] They may well have travelled together with the envoy from Kokand.

[83] This may refer to the Ajdabol (*айдабол*) clan of the Argyn tribe of the Kazakh Orta juz (middle Horde).

[84] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 161.

[85] An account of ambassador Tulishen is available in English translation: *Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, in the Years 1712, 13, 14, & 15 by the Chinese Ambassador*. Translated by Sir George Thomas Staunton (London: J. Murray, 1821); See also Mark Mancall, "China's First Mission to Russia, 1729–1731," *Papers on China from the East Asia Regional Studies Seminar* 9 (1955).

While of course this history can be interpreted and told from a variety of viewpoints, what most interests us here is the representation of the event in the *Zhigong tu*. Two textual annotations describe the return of the Torghuds. One stands alone without an illustration, much like the introductory text to the section on the various *Huiren*. The other is devoted specifically to the Taiji of the Torghuds.

The first notation serves to give a historical overview of the negotiation for the return of the Torghuds. We read that Ubashi, in a meeting with two others, Tsebek Dordzhi and Tsereng,[89]

> consulted and decided to leave their dwelling place along the Ejile [Volga River] in Russia, and to lead their flocks and return to China. Their request was granted, and they were ordered to select a group of elders and to appear with them before the emperor.[90]

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[86] James A. Millward's "Qing Inner Asian Empire and the Return of the Torghuts," in *New Qing History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James A. Millward (London: Routledge, Curzon, 2004), highlights the importance of the return of the Torghuds within the Qianlong emperor's policy of westward expansion and conquest.

[87] Wobaxi (渥巴锡) (*1744 †1775).

[88] Perdue, *China Marches West*, 297. See Michael Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) for more on their experience in Russia. For the places where the Torghuds were resettled and on some quite substantial objections against this settlement among Chinese border military see Benjamin Fürchtegott Balthasar von Bergmann, *Nomadische Streifereyen unter den Kalmüken in den Jahren 1802 und 1803* (Riga: Hartmann, 1804–1805), Reprint (Oosterhout: Anthropological Publications, 1969), 184–246; Pelliot, *Notes critiques*, vol. 1, 37–38, 94; John L. Mish, "The Return of the Turgut: A Manchu Instription from Jehol," *Journal of Asian History* 4,1 (1970), 81–82; and Schorkowitz, *Soziale und Politische Organisation*, 232.

[89] Tsebek Dordzhi (Cebokeduo'erji 策伯克多尔济) †1778, also rendered Cebek Dordži, Cäbäk Dorji Buyantu-ts'in-wang, was a Volga Torghud noble and descendant of the famous Ayuki Khan. Tsereng (Sheleng 舍楞), also rendered as Cereng, Chèreng, Seryn, was a Tsoros noble who fled Züngharia together with 10,000 families in 1759/60 and had joined the ranks of the Volga Torghuds.

[90] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 163. Among those received by the emperor were the nobles Ubashi Khan, Tsebek Dordzhi, Tsereng, Gunge, Shara kökön, Momyn'tu and Tsile Mupir.



ILLUSTRATION 6.5 *Taiji of the Torghuds.*[91]

The text of the *Zhigong tu* clearly states that "the audience was held in the Yimian valley [*Zhi Yimianyu rujin*]," and that "Ubashi and each of the others was granted [*Si*] caps and clothing, saddles and horses. They then spread out and followed the emperor. He led them to Shanzhuang where they were banqueted and conferred with rank and official position."[92] From this time the Dörben Oirat tribes were in the imperial service. Clearly this was an important ceremonial and symbolic occasion. The bestowing of imperial gifts in the Yimian valley audience echoes, and uses the same vocabulary of bestowing imperial largess and favor (*Si*), that we saw in the case of the *Huiren* of Ili who made a pilgrimage to Rehe. The final words of the annotation go on to say that their old customs, clothing, and fabrics, are not like the other Zünghar tribes. Thus the emperor issued an edict to have new drawings made.

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[91] By courtesy of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan. The leader of the Torghuds and his wife are exquisitely dressed in brocade robes. He has no facial hair and sports a distinctive hat, quite unlike any other in the Central Asian section of the scroll. The grandeur of his clothing and that of his wife may be meant to represent the largess of the emperor at the audience held on their return from the Volga to Qing lands.

[92] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 163. Perdue, *China Marches West*, 298, confirms that the audience took place at Chengde where Ubashi was banqueted, bestowed many gifts, and allowed to keep his title of Khan. However "he was no longer in charge of his people. They were split up into ten banners in four leagues dispersed across hundreds of kilometres in northern Xinjiang in order to make sure that these Mongols would never unite to challenge the empire."

The Taiji of the Torghuds also merited his own illustration and annotation (see illustration above). In keeping with the organization of the earlier portion of the scroll, illustrations of Torghud Zaisang and commoners are also provided. They are portrayed in progressively simpler attire. The Taiji are, however, lavishly dressed. The annotation on the Taiji of the Torghuds states that the group had been

> one of the four Eleuth [Dörben Oirat] of Züngharia, but that their ancestor, and E'erle Khan [鄂尔勒克汗, Kho Urlük[93]] did not get along well with Chuoluosibatuluhun [绰罗斯巴图鲁浑, Erdeni Batur khong tayiji[94]]. He thus led his people to move to the region of the Ejile [Volga River] in Russia. After five generations the Khan position was passed down to Guolubulashi [郭鲁布喇什, Donduk Dashi[95]]. In the twenty-first year of the Qianlong emperor's reign [1757] he, Guolubulashi, sent an envoy to the court with tribute [入贡 ru gong]. In the thirty-sixth year of the same reign [1772], his son, Ubashi, worked with the leader [Taiji] of each clan and led all the people—over 100,000—to return to submission [*Guishun*]. After they had come to have an audience [*Rujin*], they were bestowed with honours and assigned official positions [*Fengshang youchai*]. Afterwards they were settled in various parts of Ili.[96]

Those Torghuds who returned from Russia would be referred to in some sources as 'New' as opposed to 'Old' Torghuds. Following this accounting of their return, and resettlement, the scroll moves on to more ethnographic description. The reader learns that they are adherents of the Gelug-pa Yellow Hat sect of Tibetan Buddhism, and have a nomadic lifestyle. The dress of the Taiji, Zaisang, and commoners is then described.

11 The *Zhigong tu* on Areas beyond Yunnan Province

The final entries for Central or Inner Asia are for areas beyond the province of Yunnan. Again, a purely textual note precedes annotated illustrations of the peoples in question. It reads as follows:

> In the thirty-fourth year of the Qianlong reign [1770], Zhao Jiao [召教], native leader [*Toumu*] of Zhengqian, and Diao Bie [刁别], native leader of Jinghai, from beyond the Yunnan border surrendered and expressed their willingness to become part of China [*Shucheng neixiang*], and requested from afar to present their services [*Gongzhi*]. Keeping in mind that their lands are extremely far, it was ordered that they present only once every six years, as a way to manifest Our favour and compassion. In the winter of this year [1775] their headmen offered ivory and rhinoceros horn. His majesty ordered the envoy to join in at the end of the New Year tributary groups. Therefore drawings were made of their dress and ornamentation and appended to the back of this work.[97]

In keeping with the overall organizational structure of the *Zhigong tu* that we have seen so far, this introductory note to the tributaries from beyond Yunnan province is followed by an annotated illustration of headmen from each of the areas already alluded to. The first is of Xianmaiyandi (先迈岩第), headman of Zhengqian. The text is fairly cursory. We learn that Zhengqian is located outside the border formed by the Jiulong River, over 1,000 *Li* from Pu'er prefecture, and that it produces elephant tusk and rhinoceros horn. There are more than ten affiliating villages, with a total of sixteen headmen, including Xianmaiyandi. The dress of men and women is briefly described, but only one man, presumably Xianmaiyandi himself, is depicted in the illustration. The second illustration is of Xian'ganghong, headman of Jinghai. We learn that it too is located outside the border formed by the Jiulong river, another few hundred *Li* from Zhengqian. The region includes a total of more than twenty leaders at various levels, Xian'ganghong presiding over them all. Local products and attire are noted simply as being the same as those in Zhengqian.

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[93] Kho Urlük (†1644) is also variously written: Kho Örlöq, Gaj Urlug, Kchoj Urlug, Xô Örölöq, Kho Örläk.

[94] Erdeni Batur khong tayiji (†1653) has many different spellings: Pâ-thur Hun-the'i-je, Ho-to-ho-chin Pa-t'u-erh Hun-t'ai-chi, Baatur Khungtaidshi, Pa T'u Erh Hun T'ai Shih, Qotoqotschin Erdeni Baghatur Khungtajdschi, Khodokhocin Bâtur Khontaïji, Houo-to-houo-ts'in Pa-t'ou-lou-houen-t'ai-ki.

[95] Donduk Dashi (†1761) has a number of different spellings: Donrub Arshi, Dondob Rashi, Dondok Rashi, Dondub Dashij. In terms of generation (not rulers') count we may find six generations: Kho Urlük—Shikhur Daichin—Puntsuk—Ayuki Khan—Chakdor Dzhab—Donduk Dashi.

[96] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 165. For a thorough consideration of the numbers involved see Schorkowitz, *Soziale und politische Organisation*, 610–3.

[97] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 167.

12 Classifying the 'Tributary Peoples': Some Concluding Remarks

While altogether there are twenty-nine annotated illustrations of Central and Inner Asian peoples in the *Zhigong tu*, only some of them actually allude to journeys to the court or the payment of tribute, and when they do so, a variety of language is used. It is, perhaps, somewhat surprising that the *Zhigong tu* makes no specific mention of the Lifanyuan or the Libu as the document specifically addresses questions of tributary relationships to the Qing. Ultimately the *Zhigong tu* is more about the groups themselves, and providing (or creating) a record of those groups and their relationship to the court rather than describing the administrative workings of this process. Yet, overall we do find a dizzying array of different levels of submission, rewards, assignments, and a complex web of relationships that will further our understanding of the complexity of what has simply been called the 'tributary system'. In some instances relationships with imperial China were longstanding, in others only recent. In cases where submission was recent the leaders of the groups that came to pay tribute are often individually named, demonstrating a system of foreign relations in which relationships with individuals were still paramount over agreements made between states or other polities. In other instances, as with the posts of Taiji and Zaisang the administrative position is named rather than the individual occupying the post. In still other instances no actual tribute was paid at all and the entry simply forms a record of the existence of a kingdom beyond imperial China's control, but now within its ken.

From this close reading of the administrative concerns in the *Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples* some general statements about the meaning of specific terms related to the payment of tribute, the relationships they represent, and degree and nature of submission to Qing authority may be ventured. We have learned, for example that a distinction was made between sending good wishes from afar, having an actual audience, bearing tribute to the court, and making pilgrimage. For those groups that paid tribute, specific vocabulary was used to describe its presentation. Finally some groups are described as having been pacified and their territories having 'entered the map', and others not.

I end with a brief summary of the usage of terms gleaned from this close reading of the Central and Inner Asian portion of the *Zhigong tu*:

Rujin. The term is employed twice, one in relation to the Gurkha, and once in relation to the return of the Torghuds. In both instances payment of tribute is not mentioned, just a 'coming to have an audience'. The audience with the Torghuds in the 36th year of the Qianlong reign (1772) was held at Chengde (Jehol, Rehe). The scroll does not indicate where the audience with the Gurkha, which occurred in the 54th year of the Qianlong reign (1790), was held. *Rujin* is not used in instances where territory is entering, or becoming 'attached to the map' (*Libantu*).

Gongqing shengan. The term appears twice in the section of the scroll analysed here. The first time we see the phrase is in relation to Tibet's Bulukeba *Fanren* who had originally been under the jurisdiction of lands in what is now part of Bhutan, but who later submitted to Regent Polhanas of Tibet. After their submission they sent envoys to Tibet annually to "ritually pay respects, and express wishes for his holy majesty's good health."[98] The second time we see the phrase is in relation to Irdana Bij (Erdeni Beg) who sent envoys to the military camp in Badakhshan in the 24th year of the Qianlong reign (1760).[99] In other words, *Gongqing shengan* seems to be used in the context where allies wish to indicate their acknowledgement of Qing suzerainty, but from a distance without coming to the capital for a personal appearance. This term is also not used in instances where territory is entering, or becoming 'attached to the map' (*Libantu*).

Libantu. This expression is used in instances where territory has been pacified and settled (*Pingding*). The usage of both *Pingding* and *Libantu* appears in the section of the scroll dealing with the administration of Ili under Taiji and Zaisang.[100] The other instances where *Libantu* appears are in relation to the Kazakh and Kyrgyz (Bulute) which are both described as having "sincerely returned" (*Guicheng*).[101] Whereas *Guicheng* is associated with becoming 'attached to the map' (Kazakh, Kyrgyz), *Guishun* is used in association with the returning Torghuds, who settled in (pacified) Ili.[102] Both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz also sent envoys to the capital to look with reverence upon the emperor (*Zhanyang*).

Zhanyang. The term is used in combination with phrases that variously indicate going to the capital (*Fujing, Laijing, Jinjing*). I have translated *Zhanyang* as 'looking upon the emperor with reverence'. In the scroll it is used in relation to the Kazakh and Kyrgyz, whose territories became 'attached to the map', but also for the audience of Muzaffar, son of Khōja (Khwāja) Sir Beg of Ush, from Ili.[103] Ili, which had been pacified, had also been added to the map, but the phrase *Pingding*, pacified and settled, is not reiterated in the section on the audience of Muzaffar as the Hui seem to have enjoyed a somewhat different status than the other portions of the population in Ili who were governed under the Taiji and Zaisang.

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[98] Zhuang Jifa, *Zhigong tu*, 117.

[99] Ibid., 155.

[100] Ibid., 129. In the annotation on the Hui leaders in Andijan, located more than one thousand *li* to the northwest of Kashgar, *Pingding* is used in relation to the pacification of Kashgar, but we do not see anything about the area 'becoming attached to the map', probably since the actual topic is the more distant Andijan.

[101] Ibid., 137, 139.

[102] Ibid., 163.

Chaojin. Only one group in the Central and Inner Asian section of the *Zhigong tu* is described as making a pilgrimage. These are the *Huiren* in various parts of Ili. Their destination was, significantly Rehe, and not Beijing. As Chia Ning has shown, pilgrimage signalled a reciprocal relationship. The participants were bestowed with rewards (*Cilai qiangui*), and sent back.

As for the role of tribute itself, a number of different terms and expressions are used. The Kazakhs offer (*Xian*) horses. The term *Gong*, by contrast, appears primarily in relation to Hui. The Hui leaders from Badakhshan presented dogs and horses as tribute (*Gongxian gouma*); the Hami *Huiren* of Anxi yearly sent tribute melons and other goods (*Sui gong hamigua deng wu*); the *Huiren* in Aiwuhan sent envoys with tribute horses (*Qianshi... Gongma*); and the *Huiren* from Kokand, as well as Nuraly Khan and Batyr Khan from the Kişi juz and Hayabu of the Argyn tribe submitted tribute (*Rugong*). In fact, the only Hui in this portion of the scroll *not* recorded as submitting tribute were the *Huimin* in Guazhou, who had surrendered and been assigned to banners (*Toucheng ancha*) during the Yongzheng period and the *Huimin* in Luguqing who had sincerely submitted and been made part of the interior (*Toucheng neifu*). As subjects who were part of the banners tribute was apparently not required. Other duties and reciprocal relationships were in place instead.

Of the types of relationships we have seen between the Qing court and the people in frontier areas, the most unique was undoubtedly that of the Torghuds. Their anomalous status is reflected in the language of their return. In the twenty-first year of the Qianlong reign (1756) they are recorded as having returned to obedience and submitted tribute. However, in the 36th year of the Qianlong reign (1772), when they had actually returned from Russia, they went to court for an audience (*Rujin*) and were rewarded with various ranks and official positions (*Fengshang youchai*).

This close look at the representation of Central and Inner Asian peoples in the *Zhigong tu*, gives us an idea of the way in which the Qing tried to record and to concretize its relationships to frontiers people in the northwest during a moment of ascendancy—even though these relationships were still very much in flux. The *Qing Illustrations of Tributary Peoples* reflected a range of peoples and regions from areas that had become part of the map of the Qing and populations that had been settled into the banners, to those who paid tribute, but were considered beyond the actual territorial reach of the empire, to those so far beyond that no meaningful remarks could be made about their environment or livelihood. Yet whether near or far, subdued or savage the Qing empire made a comprehensive record of them all.

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[103] Ibid., 137, 139, 141.

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CHAPTER 7

Manchu-Mongolian Controversies over Judicial Competence and the Formation of the Lifanyuan

Dorothea Heuschert-Laage

1 Manchu-Mongolian Interaction in the Field of Law

Among the Lifanyuan's range of duties, administration of justice was a sphere of specific importance. Since its establishment in 1636, the Lifanyuan was concerned with the investigation of legal cases and the announcement of imperial orders among Inner Asian peoples. Since 1661, one of its four—and, after reorganization between 1761 and 1764, six—departments was the, the Judicial Department (*Lixingsi*). Legal authority was not only a constant element of its activities but also an essential one. When looking at the recently published routine memorials of the Lifanyuan,[1] one is struck by the high proportion of records of legal cases: about one third of the documents in that 23-volume publication are judicial files, altogether more than five hundred items documenting the work of this institution in the time from 1653 to 1795. As these records show, the Lifanyuan was regularly concerned with cases of livestock rustling and, though to a much lesser extent, cases of murder, homicide, robbery, sexual harassment, etc. The fact that at least in the first 150 years of its existence legal issues were at the core of the Lifanyuan's activities invites us to reconsider the role of law in the process of institution building.

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[1] *Dayičing gürün-ü ekin üy-e-yin γadaγadu mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun-u manǰu mongγol ayiladqal-un debter-üd*, ed. Borǰigidai Oyunbilig et al. (Hohhot: Nei Menggu renmin chubanshe, 2010). As we do not know what other material related to the Lifanyuan is still in the archives, it may be necessary to reassess this ratio at some point in the future. The collection, for example, does not cover the years of 1703–1735, and it contains only eleven documents dating from the twenty-three years of 1667–1690. However, the absolute number of Mongolian legal cases handled by the Lifanyuan, together with the fact that a Mongolian Code was compiled (see below), provide ample evidence of the crucial significance of law in Manchu-Mongolian relations and, correspondingly, its importance for the Lifanyuan. For routine memorials, see Beatrice Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers. The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 21–2.

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In the present contribution, particular attention will be given to the Lifanyuan's interaction with the Mongolian subjects of the Qing. Manchu jurisdictional politics towards the Mongols—implemented by the Lifanyuan—had far-reaching consequences for Mongolian legal traditions. This, however, was not a one-directional process. I intend to show that by either allowing and even calling on the Lifanyuan to exercise legal authority or denying it that authority, Mongols took an active part in the process of shaping that office's sphere of responsibilities. Long before the Lifanyuan began to routinely decide on Mongolian legal cases, it was common for Mongols to approach it with petitions. In order to manage the large number of incoming cases, the Lifanyuan had to re-delegate authority to local rulers and to define more clearly which cases were part of its responsibilities and which were not. Its scope of duties developed over a series of jurisdictional conflicts with Mongols, both members of the elite and commoners. Against this background, it remains doubtful whether the formation of the Lifanyuan was the foreseen result of careful and long-term planning on the side of the Qing state. Rather, as will be argued, it was the outcome of a permanent struggle over redefining the relationship between centre and periphery. Due to the fact that it was in the 17th and 18th centuries that the Lifanyuan established its basic structures, the focus of the present essay is thus on the early Qing period. However, very few records of Mongolian legal cases have come down to us from that time. For this reason, we heavily rely on imperial orders, and in some cases we can only guess that imperial decisions were preceded by some situation considered unacceptable by the emperor, who consequently saw need for new regulations.

Manchu claims to legal sovereignty over Mongols were a heritage from the time when Manchu politics were directed at winning Mongolian communities over as allies in the war against the Ming. The loyalty of individual Mongolian noblemen was vital to the strength of the evolving Manchu state. The Manchus, who at that time still referred to themselves as Jurchen (Jušen), attempted to gain influence on legal matters of confederate Mongolian communities as early as in the 1620s. The Manchu Khan, while accepting the vow of allegiance of Mongolian rulers, demanded them to take part in his campaigns. For this reason, Manchu activities in the field of law were clearly aimed at securing the operational readiness of the Mongolian troops.[2] However, Manchu-Mongolian interaction in the legal arena was manifold and went beyond the declaration of martial law for Mongolian military units in combat. Hūwangtaiji did not only need to ensure his allies' loyalty, availability, and discipline in times of war. It was also crucial for him to prevent internal conflicts among his allies outside of times of crisis, because such strife might weaken the fighting strength of the Mongols or even cause the confederation to disintegrate.

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[2] For the regulations soldiers and commanders had to observe during the wars against Chakhar, see Nicola Di Cosmo, "Military Aspects of the Manchu Wars against the Čaqars," in *Warfare in Inner Asian History, (500–1800)*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 343–7.

In this context, two other directions of impact in the field of law have to be mentioned: firstly, the Manchu ruler availed himself of the instrument of traditional Mongolian law-making. This implied the assemblage of leading representatives from the fields of politics and religion who, in a solemn act, would deliberate on legal foundations. As a declaration of mutual consent, they would lay down a list of legal directives in written form. As I have argued elsewhere, the significant weight of these legal records did not so much derive from the actual content of the rules; rather, they were important as expressions of the collective will to abide by the general principles of law and, in case of conflict, to try to achieve an amicable settlement of the dispute.[3] By joining in with the efforts of Mongolian leaders to create conditions for peaceful coexistence,[4] Hūwangtaiji presented himself as a pillar of social stability. He resorted to the formal language of his Mongolian allies and followers in order to clearly state his commitment to values shared by both sides.

The role of Hūwangtaiji as a guarantor for peace and social harmony leads us to a further aspect of Manchu-Mongolian relations in the field of law: long before the Lifanyuan was established, it was common for Mongols to present petitions to the Manchu ruler urging him to side with them in on-going disputes. For Hūwangtaiji, to accept the task of acting as an arbitrator was a way to demonstrate his will—and his ability—to protect people and property and to forestall the excessive use of force. In this context, his intermediary role in Mongolian legal disputes added another facet to Hūwangtaiji's efforts to attain political legitimation. In connection with the rivalry between the Chakhar Mongols and the Manchus, Nicola Di Cosmo has pointed out that "charismatic leadership had to undergo social validation before it could attain political legitimation. Validation could not occur without addressing the leader's capacity to respond satisfactorily to the needs, beliefs, and aspirations of the social and political basis."[5] The legal arena offered the Manchu ruler an opportunity to legitimize his rule over Mongols by guaranteeing certain rights and principles.

Moreover, we should keep in mind that by accepting petitions Hūwangtaiji may also have supported 'informal' mechanisms of dispute resolution. As Benjamin Kelly has argued with regard to Roman Egypt, "as in many societies, making complaints or even beginning court hearings were merely ways to force private settlements. In this sense, then, state adjudication, even though probably a failure in its own terms, did sometimes play an important role in alternative methods of resolving a dispute."[6] Going to law was a strategy in private systems of control, and by underpinning these methods the state signalled its determination to support peace-making processes. These aspects of Manchu-Mongolian communications in the field of law can hardly be overestimated as factors for establishing the Lifanyuan.

The Manchus continued to lay claim to legal authority over the Mongols even when disputes among the latter ceased to have the potential of destabilizing the Manchus' evolving state. With the consolidation of their rule after the defeat of the Chakhar Mongols in 1634, and with the increase of the number of Mongols under Manchu rule, new ruling strategies became necessary. This need was met by the Lifanyuan, which—among other things—took on the arbitration of unresolved disputes, announcement of legal decisions, and supervision of legal matters among the Mongols.

Controversies over jurisdictional boundaries among the Mongols continued to be of crucial importance for redefining the spheres of responsibility of the Lifanyuan; at the same time, however, the influence of the Lifanyuan on Mongolian legal traditions was enormous. Not only were the Mongols the only ethnic group in the Qing empire for which—in addition to the Great Qing Code (*Daqing lüli*), which, to a large extent, was based on precedents of previous Chinese dynasties—a separate legal Code[7] was established under the aegis of the Lifanyuan. The great number of records of Mongolian legal cases dating from the 18th to early 20th centuries which went through the official channels of Qing bureaucracy also demonstrate that the Qing claim to supreme authority over Mongolian legal affairs was not just of a nominal nature.[8]

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[3] Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, "Schriftlichkeit und mündliche Rechtstradition. Überlegungen zum Gebrauch mongolischer Rechtsaufzeichnungen im 16.–18. Jahrhundert," *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 58,1 (2004): 151–3 and Dorothea Heuschert, *Die Gesetzgebung der Qing für die Mongolen im 17. Jahrhundert anhand des Mongolischen Gesetzbuches aus der Kangxi-Zeit (1662–1722)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 79–81.

[4] For early Manchu legislation for the Mongols, see the publications by Michael Weiers, particularly "Mandschu-Mongolische Strafgesetze aus dem Jahre 1631 und deren Stellung in der Gesetzgebung der Mongolen," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 13 (1979), and Dalizhabu, "Qingchao ruguan qian dui menggu lifa chutan," in *Zhongguo meng yuan shi xue shu tao lun hui Ji Fangling jiao shou jiushi huadan qingzhu hui*, ed. Fang Tie et al. (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009).

[5] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Competing Strategies of Great Khan Legitimacy in the Context of the Chaqar-Manchu Wars (c. 1620–1634)," in *Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth-Twentieth Centuries*, ed. David Sneath (Bellingham, Wash.: Western Washington University, 2006), 255.

[6] Benjamin Kelly, *Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 329–30.

[7] In Chinese *Menggu lüli*. For Mongolian language editions of this legal Code, see *Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig* and *Mongγol čaγajin-u bičig: Ekh bichgijn sudalgaa*, ed. B. Bayarsaikhan (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2004).

As tendencies to unify, formalize, and centralize became stronger, the willingness of the Qing to grant their Mongolian subjects exemptions and privileges decreased. For the Mongols of Southern Mongolia, who had accepted Manchu rule by 1636, this trend became manifest as early as in the Shunzhi period,[9] i.e. under the second Qing emperor who was the first to take residence in Beijing. Elements of Chinese law were increasingly incorporated into the Mongolian legislation and legal administration. In the course of these changes, the role of the Lifanyuan changed as well: as time passed by, it had to share power once taken from the hands of Mongolian legal authorities with other state offices, or even to relinquish such power. An examination of its activities in the legal arena reveals the Lifanyuan's ambivalent role: on the one hand, it paved the way for Mongols to be more firmly incorporated into the Qing legal system. On the other, the more successfully the Lifanyuan operated, the less would the emperor need to rely on its expertise.

2 The Lifanyuan as a Port of Call for Mongolian Petitioners

The establishment of a Court for Mongolian Affairs (mo. *Mongγol-un yabudal-un yamun*)—later renamed Lifanyuan—is usually dated to 1636.[10] As the name suggests, this office was responsible for Mongols, and there is evidence that its sphere of responsibilities included regular communication. A look at the selection of members for delegations sent to allied Mongols after 1636 shows that in the early years it was an agency of minor significance. The delegations almost always included members of this office, but were not made up of Lifanyuan personnel exclusively.[11] Other high-ranking central government officials were also responsible for the administration of Mongolian matters. After 1644 at the latest, however, it was explicitly the Lifanyuan that had the duty of

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[8] Mamoru Hagihara, *Shindai Mongoru no saiban to saiban monjo* (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 2006), 52–90.

[9] Dorothea Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 316.

[10] Zhao Yuntian, *Qingdai Menggu zhengjiao zhidu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 47.

[11] Zhao Yuntian, *Qingdai Menggu zhengjiao zhidu*, 49.

circulating imperial proclamations among the Mongols.[12] This office became the mouthpiece of the emperor for purposes of communicating legal decisions to Mongols under Qing authority.

When looking back in the history of Manchu-Mongolian relations in the field of law, the interposition of the Lifanyuan marks a significant change. As indicated above, the first Manchu legislations for the Mongols had been individual settlements with separate political bodies; they were drafted on the occasion of personal meetings and to some extent negotiable. The laws circulated by the Lifanyuan, however, bore a different quality. Native Mongolian authorities did no longer have a say in Qing Mongolian legislation. Instead, it was now the Lifanyuan that sent envoys to inform the Mongolian nobility about regulations drafted by central government officials and endorsed by the Qing emperor.[13]

This development not only allows conclusions about the balance of power, which obviously shifted in favour of the Manchu side. It is also worth noting that simultaneously with assigning responsibilities to the Lifanyuan, the Qing began to treat those Mongolian communities they considered to be part of their confederation as a more or less uniform group. This becomes apparent from the way the target group of the respective Manchu rules is addressed: the earliest surviving Manchu-Mongolian laws specify the Mongolian *Ulus* (polity) or mention the names of the Mongolian leaders with whom and for whom regulations were laid down. The laws drafted and—after imperial approval—distributed by the Lifanyuan, however, usually make no reference to individual Mongolian authorities or their respective polities. Instead, the recipients of the Lifanyuan regulations were the so-called 'Mongols on the outside' (*Γaday-a-du mongγol*) or, since the 18th century, 'the Mongols'.

The term 'Mongols on the outside' referred to those Mongols whom the Qing considered to be under their authority.[14] The composition of this group was not static, but—with more Mongolian communities joining the confederation and others renouncing their loyalty to the Manchu emperor—had to be constantly redefined. In the second half of the 17th century, the 'Mongols on the outside' did not include Khalkha and Oirats, and the term had, of course, no bearing on the later designation of Outer Mongolia. It was used by the Qing to differentiate among various Mongolian communities under their rule, and was very likely a collective term for those Mongols under Qing hegemony who were not incorporated into the Eight Banners. With the expansion of Qing control in Inner Asia the Mongolian term *Γadaγ-a-du mongγol*, like its Chinese equivalent *Waifan menggu*, became an umbrella term for various Mongolian groups including also Oirats and Khalkha. It lived on in the Mongolian name for the Lifanyuan: Court for the Administration of the Legal Order of the Mongols on the Outside (*Γadaγadu mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun*).

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[12] *Čing ulus-un dotoγadu narin bičig-ün yamun-u Mongγol dangse ebkemel-ün emkidkel*, ed. Čimeddorǰi et al. (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2003 and 2006), vol. 2, 11–21.

[13] As an early example on how regulations drafted by the Lifanyuan were communicated to the Mongolian rulers, see Michael Weiers, "Gesetzliche Regelungen für den Außenhandel und für auswärtige Beziehungen der Mongolen unter Kangxi zwischen 1664 und 1680," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 15 (1981): 32–4. His article is a translation of a document from the 19th year of Kangxi (1681) taken from *Mōko rengō jichi seifu Bayantara meishi shiryō shūsei: Tumeto tokubetso ki no bu daiisshū*, ed. Gō Minoru (Zhangjiakou: Mōko Rengō Jichi Seifu Bayantara Mei Kōsho, 1942), 6.

[14] When exactly the term came into use in this sense remains open to further research.

The policy of generically subsuming many different Mongolian communities and making them one unitary target group for imperial instructions had far-reaching consequences in both political and legal respects. Politically, this strategy worked towards levelling the differences in influence and status that prevailed among Mongolian rulers or polities, who were now all equally governed by Qing legislation.[15] Where legal aspects were concerned, regulations distributed by Lifanyuan officials set standards pertaining to all Mongols under Qing rule. In a legal environment that was by no means uniform, the regulations systematically made known among the nobility in written form may have worked towards streamlining legal standards, and thus resulted in a tentative adjustment of legal practices.[16]

The Lifanyuan was not only responsible for outgoing communication and delegations to the Mongols. It also functioned as an 'inbox' for the correspondence Mongols sent to the Qing court. Before its formation, responsibility for Mongolian correspondence had formally rested with the Bureau for Writing (*Bithei jurgan*), which in early April 1636 was replaced by the Three Courts for Writing (*Bithei ilan yamun*).[17] One of these Three Courts for Writing, the *Narhūn bithei yamun*, was in charge of 'secret writing' and dealt, among other things, with "complaints about crimes to which one has fallen victim."[18] Very little is known about decision-making processes in these courts, and since the exact date of establishment of the Lifanyuan is not clear we also do not know whether the latter took on tasks formerly performed by the Three Courts for Writing.

Examples dating from the late 1620s show that Mongolian correspondence directed at Hūwangtaiji included legal issues. Rivalling parties in legal disputes tried to strengthen their position by gaining support from Hūwangtaiji as a higher authority. It seems to have been common practice for Mongols to accuse an opposing party of unlawful behaviour and—by drafting up a letter—call for the Manchu sovereign to step in on their behalf.[19] From our present point of view, it appears that the conflicts in which Hūwangtaiji was asked to intervene were not of special political relevance but rather related to individual solutions for property issues. Even though only a handful of petitions has come down to us and we do not know the outcome of these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the Manchu ruler—or his delegates—reacted in a satisfactory manner to the concerns of the senders and tried to put a stop to the unlawful appropriation of dependant households, livestock, or other possessions or valuables. To put it briefly, Mongols appealed to the Manchu court asking the ruler to intercede in legal situations they were dissatisfied with. In turn, the sovereign would endeavour to mediate between the parties to the dispute, thus cultivating the image of a ruler possessing the power to re-establish social peace.

It can be assumed that the number of petitions directed at the Manchu ruler did not decrease in the course of the early 1630s. Mongolian allies or subjects of the Manchus were accustomed to addressing their written messages directly to the ruler with no go-between. We may see the establishment of the Lifanyuan as an attempt to channel the incoming correspondence and to avoid letters being addressed directly to the throne. With the following words, Mongols were informed in 1637 that the Lifanyuan was to become the first port of call for their legal matters at the Qing court:

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[15] For an exception in case of the Khorchin, see *Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig*, fos. 48r/v and Heuschert, *Gesetzgebung der Qing*, 151–2 and 220–2.

[16] For the coexistence of oral and literary legal cultures in 18th century Khalkha Mongolia, see Heuschert-Laage, "Schriftlichkeit und mündliche Rechtstradition," 154–5.

[17] Michael Weiers, "Die drei Amtshöfe des Schriftwesens im späten Aisin-Staat," *Zentralasiatische Studien des Seminars für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens der Universität Bonn* 31 (2001): 71–9.

[18] *muribuha weile be habšaha gisun.* See *Jiu Manzhou Dang*, ed. Chen Jiexian (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1969), fol. 4687, 4688. Weiers, "Drei Amtshöfe," 72 and 85–6.

[19] Examples can be found in *Arban doloduγar ǰaγun-u emün-e qaγas-tu qolboγdaqu mongγol üsüg-ün bičig debter*, ed. Li Baowen (Tongliao: Nei Menggu shaonian ertong chubanshe, 1997). Relevant passages are translated in: Nicola Di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History* (Leiden: Brill 2003), 50–1, 140–1, 165–6, 167–8 and Michael Weiers, "Ersuchen an den Herrscher," *Zentralasiatische Studien* 38 (2009): 348–9.

> If you come in [matters of] punishable offences that were not finally settled in the polities of the Mongols on the outside, you are no longer supposed to make a report to the throne at your own discretion! Write down the grounds for the punishable offence and inform the Lifanyuan![20]

The Lifanyuan was instituted in order to review Mongolian petitions before they were presented to the emperor. Its officials were responsible for coordinating the flow of information between the Mongolian nobility and the court. There is all reason to assume that they were authorized to regularly check each item and to decide on the action to be taken and the priority to be given to the matter. In this way the Lifanyuan became the filter for communications of Mongolian origin with the throne.

Two important conclusions can be drawn from the imperial instruction that Mongols should bring unresolved legal cases before the Lifanyuan: firstly, it was explicitly for "punishable offences" or "criminal matters" (*Yal-a-yin učir*)[21] that the Lifanyuan was installed as a port of call for incoming Mongolian correspondence. We may assume that there was a broad definition of 'punishable offences' and that this included political matters or behaviour considered to be disrespectful. The emperor nonetheless did not arrange for all Mongolian communication to go through the hands of Lifanyuan officials. Reading between the lines, some sort of communication—sensitive diplomatic correspondence or military intelligence—could still be addressed directly to the throne. This leads to the conclusion that the Lifanyuan was established to relieve the workload of other governmental authorities, but was given responsibility to a clearly defined extent only in the field of law and not for Mongolian matters as a whole.

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[20] *Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig*, fo. 4v.: *γadaγ-a-du mongγol-un ulus tende sigüǰü ese baraγsan yal-a-yin učir-du irebesü urida öber-ün ǰoriγ-iyar + deger-e buu ayiladq-a . yal-a-yin učir siltaγan bičig bičiǰü . γadaγ-a-du mongγol-un törö-yi ǰasaγči yabudal-un yamun-dur ügülegtün*. In the Mongolian Code this order of Hūwangtaiji is not dated. It is, however, also included in the Collection of Mongolian dangse-archives of the Inner Secretariat of the Qing State where it is dated 4th September 1637 (Chongde 2nd year, 7th month, 16th day). *Čing ulus-un dotoγadu narin bičig-ün*, vol. 1, 187.

[21] For connotations of the Mongolian word *Yal-a*, see Françoise Aubin, "Les sanctions et les peines chez les Mongols," in *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'histoire comparative des institutions* (Bruxelles: De Boeck Université, 1991), 270–1.

Secondly, it is important to note that the imperial order cited above is directed at Mongols appealing to the Qing court on their own initiative. In 1637, Mongolian legal matters were apparently not meant to be handled by the Lifanyuan as a matter of routine, but were brought forward by Mongolian legal authorities at their own discretion or, as the case might be, by informants or parties to disputes who wished for a higher authority to act as an advocate in their case.

The possibility of turning to a higher authority was evidently welcomed by the Mongols. More people brought their disputes before the Lifanyuan than this office actually could—or wanted to—deal with. This can be concluded from an order given by the Shunzhi Emperor in 1651. Litigating commoners had tried to bypass their Mongolian lords and turned directly to the Lifanyuan on their own initiative, thus trying to outwit local authorities. For that reason it was decreed that only holders of high Qing ranks should have the right to transfer legal matters to the Lifanyuan:

> In case of punishable offences among the Mongols on the outside, [people are to] file a suit with the Wang[22] or Noyan[23] of their own banner! If [the case] cannot be solved, the Wang or Noyan should send the [litigating] persons off together, and they should come to the Lifanyuan[24] in order to file a suit! If someone does not file a suit with his Wang or Noyan and inappropriately comes to the Lifanyuan in order to file a suit, let us not consider right or wrong of the case but seize [the person] and return him to his own lord! With these words an order was given in response to a memorial. The act of seizing and returning [the person] proved difficult. Our officials have agreed on the following: If someone does not file a suit with his ruling Wang or Noyan and inappropriately comes to the Lifanyuan [as if he had] no Wang or Noyan, let us give up [the principle of] seizing and returning him; [however], without judging the case send him away with the words: 'File a suit with your regent!' This is what we have agreed on.[25]

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[22] Honorary title conferred by the Qing emperor.

[23] Traditional Mongolian term for lord or chief exercising authority.

[24] Literally: "to the Court of Affairs" which, for the sake of clarity, I translate as Lifanyuan.

[25] *Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig*, fos. 67v–68r: [67v] *γadaγ-a-du mongγol-ud-un aliba yal-a bolbasu öber öber-ün qosiγun-u vang . noyad-dur ǰaγaldu . ese barabasu . vang noyad kümün-i qamtu ilgeǰü yabudal-un yamun-dur ǰaγaldur-a ir-e . vang noyad-dur* [68r] *ǰaγalduqu ügei ketürkei-e yabudal-un yamun-dur ǰaγaldur-a irebesü . yal-a-yin ǰöb buruγu-yi ülü asaγun . bariǰu qoyisi öber-ün eǰen-dür öggüy-e kemen ayiladqaǰu ǰarlaǰuqui : bariǰu öggügči*

While in 1637 Mongols were encouraged not to bring their petitions directly to the Emperor but have the Lifanyuan review them first, fourteen years later there was need for new regulations. Apparently, parties to disputes did not—as one might expect—try to bypass the Lifanyuan. The opposite was the case: they besieged the Lifanyuan with petitions. It seems that people preferred their case to be decided by the Lifanyuan, and thus did not present their appeals to local courts. We do not know how native Mongolian courts were organized back then, how decisions were reached, and what role was played by written rules. No case records have survived from that time. Even though some native authorities were already qualified as *ǰasaγ* (regents), we cannot start out from the assumption that legal authority rested exclusively with these.

We can conclude, however, that in places where responsibilities may have been ill-defined the Lifanyuan was viewed as the forum[26] where Mongols expected the most favourable treatment. Yet, the growing number of Mongolian legal matters presented to the Lifanyuan exceeded the quantity of cases central government officials could handle, and eventually became a burden. What was stipulated in the time of Hūwangtaiji—i.e. to address one's petition to the Lifanyuan—thus came to be regarded as malpractice in the Shunzhi period.

The regulation quoted above is illuminating for two reasons: it reveals that Mongols—while ignoring local courts' decisions—tried to benefit from the possibility of turning to the Lifanyuan. Moreover, it shows the limits of Lifanyuan control and executive authority. According to the order of 1651, people who had bypassed their lord were to be arrested and returned to the authorities under whose jurisdiction they were supposed to be. A later, undated amendment, however, reveals that this could not be put into practice. To transfer unauthorized petitioners back into the hands of local administrators was beyond the resources and manpower of the Lifanyuan. If we visualize the long distances and lack of infrastructure in the Mongolian territories, as well as political conditions that were not as stable as it might appear in retrospect, we can imagine the difficulties faced by central government officials in their attempts to put the regulation into practice and escort people back to their competent court. Moreover, spheres of responsibility were still in the process of being defined, and petitioners may not have been quite open about the nature of their dependencies. In cases, which concerned the nature of dependencies or in disputes over judicial competence, the Lifanyuan, just by trying to refer the case to the competent authority, would be compelled to take sides. For this reason, the office simplified its work—with imperial approval—and confined itself to rejecting unauthorized petitioners without taking care of their return or contacting the competent court.

The amendment admitting the limits of Qing power when it came to the situation on site is only found in the Kangxi edition of the *Mongolian Code* (*Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig*). It is not included in any of the editions of the *Collected Statutes of the Great Qing dynasty* (*Daqing huidian*), in the Qianlong edition of the *Mongolian Code* or in the *Regulations of the Lifanyuan* (*Lifanyuan zeli*). On the one hand, the situation in the 18th century was different. As will be shown below, the Qing had better command of the infrastructure at that time and had installed a multi-layered system of administrative bodies ensuring the implementation of central government decisions. On the other, we can assume that it was not in the interest of the dynasty to divulge the fragility of its administrative structures. The amendment reveals that even though Southern Mongolian political authorities had submitted to the Qing as early as in 1636, Manchu control in the Mongolian territories was not as firmly established in the second half of the 17th century as official compilations of the 18th century try to make us believe.

3 The Handling of Mongolian Legal Cases on a Routine Basis

With the order of 1651, the question of who should be entitled to bring a case before the Lifanyuan was not solved once and for all. Changes in the power relations between centre and periphery, resulting from the incorporation of Khalkha and Oirats into the Qing empire as well as from administrative restructuring, made it necessary to redefine jurisdictional competence. 120 years after the need of limiting access to the Lifanyuan had first been discussed in the early Qing, the issue of petitions of Mongols to the Lifanyuan was taken up by legislators again in 1774. By that time the Qing had created a superior territorial-administrative unit, the league, and thereby established a new form of appellate court for judicial proceedings. However, legislators did not take an unequivocal stand, and the possibility of appealing to the Lifanyuan in order to revoke judgements of local authorities was not ruled out:

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anu kündü bolǰuqui : tüsimel man-u kelelčegsen anu . aliba kümün . ǰasaγ-un vang noyad-dur ǰaγalduqu ügei . vang noyad-un kümün ügei ketürkei-e yabudal-un yamun-dur irebesü bariǰu ögkü-yi bayiǰu sigükü ügei qoyisi ǰasaγ-dur ǰaγaldu kemen ilegey-e kemen kelelčeǰüküi. In the Mongolian Code this paragraph is not dated. It was drafted in the 8th year of Shunzhi (1652) according to *Da Qing Huidian*, chap. 145, fos. 2v/3r.

[26] For this term see Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, "Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra," *Journal of Legal Pluralism* 19 (1981).

> If there is any kind of law case or litigation among the Mongols, a suit should first be filed at any rate with the competent ruling Wang or Beile.[27] If the case is not treated fairly, a letter should be handed in to the heads of the league. If the heads of the league also do not make a decision based on the facts, the very same complainant should state the whole matter clearly in writing and point out how the case was decided after he filed it with the competent regent and how [the matter] was concluded after he filed it with the competent head of the league, and he should file a suit with the Lifanyuan. The Lifanyuan should examine the case, carry out investigations, and make a resolution on whether it is appropriate to decide the case by either handing it over to the respective heads of the league or by sending out an imperial commissioner, and it should make a memorial asking for an imperial decision.[28]

Even though local authorities—the regents (*J̌asaγ*) of the banners and the heads of the leagues—were acknowledged as courts of first and second instance and parties to disputes were not supposed to bypass them, Qing law provided litigants with legal means to overturn the judgements of these authorities independently. If they were dissatisfied with decisions of local courts, they were entitled to approach the Lifanyuan on their own initiative. Of course, this policy opened the floodgates for excessive litigating. Accordingly, the 1774 paragraph proceeds with a list of punishments for people who, bypassing the different levels of local courts, tried to bring their case directly before the Lifanyuan:

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[27] Honorary title conferred by the Qing emperor.

[28] *Mongγol čaγaǰin-u bičig*, 181 (chap.8, paragraph 5): [03.11b] *mongγolčud-un aliba ǰarγu ǰaγaliqai-yin kereg bui bügesü erke ügei urida qariy-a-tu ǰasaγ vang . beyile-nar-tur ǰaγaldutuγai muskiγdabasu . čiγulγan-u terigüd-tür bičig ergün barituγai . čiγulγan-u terigüd basa sidurγu-bar ese sidkebesü iǰaγur-un ǰaγalduγsan kümün qariy-a-tu ǰasaγ-tur ǰaγalduγad kerkiǰü sidkegsen ba . basa qariy-a-tu čiγulγan-u terigün-dür ǰaγalduγad . kerkiǰü tasulun qaγalγaγsan yabudal-i ǰüyil büri todorqayilan γarγan bičiǰü . yabudal-un yamun-dur ǰaγaldutuγai . yabudal-un yamun* [03.12a] *-ača kereg-ün učir-i kinan bayičaγaǰu . esebesü mön-kü yosuγar čiγulγan-u terigüd-tür tusiγan ögčü . sidkegülbesü ǰokiqu ba . esebesü sayid γarγaǰu sidkegülbesü ǰokiqu yabudal-i toγtaγaǰu ++ ǰarliγ-i γuyun ayiladq-a .* This regulation was issued in the 6th month of the 39th year of Qianlong (9th July–6th August 1774) in response to a memorial of the Lifanyuan.

> If someone comes directly to the Lifanyuan in order to file a suit and does not bring a suit before the competent reigning Wang or Beile and does not reverently hand in a letter to the heads of the league, one should not consider what is right and wrong, but—if it is a Taiji or an official—one should fine him three nines![29] If it is a common taxpayer his sentence should be 100 lashes! If it is an unimportant matter, one should likewise settle the case by entrusting it to the competent reigning heads of the league. If it is a serious matter of the category involving [the loss] of a human life, an investigation should be carried out and a resolution should be passed by the Lifanyuan on the appropriate action of settling the case by sending an imperial commissioner and a memorial should be made to ask for an imperial order![30]

Again, the objective was to limit the quantity of cases handled by the Lifanyuan to disputes that had already gone through several stages of appeal. Nevertheless, the Lifanyuan tried to keep all options open and would also review cases that had been turned down by local authorities. Moreover, it becomes apparent that in the Qianlong period the rules of procedure had changed again: unlike in the early Qing period, the Lifanyuan did not only reject unauthorized petitioners but would also take care of their punishment and contact the competent authorities accordingly. We can infer that spheres of responsibility were much more clearly defined than in the early Qing period when, as we learned above, Lifanyuan officials had to acknowledge that it was impossible for them to trace petitions back to local courts. In the Qianlong period the Lifanyuan had better command of the relevant channels of communication. As the provision of 1774 further shows, control over local authorities had tightened considerably:

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[29] A unit for a fine in livestock, i.e. nine animals of variable composition. See Aubin, "Les sanctions et les peines," 274–5.

[30] *Mongγol čaγaǰin-u bičig*, 181 (chap. 8, paragraph 5): [03.12a] *kerber qariy-a-tu ǰasaγ vang : beile-nar-tur ǰaγalduqu ügei . čiγulγan-u terigüd-tür bičig ergün bariqu ügei . šiγud-iyar yabudal-un yamun-dur ǰaγaldur-a irebesü. kereg-ün ǰöb buruγu-yi ülü bodon . taiǰi kiged tüsimel bolbasu γurban yisün mal-iyar torγaǰu ab . albatu bolbasu . ǰaγun tasiγur-iyar* [03.12b] *ǰanči . arsar kereg bolbasu . mön-kü qariy-a-tu ǰasaγ čiγulγan-u terigüd-tür tusiγan ögčü sidkegül . kümün-ü amin-dur qolbaγdaγsan ǰerge-yin yekeken kereg bolbasu . yabudal-un yamun-ača kinan asaγuǰu sayid γarγaǰu sidkebesü ǰokiqu yabudal-i toγtaγaǰu + ǰarliγ-i γuyun ailadq-a .*

> If people come in order to file a suit with the Lifanyuan and say that they have already filed a suit with the competent regent and the heads of the league [but] the regent and the heads of the league did not make a decision based on facts, we will let the case be settled by the Lifanyuan and—assessing the gravity of the case—[it] will either send an official or—after making a memorial—send an imperial commissioner; once the matter is clarified and the decision of the competent regent or the heads of the league has been in accordance with the law, there is nothing else to discuss about! If the decision of the regents was not based on facts, let [the officials] discuss a fine for the regent! If the decision of the heads of the league was not based on facts, let [the officials] discuss a fine for the heads of the league! If the charges were false, you should assess the gravity of the matter and in turn fine the person who originally filed the suit.[31]

This passage restates that by appealing to the Lifanyuan, litigants could hope for the decision of the regent or the league to be overturned. In principle, Qing law provided Mongols with a tool to file complaints with the Lifanyuan in cases that had already been decided by local Mongolian courts. Moreover, Mongolian legal authorities did not only have to accept that their decisions were revoked by the Lifanyuan—they also had to be prepared to be held responsible for alleged misjudgements. If litigants won their case in appeal proceedings, local authorities were likely to face penalties.

The repeated urgings of the Lifanyuan not to bypass local courts when filing suits must be seen in the context of the conflicting signals given by this office.[32] The Lifanyuan was performing a balancing act. In order to control local authorities and to limit their scope for independent action, it almost encouraged people to report on breaches of Qing law. On the other hand, the restrictions issued in 1651 and 1774 reveal what must have been a constant element of irritation for the Lifanyuan: it had to fend off unrequested correspondence from Mongols who wished the Lifanyuan to intercede on their behalf. The expenditure of time involved in dealing with what in the eyes of metropolitan officials were insignificant disputes increased the workload of the Lifanyuan and caused confusion about legal competence.

It may thus be concluded that as an unforeseen result of Qing efforts to make Mongolian judiciary part of the imperial legal system, the authority of local courts was questioned and people tried to find ways to have cases revised that had already been adjudicated. This is a situation historians have encountered in different settings. Using the example of Turkestan under Russian rule, Paolo Sartori gives an explanation for "the exceptional number of Muslim appeals for revision, which was apparently not a widespread legal custom in pre-colonial Central Asia."[33] According to Sartori,

> the Russian government became guarantor on all legal matters. This legal polity had a significant implication which had not been foreseen by the colonial rulers, namely that the indigenous population would perceive the colonial administration as determining the legal authority of the region's traditional courts.[34]

In the eyes of Turkestani Muslims, the colonial government provided the locals with an opportunity to have unsatisfactory legal decisions overturned. The Russian government soon realized that it did not have the means to maintain the petitioning system, and for this reason established second-instance judicial proceedings based on Islamic law in 1886.[35] Both the Qing and the Russian governments had to deal with the conflicting interests of establishing their supreme legal authority while at the same time acknowledging the irreplaceable role of local courts.

These courts, however, were not all equally accepted; rather, the weight of their decisions was graded according to the social and political recognition they received by the Qing court. The higher the rank of the authority whose judicial decision was questioned, the heavier was the penalty for the person who unsuccessfully tried to lodge an appeal. According to an undated paragraph of the Mongolian Code (Qianlong edition):

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[31] *Mongγol čaγaǰin-u bičig*, 181–183 (chap. 8, paragraph 5): [03.12b] *kerber nigende qariy-a-tu ǰasaγ čiγulγan-u terigüd-tür ǰaγalduγsan. ǰasaγ . čiγulγan-u terigüd siduryu-bar bariǰu sidkegsen ügei kemen yabudal-un yamun-dur ǰaγaldur-a iregčid bui bügesü . yabudal-un yamun-ača kereg-ün kündü* [03.13a] *könggen-i bodoǰu. tüsimed-i γarγaǰu sidkegülümü . esebesü ++ deger-e ayiladqaǰu sayid γarγaǰu sidkegülümü . kereg-i todorqayilaγsan-u qoyin-a . qariy-a-tu ǰasaγ . ǰiči čiγulγan-u terigüd sidkegsen anu . qauli yosun-dur neyilelčebesü kelelčekü yabudal ügei bolγ-a . ǰasaγ-ud-un sidkegsen anu siduryu ügei bolbasu . ǰasaγ-i yal-a kelelčegül . čiγulγan-u terigüd sidkegsen anu siduryu ügei bolbasu . čiγulγan-u terigüd-i yal-a kelelčegül . ǰaγalduγsan anu qudal bolbasu . kereg-ün kündü könggen-i bodoǰu iǰaγur-un* [03.13b] *ǰaγalduγsan kümün-i qarin gedergü yal-a torγaγtun.*

[32] According to the Chinese legal tradition, it was not uncommon for litigants to forward difficult cases to the imperial court for judgement and to try to avoid stages of appeal. In contrast to the situation among the Mongols, however, this was not a key issue until the beginning of the 19th century and there seems to have been no significant increase in the number of capital appeals. Jonathan K. Ocko, "I'll Take it All the Way to Beijing: Capital Appeals in the Qing," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 47,2 (1988): 310.

[33] Paolo Sartori, "Behind a Petition: Why Muslims' Appeals Increased in Turkestan under Russian Rule," *Asiatische Studien* / Etudes Asiatiques 63,2 (2009): 428.

[34] Sartori, "Behind a Petition," 427.

[35] Ibid., 429.

> If someone reopens a case which has been judged by Wang and [the result of the appeal] is in accordance with the judgement of the Wang, the fine for the person who filed the suit [should be] one nine; if it was a judgement [passed by] ruling Beile, Beise or Gung,[36] [the fine should be] five animals; if it was a judgement [passed by] Janggi,[37] you should take one horse.[38]

The paragraph does not reveal which courts could possibly be called upon if people wanted to reopen a case settled by Wang, Beile, Beise, Gung or Janggi. It is likely that appeals were not carried to Beijing but presented to higher-ranking local authorities. While this directive can be understood as further evidence of the Qing policy to back up the position of native authorities, we will now take a look at the opposite trend, i.e. the process by which local courts were limited in their sphere of competence.

4 Incorporating Native Authorities into the Qing State

As discussed above, the aim of the 1651 directive was to prevent Mongols from bringing their case directly before the Lifanyuan. At that time, the Lifanyuan apparently did not attempt to encroach significantly on the sphere of competence of native courts: There is no mention that it was obligatory for Mongolian judges to transfer any kind of cases to the Lifanyuan. It seems that no guidelines were given in order to define what should be considered 'an unresolved case' and when the Lifanyuan should be called in. The ones to prompt the Lifanyuan to take action were either the Mongolian authorities or Mongols who would not put up with the decision of their local authorities and the outcome of their case. The Lifanyuan was not in charge of routine inspection of Mongolian legal cases.

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[36] Honorary titles conferred by the Qing emperor.

[37] Officer in the banner administration.

[38] *Mongγol čaγaǰin-u bičig*, 179–181 (chap. 8, paragraph 3): [03.10b] *vang-ud-un sigügsen kereg-i udarču ǰaγalduγad mön-kü vang-ud-un sigügsen yosuγar bolbasu . ǰaγalduγsan kümün-dür yal-a nigen yisün ǰasaγ-un beyile . beyise .* [03.11a] *güng-üd-ün sigügsen anu bolbasu tabun mal ǰangginar-un sigügsen anu bolbasu . nigen mori abtuγai:*

Over the course of the second half of the 17th century the Qing gradually modified their position of acknowledging the jurisdictional competence of Mongolian courts. Legal authority, however, did not pass directly from the hands of individual Mongolian personalities to the Lifanyuan or its representatives. Rather, in a first step the Qing encroached on the autonomy of local courts by urging them not to carry out death sentences on their own.

For this reason, native Mongolian authorities were grouped in assemblies of two or three and instructed to jointly administer the law. Jurisdiction over capital offences was thus removed from the hands of the individual and had to be shared with the neighbouring rulers. Earlier attempts to implement this policy were clearly reinforced after the April 1675 rebellion of the Chakhar nobles Burni (†1675) and Lubsang (†1675).[39] A couple of months later the Kangxi Emperor stipulated that Mongolian ruling noblemen should no longer dispense justice on their own initiative:

> According to what was decided by the Taizong Emperor,[40] ruling Wang and Noyan who govern a banner should carry out the execution of a person condemned to death [only] after they have notified the neighbouring ruling Wang and Noyan and examined [the case] in court. If they carry out the execution without notifying the neighbouring ruling Wang and Noyan and without examining [the case] in court, let us punish them as if they had carried out an execution at will. If small Taiji [insist on the execution of][41] commoners, taxpayers, or domestic servants, they should set out the reason of the matter to their own ruling Wang or Noyan! The Wang and Noyan should likewise carry out the execution [only] after they have notified the neighbouring ruling Wang and Noyan and examined [the case] in court. If you convene an assembly, have a court hearing and if there is a person condemned to death, you should carry out the execution according to the judgement immediately at the place where the assembly was convened.[42]

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[39] For the Chakhar rebellion, see Fang Chao-ying, "Hsiao-tuan Wen Huang-hou," in *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1912)*, ed. Arthur W. Hummel, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943–44, reprint Taipei: SMC Publishing INC., 1991), vol. 1, 304–5.

[40] Posthumously given the dynastic title of Hūwangtaiji.

[41] Restored passage illegible in the Mongolian text.

[42] *Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig*, fos. 32v–33r: [32v] *aliba alaqu yal-a-du kümün-i + tayisung quvangdi-yin toγtaγaγsan yosuγar qosiγu ǰakiruγči ǰasaγ-un vang . noyad köndelen ǰasaγ-un vang noyad-dur ügüleǰü sigüǰü alatuγai : köndelen ǰasaγ-un vang . noyad-dur ügüleǰü sigükü ügei alabasu . ǰoriγ-iγar alaγsan yosuγar γalalaγ-a : baγ-a taiyiǰi-nar qaraču kümün . albatu ger-ün kübüd-i* [33r] *öber öber-ün ǰasaγ-un vang noyad-dur učir-i γarγaǰu ügületügei :*

There is much reason to assume that the rules for stricter control of Mongolian leaders' judicial competences resulted from imperial irritation about the ongoing insubordination of the Chakhar. As early as in 1659 there had been a conflict over the legal competences of the Chakhar ruler Abunai (†1675), who had the whole family of one of his internal opponents extinguished.[43] Even though the Qing left Mongolian rulers a certain scope of discretion when it came to handling internal affairs, the court would not let Abunai get away with this and imposed a heavy fine on him. In the years to come, disagreement with the Chakhar ruling house became more acute and culminated in the open rebellion of 1675. Even though reference is made in the passage above to an earlier directive given by Hūwangtaiji,[44] it appears to be quite self-evident that there is a direct connection between the armed conflict in early 1675 and measures taken later that year to limit native authorities' scope for independent action. The emperor apparently responded to the anti-Qing strategies pursued by the Chakhar ruling family with a closer integration of the Mongols into the imperial state.

This scheme of inhibiting unilateral actions by forcing Mongolian authorities to cooperate was not an isolated phenomenon. The policy to diminish the Mongolian rulers' sovereign powers by compelling them to consult each other was not only pursued with regard to the use of force. It was also the guiding principle when it came to the confiscation of fines. According to Qing legislation, fines could be paid in line with Mongolian legal customs as compensation to the aggrieved party; however, depending on the persons convicted and the nature of the crime they could also be collected by the government.[45] The Qing court laid a direct claim to fines imposed on holders of offices in the banner

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vang noyad mön-kü köndelen ǰasaγ-un vang noyan-dur ügüleǰü sigüǰü alatuγai . čiγulγan neyileǰü sigüǰü alaqu yal-a-du kümün bolbasu darui čiγulγan neyilegsen γaǰar-a sigügsen yosuγar alatuγai. Dated in the middle autumn month of the 14th year of Kangxi, i.e. 19th September–18th October 1675 (*engke amuγulang-un arban dörbedüger on namur-un dumdadu sar-a-dur*).

[43] Strictly speaking, he was accused of killing his opponent and his officials were accused of killing the family. For this dispute, see Dalizhabu, "Qing dai chahaer zhasake qi kao," *Lishi yanjiu* 5 (2005): 57.

[44] According to Dalizhabu, the Qing included a similar regulation already in the Mongolian Code printed in Beijing 1667. Dalizhabu, "<Menggu lüli> ji qi yu <Lifanyuan zeli> de guanxi," *Qingshi yanjiu* 4 (2003): 2.

[45] Françoise Aubin, "Some Characteristics of Penal Legislation among the Mongols (13th–21st Centuries)," in *Central Asian Law: An Historical Overview. A Festschrift for the Ninetieth Birthday of Herbert Franke*, ed. Wallace Johnson et al. (Topeka, Kansas: Society for Asian Legal History, 2004), 142.

administration, and since 1692 there is evidence that livestock was indeed confiscated and transferred to Beijing.[46]

Fines which the Mongolian rulers had imposed on their own dependents, however, were a different matter, because no provisions were made as to how these assets should be appropriated. This changed after the 1675 Chakhar rebellion. From that time, native authorities were no longer allowed to dispose of these fines alone but had to share them with neighbouring rulers in joint trials.[47] For this purpose, the Southern Mongolian rulers—with no mention of the Chakhar, who since their rebellion were under direct imperial control—were organized in groups of two, three or four and were obliged to coordinate legal decisions with each other. Animals taken as punishment from their subjects had to be shared and were allocated to each ruler according to set quotas. With these measures the Qing obviously tried to avoid the risk of single-handed actions and arbitrary confiscation of livestock.

The Chakhar rebellion can be understood as the catalyst for a further tightening of control. By diminishing the Mongol rulers' sovereign rights of administering justice to their own people, and by making provisions for the redistribution of confiscated property, the Qing increasingly encroached on the internal orbit of power of these lords after 1675. This trend intensified under the Yongzheng Emperor when the networks of neighbouring (*Köndelen*) rulers formed in the Kangxi period were expanded into leagues. These units comprised up to more than twenty banners and were put under the control of a league chief appointed by the emperor through the Lifanyuan. Among other things, the authorities were supposed to convene an assembly every three years in order to decide over unsettled legal cases. The Lifanyuan moreover delegated an official who was present at every meeting.[48] The fact that rulers had to reach an agreement in a larger group went hand in hand with the very process of curtailing individual legal authority. According to an undated rule in the Qianlong edition of the Mongolian Code:

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[46] Lawrence Edward Yates, "Early Historical Materials of the Bayantala League" (PhD dissertation, Bonn University, 1986), 192–3.

[47] Relevant passages in *Mongγol-un čaγaǰan-u bičig*, fos. 48r–51v. Translation in Heuschert, *Gesetzgebung der Qing*, 220–223. For a dating of this passage on the basis of the persons mentioned, see ibid., 151.

[48] According to Zhao Yuntian, *Zhongguo zhibian jigou shi* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2002), 274, no Lifanyuan official was sent to league meetings of the Inner Mongolian leagues after 1751.

> A fine in livestock, which is due to the government should be handed over to the heads of the competent league; after you have rounded up and taken the appropriate number [of livestock], give it as a reward to people who made a real effort and did [everything] in their power! You should let the Lifanyuan know about the rewards and let it examine and investigate the matter! People to be punished by decapitation or strangulation will be transferred to the place where they originally have committed the crime and will be dealt with according to the law.[49]

The examples given above provide strong evidence that native authorities' right of control over their own subjects was not reduced by interference on the part of imperial representatives endeavouring to assume control. Rather, the power of the Mongolian legal authorities was curtailed by a system of mutual control among the Mongolian rulers—under the surveillance of the Lifanyuan. Compulsory cooperation among Mongolian authorities and the inhibition of unilateral actions can be understood as a scheme of the Qing to prevent individual rulers from playing a lone hand.

In light of the strategies of Qing control over the Mongols, fragmentation has rightfully been viewed as a key instrument of Qing policies.[50] But this is only one side of the coin: if we talk of fragmentation we presuppose former unity. The Mongols of what was to become Inner Mongolia, however, did not speak with a single voice. For this reason, we should not lose sight of the fact that in conjunction with breaking up established structures there was actually a reverse trend, a trend of merging distinct entities into newly created administrative units. Native authorities who had formerly acted independently were urged to collaborate and agree on important decisions. The Mongolian rulers were required to concertedly toe the political line set by the Qing and to supervise each other.

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[49] *Mongγol čaγaǰin-u bičig*, 237 (chap. 12, paragraph 10): [04.25a] *aliba ǰasaγ-tur abquy-a ǰokistu yal-a-yin mal-i qariy-a-tu čiγulγan-u terigün ǰasaγ-ud-tur tusiyan ögčü toγan-u yosuγar kögeǰü abuγad üneker ǰidküǰü küčün öggügsen arad-tur šangnaǰu ög šangnaγsan yabudal-i yabudal-un yamun-dur medegülǰü kinan bayičaγaγtun :* [04.25b] *čabčiǰu alaqu köbčideǰü alaqu yalatu arad-i uγ yal-a qaldaγsan γaǰar-tur kürgeǰü čaγaǰa-bar bolγaqui anu.* The regulation stipulating redistribution of confiscated livestock "was issued when the dynasty was founded" (*Guochu ding*); see *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben <Lifanyuan zeli>*, ed. Labapingcuo (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006), 153. However, mention of leagues which at that time did not yet exist points to the fact that this regulation was reformulated and is quoted out of context.

[50] Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Making Mongols," in *Empire at the Margins. Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 74–5.

In this regard, I believe, there is a close connection between what I call compulsory cooperation among Mongolian authorities and the extension of the Lifanyuan's activities. By definition, the Lifanyuan was in charge of the heterogeneous group of the 'Mongols on the outside' as a whole; it was the agency supposed to progressively integrate the distinct Mongolian polities and to overcome divisions that might cause internal disputes. Under the umbrella of the Lifanyuan, all Mongolian rulers had their specific positions, and it must have been in the interest of the office to avoid conflicts that might result in a shift of power.

5 The Qing Claim to Legal Hegemony: Consequences for the Lifanyuan

Qing policies were clearly aimed at diminishing the authority of native rulers. When looking at the role of the Lifanyuan, it becomes apparent that this office first confined its activities to supervising the composition and the judgements of local courts. However, the stipulation that Mongolian authorities collectively dispense justice did not produce a stable situation with clear definitions of judicial competence. For this reason, the Lifanyuan laid claim to exercising legal authority in a more direct manner. In cases involving capital offences, the league office, after reviewing the case, was required to send a report to the Lifanyuan, which jointly with officials of the Board of Punishments, the Censorate, and the Court of Revision would then draft a memorial summarizing the case and proposing an adequate judgment:

> If it is appropriate to impose the death penalty of strangulation or decapitation and the Mongols are tried by a court [composed] of several regents, one should set out the reasons for the judgement and come in order to inform the Lifanyuan. After [officials] from the Lifanyuan jointly with the Three High Courts[51] have defined a sentence, they should make a memorial and ask for an imperial order.[52]

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[51] Board of Punishments, Censorate, and Court of Revision.

[52] *Mongγol čaγaǰin-u bičig*, 243 (chap. 12, paragraph 20): [04.31b] *aliba köbčideǰü alaqu ba čabčiǰu alaqu yal-a-dur torγabasu ǰokiqu mongγol-ud-i olan ǰasaγ-ud-un γaǰar-ača sigüǰü . yal-a-yin učir siltaγan-i γarγaǰu . yabudal-un yamun-dur medegülür-e iregtün . yabudal-un yamun-ača γurban čaγaǰa-yin yamun-luγ-a qamtu neyileǰü yal-a toγtaγaγad + ayiladqaǰu ++ ǰarliγ-i γuyuγtun.*

Only petty crimes were to be decided by courts at banner level. All other cases had to be transferred to a higher court at the level of the league, which was composed of a group of regents. Moreover, cases involving the loss of human life had to be presented to the Lifanyuan. The Lifanyuan had to confirm the case jointly with the highest judicial body in the capital, and the sentence could only be carried out after imperial approval. It is unclear when this regulation was issued and how it was put into practice. The sources provide contradictory evidence. According to the *Internal Manuscript Copy of the Lifanyuan zeli*, Mongolian authorities were already required to report capital cases to the Lifanyuan as early as in 1662; the office, in turn, was supposed to hand in a memorial jointly with the Three High Courts.[53] It remains doubtful, however, whether this law was enforced in 1662—given the fact that 13 years later, in 1675, the emperor demanded Mongolian rulers to dispense justice collectively without requiring the involvement of the Lifanyuan. The 1662 order seems even more inappropriate when we recall that only a couple of years before it had been difficult for the Lifanyuan to trace people back to their competent court because spheres of responsibility were still in the process of being defined. One possible explanation of the contradictory evidence found in the Kangxi edition of the Mongolian statute book and the internal manuscript copy of the *Lifanyuan zeli* is a significant divergency between statements and reality. As Brian Tamanaha has observed, in the colonial context "transplanted state law norms" were "frequently a kind of virtual norm, with an existence only on paper until invoked to justify the decisions and actions of the state legal apparatus."[54] The order of 1662 anticipated future developments. Archival evidence shows that beginning in the mid-18th century the Lifanyuan made efforts to exercise legal authority more directly, and Mongolian authorities did transfer capital cases to the Lifanyuan.[55] However, since we do not know the context in which the regulation of 1662 was drafted, it is impossible to determine whether we can see it as a general concept or as a blueprint for the future.[56]

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[53] *Qianlong chao neifu chaoben*, 169.

[54] Brian Tamanaha, "The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism," *Journal of Law and Society* 20,2 (1993): 210.

[55] Charles Bawden, "A Case of Murder in Eighteenth Century Mongolia," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 32,1 (1969).

[56] As early as 1659 there had been disputes about the legal competences of the Chakhar ruler. Dalizhabu, "Qing dai chahaer zhasake qi kao," 57. There may be a connection between this controversy and the regulation of 1662. Moreover, when Manchu regents directed the state affairs during the minority of the Kangxi emperor there were tensions over the future manner of structuring the Qing state. Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency 1661–1669* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

By installing stages of appeal, the handling of capital cases originating from Mongolia was brought into line with legal practice in China: the Chinese emperor, as the ultimate guardian of cosmic harmony, had to sanction each individual death sentence. Ideally, capital punishment was used sparingly and only carried out after going through the usual procedure of the Three High Courts and careful review of the case. Instances of summary executions remained an exception.[57] For this reason, it is fair to say that the gradual shift of decision-making authority from the periphery to the centre went hand in hand with tendencies to unify and harmonize legal administration over the Mongols with the Chinese tradition. This trend can not only be observed in procedural law. It is even more obvious in the field of legislation, where elements of Chinese law were increasingly incorporated. Lifanyuan officials faced a dilemma: Mongolian law as it had been laid down in the early 17th century was viewed as being insufficient to the standards of the legal code of the Qing dynasty. The Lifanyuan had to formulate regulations which in elaborateness and form would meet the standard of Qing penal law as practiced in China while still being specifically Mongolian. For lack of precedents, legislators began to model Mongolian legal rules on their counterparts in the Qing Code.[58]

This development did not only have far-reaching consequences for legal rules and the administration of justice over the Mongols; it also had repercussions on the Lifanyuan's spheres of operation. From the Shunzhi and Kangxi periods we know of some cases in which the emperor ordered to apply Chinese law to Mongols. In the Qianlong period it became common practice for the emperor to have Lifanyuan officials deliberate decisions over Mongolian legal cases jointly with officials from the Board of Punishment and—occasionally and depending on the context—members of the Grand Council. The results of these deliberations were submitted to the emperor as a draft in the form of a joint memorial. This procedure shows quite clearly that the emperor regarded the competence of the Lifanyuan as limited and that he wanted to counterbalance this by consulting officials of other central government agencies who had different background knowledge. Familiarity with the subtleties of internal Mongolian conditions (which Lifanyuan officials could be presumed to have) was not sufficient and had to be complemented by specific legal or strategic expertise and familiarity with the Qing Code.

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[57] M.J. Meijer, "The Autumn Assizes in Ch'ing Law," *T'oung Pao* 70 (1984): 1–5 and Ocko, "All the Way to Beijing," 293.

[58] For the incorporation of Chinese law into the Qing Mongolian legislation, see Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism," 315–7 and Frédéric Constant, "Questions autour du pluralisme juridique sous la dynastie des Qing à travers l'exemple mongol," *Études chinoises* 26 (2007): 249–51.

6 Conclusion

By installing stages of appeal and organizing more efficient supervision, legal practice in the Mongolian territories was made compatible with the legal system of China over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. This paper argues that this development should not be seen *ex post* as the result of a comprehensive concept on the part of the Qing. The specific role of the Lifanyuan was contested along jurisdictional lines and developed through the interplay of the imperial centre and various actors on the Mongolian side, be they petitioners trying to pursue their own interests or indomitable Mongolian rulers not willing to tolerate Manchu interference in their internal affairs. This interaction can be seen as an example of a development which, as Lauren Benton puts it, "produced a strengthening of state authority that neither side precisely embraced or predicted"[59] in other—colonial—contexts. A closer look at legal politics towards Mongols will help us to understand the strategies used by the Qing to accommodate diversity while at the same time making an effort towards consistency of legal practice within their realm. In this context, analysing Qing jurisdictional politics will not only enable us to better understand the changing scope of political authority, but will also provide insights about the boundaries that separate imperial constituencies.

Jurisdictional disputes and conflicts over competence waged between the metropolitan centre and Mongolian authorities or litigants directly affected the definition of the Lifanyuan's scope of functions. As the earliest records of Manchu-Mongolian interaction show, the Manchu ruler placed much importance on the acknowledgment of his supreme legal authority over Mongols. The establishment of the Lifanyuan was closely linked to the practice of Mongols to present petitions to the Manchu ruler. As a port of call for Mongols at the court, it was responsible for reviewing and organizing their correspondence and preparing it for presentation to the emperor. In return, it would inform petitioners of imperial decisions and circulate proclamations. There is every indication that Mongols made wide use of the possibility of filing charges with the Lifanyuan. The fact that in 1651 the Shunzhi Emperor found it necessary to pass an order allowing only holders of Qing ranks to bring disputes before the Lifanyuan is most revealing. It shows that the authority of the Lifanyuan as a first port of call for the arbitration of Mongolian legal matters was readily accepted and at times even exploited. Mongols had seized the opportunity to litigate as far as Qing law permitted, and used the Lifanyuan to pursue their own ends.[60] Even though the Qing tried to limit the number of complaints, the Lifanyuan continued to exert a strong attraction on Mongolian petitioners, because it reserved for itself the right to re-examine legal cases decided by native authorities and to dismiss their judgements. People who were dissatisfied with the decision of their local court viewed the Lifanyuan as an alternative and tried to have the judgment revoked. The amount of Mongolian correspondence it had to deal with made it necessary for the Lifanyuan to define its spheres of responsibility more clearly. Thus, disputes over judicial competence were instrumental in shaping the functions of the Lifanyuan.

In a complex legal situation where jurisdiction was to some degree unclear, actors on both the Manchu and the Mongolian side tried to exploit the competences of the Lifanyuan to their own advantage. The earliest example of the Lifanyuan being entrusted with drafting laws for the Mongols dates from 1658. For that time, it is difficult to establish how the Lifanyuan ensured abidance by the laws it had distributed among the Mongolian nobility. As it did not routinely review Mongolian legal cases, it is very likely that the Qing heavily relied on informants to enforce their law. It seems that at one point in time the Qing emperor turned the tables: people who were dissatisfied with the decision of native authorities and presented their case to the Lifanyuan in order to have the judgment revoked took the role of informants. By making such petitioners an instrument for its own purposes, the Lifanyuan was able to supervise local courts' decisions.

The Lifanyuan represents the intention of the Qing to overcome internal divisions among the diverse groups of Mongols under their rule and to limit antagonism and political infighting. Up until the last decades of the 17th century, the Mongolian rulers had a certain measure of discretion when handling internal affairs. This changed in the wake of the conflict over the legal competences of the Chakhar ruler Abunai, who had the whole family of one of his internal opponents extinguished in 1659, and the open rebellion of the Chakhar in 1675. The order of the Kangxi Emperor instructing Mongolian rulers to administrate justice collectively can be understood as a first plan for the interaction of the multiple legal spheres among the Mongols under Qing

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[59] Lauren Benton, "Colonial Law and Cultural Difference: Jurisdictional Politics and the Formation of the Colonial State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41,3 (1999): 574.

[60] For the phenomenon of colonized people attempting to manipulate the legal system of the colonial state and make themselves into 'legal actors', see Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 173 and Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 169.

hegemony. On the surface, the Qing left the administration of justice in the hands of the nobility, but legal authority now rested with a network of rulers of relatively equal standing. Observance of Qing law was guaranteed by mutual surveillance.

In the 18th century, the Qing further encroached on the autonomy of the Mongolian legal authorities while at the same time attempting to establish a more coherent unified legal system. The role of the Lifanyuan in this streamlining process was ambivalent. While at one time the weight of Lifanyuan influence on the administration of justice over the Mongols had increased at the expense of native legal authorities, with the trend towards legal uniformity it had to give more and more leeway to other central government agencies exercising legislative and judicial authority over the Mongols.

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CHAPTER 8

The Sino-Russian Trade and the Role of the Lifanyuan, 17th–18th Centuries

Ye Baichuan and Yuan Jian

In the discussion of Sino-Russian relations, scholars have long been either focusing on historical documentation[1] or on the discussion of the tributary system and the closed-door policy.[2] Taking the Lifanyuan regulation practices for the Sino-Russian trade in the 17th to 18th centuries as a point of departure, this chapter will add a new perspective. In particular, it will be discussed how the Qing government combined treaty diplomacy with tributary diplomatic thinking to realize a series of political objectives in its relationship with Russia.[3]

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[1] Zhang Weihua and Sun Xi, *Qing qianqi zhong'e guanxi* (Jinan: Shandong Education Press, 1997); Tong Dong, *Sha'e yu dongbei* (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 1985); *Sha'e qinghuashi*, ed. Yu Shengwu et al. (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1978–1990); *Yiliubajiunian de zhong'e nibuchu tiaoyue 1689*, ed. Dai Yi et al. (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1977); Wang Xilong, *Zhong'e guanxishilue* (Lanzhou: Gansu Culture Press, 1995); Liu Yuantu, *Zaoqi zhong'e dongduan bianjie yanjiu* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1993); Jiang Changbin, *Zhonge guojiedongduan de yanbian* (Beijing: Central Literary Contributions Publishing Bureau, 2007); *Zhongsu maoyishi ziliao*, ed. Meng Xianzhang (Beijing: China's Foreign Trade and Economic Publishing House, 1991); Meng Xianzhang, *Zhongsu jingji maoyishi* (Harbin: Heilongjiang People's Publishing House, 1992); Li Mingbin, *Zhongguo yu esu wenhuajiaoliuzhi* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1998); Li Sheng, *Xinjiang dui esu maoyishi* (Urumqi: Xinjiang People's Publishing House, 1993); Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyishi* (Beijing: The Central University for Nationalities Publishing House, 1991); Mi Zhenbo, *Qingdai xibeibianjingdiqu zhong'emaoyi: cong daoguang chao dao xuantong chao* (Tianjin: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2005); *Jianming qingshi*, ed. Dai Yi (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1984).

[2] *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, part 2*, ed. John King Fairbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), *Jianqiao zhongguo wanqingshi*, trans. The Compiling Room of the Institute of History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2007), 29–33. Dai Yi, *Shiba shiji de zhongguo yu shijie* (Shenyang: Liaohai Press, 1999), 100–11.

[3] Mikhail Iosifovich Sladkovskij, *Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenij narodov Rossii s Kitaem (do 1917 g.)* (Moskva: Nauka, 1974). Evgenij Pantelejmonovich Silin, *Kyakhta v XVIII v.: iz istorii russko-kitajskoj torgovli* (Irkutsk: Irkutskoe oblastnoe izdatel'stvo, 1947). Khristofor

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The foreign relations of the Qing dynasty are usually divided into the tributary and the treaty system,[4] the former of which is recognized as a main characteristic of the Qing government until the Opium Wars (1839–42, 1856–60). As a matter of fact, however, Russia was an exception in diplomatic practice. As early as in 1656, Fëdor Isakovich Bajkov, the representative of Tsar Aleksej Mikhailovich, came to Beijing and established formal diplomatic relationships between the two empires. In the wake of many border conflicts and in the face of domestic troubles and foreign invasion, the Qing sought to regulate their relations with Russia for the first time and signed the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689.[5] This treaty, which was followed by the 1728 treaty of Kyakhta, provided the basic framework for bilateral political, trading, cultural, and religious operations until the Opium War, thus paving the way for a new, modern period of foreign relations between Russia and China.

At the same time, however, some practices of tributary diplomacy were continued. Taking advantage of the Russian desire for trading profits, the Qing government pursued various political goals, such as control over the migration of the Zünghars and Khalkha Mongols and the delimitation of border areas, by bestowing trade rights in China. Qing political ambitions obviously benefited from the leverage exerted through trade control, and the importance the government attached to the Sino-Russian trade by far exceeded common economic interests. Trade relations between China and Russia were actually considered an extension of the political and diplomatic relations between the

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Ivanovich Trusevich, *Posol'skie i torgovye snosheniya Rossii s Kitaem do XIX veka* (Moskva: Tipografiya T. Malinskogo, 1882). Aleksandr Kazimirovich Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenij Rossii s Kitaem* (Kazan': Izdanie Ivana Dubrovina, 1857). Natal'ya Fedorovna Demidova and Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, *Pervye russkie diplomaty v Kitae: Rospis' I. Petlina i statejnyj spisok F.I. Bajkova* (Moskva: Nauka, 1966). Nina Pavlovna Shastina, *Russko-mongol'skie posol'skie otnosheniya v XVII veke* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoj Literatury, 1958). *Granitsy Kitaya: istoriya formirovaniya*, ed. Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov et al. (Moskva: Pamyatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 2001). Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, *Imperiya Tsin i Russkoe gosudarstvo v XVII v.* (Moskva: Nauka, 1980). Oleg Efimovich Nepomnin, *Istoriya Kitaya: epokha Tsin, XVII—nachalo XX veka* (Moskva: Vostochnaya literature, 2005).

[4] Sometimes also referred to as the 'Canton (Guangzhou) System'; for detailed information see Wu Yixiong, "Yapianzhanzheng qian zaihuaxiren yu duihuazhanzhengyulun de xingcheng," in *Jindai zhongguo: zhengzhi yu waijiao*, ed. Wang Jianlang et al. (Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2010), 13.

[5] Some scholars believe that the treaty of Nerchinsk signalled the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, see Zhao Huasheng, "Zhong'e guanxi de moshi," in *Zhonge guanxi de lishi yu xianshi*, ed. Guan guihai et al. (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009), 40.

two countries. As a whole, this strategy proved to be successful in the early Qing period given the military and political strength of its governance, which was broad enough to counterbalance Russia's expansion into the Far East and her desire for trade profits in that region. Although Russia had never given up the idea of enlarging the empire by expanding into new territories, her interest in trade profits had always dominated her policy towards China in the 17th and 18th centuries, and it was this very factor that gave the Qing government the opportunity to play out its diplomatic means.

This strategy was realized by a unique institution, the Lifanyuan, which was originally an office that handled Non-Chinese and especially Mongolian affairs; with the beginning of Sino-Russian negotiations, however, it became also responsible for dealing with the relationship between China and Russia. Since one of its main functions was to supervise and manage the trade between the two countries, the Lifanyuan began to play an important role in Sino-Russian relations. This widening of political responsibility has often raised questions as to its compatibility and effectiveness. Why, for instance, should an office in charge of managing internal and Inner Asian affairs also engage with a European power? What were the principles of the Lifanyuan's supervision and management of Sino-Russian trade, and by what means could trade supervision strengthen the Qing's political position? Finally, how did the Qing gain full control over the Khalkha Mongolian territories that lie between the two empires? These questions have as yet been hardly explored, at least in China.[6]

With regard to Russia, the Lifanyuan was both an executive and an important consulting body. Its supervision of the Sino-Russian trade reflected a specific mode of operation and thus helps us to understand the course of the bilateral relations and the distinctive features of Qing Dynasty diplomacy in the 17th and 18th centuries. Nevertheless, Chinese and foreign scholars have been focusing mostly on the Lifanyuan as a governmental agency responsible for administrating the newly acquired territories in Inner Asia. Even Zhao Yuntian, a specialist in Lifanyuan studies, has given only a brief introduction on the Lifanyuan's supervision and management of Russian affairs.

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[6] To our knowledge, the role of the Lifanyuan in the Sino-Russian trade has as yet been in the focus of only two scholars, see: Zhao Yuntian, *Qingdai zhili bianchui de shuniu lifanyuan* (Urumqi: Xinjiang People's Publishing House, 1995); Idem, "Qing chao lifanyuan yu zhong'e guanxi," *Qiqiha'er shifanxueyuanxuebao* 1 (1981), and Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, "Lifanyuan yu eqing guanxi (17–18shiji)," trans. Ye Baichuan et al., *Mingqing luncong* 12 (2012).

1 The Lifanyuan's Functions in Sino-Russian Relations: Tribute or Not?

The diplomatic practice of the Lifanyuan lasted until the establishment of the *Zongli geguo shiwu yamen* in 1861, and it was responsible for the affairs of foreign countries west and north of China that could be reached overland, including Russia. Ever since negotiations had started, it was the Lifanyuan that was responsible for Russian affairs although its original range of authority was much more limited: it was "responsible for governmental decrees to the minorities, defining the ranks and salaries of their nobility, regulating the homage paid by the latter, and implementing sentences and penalties" and it was "in charge of the affairs of the external Royal Highnesses, the people who possess a rank of Manchu nobility below that of a prince, princess, etc., and the items of etiquette and the determination of penalty or punishment".[7] Later, the treaty of Kyakhta specified explicitly that negotiations with Russia were to be conducted under the authority of the Lifanyuan:

> When China hereafter sends an official document to Russia, the seal attached shall be that of the Lifanyuan according to the precedent cases, and then the official document shall be submitted to Russia's Governing Senate; when Russia sends an official document to China, the seals attached shall be those of the Senate and the commandant [Voevoda] of Tobol'sk City, and the document shall be submitted to the Lifanyuan of China.[8]

Consequently, in its official communications with Russia the Lifanyuan attached great importance to the seals and staunchly dismissed all communications that ran contrary to the treaty. For instance, in 1732 an official document was dismissed because there was no seal of the Senate but only from the Tobol'sk commandant; in 1733, another document was dismissed because it was signed "Lifanyuan of Russia".[9]

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[7] *Da Qing huidian Guangxu* (Guangxu edition, 1899), vol. 63, Lifanyuan; *Qingshengzu Shilu*, vol. 1, August, 18th year of Shunzhi Dynasty (1662). All English translations of Chinese quotations are by the authors.

[8] *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, ed. The First Historical Archive of China (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), file No. 215, p. 519.

[9] Ibid., file No. 247, p. 568 and file No. 262, p. 595.

There is no detailed documentation in the Chinese historical archives about why the Lifanyuan, being an office for managing ethnic minorities issues, was put in charge of additionally dealing with Russian affairs. Qian Shifu even believed that it was simply a mistake in the design of that political institution.[10] Similarly, although Russian diplomatic mission reports repeatedly mentioned disputes between Russian envoys and Lifanyuan officers over etiquette issues such as the format of official communications and submission procedures of official communications and gifts, and despite complaints by Russian envoys about the arrogance of Chinese officers, no specific investigations into the Lifanyuan's diplomatic functions were made by Russian academics specializing in Sino-Russian relations.[11]

It was the Russian scholar Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov who, as a rare exception, discusses the functions of the Lifanyuan in detail in a recent article, and concludes that it was

> primarily responsible for handling the relations between Manchuria, whose territory expanded increasingly, and its neighbouring countries, especially with Korea. In December 1638 Korea recognized Manchu suzerainty and sent envoys to deliver tribute every year. In addition, the Lifanyuan was responsible for the relations with South and Western Mongolia that became gradually annexed. Its functions extended dramatically after the Manchus occupied the Central Plains of China, established diplomatic relations with Russia (1657), incorporated Khalkha Mongolia into its territory (1691) and occupied the Western Regions (1759).[12]

In an earlier publication Myasnikov, who is today's most accredited expert on Qing history in Russia, has particularly pointed out that the Governing Senate and the Lifanyuan were bodies of unequal authority, reflecting Qing intentions to reduce Russia's status, and that the coequal counterpart of the Governing Senate should have been the Qing Cabinet and later the Grand Council (*Junjichu*).[13] This diplomatic disequilibrium can be explained against the historical backdrop that

> Russian politics and culture is based on Byzantine traditions and European standards, claiming that all sovereign states be equal, whereas the political and cultural base of the Qing Empire is the political hierarchy system of Confucianism and traditional Chinese worldview that attempted to build its own external diplomatic links as a top-down vertical international order.[14]

In our opinion, Myasnikov's argument as to the institutional mismatch and his conclusion that the corresponding level of the Governing Senate should have been the Qing Cabinet are reasonable, at least to some extent, because the Governing Senate was the highest decision-making body of the Russian government while the Lifanyuan ranked on the same level with the Six Ministries, thus being indeed lower in status than the Cabinet. Usually, Russian official communications were first reported by the Border director to the Lifanyuan which reported to the Cabinet. Then the Cabinet sent a translator and, after discussion, the report was finally presented to the Emperor. On July 10th

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[10] Qian Shifu, *Qingdai de waijiao jiguan* (Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 1959), 32.

[11] *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVII veke: materialy i dokumenty. Tom 1, 1608–1683*, ed. Natal'ya Fedorovna Demidova et al. (Moskva: Nauka, 1969); *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVII veke: materialy i dokumenty. Tom 2, 1686–1691*, ed. Natal'ya Fedorovna Demidova et al. (Moskva: Nauka, 1972); *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVIII veke: materialy i dokumenty. Tom 1, 1700–1725*, ed. Natal'ya Fedorovna Demidova et al. (Moskva: Nauka, 1978); *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVIII veke: materialy i dokumenty. Tom 2, 1725–1727*, ed. Sergej Leonidovich Tikhvinskij et al. (Moskva: Nauka, 1990; *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVIII veke: materialy i dokumenty. Tom 3, 1727–1729*, ed. Sergej Leonidovich Tikhvinskij et al. (Moskva: Nauka, 2006); *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XIX veke: materialy i dokumenty. Tom 1, 1803–1807*, ed. Sergej Leonidovich Tikhvinskij et al. (Moskva: Pamjatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 1995); see also Sladkovskij, *Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenij*; Trusevich, *Posol'skie i torgovye snosheniya*; Silin, *Kyakhta v XVIII v.*; Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie*; Demidova and Myasnikov, *Pervye russkie diplomaty*; Shastina, *Russko-mongol'skie posol'skie otnosheniya*; Nikolaj Nikolaevich Bantysh-Kamenskij, *Diplomaticheskoe sobranie del mezhdu Rossijskim i Kitajskim gosudarstvami s 1619 po 1792 god* (Kazan': Tipografiya Imperatorskaya Universiteta, 1882); Izbrant Ides and Adam Brand, *Zapiski o russkom posol'stve v Kitaj* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoj Literatury, 1967).

[12] Myasnikov, "Lifanyuan yu eqing guanxi (17–18shiji)," 255; the area under control of the Korean Kingdom then covered the whole Peninsula, not only today's North Korea. The tribute system has been often discussed in the English literature; the most representative statements can be found in the volume *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); cf. Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretative Essay," in Ibid., 63–89. Mancall believed that the Chinese bureaucracy did not consider the tributary system as being different from other systems of Confucian society, and that it should be understood as an integrated part of traditional Chinese vocabulary and systems.

[13] *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVIII veke*, vol. 3, p. 13.

[14] Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, "Eqing guanxi de lishiwenhuatedian," trans. Ye Baichuan, *Qingshi yanjiu* 3 (2004): 121.

1726, for example, the Lifanyuan passed an official communication, issued by the commandant (Voevoda) of Nerchinsk and reported by the Heilongjiang General Fu Erdan (*1680 †1752) concerning 21 Russian merchants with Russian trade licenses coming to China for trade, and two Manchu official communications to the Cabinet for translation.[15] These were received by the academician reader-in-waiting (*Shiduxueshi*) Duo Erji, by director (*Zhushi*) Taiming, and Kuxi Ma, the Russian Embassy Courageous Guard (*Xiaoqijiao*). They and Yagao, a sixth-grade mandarin official, were asked to translate the official communications after reporting to the Cabinet. The communications were submitted to director (*Langzhong*) Buyantai of the Lifanyuan on July 15th after imperial permission was obtained. However, the Cabinet did not have real power but rather helped the emperor to deal with daily affairs, while the responsibility of handling Sino-Russian affairs lay fully with the Lifanyuan. In the early period of the Kangxi reign, the political authority that had real power was the Council of Princes and High Officials (议政王大臣会议), later followed by the influential *Junjichu*. However, the *Junjichu* was not an executive office (*Yamen*) but the emperor's secretary team. Hence, the view that the *Junjichu* can be regarded as an equivalent to the Governing Senate of Russia does not bear closer examination. We think that the reason for the emergence of such ambiguities is rather to be sought in the different forms of governmental institution building and in the authority mechanisms of the two countries.

Until the treaty of Kyakhta, all Russian attempts to shift Sino-Russian relations to a higher governmental level failed. On March 1, 1711 for example, Prince Matvej Petrovich Gagarin, the first Governor of Siberia (1711–1719), sent a letter to Beijing and demanded that it be directly submitted to the Chinese emperor and the Cabinet. However, the reply was sent in the name of the Lifanyuan. In 1719, Gagarin's successor, Aleksej Mikhajlovich Cherkasskij (1719–1724), also sent a letter informing the Chinese authorities that the Russian envoy Lev Vasil'evich Izmajlov (*1685 †1738) would go to China to visit the Cabinet, but the official reply still came from the Lifanyuan.[16] In fact, the Lifanyuan was in charge of negotiations with Russia's Governing Senate until 1861, when the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established.

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[15] Taken from the original note of the Cabinet: "Memorial to the throne concerning Heilongjiang General Fu Erdan's reporting on Russian merchants entering the territory for trade and the recent situation in Russia"; cf. *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, file No. 202, p. 459, where the memorial is published but without the original note.

[16] Myasnikov, "Lifanyuan yu e'qing guanxi (17–18 shiji)." *Russko-kitajskie otnosheniya v XVIII veke*, vol. 1, pp. 118–9, 127–130, 296–8, 301–3.

Myasnikov's assumption that Russia attempted to establish equal diplomatic relations with Qing China is questionable, too. Autocratic Russia showed no interest whatsoever in equality from the very beginning of its diplomatic missions to China. In 1670, Russia's envoy Ignatij Mikhajlovich Milovanov thus arrived in Beijing with credentials to start negotiations with Emperor Kangxi, and suggested that tribute be paid to the Tsar.[17] The fact that Russia later claimed parity was not due to any progress in her concepts in foreign policy; rather, the government had to face the real level of power and adjusted its strategy, taking the concept of equal sovereignty as a basis to counteract the so-called 'vertical international order' of the Qing Dynasty.

In the discussion of Sino-Russian relations, the tributary system has been clearly of great importance. Focussing on the confrontation between the Russian and the Chinese Empire that upheld Confucian traditions, Mark Mancall has also paid attention to China's traditional tributary system and the mutually compromising process between morality and legal equality under the aspects of sovereignty and legitimacy in the modern commercial relations brought to East Asia by the Russians.[18] Similarly, the editors of the *Cambridge History of China* have pointed out that the Qing adopted and, particularly with regard to the Mongols, further developed the strategy of the Ming emperors which generously allowed non-Chinese people to join Chinese civilization:

> For non-Chinese people who, because of their geographical distance and cultural difference, were beyond the reach of military force, administrative control or code of ethics, the Chinese government limited itself to engage in material interests [...] which took primarily the form of trade allowance and presenting gifts to the court. The foreigners were indeed insatiable, but in this way they were induced to perform the etiquette and thus could be included into the Chinese system of handling affairs.[19]

This view clearly reveals the Qing strategy to achieve national objectives by using the tributary system. In recent years, however, the validity of this picture and the range in which the Qing tributary system was implemented have been questioned. Peter Perdue argues that China's foreign relations model as proposed by John King Fairbank was actually a Sinocentric concept which allowed outsiders to enter Chinese culture by presenting gifts, and James Millward has criticized Fairbank's view for not thoroughly taking into account the complex interactions between the many ethnic groups and the Qing Empire.[20] Analysing the duties and status of the Lifanyuan from economic, trade, and administrative perspectives, Jin Noda has recently pointed out that, for nearly one hundred years between the mid-18th and the mid-19th century, three different types of merchants (Kazakhs, Central Asians, and Russians posing as Muslims) have played an important role in the Sino-Russian trade, which was regulated and guided mainly by the Lifanyuan. Nicola Di Cosmo has argued that the Qing formed a regional military and administrative network in the Northwest region under the Lifanyuan, and Michael Weiers has contributed to our knowledge about the foreign trade and relations regulations of the Mongols under Kangxi.[21]

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[17] Ye Baichuan, *Eguo laihua shituan yanjiu (1618–1807)* (Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House, 2010), 164.

[18] Mark Mancall, *Russia and China: Their Diplomatic Relations to 1728* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 267–73. In fact, Milovanov even failed to convey the intentions of the document to emperor Kangxi.

[19] *The Cambridge History of China*, 29–32.

In the light of these studies, we believe that the Lifanyuan, though being in charge of handling 'colonial' affairs even with Russia, neither intended nor expressed a policy to make Russia a Qing vassal state. Indeed, the Lifanyuan's responsibilities for Russia were objectively associated with its early engagement in Mongolian affairs, given the fact that north and western Mongolia (Khalkha, Zünghar) had intricate links with the Russian Empire which made Russian affairs an important aspect of Qing relations with Mongolia. Under these premises, the decision to assign all Russian affairs to the Lifanyuan was rather self-evident and convenient for the governance of domestic affairs, and did not aim at incorporating Russia into the Qing tributary system. In addition, there was in fact no governmental institution for foreign affairs until 1861: relations with countries to the west and the north that could be reached overland

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[20] See Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005; James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 153–93.

[21] Jin Noda, "Russo-Chinese Trade Through Central Asia: Regulations and Reality," in *Asiatic Russia: Imperial Power in Regional and International Contexts*, ed. Tomohiko Uyama (London: Routledge, 2012), 166–7; Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 296. Michael Weiers, "Gesetzliche Regelungen für den Außenhandel und für auswärtige Beziehungen der Mongolen unter Kangxi zwischen 1664 und 1680," *Zentralasiatische Studien des Seminars für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens der Universität Bonn* 15 (1981). See also Clifford M. Foust, *Muscovite and Mandarin. Russia's Trade with China and its Setting, 1727–1805* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 213, and Mancall, *Russia and China*, 267–73.

and with coastal countries in the southeast were handled separately by the Lifanyuan and Libu, the Ministry of Rites, respectively.

2 Supervision and Management of the Sino-Russian Trade: Regulations and Practices

2.1 *System Regulations*

The supervision of the Sino-Russian trade represented a considerable part of both the Lifanyuan's duties and the negotiations between China and Russia. The management of these affairs, its practices and regulations underwent a process of gradual improvement and intensification. For traders who went to Mongolia and Russia, a ticket system was adopted. This system was first introduced at the Urga (Kulun) market in the 59th year of Kangxi (1721); its purpose was to limit contact between Russians and Mongolians on the one hand, and to limit exchanges of Chinese merchants with Mongolians and various internal banners in Mongolia on the other. There were specific provisions:

> On frontier trade, issue tickets to the merchants. To all merchants who go to Uliastai, Kulun [Urga], Kyakhta and to the Khalkha tribes tickets are given. Merchants who leave from Zhili [now Hebei province] receive tickets from the Chakhar military-administrative organization or from the Dolonnuur Tongzhi Yamen; merchants who go out from Shaanxi receive tickets at the General Yamen in Hohhot. Enter the merchant's name, his goods, destination address, and date of departure in the ticket and hand it out to the merchant.[22]

In Qianlong's 45th year (1781), the Lifanyuan stipulated that all merchants had to obtain a permit by showing their tickets. When Chinese merchants arrived at Urga, the department of inspection issued that permission. If the amount of vehicles and camels as given in the ticket was correct, another license would be issued. When the merchant arrived at Kyakhta, still another inspection would be conducted. Merchants who could not show a permit issued at Urga would not get access to the market. In the 4th year of Jiaqing (1800), further regulations were issued. Those merchants who had no license "would be punished by being pilloried for two months and then receive 40 lashes of the whip.

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[22] *Qianlong chao Neiwufu chaoben 'Lifanyuan Zeli'* (Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House, 2006), 355–6.

Afterwards, the merchant will be sent back to his hometown, and half of his goods will be confiscated."[23]

The tickets were issued by a Lifanyuan administrator at the Office for General Management (*Tongzhi yamen*) of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), and the permitted trading amount of each ticket was calculated by the number of camels, 200 camels being a ticket. To prevent Chinese merchants who went to Mongolia for trade from settling there, the Lifanyuan also

> set prohibitions for the merchants, and required them to trade in cash and silver. The time limit for trade is one year, and they are neither allowed to marry nor to build houses in Mongolia on the pretext of debt collection. Merchants are not allowed to take a Mongolian name and they will be sentenced and sent back to their hometown according to the practices once the case is inspected, with half of their goods being confiscated.[24]

The Lifanyuan also specified the number of people, time and expenditures for Russian merchants coming to China. In the early period, the reception and farewell, horse and cart, board and lodging for Russian caravans were all free, and there was no limit to the number of Russian merchants and the length of their stay. However, in the 32nd year of Kangxi (1694) the Lifanyuan released first restrictions:

> The number of Russian traders must not exceed two hundred, and they can come to Beijing every three years. They have to provide for horses, camels and travelling expenses. All goods are free of tax, and contraband shall be not traded. Merchants who arrive in Beijing can stay at the Russian courier hostel for free, and have to leave again within eighty days.[25]

In Kangxi's 53rd year of reign (1715), trade qualifications were stipulated: "When Russian merchants come for trade, and if they have permissions issued at Selenginsk or Irkutsk, then they are allowed to trade; but if they have only a permission issued by Nerchinsk, they will be refused."[26] In 1725, August 16th, the recently established Yongzheng government once more emphasized:

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[23] He Qiutao, *Shuofang Beicheng* (Taipei: Wenhai Press, 1964).

[24] *Qianlong chao Neiwufu chaoben 'Lifanyuan Zeli'*, 365–6.

[25] Ibid., 114.

[26] *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, file No. 210, p. 486.

> If there are envoys who arrive and depart in the border areas, other than the sporadic merchandise for trade, any trader shall be handled according to the foregoing practices, that is, they have to possess permissions issued by the town commanders of Selenginsk or Irkutsk, so as to be allowed to trade. All traders shall be sent back to their countries.[27]

Regarding trade locations, the Lifanyuan issued an official document to the Governing Senate in the 56th year of Kangxi (1718), expounding the situation that the Beijing market was saturated with fur goods and that there was no buyer. Consequently, sporadic traders who would go to Beijing were requested to change the former Nerchinsk trade route for the Qiqihar (Tsitsihar) trade route.[28] However, as the eastern region of Qiqihar fell into decay due to an increasing depression in capital trade, the Qiqihar market failed to yield any real turnover, whereas Urga, located in the middle border area, grew rapidly. In the 59th year of Kangxi (1721), the Lifanyuan approved the establishment of a new market location at Urga and sent a supervisor to manage the Russian affairs with the Khalkha Tüshiyetu Khan (1711–1732). In the 6th year of Yongzheng (1729) the Lifanyuan reported to the emperor and successfully requested to send Coldo (绰尔多, ?–1762) as director (*Langzhong*), who was familiar with Russian affairs, and to station him at Kyakhta where the treaty was signed that year.[29]

In addition, there were detailed trade and transaction requirements (rules, taxes). The capital trade was mainly conducted in cash, which also caused problems. Russian merchants were sometimes reluctant to sell and deliver goods on credit to their Chinese merchant partners, because the latter's payment would come in with much delay. They turned to the supervisor dispatched by the Lifanyuan for complaints or negotiated with the Lifanyuan through their own trade commissioner. To resolve the dispute, the Lifanyuan often had no choice but to intervene. Sometimes it paid the debts of the Chinese merchants by means of national finances. To avoid this situation, the treaty of Kyakhta decreed the introduction of barter economy, that is, the two parties used certain types of goods as exchange equivalents, so that other commodities could be exchanged by comparing them with the particular exchange equivalent in price. During the 17th and 18th centuries, Chinese cotton was used as exchange equivalent. On-credit payments and loans were now prohibited and offenders would be severely punished.

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[27] Ibid., file No. 209, p. 484.

[28] Ibid., file No. 182, p. 388.

[29] Ibid., file No. 220, p. 524.

Since the beginning of the trade, pricing was regulated between Russian and Chinese merchants themselves. It was only with Qianlong's 23rd year of reign (1759) that in view of "Russia's attempts to gradually increase taxes and the Chinese merchants' practice to raise prices privately for profit",[30] the Lifanyuan instructed the city market official Hütüringga (瑚图灵阿, 1720–1779) to lay down trading rules. This he should do according to an imperial edict, dividing all city goods into eight categories (fine silk, cloth, wool, fine tea, coarse tea, tobacco, candy, and porcelain) and selecting the most honourable and well-off merchants to conduct pricing negotiations with the Chamber of Commerce. Consequently, Chinese merchants had to accept the estimated price as the standard and basis when they started bargaining with Russian merchants; the agreement was fixed in a contract.[31]

Khristofor Trusevich, a 19th century scholar, mentioned a confidential Qing order for Chinese merchants related to trade rules, including strategy, punishing measures, language requirements, and manners of exchange with their Russian counterparts. They should stay in close contact with each other and act in unison. Demands from the Russian side were to be carefully inquired and the information discussed at a general meeting every day. The number of party B's commodities was to be limited to raise the price. Private interests were to be subordinated to common interests, and the merchants should behave with restraint and keep calm even if they were eager to buy Russian goods. Trade secrets must not be divulged and the Russian language should be learned as far as possible, whereas Russians should never be encouraged to learn Chinese. If any Russian merchant raised prices, all Chinese merchants should unanimously refuse to buy his goods.[32]

Capital trade was exempted from taxes. With the establishment of Kyakhta as a trade location it was agreed that Kyakhta was not to be taxed, either. However, the two countries could levy transit dues in their respective territories. The Qing had their custom office at Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) and levied tariffs on merchants trading between Urga and Kyakhta. However, the tax was not primarily meant to increase tariffs, but to strengthen the cooperative management of the merchants. In the 20th year of Qianlong (1756) Russia violated the treaty and levied import and export dues on Russian merchants at Kyakhta, which resulted in a rise in prices for Russian commodities and consequently to losses for Chinese merchants. The Qing government protested strongly, and the incident became one of the reasons for closing Kyakhta in the 27th year of Qianlong (1763). With the Convention of Kyakhta signed in the 33rd year of Qianlong (1769) it was agreed to "not levy at the two places of Kyakhta and Tsurukhaitu".[33]

2.2 *Management Procedures*

Besides trade policy the Lifanyuan was specifically responsible for the approval, reception and dispatch of trade caravans from Russia, and it had to take care of all problems that might occur in the course of the trade. In the 9th year of Yongzheng (1732), the Lifanyuan—upon having received approval from the emperor—established a new procedure: the Khalkha Tüshiyetu Khan and other nobles were ordered to report and request for an imperial edict when Russian merchants entered the territory, and an officer was sent to Kyakhta to receive and accompany them. In the 10th year of Yongzheng (1733), the Lifanyuan received imperial instructions that officers be sent to escort Russian merchants to the boundary when they had completed their trade business and were to leave China. Whenever a Russian caravan arrived at the Chinese border, the merchants first negotiated with the director of the Chinese border office—initially the General of Heilongjiang and later the Tüshiyetu Khan from Khalkha Mongolia—who then reported to the Lifanyuan which either conveyed the matter to the Cabinet or directly requested an imperial decree. Only then did the Lifanyuan send officers to escort the caravan to Beijing and to accommodate the merchants properly.

There were cases when a caravan had to ask for instructions from the Lifanyuan first. On October 14, 1740 for example, caravan commissioner E. Firsov sent an official communication to the Lifanyuan, requesting permission to postpone the caravan to Beijing until the following year in order to avoid passing through the Gobi Desert in the long winter time. Whenever a caravan reached Beijing, the Lifanyuan designated two supervisors to be in charge of monitoring the Russian merchants and mediating in their disputes. In the 52nd year of Kangxi (1714), the Siberian Governor Gagarin sent an official communication to the Qing government, complaining that Chinese people still owed silver to caravan commissioner Pëtr L. Khudyakov from his trade in China: "The secretary of the Grand Secretariat [内阁学士] owed 2475 Tael silver, the merchants from China Sanggagorto [桑嘎] owed 957 Tael silver, Bayan owed 384 Tael silver, and Bayan also owed 1332 Tael silver for ordering furniture", and he requested the court to "urge the people who have not paid the loans yet"[34]. On 7 July of the following year the Lifanyuan therefore sent an official letter to Governor Gagarin, clarifying that Ude [乌德], the son of the former vice Censor-in-Chief (*Duyushi*) Alpha [阿尔法], Sanggagorto, Bayan, and others were ordered to pay all their debts to caravan commissioner Grigorej Oskolkov when he came to China for trade.[35]

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[30] *Qing gaozong Shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1986), vol. 816, the 33th year of Qianlong (1769).

[31] Samples of such contracts can be found among the collected papers of Pavel L'vovich Shilling Fon Kanshtadt (Paul Ludwig Schilling von Cannstatt, *1786 †1837), a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences who was ordered to explore the Sino-Russian border east of Kyakhta from 1820 to 1832. The collection is kept at the Institute for Oriental Manuscripts at the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences; see: Leonid Ioakimovich Chuguevskij and Irina Fedorovna Popova, "Shilling Pavel L'vovich (Obozrenie fonda № 56 Arkhiva vostokovedov SPbF IV RAN). Vstuplenie i publikatsiya I.F. Popovoj," *Pis'mennye pamyatniki Vostoka* 1,4 (2006): 257–8.

[32] Trusevich, *Posol'skie i torgovye snosheniya*, 240–1.

[33] Wang Tieya, *Zhongwai jiuzhangyue huibian* (Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 1982), 29.

The Lifanyuan was also instrumental in helping Russian merchants to solve their difficulties. On October 5, 1727, trade agent and caravan commissioner Lorenz Lange (ca. *1690 †1752) requested permission to leave horses, cattle and sheep to graze outside the border. The emperor ordered the Lifanyuan minister Tegut to send an officer to inspect the area and to watch out for thieves and to prevent brawls. He told Tegut to inform Lorenz Lange and to select an officer who could act convincingly and see to it that the Russians stayed outside the border. Emperor Yongzheng also ordered the Lifanyuan to

> write to the commanders who are in charge of the nearest residence, requiring them to ask their subordinates to specially restrict and prevent theft [...] if there is theft or loss, check the exact places and order the local commander to inspect and act accordingly. If stolen goods cannot be discovered and seized, the local commander shall be asked to compensate all the loss.[36]

In the 6th year of Qianlong (1742), caravan commissioner E. Firsov requested permission to leave the excess livestock to be pastured outside the border again, and asked the Lifanyuan to designate personnel to supervise the herd together with the Russian guards. The Lifanyuan thereupon dispatched Jarghuci (扎尔固奇) Xilai to the area with his subordinates. The Russian caravan left the livestock for pasturing with Xie Shaofu, a resident of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), and signed a contract with him. The contract was then handed to Xilai for future reference.[37]

Hence, the Lifanyuan was responsible for maintaining orderly trade, preventing theft, and combating smuggling and crime. On 23 December 1733, for example, the Lifanyuan sent a letter to the commandant of Tobol'sk, then capital of the Siberia Governorate, informing him that Russian merchants had sneaked into Qing territory for trade and had been seized by the Khalkha guards of Setsen Khan Chojdzhab (1733–1735). They were turned over to the commander of border defence and their cargoes were confiscated according to the provisions of the treaty.[38] In the 18th year of Qianlong (1754), the Lifanyuan sent a letter to Russia's Governing Senate, with the request to sentence a man from Russia named Shielivan (谢利旺) and his fellows to death. Lifanyuan officials stationed at Urga and Kyakhta were also responsible for maintaining security in their region. On 16 October 1764, Inspector Nawei posted notices at Urga concerning the punishment of bandits, in order to appease the merchants and make people's life easier.[39]

3 Khalkha Mongolia under Supervision of the Lifanyuan

Besides issuing decrees and implementing regulations, the Lifanyuan managed the Sino-Russian border trade by appointing agents, the Khalkha Mongolian Tüshiyetu Khan being the first in a row after the Dolonnuur convention of 1691. Khalkha Mongolia's role as a mediator quickly grew with the rising of the Urga market and the integration of Kyakhta into the Sino-Russian trade system in the mid-18th century. Being geographically located between China and Russia, Khalkha Mongolia became very important and its trade functions were endowed with strategic significance.

The changing role of Khalkha Mongolia can be divided into three stages. Before Dolonnuur, it acted as an intermediary in its own right in the Sino-Russian trade and traded independently with Russia. After Dolonnuur, when the Khalkha nobles had submitted themselves to the Qing court, their trade with Russia turned into a Sino-Russian border trade. To win the Tüshiyetu Khan over, who represented one of the three Khalkha clan confederations, the Qing made him the Khalkha leader for managing Russian affairs under the auspices of the Lifanyuan. In doing so, however, the government ignored the genuine trade needs of Khalkha Mongolia. In 1765 this resulted in the smuggling case (to be discussed below) of Sangjayi Dorji (1730–1778), vice general in the Tüshiyetu Khan Aimag and executive minister of Urga. As a result of this incident, the Qing lost much of their trust in the Tüshiyetu Khan family, and the government began to strengthen its rule over Khalkha Mongolia, gradually centralizing power and the management of the Sino-Russian trade. The Dolonnuur convention (1691) and the Sangjayi Dorji case must thus be taken as caesuras in the development of the Sino-Russian trade, a point that has as yet not received proper attention in scholarly discussions. It was in the early 17th century that Russian servicemen and *promyshleniks* made first contacts and started trade with the Mongols of Jasagtu Khan Aimag and Sholoi Ubashi Khung-Taiji (*1567 †1627) from the Khotoghoid.[40] As the Cossacks made continuous progress towards the east, during the 1630s they had made contact with the Setsen Khan and Tüshiyetu Khan branches of Khalkha Mongolia and engaged in trade with them. From the 1670s onward, trade between Russia and Khalkha entered a more stable period. Merchants from either side visited the territory of the other: in 1673, six

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[34] *Gugong ewen shiliao* (Beijing: National Compilation Committee of the Qing Dynasty History, 2006), file No. 14, p. 29; see also file No. 22, p. 38.

[35] *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, file No. 155, p. 339. Representing Chinese transcriptions from Manchu archive documents, some of these names (Sanggagorto, Bayan, Ude, Alpha), though obviously from a Mongolian background, can hardly be reconstructed.

[36] Ibid., file No. 216, p. 520.

[37] *Gugong ewen shiliao*, file No. 29, pp. 49–51. *Jarghuci* is the Manchu official title borrowed from the Mongolian form *Jarghuchi*, meaning judge.

[38] *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, file No. 267, p. 601.

[39] *Gugong ewen shiliao*, file No. 45, p. 81. *Lvmengshang dang'an jicui*, ed. The State Archives Bureau of Mongolia et al. (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia University Press, 2009), 4. Again, this name, which does not sound Russian (perhaps: Shirvan, could be an Armenian merchant in Russian services), is hard to trace back.

> envoys came on behalf of the Mongolian Khutugtu Lama [Jibzundamba Khutugtu Undur Geghen Zanabazar, *1635 †1723] to Selenginsk on a diplomatic mission and engaged in trade. On 23 September, 1685 Mongolian delegates came on behalf of Tüshiyetu Khan [Ochir Sain Tüshiyetu Khan Chakhundorji, †1699] to Semipalatinsk [...] In January 1684, Russian officials led by [serviceman] Taras Afanas'ev left Selenginsk and went to Khalkha to purchase commodities.[41]

Russians exchanged cloth, leather, clothing and articles of daily use for livestock, leather goods and silk brought from Inner China. Obviously, trade between Khalkha and Russia during that period was motivated by subsistence economy and characterized by natural and equal circumstances, so that Khalkha Mongolia objectively acted as an intermediary in the Sino-Russian trade.

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[40] Trusevich, *Posol'skie i torgovye snosheniya*, 149.

[41] Shiran Bodievich Chimitdorzhiev, *Vzaimootnosheniya Mongolii i Rossii v XVII–XVIII vv.*, trans., Fan Lijun (Inner Mongolia People's Publishing House, 2008), 91.

After the Dolonnuur Assembly, however, the status of Khalkha Mongolia and consequently its role in the Sino-Russian trade changed. This caesura came as a result of Galdan Boshogtu Khan's (*1644 †1697) military campaign against Khalkha Mongolia in 1688. He was taking advantage of the infighting there, and the Khalkha nobles had to flee from the Zünghar forces, crossed the Gobi desert and submitted to the Qing. Emperor Kangxi personally presided over the Dolonnuur Assembly of the three Khalkha confederations in 1691 and thus established Qing rule over Khalkha Mongolia. Trade relations with Russia were no longer the subject of internal Mongolian affairs but became part of the relations between China and Russia, which were not always stable at the time.

Since the Tüshiyetu Khan had always been in close contact with the Qing administration and the main trade markets were located in the territory of his Aimag, Emperor Kangxi appointed him from among the three Khalkha confederations to be in charge of the Sino-Russian affairs. In the 60th year of Kangxi (1722), the government granted a seal and the honorary title of 'Ochiraj Batu' to Tüshiyetu Khan Wangjal Dorji (†1732) at the request of Jibzundamba Khutugtu Undur Geghen Zanabazar, and ordered him to supervise the Russian border. The Kyakhta treaty further specified:

> At the places close to the border, if China and Russia send official communications to each other regarding theft and escaped people, Tüshiyetu Khan Wangjal Dorji and Wangdanjindoleji [Wang Danjin Dorji] of China's border areas and the commander of the Russian border town signed and sealed to manage the affair.[42]

Thus, the Tüshiyetu Khan became the Qing's agent for Sino-Russian trade relations, and he was directly responsible to the Lifanyuan. Whenever a caravan or envoys from Russia reached the border, he was to be informed first and only after he had reported to the Lifanyuan and asked the latter for approval could the caravan pass. His status became significantly enhanced, and travellers from Russia had to socialize with him. For example, when in 1719 a caravan was not allowed to enter China, the Russian envoy Lev Vasil'evich Izmajlov decided to establish good contacts; hence, he wrote a letter from Selenginsk in 1720 and asked the Tüshiyetu Khan to submit the letter to Beijing. Izmajlov's diction in his communication to Tüshiyetu Khan Wangjal Dorji was extremely respectful, and he gave fox furs, velvet and other gifts to him. In 1740, before Firsov's caravan was departing for China, Russia's Governing Senate sent an official request to the Lifanyuan asking to issue an imperial decree to the Mongolian officials to let the caravan pass.[43] On 24 June the same year, the Lifanyuan informed the Governing Senate that it had ordered Tüshiyetu Khan Dondan Dorji (†1743) to report once the Russian caravan arrived at the border and to receive the caravan according to the convention.[44]

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[42] *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, file No. 215, p. 519.

In 1698 the Russian government promulgated the 'General Trade Provisions with China' followed by the 'Private Trade Provisions with China' in 1706 which not only strengthened tax regulations with China but also included the franchise of lucrative commodities such as furs, rhubarb, and tobacco. In addition, the frequency in which Russian caravans could go to China was limited and violations of these provisions were treated as felony resulting even in death penalties. After Russia had monopolized trade with China, large numbers of Russian merchants entered Mongolia moving to Urga for trade, which alarmed the Qing. To prevent the spread of Russian influence in Khalkha Mongolia, regulations were set up:

> In the very beginning, the trade with Russian merchants along the border of the Tüshiyetu Khan's aimag territory and Russia was under the control of the Tüshiyetu Khan; the Qing government did not dispatch a special officer nor did it implement the rule of distinction and punishment there.[45]

Although Emperor Kangxi relied heavily on the Tüshiyetu Khan's services, as a matter of fact he did not lose vigilance over Khalkha Mongolia. From 1720 until emperor Yongzheng's 5th year of reign (1728) the Lifanyuan regularly dispatched an officer to Urga to jointly manage and inspect trade affairs with the Tüshiyetu Khan in addition to the existing ticket system.

If Qing anxieties about a growing Russian influence in Khalkha Mongolia caused the two emperors to tighten control over the Urga trade, then the 'Submit to the authority of Russia movement' in Khalkha Mongolia in the 1750s made the government feel really threatened by an anti-Qing undercurrent. This led to a further tightening of control over the region and to the nomination of a Manchu Urga Executive Minster in the 27th year of Qianlong (1763).[46] It was him who now reported to the Lifanyuan on Russian affairs, and the era

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[43] *Gugong ewen shiliao*, file No. 20, p. 36.

[44] Ibid., file No. 21, p. 37.

[45] He Qiutao, *Shuofang Beicheng*, 4–6.

[46] Morikawa Tetsuo, "Waimenggu de guishu' esuosiyundong yu di' erdai zhebuzundanbahutuketu," trans. Zhang Yongjiang, *Mengguxue xinxi* 2–3 (1995). See also Li Yushu, *Waimeng zhengjiao zhidukao* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1978).

of the Tüshiyetu Khan as an independently acting Qing agent came to an end: "From the two Urga Executive Minsters, one was selected Mongolia minister from among the Manchus and stayed in Beijing, while the other was dispatched specially by the Zasagtu Khalkha Mongols"[47] and was called Mongolia Executive Minster. However, this reshuffle was in line with old traditions, since the office of the Urga Executive Minster was now held by members of the Tüshiyetu Khan family. The first of these was Vice General Sangjayi Dorji, who managed Russian affairs at Urga even before he was given the ministerial seal. Selecting a prominent Manchu from Beijing as minister for Khalkha Mongolia strengthened the control over the region in the long term. It must be noted, however, that the original idea behind Emperor Qianlong's appointment of a Manchu Executive Minster for Urga was to consolidate the position of Sangjayi Dorji, who enjoyed the confidence of Emperor Qianlong, in order to reinforce indirect rule in Khalkha Mongolia.

Sangjayi Dorji's mother was Princess Hesuo (Hoshoi ho-hui kung-chu), the daughter of Yiqin Yunyang (Yinxiang) who was a younger brother of Emperor Yongzheng. Sangjayi Dorji spent his childhood and youth at the court and returned to Khalkha when he was 18 years old. Thereafter, he was labelled Highness Heshuo, and Qianlong had complete trust in his loyalty during the Chinggünjab (*1710 †1757) rebellion. He was made Vice General of the Khalkha troops, thus turning the old Tüshiyetu Khan Yampil Dorji (†1758) into a mere figurehead. Sangjayi Dorji's biography and his pro-Qing attitude raised the government's expectations of strengthening indirect rule in Khalkha Mongolia. The Qing government needed a prestigious Mongolian noble to maintain its control. However, his political loyalty soon led to his isolation among the Khalkha Mongol nobles, and the dispatch of a Manchu Executive Minister was precisely aimed at reversing this situation and helping Sangjayi Dorji to consolidate his position.

When the Qing government had shut down the Kyakhta market for the second year, a smuggling case was disclosed in 1765. The Vice General of the frontier's control Tsenggünjab (成衮扎布) in 1771 reported to the court, claiming that Russian leather had been found, purchased by Mongols and transported by merchants and lamas coming from Urga. He then reported again that subordinate officers of Sangjayi Dorji had gone to Russia with his documents, which permitted him to engage in trade.[48] The emperor immediately dispatched

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[47] *Qianlong chao Neiwufu chaoben 'Lifanyuan Zeli'*, 366.

[48] *Qing gaozong Shilu*, vol. 738, Yiyou June Gengxu in the 30th year of Qianlong (1766). See also Oka Youki, "Qianlong sanshinian sangzhaiduo'erji dengren dui e zousi maoyi shijian," *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu*, 1 (1997).

Secretary of the State Council (*Junji zhangjing*) Aligun to Zhangjiakou (Kalgan) for inspection, and he confirmed that Sangjayi Dorji's camel caravan was carrying Russian commodities. His memorial to the throne made the smuggling trade of Sangjayi Dorji and the former Manchu Urga Executive Minister Chouda public. Qianlong became exceptionally furious: he sentenced Chouda, deprived Sangjayi Dorji of his noble rank and imprisoned him in Beijing, and all others involved in this case were punished, too.[49]

In fact, this major incident reflected the economic needs of Khalkha Mongolia, which after the Dolonnuur convention of 1691 had lost its right to freely engage in trade with Russia and had to comply with the Lifanyuan provisions instead. These provisions clearly specified that when the Zasagtu Khan or the Jibzundamba Khutugtu sent people to Kyakhta for trade,

> they are free to trade if the commodity is worth 100 Tael silver, while the Chancellor of the exchequer [*Shangzhuoteba*] has to send an official and sealed document to the commander of Kyakhta that the commodity is worth 100 Tael silver, and the commander replied in a letter after the official document was delivered to all the commercial agents and the trade was complemented. Unworthy merchants who attempt to draw profit by imitating will be punished by the Lama and Mongolia, with the goods being confiscated and the *Shangzhuoteba* being punished.[50]

The governmental concern was focused on political interests alone, ignoring the economic needs of the people in border areas. The Qing shut down the markets easily whenever a conflict with Russia arose, which made the Mongols suffer huge losses. When their trade with Russia was cut off, they could not secure their means of subsistence, even if their survival was threatened. The Sangjayi Dorji incident was exactly both, a revolt against the government for ignoring the Mongols' economic interests and a reaction to Qing trade policy in Khalkha Mongolia which was dependent on the changing relations between the Russian and the Qing empire. As a result, the Tüshiyetu Khan family lost the trust of the emperor. The Qing no longer expected to rely on Khalkha nobles to exert indirect rule over outer Mongolia, and gradually shifted towards direct control. Lifanyuan officers stationed at the above-mentioned market places now all called themselves "imperial commissioners", thus expressing the great

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[49] *Qing gaozong Shilu*, vol. 379, Yiyou July Pat Mao in the 30th year of Qianlong (1766).

[50] *Qianlong chao Neiwufu chaoben 'Lifanyuan Zeli'*, 366–7.

power they possessed in that period.[51] In the 40th year of Qianlong (1776), the Qing government "strengthened its rule over Khalkha Mongolia systematically by issuing the 'Regulations on the proceedings of generals, ministers, counsellors, leaders of alliances, and vice generals in the division of rangeland'"[52] and transferred the power to the Manchu Executive Minister during the lifetime of Tserendorji, the successor of Sangjayi Dorji. The Tüshiyetu Khan family no longer served as Qing agents in northern Mongolia and had lost its power of supervising the Sino-Russian trade.

4 The Lifanyuan's Political Interests and Guiding Principles in Supervising the Sino-Russian Trade

In general, the Lifanyuan's supervision of the Sino-Russian trade represented an integral part of Qing policy and reflected the contemporary situation in China. Contrary to Russia's pursuit of trading profits, the Qing government considered the Sino-Russian trade a trivial matter, questioning whether it served the interest of the two countries at all. This reluctance is directly related to the traditional accentuation of agriculture and the downgrading of commerce. China has always taken agriculture as a basis, and self-sufficient peasant economy prevailed. Commodities exchanged and imported by foreign trade were not absolutely necessary for consumption. Custom revenues accounted only for a very small proportion of public revenues. In fact, China's well developed economy on the one hand and a particular ignorance towards the outside world on the other played a role as well.

However, in its foreign trade policy the Qing attitude towards Russia was consistent, for example, with that towards the United Kingdom. Emperor Qianlong's position found expression in a well-known passage of a letter written to King George III in 1792 on the eve of the Macartney Embassy:

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[51] Samples can be found in *Lvmengshang dang'an jicui*, 4–8, e.g.: "official notice concerning the imperial commissioner and vice director [*Yuanwailang*] plus three levels of Lifanyuan Nawei: supervise the merchant's affairs at Kulun [Urga] to prevent theft and punish the bandits in order to appease the merchants and ease the people's livelihood"; "official notice concerning imperial commissioner and Lifanyuan's vice minister [*Shilang*] Hu: station at Kulun [Urga] to manage the affairs of national minorities and Han population"; Lifanyuan's vice minister [*Shilang*] Fuwei conveys the imperial edict in prohibiting private trade with Russia"; "present the document of the Kulun [Urga] imperial commissioner to all merchants, informing them that coming to Sakon Zhasake left of Kyakhta for trade is prohibited and that perpetrators will be punished".

[52] Oka Youki, "Guanyu kulun banshi dachen de kaocha," *Mengguxue xinxi* 2 (1997): 35.

> [...] although our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces, are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves, we have permitted, as a signal mark of favour, that foreign *hongs* [groups of merchants] should be established at Canton, so that your wants might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence.[53]

In a similar stance Emperor Jiaqing expressed Qing trade policy in a letter to King George on the eve of William Pitt Amherst's arrival at Pei Ho in 1816: "We have never esteemed ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need for your country's manufactures."[54]

This was almost the same attitude as reflected in the economic interests vis-à-vis Russia. When the Russian envoy Lev Vasil'evich Izmajlov came to China in 1720, determined to sign a trade treaty, Lifanyuan officials bluntly replied that "commerce does not have a large scale here, and we do not consider it a major issue. Only the poorest and the guards are doing business."[55] According to Savva Lukich Vladislavich-Raguzinsky, another Russian envoy who began trade negotiations with Qing officials in 1725, he was told "that trade was a trivial matter and that the noble minister would abase himself if he would talk about such trivial issues."[56]

Although the Qing government did not attach importance to trade itself, it successfully turned Russian trade needs into an important means to achieve its political goals of strengthening national security. As a central institution in the management of Russian affairs, the Lifanyuan was undoubtedly guided by political considerations; if Russia's transactions were in line with the political interests of the government, the Qing would meet Russian trade needs to a certain extent; if not, they would threaten to suspend the trade.

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[53] *Yuehaiguanzhi* (Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Publishing House, 2002), vol. 23, p. 8; for an English translation see: http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/2c/texts/1792QianlongLetterGeorgeIII.htm, accessed March 26, 2013.

[54] *Qingdai waijiao shiliao (jiaqing chao)*, ed. Taibei Gugongbowuyuan (Taibei: Chengwen press, 1968), vol. 5, p. 60, cf. p. 29.

[55] *Ezhong liangguo waijiao wenxian xuanbian (1619–1792)*, trans. The Russian Teaching & Research Office, Renmin University of China (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1982), 501, cf. p. 117.

[56] Ibid., 489.

5 The Submission and Pacification of the Zünghars: A Complex Task for the Lifanyuan

In the 17th and 18th centuries border issues, cross-border population flight, and the Zünghar problem called for the Qing's highest attention in their relation with Russia, the Zünghar Mongols being a top priority during the reign of three succeeding emperors: Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong. Given this long-term conflict that started with Galdan Boshogtu Khan's battle at Ulan Butung (1690) at the latest and ended with the total destruction of the Zünghar khanate in the late 1750s, the principles which guided the Lifanyuan' interests in the Sino-Russian trade are quite obvious.

The Zünghar khanate was a West Mongolian power competing with the Qing government over influence in Mongolia. Zünghar troops controlled an area bordering Russia, and their possible alliance with Russia posed a huge threat to the Qing. Hence, to secure Russia's neutrality the Qing often granted trade profits. In the Nerchinsk negotiations, the government complied with Russia's requests for regular trade with China, and this decision was directly affected by rumours, spread by Galdan Boshogtu Khan, that the Zünghars had gained Russia's support. As a matter of fact, guaranteeing trade rights to Russia turned out to be not the worst decision: when Galdan Boshogtu Khan repeatedly sent envoys to establish a military alliance in the 1690s, the Russian government did not respond to his proposals, perhaps with Chinese trade profits in mind.[57]

Whenever preparing for a military campaign against Zünghar troops or asking for Russian assistance in these matters, the Qing used trade in a policy of 'temper justice with mercy' towards Russia. The sale of goods on credit in China is a case in point. In the 54th year of Kangxi (1716), when Russian merchants were selling commodities to Chinese merchants at random, they did not receive payment for their goods and repeatedly complained to the Lifanyuan. Those Chinese merchants who owed silver were punished by the Lifanyuan after the latter had reported to the imperial court, and the Russian merchants were reimbursed with treasury silver.[58] To avoid similar incidents, sales on credit were strictly forbidden by the Qing. In 1717, however, the Lifanyuan allowed caravan commissioner M.Ya. Gusyatnikov, who arrived at Beijing in 1716, to sell goods to Chinese merchants on credit on the request of the Siberian Governor Matvej Petrovich Gagarin. As a matter of fact, this decision resulted from the military pressure exerted by Tsewang-Rabtan Khung-Taiji's Zünghar troops on the Kumul khanate (1714) and Tibet (1717). Regarding the relations between the Russian Empire and the Zünghar khanate, the Qing government was on alert at any time, and would appease Russia if necessary.

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[57] Chimitdorzhiev, *Vzaimootnosheniya Mongolii i Rossii*, 125, 128.

[58] *Qingdai zhonge guanxi danganshiliao xuanbian*, file No. 176, p. 377.

There were cases when Russia did not want to comply with the requests of the Qing government; then the Lifanyuan would give a shot across the bows in due time. In the 9th year of Yongzheng (1732), for example, China prepared to send a diplomatic corps to Tseren-Dondug, the Torghud Khan (1724–35) of the Volga Kalmyks, under the pretext of celebrating the accession to the throne of Empress Anna Ivanovna (1730–40). However, the real purpose of the delegation was to persuade the Torghud Kalmyks of Tseren-Dondug to provide the Qing with troops in their military campaign against the Zünghars. But Russia refused to let the delegation in, claiming that the "Torghuds have been subordinated to Russia long ago, and we shall not let foreign envoys pass if they are not authorized by our Empress."[59]

The Lifanyuan reacted quickly. It first refuted Russia's complaints about Chinese border officers' corruption and their practices of extortion, and then ignored her condemnation of the unfairness in Chinese border officers' judgments on Russia's merchant trade.[60] This warning shot made the Russian government reconsider its position, and the diplomatic corps of Dexin (德新) could finally visit Tseren-Dondug. Again the Lifanyuan acted quickly and on 30 February 1732 sent an imperial decree to vice general Danjindorji (丹津多尔济) of Khalkha, ordering him to smoothly escort a Russian caravan, which had completed trade, to Russia since the Zünghars "violate the borders and cause chaos in Khalkha and other regions."[61] In May, the Lifanyuan allowed the merchants to return via Xifengkou and Qiqihar (Tsitsihar) at the request of trade agent and caravan commissioner Lorenz Lange, promising that "camels, horses, livestock and comestible goods will be provided in a fair manner according to market prices if the Russian merchants need them".[62] In September 1732, the Chancery of the Imperial Household Department, Laibao (来保), who had been deployed to the Torghuds, sent a memorial claiming that the merchants who had completed trade in Beijing and returned to Russia with their horses had been robbed by Khalkha people, and that three Russians had been injured by bowshots. Emperor Yongzheng immediately ordered the "Lifanyuan's minister Tegut to seize and interrogate the Khalkha people and the fellows who robbed the Russians and punish them according to the law. All robbed horses shall be collected and returned to Russia", and he stressed that "the Khalkha people who injured the three Russians with bowshots must be seized and heavily punished according to law".[63] The same strategy was adopted by Emperor Qianlong who sent troops against the Zünghars in 1755 taking advantage of the Zünghar succession crisis. To please Russia, the Lifanyuan allowed the Alexej Fradkin caravan to travel to Beijing via Kerulen and informed the Governing Senate that the caravan had been escorted to the Russian border by Qing officials.[64] After the rebellious Zünghar leader Amursana (*1722 †1757) had fled to Southern Siberia in 1757, another conflict arose when the Qing demanded that his dead body be turned over and Russia, refusing the request in the first place, only reluctantly agreed to show his corpse to the Qing officials in 1762.[65]

With the devastation of the Zünghar forces, however, the potential threat of their cooperation with Russia no longer existed, and thus the constraints for the Qing in their relations with Russia were basically gone. Consequently, the Qing attitude towards trade issues with Russia also changed: the government no longer appeased Russia. It would now threaten Russia with closure of the markets and a strict trade prohibition for Chinese merchants on the first signs of Russian noncompliance with the regulations. In the 29th year of Qianlong (1765), the Qing shut down the markets for the first time. In 1766 the Lifanyuan official Galsan was convicted for having accepted Russian money, silk, fabrics and other objects in return for letting Russian merchants conduct private trade when he was stationed at Kyakhta. Emperor Qianlong was furious and ordered to punish him. Following his decree, the Lifanyuan officials at Khalkha, Shilang Hu and Zuoshilang Fuwei had to inform the merchants and residents of Khalkha that they were allowed to trade only with goods bought before the market was suspended; if they did otherwise, they would risk severe punishment.[66] In 1785 the Kyakhta market was closed again as a result of the cross-border robbery of the Buryat Mongolian Ulalezhai, and in 1788 Chinese merchants and residents were forbidden to go to Urga and Kyakhta for trade with Russians there. The Printing Office of the imperial commissioner at Urga issued the information that all merchants and residents were barred from going to Zasagtu Khan Aimag in the vicinity of Urga for trade and that offenders were

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[59] Ibid., file No. 248, p. 568.

[60] Ibid., file No. 230, p. 532.

[61] Ibid., file No. 240, p. 554.

[62] Ibid., file No. 250, p. 576.

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[63] Ibid., file Nos. 256–257, pp. 585–587; Rosemary K.I. Quested, *Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd, 1984), 51.

[64] *Gugong ewen shiliao*, file No. 34, p. 60.

[65] *Qing gaozong Shilu*, vol. 557, Yiyou [Feburary] Gengxu, the 23rd Year of Qianlong; G. Patrick March, *Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 116.

[66] *Lvmengshang dang'an jicui*, 5.

to suffer severe punishment and the confiscation of their goods once they were seized.[67] Again in 1789, the imperial commissioner informed about the emperor's decree "to search Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), Guihua (Hohhot), Dolonnuur and other places within the Great Wall, and if someone is found guilty of secretly trading Russian goods, he will be beheaded in public."[68] Already by dint of these few examples the radical shift in the Qing policy towards Russia after the abolition of the Zünghar khanate becomes clearly apparent.

6 Conclusion

While the Sino-Russian relations of the 19th century have always been in the focus of academic research, the preceding period of the 17th to 18th century, which was very different in structure and impact, has been but little investigated.[69] In the context of the Sino-Soviet polemics of the 1970s and 80s, sharp differences prevailed in Chinese and Russian perceptions of Sino-Russian relations during the Qing Dynasty, especially with regard to border issues. Soviet scholars argued that Russia had agreed during the Nerchinsk negotiations under Qing pressure to give up a vast territory at the Amur River controlled by Cossacks of the fortress Albazin. The treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) was therefore not believed to be legitimate:

> From a legal perspective, the treaty of Nerchinsk neither meets modern international law nor conforms to the legal instruments between the two countries; moreover, the geographical indication in the text of the treaty is not very clear, but only drew a general direction; neither was a map of the demarcated region exchanged, nor the relevant certificates of approval interchanged; the various language versions of the treaty are inconsistent and the terms of the treaty are ambiguous.[70]

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[67] Ibid., 6–7.

[68] Ibid., 8.

[69] Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871–1881* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965); Klaus Heller, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Handel von seinen Anfängen bis zum Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Erlangen: Universitätsbund Erlangen-Nürnberg e.V., 1980); Thomas E. Ewing, "The Forgotten Frontier: South Siberia (Tuva) in Chinese and Russian History, 1600–1920," *Central Asiatic Journal* 25,1–2 (1981); Sarah Crosby Mallory Paine, *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1996); Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

[70] Aleksej Dmitrievich Voskresenskij, *Tsarskaya Rossiya i Kitaj v issledovaniyakh poslednykh let (80–90-e gody XX v.)* (Moskva: Rossijskaya Akademiya Nauk, 1994), 20–1.

The treaties of Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860), however, finally reversed the borderline agreement from 1689: "Russia took the left bank of the Amur River allotted to China according to the terms of the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689."[71] Nevertheless, Chinese scholars have proven that the Heilongjiang drainage area was part of China's territory since ancient times. The treaty of Nerchinsk was the first external treaty signed by the Qing government, and it was perceived as an equal treaty in sharp contrast to the treaties of Aigun, Beijing and the memorandum on Sino-Russian prospecting on the Northern frontier that followed in the second half of the 19th century, after Russia had occupied a great part of China's Northeast.[72]

In fact, the Jiaqing-Daoguang period already represented a clear turning point in Sino-Russian relations based on a serious decline in China's economic development. Both emperors faced multiple difficulties during their reigns, resulting from growing political, economic, and social contradictions; hence, unlike Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong they lacked the self-confidence and decidedness necessary in handling foreign relations. A symptomatic incident was Emperor Jiaqing's dismissal of the ambitious Golovkin mission in 1806, which was the largest diplomatic corps ever deployed by Russia in order to expand its trade relations with China. Jiaqing did not realize that the world was in rapid change and that China had gradually come to lag way behind the global capitalist development. He also did not seize the opportunity to take advantage of Russia's particular trade interests and to resolve the border issue for the benefit of China. Instead, he was obsessed with etiquette issues when he hastily dismissed the diplomatic corps at Urga, being uncertain about its intentions.[73]

Sino-Russian relations of the 17th and 18th centuries were, on the contrary, developing on equal terms especially under the treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta that transferred additional functions to the Lifanyuan, which gained not only a central role in the mediation process between the two empires but could also temporarily strengthen its institutional responsibilities vis-à-vis the Mongols. Early Sino-Russian relations should therefore, as the authors tried to show in this chapter, be given more scholarly attention. They deserve a special focus and have to be treated separately from late Qing governance. With the empire's decline following Qianlong's reign, China's internal situation changed dramatically and so did its relationships with foreign countries.

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[71] Ibid., 25.

[72] Tong Dong, *Sha'e yu dongbei; Sha'e qinghuashi; Yiliubajiunian de zhong'e nibuchu tiaoyue 1689*; Wang Xilong, *Zhong'e guanxishilue*; Liu Yuantu, *Zaoqi zhong'e dongduan bianjie yanjiu*; Jiang Changbin, *Zhonge guojiedongduan de yanbian*; *Jianming qingshi.*

[73] Ye Baichuan, *Eguo laihua shituan yanjiu (1618–1807)*.

A significant feature of the early Sino-Russian relations was flexibility. Rulers were not restricted by diplomatic traditions but rather adjusted diplomatic strategies in a timely manner and took a more pragmatic approach. The flexibility of Kangxi to accommodate diplomatic traditions of the 'Celestial Empire' to real national interests when a new powerful neighbour—Russia—suddenly appeared in the north was remarkable. In commenting on the Nerchinsk treaty, John King Fairbank was convinced that Kangxi owed his success not least to the fact that his "viewpoints and methods were not completely assimilated by Han culture", and Fairbank believed that "he [Kangxi] could act according to the circumstances and associate with Russia equally as long as it benefits diplomacy."[74]

Although the early Sino-Russian treaties demonstrate that the Qing had entered a new era of modern national relations, the traditional concept of tributary diplomacy continued when the two sides began to engage with each other. From a Chinese perspective trade interests always served political interests, while it was Russia that pushed the Qing to include the terms of trade into the treaties. However, even though Sino-Russian trade procedures and management as supervised by the Lifanyuan represented an exact copy of ordinary tributary trade relations, it would be a mistake to call the Sino-Russian trade of this period a 'tributary trade', because Russia had never agreed to becoming a vassal of China and the Qing were pretty much aware of this. The period under discussion was obviously one of transition, when Qing diplomacy switched from the tributary to the treaty system. The effective combination of treaty and tributary diplomacy is thus another main feature of the Qing policy towards Russia.

Along with the supervision and management of the Sino-Russian trade, the Lifanyuan was also instrumental in solving another important problem: the control over Khalkha Mongolia which had become the northern frontier after the Dolonnuur convention of 1691. Given the geographical location of Khalkha Mongolia and Russia's growing influence in the region, the Lifanyuan became a vanguard against direct contacts by exerting control from afar through a ticket system and supervising personnel. As a result, the Qing government finally put an end to the power of the Tüshiyetu Khan family by the nomination of a Manchu Urga Executive Minster. However, it must be noted that despite or because of the strengthening of this control the Khalkha Mongols became more discontent and rebellious over time due to the government's blind pursuit of political interests that ignored people's economic interests, which paved the way for their eventual breakaway from China. The smuggling case of Sangjayi Dorji in 1765 was indeed nothing else than an economic reaction against Qing policies in Mongolia, which had a negative impact on local profits and ran counter to the interests of the border residents. Qing merchants thus became disinterested in going to the frontier for trade. As a consequence, the border market would neither get rid of the plan and military town pattern, nor attract domestic commercial activities, investment and labour force. Thus, although the Lifanyuan was a top-level institution designed to foster multi-ethnic coexistence and to stabilize the cohesive forces of the multinational Qing empire, its deficiencies in regulating the Sino-Russian trade caused the Qing to suffer a huge setback in national identity and nation building.

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[74] *The Cambridge History of China*, 33.

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CHAPTER 9

On Lifanyuan and Qianlong Policies Towards the Muslims of Xinjiang

Song Tong

At the close of the Khōja (Khwāja, ma. Hojo) rebellion in the 24th year of Qianlong's reign (1760), the region south of the Tianshan Mountains entered a time of fundamental transformation after many years of turmoil. However, the recovery from decades of armed conflicts between the Qing state and the Zünghar Mongols, followed by the rebellion of the Khōja brothers Burhān al-Dīn and Jahān and the insurgence of Amursana, was not an easy task for both the government and local communities. Part of the problem was the on-going struggles between the 'Black' (*Qara Taghliq, Ishāqiyya*) and 'White Mountain' (*Aq Taghliq, Āfāqiyya*) factions of Sunni Islam, which continued to increase tensions in Eastern Turkestan and thus called for an urgent peace settlement.[1]

Historical research in the People's Republic of China has so far focused mainly on the causes of these events, the backgrounds of its participants, and the strategies of the warring parties. The role of Qing institutions and the interaction of the different parties involved, however, have been given little attention, if any. We do not know much about Qing policies towards the Khōja rebellion and the ways in which the government attempted to reform and adjust the long-standing dominions of Muslim rulership in Southern Xinjiang. The involvement of governmental institutions responsible for the setup of administrative procedures is still an underrepresented issue, partly due to restricted accessibility of historical sources in the past.

Hence, many specifics in the historical documents need to be critically readdressed and further examined in order to better explain Qing policies and decision making in Xinjiang. The most problematic issue, well-known to scholars of Chinese history, is the handling of sources and the heavy reliance on the *Veritable Records* (*Shilu*), the *Documents on Qing Strategies* (*Fanglüe*), and biographies (*Liezhuan*) in Chinese or in Uyghur, which were compiled (or revised) at a later point in time.[2] In fact, these sources give a detailed account on the origins and developments of various incidents and explore the whole process from a macro-perspective. When it comes to genuine information, reliability, and detailed questions, however, they can hardly compete with archival files.

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[1] A short informative overview (with reference to further reading) on the Zünghar domination in pre-Qing Eastern Turkestan, who brought Altishahr under their control as early as 1679, can be found in Laura J. Newby, "The Begs of Xinjiang: Between Two Worlds," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61,2 (1998): 279–81.

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In the few remaining archives, the relevant files kept by the *Junjichu* have been recognized as being most important with regard to the warfare in the so-called Muslim territories, or *Huijiang* according to Qing terminology. The *Manchu Monthly Archive* (*Manwen yuezhe bao*), which collected and copied reports from the originals of the *Junjichu* on a monthly basis, is among the most reliable sources as well. In addition, the *Junjichu* kept copied reports from various Qing departments, which are highly valuable. Some scholars from Xinjiang have already used these sources to the benefit of their studies.[3] Since the Lifanyuan, being in charge of non-Chinese affairs in Inner Asia, was deeply involved in governing Xinjiang in the mid-18th century, I would argue that the recently published *Lifanyuan Manchu and Mongolian Reports of the early Qing Period* should take a prominent place in our investigations on Qing engagement in Eastern Turkestan.[4] Written either in Manchu or bilingually in Manchu and Mongolian, these reports (*Tiben*), inaccessible to researchers until 2010, offer a tremendous opportunity to study Qing institutions, especially the Lifanyuan; as to Xinjiang, they include about 1,500 reports dating from the fourth year (1648) of Emperor Shunzhi's reign to Emperor Qianlong's reign. No Xinjiang studies have so far used Manchu-written *Tiben* as sources to explore the imperial crisis emerging from the Khōja uprising. Such *Tiben* will be taken into account in this chapter, which explores the role and fungnehe be dahame, erei (+)ulhibure fungnehen be benjibufi, (+)abdangga fungnehen halame bahabure jalin, hafan i jurgan de afabuki sembi, amban meni cisui gamara ba waka ofi gingguleme wesimbuhe (+)hese be baimbi.

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[2] See for instance: *Qing gaozong chunhuangdi shilu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985).

[3] On the relations of the Manchu Monthly Archive and Xinjiang see Wu Yuanfeng, "Junjichu manwen yuezhebo nei xinjiang shiliao jiqi yanjiu jiazhi," *Xiyu yanjiu* 1 (2000). Based on that article, Laura Newby has elaborated on the Kokand Khanate (Haohanguo); see Laura J. Newby, "A Preliminary Discussion of Sources in Manchu Relating to Xinjiang (c. 1760–1912)," in *Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17–20th Centuries*, ed. James A. Millward et al. (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 2010). In addition, Chaghatay historical data are used; see for instance Takahiro Onuma, "A Set of Chaghatay and Manchu Documents Drafted by a Kashgar Hakim Beg in 1801: A Basic Study of a »Chaghatay-Turkic Administrative Document«," in Ibid. The range of this investigation is, however, not related to our chapter. On the documentation of the *Manwen junji lufu* on Xinjiang, see Li Hua, "Materials in the /Manwen lufu/ regarding Hui Muslim Migrants to Xinjiang," in Ibid.

[4] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmeg tiben* (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2010).

abkai wehiyehe i orin ilaci aniya sunja biyai orin sunja.

ambarame giyangnara hafan, taiboo, enteheme hūwaliyambure deyen i aliha bithei da, hebei amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, hafan i jurgan, boigon i jurgan, tulergi golo be dasara jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara booi amban, ilan namun i baita be kadalame icihiyara uju jergi tatado baturu gung ilan jergi nonggiha emu jergi ejehe, coohai gungge de sunja jergi nonggiha sunja jergi ejehe, amban fuheng.

taidzi sooboo hebei amban aliha amban bime kubuhe lamun i monggo gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban coohai gungge de juwe jerge nonggiha juwe jergi ejehe amban nayantai.

gocika amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, kubuhe šangyan i manju gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban, baita be kadalame icihiyara dergi adun i jurgan i aliha hafan de kamcibuha faksi jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara ici ergi ashan i amban, manju tuwai agūrai kūwaran i doron jafaha amban gajarci de uju jergi wasimbufi tušan de bibuhe geli hafan efulefi tušan de bibuhe, amban wangjal.

ashan i amban i baita be taka icihiyara beidere jurgan i ashan i amban kubuhe suwayan i monggo gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban abka be ginggulere yamun i aliha hafan i baita be kadalame icihiyara hafan efulefi tušan de bibuhe, amban dzoroi lersel.

aisilakū hafan amban ulemji.

aisilakū hafan amban singgebu.

aisilakū hafan amban tusangga.

aisilakū hafan amban fulu.

aisilakū hafan amban alin.

aisilakū hafan amban weihe.

Translation:

[Emperor's instruction in red ink]: Do as discussed

Memorialization

Fuheng—the Jingyanjiangguan [Official in charge of Classics Colloquium], taibao [Grand Guardian], baohediandaxueshi [Grand Academician of Hall for the Preservation of Harmony], Government minister, Lingshiweinei dachen [Grand Minister of the Imperial Household Department Concurrently Controlling the Imperial Guardsmen], Minister of Board of Appointments, Minister of Board of Revenue in joint responsibility of Lifanyuan, Household Department, and the Three Imperial Storages, The First Rank Gong [Duke] of Loyalty and Bravery with three promotions, one record, five military promotions, and five military records—has memorialized the emperor's following instruction, copied from the *Junjichu* on April 14th, the 23rd year [1759]. The emperor instructed that "Emin Hojo of the Beile rank from Turfan has served the military duty with honesty and won my satisfaction. I grant him my mercy, bestow on him the title of Beile, and appointed him as Canzan dachen [Grand Minister Consultant] in charge of military affairs as an assistant to the General."[8] When this instruction was sent to the Lifanyuan we [the officials] discussed that "on April 14th of Qianlong's 23rd year, the emperor instructed that Emin Hojo from Turfan with the rank of a Beile served the military duty with honesty and won my satisfaction. I grant him my mercy, bestow on him the title of Beile, and appointed him as Grand Minister Consultant in charge of military affairs as the assistant to the General." In our check of the records, any new bestowal of a Beile title will be confirmed by issuing an entitlement document. Today the emperor has granted his mercy and promoted Emin Hojo of the Beile rank to a Beile.[9] [Emin Hojo] should return [the old] entitlement document in exchange for the new one. This matter should be handled by the Board of Appointments. We could not make such a decision, [so] we respectfully ask Your Majesty for instruction.

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[8] This Emin Hojo (Emin Khwāja, Emin Khōja, Amīn Khōja, *1684/85) has been in the focus of two recent articles by Kwangmin Kim, "Profit and Protection: Emin Khwaja and the Qing Conquest of Central Asia, 1759–1777," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71,3 (2012) and by Takahiro Onuma, "Promoting Power: The Rise of Emin Khwaja on the Eve of the Qing Conquest of Kashgaria," *The Research Institute for Oriental Cultures* (*Gakushuin University*) *Occasional Papers* 57 (2012); confer also Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 286–7, and David Brophy, "The Kings of Xinjiang: Muslim Elites and the Qing Empire," *Etudes Orientales* 25 (2008): 76–7. Emin Hojo's family lived for generations in Lukeqin (Lükchün, Lukchun) in the present Shanshan (Piqan) county of Turfan under Zünghar control. In the 59th year of Kangxi's reign (1721), when the Qing army marched through Turfan against the Zünghars, Emin Khōja turned up for support. Fearing Zünghar revenge, he moved east to Gansu in the 10th year of Yongzheng's reign (1733) and was appointed Jasag prince of the sixth rank (Zhasake fuguogong). In the 19th year of the Qianlong reign (1755), he joined the Qing army against the Zünghars and returned to Turfan, where he was further promoted prince of the fifth rank (Zhenguogong). In the 21st year of Qianlong's reign (1757), he was appointed Beise. Emin Khōja joined the Qing army in 1758 to help squash the Khōja rebellion as Grand Minister Consultant, was consequently awarded prince of second rank (Junwang), and died of illness in 1777. See also the discussion in Chia Ning's and Laura Hostetler's chapters in this volume.

[9] In this case, the promotion from Beile to Beile reflects the practice that a person with a lower noble rank could enjoy the benefits of a Beile rank. In Qing-Mongol inheritance practices, when a son carried the noble rank of his deceased father, the title of the son was degraded to the next lower rank. Now, both the rank and the title of Emin Khojo were elevated to the Beile level.

The fifth month, the twenty-fifth day, Qianlong's twenty-third year [1759]

Jingyanjiangguan, taibao, baohediandaxueshi, Government minister, Lingshiweinei Dachen, minister in charge of human resources, minister in charge of finance and minister in charge of Lifanyuan, chamberlain, zonglisankushiwu, first-level zhongyong duke with three promotions and one record, five promotions for military merits and five records

Fuheng reports.

[And others]

3 The Second *Tiben*[10]

[Emperor's instruction in red ink]: gisurehe songkoi obu

wesimburengge

◦ambarame giyangnara hafan, taiboo, enteheme hūwaliyambure deyen i aliha bithei da, hebei amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, hafan i jurgan, boigon i jurgan, tulergi golo be dasara jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara booi amban, ilan namun i baita be kadalame icihiyara uju jergi tatado baturu gung ilan jergi nonggiha emu jergi ejehe, coohai gungge de sunja jergi nonggiha sunja jergi ejehe, amban fuheng sei gingguleme wesimburengge, (+)hese be baire jalin, abkai wehiyehe i orin ilaci aniya omšon biyai orin ilan de, coohai nashūn i baci sarkiyafi tucibuhe, ineku biyai orin juwe de (+)hese wasimbuhangge, ere mudan jiyanggiyūn, ambasa umesi faššame yabuha turgunde, kesi isibume, jiyanggiyūn jao hūi be gung fungnehebi, beile emin hojo beise i jergi hojisbek de kesi isibume, emin hojo be giyūn wang ni jergi šangna, hojisbek beise fungnefi, beile i jergi šangna, gemu duin muhaliyan muduri noho sabirgi kurume etubu sehebe gingguleme dahafi, amban meni gisurehengge, abkai wehiyehe iorin ilaci aniya omšon biyai orin ilan de, coohai nashūn i baci sarkiyafi tucibuhe, ineku biyai orin juwe de (+)hese wasimbuhangge, ere mudan jiyanggiyūn, ambasa umesi faššame yabuha turgunde, kesi isibume, jiyanggiyūn jao hūi be gung fungnehebi, beile emin hojo beise i jergi hojisbek de kesi isibume, emin hojo be giyūn wang ni jergi šangna, hojisbek beise fungnefi, beile i jergi šangna, gemu duin muhaliyan muduri noho sabirgi kurume etubu sehebe gingguleme dahafi, baicaci toktobuha kooli de, beise, gung fungneci amban meni jurgan ci wesimbufi, hafan i jurgan de afabufi ulhibure fungnehen de banjibume arafi bahabumbi, te (+)enduringge ejen cohotoi kesi be dahame, hojisbek de (+)ulhibure fungnehe banjibume arara jalin, hafan i jurgan de afabuki sembi,

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[10] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmeg tiben*, vol. 7, tiben no. 59, pp. 454–8.

amban amban meni cisui gamara ba waka ofi gingguleme wesimbuhe (+)hese be baimbi.

abkai wehiyehe i orin ilaci aniya jorgon biyai juwan nadan.

ambarame giyangnara hafan, taiboo, enteheme hūwaliyambure deyen i aliha bithei da, hebei amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, hafan i jurgan, boigon i jurgan, tulergi golo be dasara jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara booi amban, ilan namun i baita be kadalame icihiyara uju jergi tatado baturu gung ilan jergi nonggiha emu jergi ejehe, coohai gungge de sunja jergi nonggiha sunja jergi ejehe, amban fuheng.

taidzi sooboo hebei amban aliha amban bime kubuhe lamun i monggo gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban coohai gungge de juwe jerge nonggiha juwe jergi ejehe amban nayantai.

hashū ergi ashan i amban bime gulu suwayan i monggo gūsai meiren i janggin ashan i hafan, amban sumeng.

gocika amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, kubuhe šangyan i manju gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban, baita be kadalame icihiyara dergi adun i jurgan i aliha hafan de kamcibuha faksi jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara ici ergi ashan i amban, manju tuwai agūrai kūwaran i doron jafaha amban gajarci de uju jergi wasimbufi tušan de bibuhe geli hafan efulefi tušan de bibuhe, amban wangjal.

fulu ashan i amban de kamcifi yabubure gulu lamun i monggoso gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban ilan jergi ejehe, amban dorji.

aisilakū hafan amban wenai.

aisilakū hafan, amban inetu.

aisilakū hafan, amban tusangga.

aisilakū hafan, amban fulu.

aisilakū hafan, amban weihe.

ejeku hafan, amban manduhū.

Translation:

[Emperor's instruction in red ink]: Do as discussed

Memorialization

Fuheng—the Jingyanjiangguan [Official in charge of Classics Colloquium], taibao [Grand Guardian], baohediandaxueshi [Grand Academician of Hall for the Preservation of Harmony], Government Minister, Lingshiweinei dachen [Grand Minister of the Imperial Household Department Concurrently Controlling the Imperial Guardsmen], Minister of Board of Appointments, Minister of Board of Revenue in joint responsibility of Lifanyuan, Household Department, and the Three Imperial Storages, The First Rank Gong [Duke] of Loyalty and Bravery with three promotions, one record, five military promotions, and five military records—has memorialized the emperor's following instruction, copied from the Junjichu on December 22nd of Qianlong's 23rd year [1759]. The emperor's instruction on the 22nd of this month stated: "This time the General and Grand Ministers are diligent [to fulfil their duties]. I grant special mercy [to them] and promote General Zhaohui[11] to the Gong rank. In addition, grace is granted to Beile Emin Hojo and Beise Huojisi Beg.[12] Emin Hojo was appointed wang [prince of the first rank] rank, and Beise Huojisi Beg was appointed Beise [prince of the fourth rank] with the rank of a Beile [prince of the third rank]. Both are given the official gown with four dragons." To carry out this instruction, [we] follow the rule that the bestowal of the Beise and Gong titles is the duty of our [Lifanyuan] office to request, and that the matter is presented to the Board of Appointments to issue the entitling certificate. As a special grace, the emperor granted Huojisi Beg on the Beise rank as Beise, so the entitling certificate should be produced by the Board of Appointments. We could not make such a decision, [so] we respectfully ask for Your Majesty's permission.

This was reported by the ministers for your confirmation on the twelve month, the seventeenth day, Qianlong's twenty-third year [1759].

Jingyanjiangguan, taibao, baohediandaxueshi, Government Minister, Lingshiweinei dachen, Minister of Board of Appointments, Minister of Board of Revenue in joint responsibility of Lifanyuan, Household Department, and the Three Imperial Storages, The First Rank Gong of Loyalty and Bravery with three promotions, one record, five military promotions, and five military records

Fuheng reports

[And others]

4 The Third *Tiben*[13]

[Emperor's instruction in red ink]: gisurehe songkoi obu
wesimburengge

◦ambarame giyangnara hafan, taiboo, enteheme hūwaliyambure deyen i aliha bithei da, hebei amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, hafan i jurgan, boigon i jurgan, tulergi golo be dasara jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara booi amban, ilan namun i baita be kadalame icihiyara uju jergi tatado baturu gung ilan jergi nonggiha emu jergi ejehe, coohai gungge de sunja jergi nonggiha sunja jergi ejehe, amban fuheng sei gingguleme wesimburengge, (+)hese be baire jalin, abkai wehiyehe i orin duici aniya juwan biyai ice ilan de, dorgi yamun ci sarkiyafi tucihuhe, abkai wehiyehe i orin duici aniya juwan biyai ice juwe de, (+)hese wasimbuhangge, hoise erke hojo eseyen, otoranju hojo mamut, ese gemu paihanpir i juse omosi, kesi isibume eseyen be gung fungne mamut be jasak uju jergi taiji obu sehebe gingguleme dahafi, sarkiyafi jurgan de isinjihabi, amban meni gisurehengge, baicaci, toktobuha kooli de, yaya gung fungneci, gemu (+)ulhebure fungnehen, geli baicaci, neneme hoise ūdui be (+)hesei gung fungnehe manggi, amban meni jurgan ci (+)hese be baime wesimbufi, gurun de aisilara gung ni (+)ulhibure fungnehen bahabuhabi, uttu be dahame, eseyen be inu gurun de aisilara gung obuki, (+)hese wasinjiha manggi, hafan i jurgan de afabufi (+)ulhibure fungnehen banjibume arafi bahabuki sembi, amban meni cisui gamara ba waka ofi, gingguleme wesimbuhe, (+)hese be baimbi.

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[11] Zhaohui (*1708 †1764) was the grandson of Empress Xiaogongren, the mother of Emperor Yongzheng, from the Wuya family of the Yellow Banner. He first worked as a *Junjichu* clerk and was promoted director of the Military Board, secretary of the Grand Secretariat, vice minister of the Board of Punishment of Shengjing (Mukden), Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Manchu Yellow Banner, and Commander-in-Chief of the Border Red Banner. In 1748 Zhaohui commanded the transportation of military supplies to Jinchuan of Sichuan and worked at *Junjichu* in 1750 to prepare the battle against the Zünghar Mongols who entered Tibet. In 1754, he managed the military supplies when the Qing army fought against the Zünghars in Xinjiang. In 1756, he was promoted Assistant General of the Right Wing in charge of the reconstruction of Ili (Yili). In 1757 his army marched to Urumqi, and Zhaohui was appointed Wuyibo for his military success. After the rebellion of Amursana (*1722 †1757), he assisted the north army fighting the Zünghars, and was appointed General of Pacifying Frontiers (*Dingbian jiangjun*) in December of the same year. In 1758 his army marched to the south of the Tianshan Mountains and finally crushed the Khōja rebellion for which he was first granted the first rank of Duke of *Wuyimouyong* and later the ranks of supreme minister (Yuqian dachen), Assistant Grand Secretary (Xieban daxueshi), and Minister of the Board of Punishment when returning to the capital. He died in 1764 and was given the posthumous title of Wenxiang (literary conservator). See also Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, passim.

[12] Huojisi Beg (Khojis, Khwāja-sī, Amīr Sharaf al-Dīn Khwāja Yūsuf Beg) was governor (Hākim) of Wushi (Uch-Turfan, Uchturpan, Uqturpan) near Aksu in Xinjiang where his family lived and held the Beg title for generations. On 16 July 1755 Dawachi (Dawaqi, Dabachi, †1759), a leader of the Zünghar rebellion, was captured by him and presented to the Qing court. Huojisi then joined the war against Amursana, was appointed Beise with Beile rank in 1758 and given the gem top hat and the official gown with four dragons. In the next year, he was promoted prince of the second rank (Junwang) for assisting the Qing army in squashing the rebellion of the Khōja brothers. See Bai Cuiqin, "The Dzungars and the Torguts (Kalmuks) in China," in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Volume 5. Development in Contrast: from the Sixteenth to the mid-Nineteenth Century*, ed. Chahryar Adle et al. (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2003), 158. Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 280; Brophy, "Kings of Xinjiang," 77. Erich Haenisch, "Zwei viersprachige Inschriften zum Dsungarenkrieg aus den Jahren 1755 und 1758," in *Miscellanea Academica Berolinensia: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Feier des 250jährigen Bestehens der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1950), 225.

[13] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmeg tiben*, vol. 8, tiben no. 25, pp. 142–6.

abkai wehiyehe i orin duici aniya juwan biyai orin.

ambarame giyangnara hafan, taiboo, enteheme hūwaliyambure deyen i aliha bithei da, hebei amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, hafan i jurgan, boigon i jurgan, tulergi golo be dasara jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara booi amban, ilan namun i baita be kadalame icihiyara uju jergi tatado baturu gung ilan jergi nonggiha emu jergi ejehe, coohai gungge de sunja jergi nonggiha sunja jergi ejehe, amban fuheng.

taidzi sooboo hebei amban aliha amban bime kubuhe lamun i monggo gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban coohai gungge de juwe jerge nonggiha juwe jergi ejehe amban nayantai.

hashū ergi ashan i amban bime gulu suwayan i monggo gūsai meiren i janggin ashan i hafan, amban sumeng.

gocika amban, hiya kadalara dorgi amban, kubuhe šangyan i manju gūsai gūsa be kadalara amban, baita be kadalame icihiyara dergi adun i jurgan i aliha hafan de kamcibuha faksi jurgan i baita be kamcifi kadalara ici ergi ashan i amban, manju tuwai agūrai kūwaran i doron jafaha amban gajarci de uju jergi wasimbufi tušan de bibuhe geli hafan efulefi tušan de bibuhe, amban wangjal.

acihiyara hafan, ambnan malhūnggal
aisilakū hafan, amban bege,
aisilakū hafan, amban dural
aisilakū hafan, amban wehe.
aisilakū hafan, amban nesutu.
ejeku hafan, amban mangduhū.
ejeku hafan, amban guwanlu.

Translation:

[Emperor's instruction in red ink]: Do as discussed

Memorialization

Fuheng—the Jingyanjiangguan [Official in charge of Classics Colloquium], taibao [Grand Guardian], baohediandaxueshi [Grand Academician of Hall for the Preservation of Harmony], Government Minister, Lingshiweinei dachen [Grand Minister of the Imperial Household Department Concurrently Controlling the Imperial Guardsmen], Minister of Board of Appointments, Minister of Board of Revenue in joint responsibility of Lifanyuan, Household Department, and the Three Imperial Storages, The First Rank Gong [Duke] of

Loyalty and Bravery with three promotions, one record, five military promotions, and five military records—has memorialized the emperor's following instruction, copied from the Junjichu on the 24th day of the 10th month of Qianlong's 24th year [1760]. [The copy says that] on the 2nd day of the 10th month of Qianlong's 24th year the emperor instructed that "Erke Khoja Erseyin[14] and Aotulanzhu Khoja Mamute[15] are both descendants of Paihanpir.[16] [I issue them] a special grace and bestow upon Erseyin the title of Gong and upon Mamute that of Jasag of first rank Taiji." After [we] followed this instruction and copied it to this office [Lifanyuan], we [the Lifanyuan officials] discussed that "due to our [regularly] check, the regulation says that the Gong award should be granted by an official certificate. According to another check in the previous instruction from the emperor, when the Muslim person Edui[17] was granted the title of Gong, our office requested a certificate for his Fuguogong [Bulwark Duke] title. Following this case, Erseyin should be granted the Fuguogong [Bulwark Duke] certificate. After the emperor's approval, [the matter should be] transferred to the Board of Appointments, let that Board issue the certificate. We cannot make such a decision, [so] we respectfully ask for Your Majesty's permission.

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[14] Husayn Erke Khōja (Erke Khoja Erseyin) was a great-uncle of the rebellious Khōja brothers Burhān al-Dīn and Jahān. His grandfather was a brother of the *Aq Taghliq* Āfāq Khwāja (Khōja) Hidāyat Allāh (Abakh Khōja, Apake). Husayn Erke Khōja lived in Yarkant (Ye'erqiang) and Kashgar, was taken hostage by the Zünghar ruler Tsewang-Rabtan Khung-Taiji (Tsewang Arabtan, Cewangalabutan, Zoriktu khongtaiji, r. 1697–1727) and brought to Turfan. Later he lived in the Ili (Yili) basin, fled to the Burut (Kyrgyz), and joined the Qing army in suppressing the Khōja rebellion. He was bestowed the title of duke in October of the 24th year of Qianlong's reign (1760). See also Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, 52–4, 76. Cuiqin, "The Dzungars and the Torguts," 156. Thierry Zarcone, "The Sufi Orders in Northern Central Asia," in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Volume 5. Development in Contrast: from the Sixteenth to the mid-Nineteenth Century*, ed. Chahryar Adle et al. (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2003), 774. Gertraude Roth Li, *Manchu: a Textbook for Reading Documents*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000, 330–1.

[15] Mahmut Khōja (Aotulanzhu Khoja Mamute), father of the Khōja brothers Burhān al-Dīn (Bulanidun) and Jahān (Jihan, Yahyā, Huojizhan), joined his uncle Husayn Erke Khōja in exile among the Burut (Kyrgyz). Later, he helped the Qing army in Kashgar and was bestowed the title of Jasag Taiji of the first rank. See also Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, 16–7, 21–2. Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 289–92.

[16] In Chinese sources this name, meaning the prophet Muhammad, is generally written Panhanba'er (Bieanba'er, Bieanboer, Pianba'er) with the exeption of the *Qingshilu* which has 'pai ga mu ba er' rendering a Farsi transliteration. The Manchu transliteration Paihanpir probably follows the Xinjiang pronunciation of the time; cf. Newby, *Empire and the Khanate*, 76: Peighambar.

[17] Edui belonged to a Beg family from Kucha and entered Qing military service in the 21st year of Qianlong's reign (1757). In early 1758, he was bestowed the title of Grand Minister Assistant Commander (Sanzhi dachen) and in December promoted Grand Minister of the Imperial Household Department (Nei dachen) for summoning Khotan to surrender to the Qing troops. After the surrender of Khotan he was bestowed the rank of Duke and

The seventeenth day of the twelfth month, Qianlong's twenty-third year [1759].

Jingyanjiangguan, taibao, baohediandaxueshi, Government Minister, Lingshiweinei dachen, Minister of Board of Appointments, Minister of Board of Revenue in joint responsibility of Lifanyuan, Household Department, and the Three Imperial Storages, The First Rank Gong of Loyalty and Bravery with three promotions, one record, five military promotions, and five military records

Fuheng reports

[And others]

5 Analysis

All three *Tiben* were written between 1757 and 1759 and the entitling edicts were issued in the name of *Gao* to local officials who were influential figures in the Qing battle against the Khōja rebellion. Among them, Emin Khōja swore loyalty already to the Kangxi court, and was thus the first Muslim leader from Eastern Turkestan to do so.[18] In the 21st year of Qianlong's reign (1757), he was granted the title of Beise for participating in the defeat of Amursana.[19] Being the most intimate Qing partner among the Muslim leaders in Xinjiang, Emin Khōja was promoted consistently. By 1759 his rank was raised to a Junwang (prince of the second rank) and he was appointed commander of the Qing post in Yarkand with heavy obligations.[20] Other local Muslim leaders, such as

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in September 1759 appointed governor (Hākim Beg) of Aksu with promotion to a Beise. In the following year, Edui Hākim Beg was relocated to Yarkand (Ye'erqiang). He was bestowed the hereditary rank of a Beile in 1775 and died in 1778 of illness.

[18] *Qinding waifan menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan* (Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), vol. 110, pp. 1a–4a, records that after conquering Turfan and Lukeqin and with the surrender of Emin Khōja in the 59th year of Kangxi's reign (1721) the Qing troops returned victorious.

[19] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmeg tiben*, vol. 7, No. 11, pp. 72–6.

[20] Ibid., vol. 8, no. 29, pp. 166–70.

Yusuf Khōja from Hami[21] and Heshikebo Khōja,[22] were also granted titles by the court as is reflected in other reports (*Tiben*) that were written in the same style as the one for Emin Khōja.[23] The privileged treatment of these Muslim Khōjas can be attributed to the Qing strategic planning in the region.

From a geographical perspective, Turfan was located at a juncture of the old silk road connecting North and South Xinjiang with Hami (哈密, Qumul) in the East.[24] To be in possession of Turfan meant to have control over the Zünghar Mongols in the North and the Khōja brothers in the South. Including Hami, a significant point on the 'golden route' between the court and the Xinjiang administration, the Qing garrisons of these two strategic locations could cooperate effectively. Living quite a distance from Kashgar, which was the center of the Khōja rebellion, the people from Turfan and Hami were more peace-minded, thus facilitating the implementation of Qing post-war pacification policies and reforms. To station Emin Khōja in Yarkand, which was another focal point of the riots, shows that the Qing had great trust in him in local affairs. His aptitude in these matters is illustrated by the case of Huojisi Hākim Beg of Uch-Turfan, a powerful local leader who had played a key role in helping the Khōja brothers access southern Xinjiang from Ili, and who submitted to the Qing after being persuaded to do so by Emin Khōja.[25] Given the strategic importance of Aksu and Uch-Turfan in Western Xinjiang, which bordered Kirghizia and neighbouring Kashgar, the court could exert full grip on central Xinjiang once the two cities were under their military control. This would enable the imperial army to interrupt the connection between Hui Muslims and the Zünghar Mongols and to take control of communication lines to Kirghizia. Huojisi Beg was therefore of great importance to the Qing empire.

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[21] Yusuf Khōja's family lived as Begs in Hami for generations and had close relations with the Qing administration. In the 5th year of Qianlong's reign (1741) Yusuf Khōja inherited the degraded title of his father, Emin, as Zhenguogong. As Resident Minister in Command (Lingdui dachen) he participated in the campaign against Amursana and made great contributions during the Khōja rebellion, capturing Kucha, Uch-Turfan, Kashgar, and purchasing horses and tea for the Qing army. In 1759 he administrated Kashgar and was bestowed the title of Beile. Later he was promoted Junwang, and in 1766 died of illness. Brophy, "Kings of Xinjiang," 73, informs us that Yusuf Khōja was the son of 'Ubaydullāh who initiated contacts with the Qing as early as 1696. However, this very 'Ubaydullāh appears to be the Tarhan Beg 'Abdullah from other sources where Yusuf figures as his great grandson; see Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 286–7.

[22] Heshikebo Khōja's family lived as Begs in Kashgar and Heshikebo Khōja cooperated with the Qing army during the Khoja rebellion. Consequently, general Zhaohui suggested to Emperor Qianlong to station Heshikebo at Aksu, but the emperor worried that Heshikebo might betray him and called him to the court. In August 1759, Heshikebo Khōja was appointed governor (Hākim Beg) of Yarkand but was soon (1760) bestowed the Duke title and lived thereon in the capital.

[23] *Qingchao qianqi lifanyuan manmeg tiben*, vol. 7, tiben no. 59, pp. 454–8 and vol. 8, tiben no. 25, pp. 142–6.

[24] On the geopolitical significance of Turfan and Hami, the latter being located at the crossroads of the "Chinese, Mongolian, and Turco-Islamic Worlds" and "more closely linked to the Sino-Mongolian border-zone than any other region in eastern Turkestan"; see Brophy, "Kings of Xinjiang," 72–81, quote from 72–3.

From the perspective of the Muslim factions, the group of Khōjas who were designated as local officials by the Qing government had been in conflict with the Khōja family of Kashgar for generations. The family of Emin Khōja, for example, had been exerting great influence in Turfan for generations but did not have any relations whatsoever with the Khōja family of Kashgar. Due to his intimate relationship with the Qing court, Emin Khōja was likely not to ally with the Khōja family of Kashgar.[26] Regarding the religious orientations of the Xinjiang Muslims, the most influential group were the Naqshbandi Sufi brothers whose order was subdivided into two factions, *Qara Taghliq* and *Aq Taghliq*, which were long engaged in hostilities and even military confrontations with each other. All members of the Kashgar Khōja family belonged to the *Aq Taghliq* branch, among them the rebellious Khōja brothers Burhān al-Dīn and Jahān, descendants of Āfāq Khōja Hidāyat Allāh (*1626 †1694), son of Muhammad Yusuf Khōja. All Qing-designated officials were more or less part of this faction. Husayn Erke Khōja, for example, mentioned in the third *Tiben* above, was a descendant of Muhammad Yusuf Khōja as well. However, his influence was much more limited than of Āfāq Khōja. When the Ili basin was taken by imperial troops, he was therefore not paid the same attention as the Kashgar Khōja brothers. Some studies have pointed out that in its early phase of expansion in Xinjiang, the Qing government did not have sufficient information about the Muslim factions' internal situation and thus put its faith in the Kashgar Khōja brothers.[27] It was not until the rebellion intensified in South Xinjiang that the Qing became better informed and promoted Husayn Erke Khōja when the riot was almost put down. This promotion differed, however, in that he was not given theocratic authority in his region as had been the case before with the Khōja brothers. Husayn Erke Khōja's position was instead appointed by the Lifanyuan. This position was part of the new Qing administrative system for Xinjiang.

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[25] *Qinding waifan menggu huibu wanggong biaozhuan*, vol. 454, pp. 909–20.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Liu Zhengyin, "Qingchao tongyi xiyu iincheng zhong baishanpai hezhuo de huodong yu yingxiang," *Xibei Minzu Yanjiu*, 1 (1997); cf. Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 279.

6 The Lifanyuan and Qing Policy in Xinjiang

There are basically two ways to understand the Lifanyuan's Xinjiang policy. First, all Lifanyuan *Tiben* like the three presented in this chapter were originally from the *Junjichu*. The Lifanyuan copied them, presented the matter to the emperor in a memorial, and executed his decision. This procedure differed considerably from an earlier stage in institution building, when the Lifanyuan received the emperor's edict directly and put his instructions into practice. By the time of Husayn Erke Khōja's promotion, the *Junjichu* had already taken over the Lifanyuan's previous counselling and decision-making power in military affairs. However, with regard to post-war arrangements and the legal process of adjusting regional organizations to the central administrative system, the Lifanyuan was, on the contrary, given even more authority. The Lifanyuan *Tiben* fully reflect this change in administrative procedures. Once a decision was made by the *Junjichu*, the court relied more than ever on the Lifanyuan for carrying out its recommendations, thus assigning more responsibilities to the Lifanyuan's local policy making. In this sense, the Lifanyuan's official duties were spelled out more precisely than before and official procedures became more simplified with a focus on policy implementation. Appointments of officials granted locally by the Lifanyuan were significant for frontier strategies and the integration policy of the empire as well. Permanent adjustment to frontier conditions was one of the central features of Qing expansion. However, this did not mean that local historical traditions were followed unconditionally. Rather, there was consistency in establishing governance in Inner Asia which is reflected in the administrative systems of Inner and Outer Mongolia,[28] in Tibet, in the Southwest with regard to the *Tusi* system, and in Xinjiang.[29]

Qing frontier policy was always under change and shifting. A striking characteristic of that policy was the tendency to lean closer and closer towards the central administrative system, in spite of the fact that many local features in names and forms were retained. For example, if we look at Mongolia, Tibet, or the Southwest, the Qing in their early encounters with the Mongols retained many of the latter's traditional political practices after some Mongolian polities had sworn allegiance.[30] However, the Qing also introduced a certain degree of revision, such as limiting the Mongols' hunting grounds and stipulating their annual visits to the court. As time went by, these practices were confirmed as regulations and recorded in the *Collected Statutes of the Qing*.[31] Though Mongolian nobles enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, the traditional nomadic structure was co-opted into the imperial administrative system and institutionalized as *Mengqi*, i.e., the banner-league system. In 1751, Tibet likewise experienced a transformation from its traditional diarchal political system (*chos-srid-gnyis*) into a superimposed council system (*Kashag*)—a chief executive body of the civil administration under the Dalai Lama and the Regent.[32] After Tibet had come under Qing rule, supervision was installed by a high commissioner (*Amban*) who took charge of the Tibetan affairs. The Tibetan rulers were now obliged to pay tribute to the central government on a yearly basis. Moreover, in Southwest China (Yunnan), the *Tusi* system was first retained and then gradually abolished.

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[28] For Mongolian cases in Lifanyuan reports see Wuyun Bilige and Song Tong, "Guanyu qingdai neizhasake menggu meng de chuxing: yi lifanyuan tiben weizhongxin," *Qinshi yanjiu* 4 (2011) and Song Tong, "Study on Alliance"; cf. also the chapters of Uradyn Bulag and Dorothea Heuschert-Laage in this volume.

[29] "Kangxi chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao," in *Qingdai Lifanyuan ziliao jilu*, ed. Zhao Yuntian (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2006).

Following the suppression of the Khōja rebellion, the Qing introduced various reforms and adopted the Beg system (from Old-Turkic *baig*), in order to integrate the local administrative system. Even though this topic has been well studied,[33] the Lifanyuan *Tiben* offer new information to the extent that immediately after the Khōja rebellion, local Muslim leaders were granted titles only from the Qing ranking system used for the Mongols (Cinqang, Junwang, Beile, Beise, Zhenguogong, Fuguogong and Taiji). The Beg title was downgraded below the Manchu-Mongolian nobility system and the status was lower in rank, comparable perhaps to county officials in 'China Proper.' It took some time before the Lifanyuan became involved in awarding and bestowing titles to local Muslim nobles. Lifanyuan reports actually do not show any record on granting the title, which leads to the conclusion that the Qing re-named

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[30] For pledges of allegiance by Mongolian nobles in early Qing, see Wuyun Bilige and Song Tong, "Guanyu qingdai".

[31] *Qinding daqing huidian*, editions of Kangxi 1690, Yongzheng 1732, Qianlong 1748, Jiaqing 1818, and Guangxu 1899. See also "Kangxi chao daqing huidian zhongde lifanyuan ziliao," 176–208.

[32] Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New York: Potala Publications, 1988), see also the discussion in Fabienne Jagou's chapter in this volume.

[33] Wang Dongping, "Guanyu qingdai huijiang boke zhidu de jige wenti," *Minzu yanjiu* 1 (2005); Niu Haizhen, "Shilun qingwangchao dui weiwu'erzu bokezhidu de gaige," *Kashi shifan xueyuan xuebao* 1 (2006); Sha Yong, "Qingdai xinjiang boke zhidu kaoshu," *Sichuan ligong xueyuan yuanbao: zhexue shehui kexueban* 22,5 (2007); Wang Juanjuan, "Guanyu qingzhengfu dui huijiang boke zhidu gaige de jige wenti," *Hetian shifan zhuanke xuexiao xuebao* 5 (2007).

Beg title may have not been granted by the Lifanyuan itself, but by the Qing-designated resident minister or a general who reported the bestowal to the Lifanyuan for notarization.

When Xinjiang was brought under Qing control, the government immediately "carried out investigations of population, grain, livestock, taxes, and the vestiges of the local administrative system"[34] including information on the Begs of Eastern Turkestan. Thus, scholars have been rightly pointing out that a number of officials were sent to Xinjiang to investigate the composition of the Beg system even while the battle against the Khōjas was still going on. Later their reports were used to adopt and modify the Beg system for the Qing ranking system.[35] Thus, in the 24th year of Qianlong's reign (1760), the Grand Minister Consultant Shuhede and the General of Pacifying Frontiers (*Dingbian jiangjun*) Zhaohui reported separately to the emperor about the Begs of Khotan and Kashgar, supplying a list of names and the fifteen kinds of Beg functions. As a result, Emperor Qianlong instructed Zhaohui that a Hākim Beg was to be ranked as a local official and should not be put on equal footing with a Mongolian Noyon who was authorized to collect taxes. To further ensure stability in the region, his Beg title could not be inherited without imperial permission. In Qianlong's 26th year of reign (1762), the court began to issue seals to the officially recognized Begs, thus replacing their former private seals.[36] This way, the Beg system was fully brought under central surveillance and Lifanyuan administration which was not only in charge of seal matters but, equally important, also organized and financed the Begs' periodical, expensive partaking in the "rituals of pilgrimage *qing'an* and tribute *jingong*."[37]

It is obvious that after the violent defeat of the Khōja rebellion in 1758 and the many turbulent years in war-torn Xinjiang, the court preferred to bestow titles on Turkestani nobles from an already operative Qing ranking system in the immediate post-war period. Within three years' time, however, this order of governance was changed in favour of co-opting a system rooted in Central Asian traditions since Timurid times. Hence, the Beg system was preserved, but the title, which entered the Qing ranking system for the first time, was now bestowed by the Qing court. The Muslim polities of Xinjiang can thus be described as a case in which the Qing reformed an old regime, integrating it into the Qing system in a new form without changing the particular characteristics of the local polity.

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[34] Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 282; according to reports collected by governor-general Zhaohui from the Kashgar region, "some 15 different administrative titles [were] in current usage including a hakim, the chief official", ibid.

[35] Wang Dongping, "Guanyu qingdai huijiang boke zhidu de jige wenti".

[36] Wang Dongping, "Guanyu qingdai huijiang boke zhidu de jige wenti," 74–5. On the transformations the Beg title underwent with the integration of the Beg system into the Qing bureaucracy and its ranking system, see also Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 283–4.

[37] Newby, "Begs of Xinjiang," 291; the first pilgrimage took place in 1759 comprising 46 Begs. Cf. Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14,1 (1993): 81.

Commenting, finally, once more on the Lifanyuan *Tiben* as a primary source, it should be noted that it is not the Khōja rebellion's historical background that is reflected there, but the awarding and bestowal of titles to influential local Muslim leaders by the Qing court and the Lifanyuan, a practice that was of great importance for the imperial strategy. None of the official documents, such as the *Veritable Records*, could go into these significant details in the manner the Lifanyuan *Tiben* do. From an administrative perspective, the Qing court—through the Lifanyuan—endowed local officials with titles and written documents recognized by central agencies, thereby confirming their legal jurisdiction over local affairs. This top-down transfer of authority filled the power vacuum left by the death of the Khōja brothers while the newly established Beg system created fresh power by transforming concepts of local theocracy into the governmentality of a centralized and more secular state.

7 Conclusion

Analyzing three representative Lifanyuan reports (*Tiben*) on early Xinjiang affairs, we found evidence that at the close of and after the Khōja rebellion, Qing policy sought to reform and to integrate the local Turkestani Beg system into the Qing ranking hierarchy, which at the time was in use for the Manchu and Mongolian nobility only. In doing so, the Qing embraced a clear strategy of incorporating Southern Xinjiang into the central administration with its northern counterpart (Züngharia) having become annexed recently. Reforms were implemented upon a traditional socio-political organization with a local official system (Beg) where self-government and indigenization played a key role in smoothing public antipathy against Qing-Chinese rule and in thwarting hostile resistance. Through Lifanyuan structures, the empire conferred titles on those local Begs who were loyal to the court and instrumental in bringing the Khōja rebellion to an end.

In the course of these developments the Lifanyuan, responsible for dealing with non-Chinese matters in Inner Asia and being in charge of frontier affairs, also experienced fundamental changes. While in early Qing China it served a dual role of consultation and execution, things changed by the mid-Qianlong era, when the *Junjichu* took over as central advisory board and the Lifanyuan became responsible for policy implementation only. Evidently, the relevant decrees and mandates of the Qing official documents were issued by the *Junjichu*, and the Lifanyuan, as becomes apparent from the *Tiben* quoted above, executed them after being informed. This limitation of responsibilities, duties, and power was part of a general centralisation process and of a constant shift from indirect to direct rule over the imperial periphery. Despite the replacement by the *Junjichu* in decision-making and the downgrade in its institutional status, the Lifanyuan became, however, locally more professional and specialized as has been shown by the example of its frontier management in the Southern Tianshan mountain range.

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CHAPTER 10

Lifanyuan and Tibet

Fabienne Jagou

1 Did the Lifanyuan Administer Tibetan Affairs?

From a brief presentation of the Qing government's various policies applied to the different parts of its empire, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, a preliminary conclusion would be to recognize the special treatment the Qing attributed to each of these three parts. Regarding Tibet, a few characteristics are obvious: the Qing managed Tibet according to three different ways because of its territorial and internal administrative organizations; Tibet was not conquered; no Tibetan military banner was created; Tibet was not subject to Han immigration; the Tibetan government was maintained in existence. As a matter of fact, the Beijing government adopted a special policy for Tibet that differed from practices in Mongolia and Xinjiang.

However, despite the set of differing policies, it is still considered that Tibetan affairs were managed by the Lifanyuan as were the Mongolian and Uighur communities. In my essay I will challenge this traditional wisdom by the analysis of documents exchanged between the governments in Lhasa and Beijing. Then, the Lifanyuan's practical involvement within the administration of Tibet will be discussed through the reading of *The Imperially Commissioned Collected Regulations of the Qing Dynasty* and the accompanying *Imperially Commissioned Collected Regulations and Precedents of the Qing Dynasty*. Finally, the carriers of the Amban, who was the Qing imperial commissioner based in Lhasa, will serve as a key element to determine potential links between the Lifanyuan and these Manchu agents in Lhasa as they were the visible face of the Manchu administration in Tibet.

2 Regional Divergences in the Making of Qing Imperial Administration

The Qing government defined various policies towards Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. In Mongolia, the Manchus reorganized the Mongol population in banners, leagues and Aimags. Roughly speaking, they divided the Mongolian tribes, which traditionally had one chief, into several banners and every banner

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had its Manchu leader, a Jasag. Titles were granted to every Mongol leader. The creation of these banners followed the advance of the Manchu troops, and authorized the growing of the Qing military force. This was to become the military support of the Qing court and would allow the Qing to remain a dynasty of conquest from the mid-seventeenth to the beginning of the 20th century. Mongolia was not modified as a Chinese province.

Eastern Turkestan to the south and Züngharia to the north of the Tianshan mountain range were conquered in the mid-eighteenth century and were administered by military governors (Jiangjun) and other high military officials (ma. Amban; chin. Zhuzang dachen) from 1762 who reported directly to the *Junjichu* in the capital. Routine affairs were handled by native officials known as *begs*. The area became a Chinese province under the name of Xinjiang in 1884.

Tibet had three provinces (Amdo, Khams and dBüs-gTsang). Amdo province, neighbouring China, became part of Gansu province in 1723 and was then administered by a Manchu civil official based in Xining. Parts of Khams were controlled by Sichuan provincial authorities and the *Tusi* system was confirmed in some areas.[1] Central Tibet (dBüs-gTsang) was not included into the Chinese provincial structure. As a matter of fact, this situation was considered as a *fait accompli* by the Qing authorities who concentrated their efforts towards Central Tibet by sending armies to defend Tibet when necessary and named an imperial commissioner (Amban) to work in cooperation with the Tibetan authorities from the beginning of the 18th century. The Amban represented the secular arm of the emperor in Tibet and reported directly to him or to the *Junjichu* or to the *Neige*. This integration of the newly conquered territories into the empire was, however, not restricted by political and administrative reforms. Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet were also subject to tributes to the Qing court and to a religious policy that attempted to control first and to include second the religious authorities within the Manchu hierarchical pattern.

As to the origins of these policies, different developments and factors can be addressed. From a strategic point of view, in Mongolia the Manchus wanted to avoid the creation of a Mongol coalition which could threaten the empire's security while in Xinjiang they aimed to overcome the power of the Western Mongols in Züngharia and of the Turkic Muslims in Eastern Turkestan. By using Tibetan Buddhism, the Manchus expected to better control the Mongol people, although Tibet, contrary to Mongolia and Xinjiang, was never conquered. It was only with the end of the 19th century that all three Tibetan provinces became a 'buffer zone' of overlapping international interests and a focal point of Inner China and the maintenance of the Qing Empire. Finally, the Manchu conquest of the Ming territories was achieved thanks to a multi-ethnic force composed of Manchus, Mongols and Chinese organized into banners. Tellingly, no Tibetan banner was created and only a few Tibetans were incorporated in the Mongol banners formed in Amdo.[2]

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[1] Beginning with the Yuan Dynasty until the end of the Qing dynasty the *Tusi* system was a way to incorporate local chieftains into the framework of the Peking government administration.

Economic aspects and local conditions also played a role. While Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang were subjects to a scheduled Han population transfer in order to clear pasturages for cultivation, Tibet did not experience any kind of Han immigration. In Mongolia, the Beijing government considered reorganizing the Mongolian tribes into banners. In Xinjiang, the permanent wars were conceived as a threat to the empire and had to be ended. While neither Mongolia nor Xinjiang had their own central governments, the Tibetan government, based in Lhasa in Central Tibet and composed of civil and religious officials, was maintained.

Besides, the Qing emperorship showed its own peculiar characteristics. Today, it is widely assumed, though not sufficiently discussed, that the Qing emperors and especially Qianlong perceived themselves as the head of a multicultural empire that they incarnated. This universal power was based on the submission of different peoples, including the Han people, whose culture had to be kept alive and separate. The emperor thus symbolized not only the link between the five peoples of the empire (Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs and Chinese) but intended also to represent and incarnate every religion of his empire. That is why the emperor appeared as the protector of each of them, particularly of Tibetan Buddhism and the *dge-lugs-pa* school, the one the Dalai Lama lineage belongs to.[3]

3 Early Qing Chinese and Tibetan Relationships

With regard to Tibet, the religious dimension was just as important as the secular dimension, considering the fact that the Dalai Lama was at the same time the spiritual and mundane ruler of this country. From a spiritual point of view, the priest-patron relationship created between Qubilai Khagan (1260–1294), the first Mongolian emperor of China, and 'Phags-pa (*1235 †1280) was in fact restored between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors by the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (*1617 †1682, r. 1642–1682) and the Qing emperor Shunzhi. When the Tibetan hierarch went to Beijing in 1652 the Manchu emperor was a child, assisted by a group of Manchu and Chinese officials, and hence not able to make decisions on his own, which may have limited his position.

Within the framework of this personified relationship, the former delivered Buddhist teaching to the latter in exchange for protection, which could take the form of donations and military or administrative support. From a spiritual point of view, the Manchu emperor thus became the protector of the doctrine, the ideal universal monarch or *Cakravartin*. However, because the emperor's protection applied both to the person of the Dalai Lama and the *dge-lugs-pa* school, to which the Dalai Lama belonged, and the government that the Dalai Lama led, the relationship between him and the Manchu emperor remained ambiguous. The emperor acquired a role in Tibetan policies and the defence of Tibet through his Ambans in order to protect the masters and monasteries of the *dge-lugs-pa* school, while at the same time, from a more pragmatic point of view, he sought to guarantee the security of the southwest border of the Qing Empire and the Mongol frontier regions.

Each time a Dalai Lama established a priest-patron relationship with a Manchu emperor, he was, from a spiritual point of view, considered superior to the emperor by the Tibetan side and equal to the emperor by the Manchus. Qianlong, for example, considered himself to be the emanation of *Mañjuśrī*. However, from a mundane and Manchu perspective, the Dalai Lama was placed in a position of inferiority, as someone who needed to be conducted in his secular role. It would be interesting to understand how the Manchu emperor himself used the religious and secular aspects of the Tibetan leadership and government for his own advantage to exercise political supremacy over Tibet.

As we have seen, different administrative treatments and different geographical interpretations have been applied to Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, which was renamed and had its borders modified. The territories and borders of these Inner Asian areas, very much on the periphery of Central China, were geographically and administratively still badly understood and perceptions permanently changed during the Qing dynasty. Mongolia was divided between 'Inner' and 'Outer', depending on the degree of proximity with the centre of the Manchu Empire and the period of the incorporation of various Mongol groups. Mongolian territories that were subdued by Manchu forces at an earlier point in time were called 'Inner', while others incorporated later were called 'Outer'. The very same schedule of 'Inner' and 'Outer' was applied to define the proximity of Tibetan territories to the empire. Tibet was likewise subject to changing perceptions depending on the degree of Qing military intervention and the knowledge of the area collected by the Ambans. But the question of Tibetan statehood was, however, not resolved until the end of the Qing dynasty, not even during the Simla conference in 1913–1914, political particularism being one of its main obstacles. Even in Central Tibet, the local political and administrative control remained split. In theory, the entire area was subordinated to the Tibetan central government in Lhasa, but some areas, such as the domains of the *sa-skya* or the *bkra-shis-lhun-po* monasteries stayed autonomous. Amdo and Khams did not fall under the authority of the Tibetan central government either. The province of Amdo in North-East Tibet was autonomous from Lhasa even before it was brought under Qing authority in 1723, while Khams, on the border between China and Tibet, was divided into principalities whose chiefs tried to stay independent or attached themselves to Peking or Lhasa according to the circumstances.

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[2] The Dalai Lama rejected a request from the Manchu emperor regarding the transfer of Tibetan and Mongol troops to China; see Sam Van Schaik, *Tibet: A History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 126.

[3] See, for example, Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

The Manchus were, indeed, aware of the differences among the three main Tibetan provinces. This becomes obvious when we compare the Manchu administrative mode chosen for each of them: in Central Tibet, since the 18th century, we find a government where a Manchu or Mongolian Amban was appointed who would act as a kind of supervisor; in Amdo, an Amban was in charge of administrative life; and in Khams, the *Tusi* system was implemented and some parts of it were incorporated into the Chinese provinces nearby (mainly Sichuan). Both 'Inner' and 'Outer' were, however, not well-defined and the borders between the two were still unspecified at the end of the dynasty.[4] But despite obvious difficulties in defining the Tibetan inner territories, it would be interesting to follow the question as to when the Qing first considered Tibet (as they define it, i.e. without Amdo province) to become part of their maps (*Rubantu*) and how they intended to control Tibet in comparison or in contrast to Mongolia and Xinjiang.

4 Tibet under Qing Administration: Published and Archival Sources

Interestingly, standard and recent literature still affirm that Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet were administered equally by the Lifanyuan, even though only very few Tibetan affairs were treated directly by the Lifanyuan. According to Brunnert and Hagelstrom's compendium, first published in 1912, the Lifanyuan was dedicated to the "management of relations with Mongolia, Qinghai and the Mohammedan Princedoms in Western China, when it was established in the 17th century",[5] consequently with the exclusion of Tibet. According to both, Tibetan affairs became part of the Lifanyuan only in 1906. Elsewhere they note, however, the incorporation of parts of Khams into the Chinese provinces and the establishment of an Amban in Tibet as of 1727. They add that this agent was under the direction of the Lifanyuan and was authorized to report directly to the Emperor.[6] Likewise, Charles Hucker stresses that the Lifanyuan was "a top-echelon agency in the central government managing relations with Mongolia, Tibet, Qinghai, and tribal chiefs of Eastern Turkestan".[7] Joseph Fletcher argues in the same direction stating that the "superintendence of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, all Ch'ing Inner Asian tributaries coming to the Ch'ing capital, and of relations with the other Inner Asian polities that lay outside the imperial boundaries, was the responsibility of the Li-fan Yüan".[8] Evelyn Rawski specifies that "lamaist affairs were supervised by a subagency of the Lifanyuan"[9] and Pamela Crossley informs us that, "because of its special connection with Mongolia, the Lifanyuan handled all communications with Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and all administrative affairs of the Tibetan religious leaders".[10] Finally, for Edward Rhoads, "the Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifanyuan) was responsible for dealing with the Mongols, Turks, and Tibetans living in the outlying realms of the Qing Empire" and, even more explicitly: "the Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans were subject to the Court of Colonial Affairs".[11] Hence, with the exception of Rawski, who claims that 'lamaist affairs' were managed by the Lifanyuan, but who did not mention who was responsible for the administrative affairs, Western authors agree that the Lifanyuan was the sole institution responsible for managing Tibetan affairs inside the Qing empire.

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[4] See Fabienne Jagou, "Étude des toponymes choisis par les Mandchous pour définir le territoire tibétain," in *Études tibétaines en l'honneur d'Anne Chayet*, ed. Jean-Luc Achard (Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études, 2010), 127–46.

[5] H[ippolit] S[emenovich] Brunnert and V[iktor] V[ladimirovich] Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China* (Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, 1978), 160, entry 491.

[6] Ibid., 467, entry 906–907.

[7] Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 304, entry 3603.

[8] Joseph Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia c. 1800," in *The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911*, vol. 10,1, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 37.

[9] Rawski, *Last Emperors*, 254.

[10] Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, "Introduction," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 22, footnote 18.

[11] Edward J.M. Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 46, 293.

Chinese secondary sources express two points of view. First, Mongolian, Tibetan and Muslims affairs were managed by the Lifanyuan from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the Qing dynasty. And second, the Lifanyuan was not even mentioned in the two chapters dedicated to the Qing Tibet policy in *The Short History of Tibet*.[12] But the commonly held Chinese view is that the Lifanyuan was a Qing governmental agency that managed Mongolian, Muslim, Russian and Tibetan affairs.

Recently published Chinese and Tibetan document collections challenge, however, these Western and Chinese opinions. Many administrative documents issued from or sent to the Manchu Amban in Tibet were published in the Tibetan and Chinese languages. Some Tibetan archival document collections are now available. One of these collections reproduces a selection of documents kept in the archives of Lhasa.[13] From the forty-six Qing documents published here, twenty-five are related to the recognition of the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor's exercise of protecting Tibetan Buddhism, especially the *dge-lugs-pa* school; twenty-one documents are related to the administration of Tibet (nomination of Tibetan officials or abbots, taxation, memorandum of 1793, etc.), either from the emperor directly or through the Amban.[14] Among them, three were issued by Tibetans. The only document which quotes the Lifanyuan is related to the selection of a new abbot for the *ra-sgrengs* monastery, dated 1828.[15] The criteria for selecting these documents for publication are not revealed in the volume's introduction which simply states that "these documents are real testimonies of the social and historical life then in Tibet and prove that Tibet has always been part of China".[16]

Another volume, entitled *Correspondences received from the Amban in the water-ox year* (1793), is introduced as the collection of memoirs from the Amban received during the year 1793 and is yet unpublished.[17] This volume seems to be a practical way to organize archives: all the correspondence emanating from the Amban and addressed to the Tibetan government in 1793 seems to have been collected (the logic of classification is not obvious because the documents are seldom dated). We don't know how and when this collection was organized. We are still very ignorant of the way the Tibetans classify their archives. Nor do we know other collections of Amban correspondences to the Tibetan government organized in Tibet or in China. And in this volume too, as a matter of fact, the Lifanyuan is not quoted.[18]

We assume, however, that the same documents have been kept in the archives of the Manchu *Yamen* in Lhasa. That is, at least, suggested by the discovery of two identical Tibetan documents related to the 1793 *Twenty-nine point Memorandum on the Restoration of Tibet approved by the Emperor* (*Qin ding Zang nei shanhou zhangcheng er shi jiu tiao*). One of these is preserved in the volume *Correspondences received from the Amban in the water-ox year* (1793) from the Lhasa archives; the other was reproduced in *A Collection of Historical Archives of Tibet* and was supposedly discovered in the archives of the Manchu *Yamen* in Lhasa.[19]

The Chinese *Compendium of Archival Documents Concerning Sino-Tibetan Relations since the Yuan Dynasty*, compiled in seven volumes, is also of interest.[20] The volumes two to five are related to the Qing dynasty. Being published from Chinese sources, this edition obviously has to be approached with caution. We are not sure whether this document collection can claim completion. We also do not know what the reasons initially were behind their coming into being nor the selection criteria for their later publication. What seems obvious is the desire to gather archives documents related to Tibet into a sole collection, documents which were originally dispatched to the archives of various administrative bodies of the Qing government. The necessity felt to gather sources related to Tibet into one or several collections today reveals that Tibet was not considered to be in need of special treatment in the Qing past, but rather recognized as one of the many affairs that the empire had to deal with. In this collection, it seems that no documents were issued by the Lifanyuan at all and that most of them are related to the *Junjichu*. The same reservations and remarks have to be addressed to the *Collection of archive documents related*

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[12] *Qing chao zhi Zang dian zhang yanjiu* (Peking: Zhongguo Zang xue chubanshe, 2002), 250. *Zang zu jianshi bian xie* (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1985).

[13] *Bod kyi lo rgyus yig tshags gces bsdus* (Peking: Wenwu, 1995).

[14] Four of these 21 documents concern economic reforms implemented by the Qing government between 1891 and 1907; Ibid., document number 48 and 68–70.

[15] Ibid., document number 60 from Amban Huixian (惠顯) to the regent.

[16] Ibid., see the Chinese, Tibetan and English prefaces without pagination.

[17] *Chu glang wang zhu tshur phul gyi deb, Shui niu nian wenshu song lai ben* (Lhasa: Research Centre of the Tibetan Social Sciences Institute, unpublished manuscript, 1983), 4: lines 3–4.

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Liao Zugui, Li Yongchang, and Li Pengnian, "'Qin ding Zang nei shanhou zhangcheng er shi jiu tiao' banben kaolue," *Zhongguo Zangxue* 2 (2004): 34.

[20] *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi dang' an shiliao huibian*, ed. Centre of Research for Tibetan Studies in China et al. (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1994).

to Tibetan affairs and Tibet preserved in the Number One Archives in Beijing.[21] Here, the Lifanyuan is present, but only at the very end of the volume and with a very small number of documents dating from 1875 to 1911.

Evidently, a fundamental question arises: who and which Qing administrative agencies did actually manage the Tibetan affairs. According to all secondary sources, it is obvious that the Lifanyuan was responsible, but to what extent. When we look at the published and unpublished archive documents, it becomes clear that other parts of the government were also involved in running Tibetan affairs, along with the Lifanyuan. In fact, both perspectives are legitimate and reveal the complexity of the empire the Qing had to govern. One has, of course, to admit that very few Lifanyuan documents still exist because many archives were destroyed by fire at the end of the Qing dynasty.

A main source that gives an idea about the Lifanyuan's involvement with Tibetan affairs is the *Imperially commissioned collected regulations of the Qing dynasty* (in the following quoted as *Collected Statutes*) and the accompanying *Imperially commissioned collected regulations and precedents of the Qing dynasty*.[22] These collections were compiled in order to preserve the regulations passed from the imperial centre to local authorities during the Qing dynasty and thus to ease local officials' governance duties, independently from the exchange of correspondence and arguments around the decisions and regulations. A first conclusion hence would be to characterize the Lifanyuan not as a decision-making body but rather as a final regulations keeper, that is to say: an archive office dedicated to Mongolian, Muslim, Russian and Tibetan affairs. Following this assumption, we find a compilation of regulations which passed between the *Yamen* and the six ministers and the Lifanyuan from 1636 to 1899.[23] The Tibetan affairs mentioned within the Lifanyuan part begin in 1654, when Emperor Shunzhi bestowed a title and a tablet to the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso and to Güüshi Khan (Törö-Baikhu, 1582–1655) and ends in 1884 granting the title of Nominkhan to the monk Blo-bzang Don-drub.[24]

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[21] *Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'an guan suo cun Xizang he Zang shi dang'an mulu*, ed. First Historical Archives of China (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2000).

[22] *Da Qing huidian*, editions of Kangxi 1690, Yongzheng 1732, Qianlong 1748, Jiaqing 1818, and Guangxu 1899. *Da Qing huidian shili*, editions of Jiaqing 1818, and Guangxu 1899. *Da Qing huidian zeli*, edition of Qianlong 1767. However, these official dates are not always representative. For example, inside the *Qianlong huidian zeli* the year 1767 is displayed but the quoted regulations stop in 1760, and the Lifanyuan regulations end in 1762 without explanations, see *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), preface, juan 49, 12a.

[23] That started with the *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690) until the end of the *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899).

[24] *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690), juan 144, 1b. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 24a. Kungang, a high Lifanyuan official (Dachen) from 1884 to 1886,

5 Lifanyuan Archives, Imperial Agencies in Charge of Tibetan Affairs, and the Problem of Communication

The role of the Lifanyuan archives is also disputable. As is well known, the Lifanyuan established two archive offices in Beijing, one for documents written in Manchu, the other for those in Chinese. The Manchu archive was managed by one Manchu and three Mongols while the Chinese archive was run by a Manchu, a Chinese military (*Hanjun*) and two Chinese correctors. In general, the Manchu archive director sent two subordinate officials as representatives to the local *Yamen* to serve as administrative employee (*Siguan*) and secretary (*Bitieshi*). In the case of the Lhasa *Yamen*, however, and contrary to other *Yamen*, the secretary for the Manchu archive was appointed by the Lifanyuan, not by the archive director.[25] These officials had first a two-year term and then a three-year term to serve.[26]

For the Chinese archive office, Manchu and Mongol literati were selected by the *Neige* and the Hanlin Academy. They were appointed by the emperor to serve two years in turn. Whether any of them were sent to the *Yamen*, because they were skilled in Chinese, is not specified. The correctors had to control the content and orthography of the Chinese language text of the documents which were copied and preserved. However, other offices were likewise responsible for the reception and transmission of documents: the General Services Office (*Siwuting*) composed of two employees (*Siwu*), one Manchu and one Mongol, received the correspondences from outside the *Yamen*. The Seal Office (*Dangyuechu*), was responsible for copying and transmitting documents to the *Neige*.[27]

From a pragmatic and technical point of view, it is obvious that the writing and sending of documents from the field written either in Manchu or in Chinese was not easy and that the work of the secretary appointed by the Lifanyuan was not particularly mentioned. In addition, communication between Lhasa and Beijing remained complicated because of the distance between the two capitals. Although the Qing officials in Tibet were supposed to correspond with Beijing in Manchu, the Chinese language was used when they were incompetent in Manchu. In that case the issue was specified in the

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contributed to the Guangxu edition. He was the only official from the Lifanyuan who participated in this enterprise.

[25] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 49, 14a–b, 15a.

[26] *Da Qing huidian zeli* (Qianlong edition, 1767), juan 142, 30a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 977, 20a.

[27] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 49, 14a–b, 15a.

report sent to the throne.[28] This is probably the reason why eight officials from the Chengdu Border Office (*Chengdu zhu fang*) skilled in Manchu (*Shu Qing zi ma jia*) were appointed for Tibet under Emperor Jiaqing.[29]

These same language obstacles in the conduct of Tibetan and other affairs can be observed for Tibetan and sometimes for foreign languages too. During the Jiaqing reign and after the two Ghurkha wars (1788, 1791–1793), for example, two officials skilled in the Ghurkha language, written and oral, were appointed at the Lhasa *Yamen*.[30] But there is no mention at all of a Manchu or a Mongol (or a Tibetan) official or secretary able to speak Tibetan appointed to Lhasa. In Beijing, since 1658, every banner had to appoint three men to learn the Tibetan language, the teachers of which received a salary of a sixth rank official.[31] Later, under Emperor Qianlong (1741), this informal structure became the Office Dedicated to the Study of Tibetan (*Tanggute xue si*). It was composed of one assistant teacher and four Mongolian secretaries.[32] The office was reinforced with more members in 1839 by Emperor Daoguang and was supposed to enrol twenty-four students for five years. A final examination directed by the Dalai Lama concluded their studies.[33] The assistant teacher was not only in charge of teaching but also of translating orders of the emperor to the Dalai Lama.[34] It seems likely that those students were not trained to be later sent to Tibet, but were educated to serve as interpreter for Tibetan tribute missions that arrived at Beijing.

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[28] On the use of the Manchu language regarding Inner Asian matters and military affairs, see Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, "A Profile of the Manchu Language in Ch'ing History," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 53, no. 1 (1993): 63–78; Evelyn. S. Rawski, "Qing Publishing in Non-Han Languages," in *Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China*, ed. Cynthia J. Brokaw et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 304. For examples, see *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, documents 847, 869, and 886.

[29] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 27a. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 67, 9a. On the importance of the Sichuan military and administrative authorities in the Manchu management of Tibetan affairs, see Dai Yingcong, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).

[30] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 27a. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 67, 9a.

[31] *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690), juan 144, 1b. *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng edition, 1732), juan 222, 1b.

[32] *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 79, 1b.

[33] *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 992, 15a.

[34] Ibid., juan 992, 14b.

Against this background, it is difficult to say whether officials appointed for Tibet spoke, read or wrote Tibetan. Hence, the way Qing and Tibetan officials communicated in Tibet remains uncertain. Among the Ambans or military officials based in Lhasa some were able to communicate with the Tibetan authorities. This was the case with at least two of them. During the first Ghurkha war (1788), Amban Bazhong (巴忠) was accused of having badly served the Qing Empire because he was able to speak Tibetan and to communicate with the Tibetan authorities directly. He was said to have been influenced by the Tibetan ministers.[35] After the second Ghurkha war (1791–1793), during the negotiations and compilation of the *Twenty-nine point Memorandum on the Restoration of Tibet approved by the Emperor*, General Fukang'an (福康安, †1796), the head negotiator, did not know any Tibetan. Although no information of Sun Shiyi's (孫士毅, *1720 †1796) Tibetan language capabilities is given, who was responsible at that time for resupplying Manchu troops in Tibet, it was he who accompanied General Fukang'an to meet the Dalai Lama, so he probably spoke Tibetan.[36] Likewise, Amban Ehui (鄂輝) was able to translate documents written in Tibetan.[37]

How the Tibetan government communicated with the Qing court is another unresolved question. Did Tibetan officials, for instance, participate in the negotiations on the establishment of Qing regulations for Tibet in 1750 and 1793 or did they get involved only after the final Qing document was translated into Tibetan? With regard to the 1750 regulations, there was, in fact, no difference between the draft, discussed with many Tibetan governmental representatives and the three *dge-lugs-pa* monasteries (dGa' ldan, Sera and 'Bras spungs), and its final version.[38] Regarding the 1793 regulations, it seems that no real negotiations took place between Qing officials in Tibet and the members of the Tibetan government, although the former mentioned to have discussed the matter with the Dalai Lama previously to the composition of the final document.[39] Thus, according to Chinese sources, General Fukang'an reported to Emperor Qianlong formally on 29th November 1792 that the Dalai Lama was consulted during the elaboration of the twenty nine articles document, the first paragraph of which presents the new rules to be followed for the selection of reincarnated masters which stipulated a drawing of lots in a golden urn as the final stage for the recognition of these masters, and that he approved it on 16th October 1792. However, according to other Chinese sources, it is clear that the golden urn destined for the Jo-khang Temple in Lhasa left Beijing before 'this consultation' on September 10th and arrived in Lhasa on November 20th the same year.[40] We thus may rightly doubt that the Dalai Lama was informed before the decision was taken in Beijing.

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[35] See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 892, for a report of general Fukang'an from the 14th February 1792.

[36] As a matter of fact, Sun Shiyi participated in the elaboration of the dictionary entitled *Five Languages of the Western Areas* (*Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi*) as a corrector.

[37] See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 900, 22nd March 1792, for Fukang'an's report which specifies that Ehui translated a letter from rDo-ring Pandita to the Dalai Lama. Ehui was Amban from the 5th December 1791 to the 4th December 1792.

[38] *Qing chao zhi Zang dian zhang yanjiu*, vol. 1, 34–45.

[39] Fabienne Jagou, "The Use of the Ritual Drawing of Lots for the Selection of the 11th Panchen Lama," in *Revisiting Rituals in a Changing Tibetan World: Proceedings of the*

Moreover, the Tibetan translations from the Manchu and Chinese languages of the Qing regulations for Tibet, which were essential to making the Tibetans know what the new rules were all about, were done in Tibet. Some questions, however, regarding the translation work remain vague. Who were the translators and were their translations, sent from Lhasa to Beijing, revised and approved by the emperor? Or is it possible that the dispatched Qing or Mongol officials were authorized to implement a Tibetan version of the imperial regulations? If so, who then were the censors of these translations done in Tibet—translators trained at the Lifanyuan Tibetan School? What can, ultimately, be said about the value of a Qing regulation for Tibet if the final Tibetan version was not revised in Beijing and approved by the emperor?

6 The Incorporation of Tibetan Affairs into the Lifanyuan Administration

At this point of our analysis, the Lifanyuan resembles rather a kind of mediator between the periphery and the centre, being in charge of keeping the archive documents exchanged between the two sides, than a powerful independent executive agency. While being responsible for the appointment of a secretary supervising the Manchu archive within the Lhasa *Yamen*, no Tibetan ever became a member of the Lifanyuan. The sphere of competence and political activities of the Lifanyuan regarding Tibetan affairs thus remain obscure. Tibet as a country was not mentioned in the Kangxi and Yongzheng editions of the *Collected Statutes*, whereas the person of the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso was recognized in 1652 when he came to Beijing to meet Emperor Shunzhi. So far, Lifanyuan duties were devoted mainly to the management of the Mongols.

However, the scope of the Lifanyuan as mentioned in the *Collected Statutes* obviously developed according to the conquest and control exercised by the Qing on the periphery of their empire. The Kangxi and Yongzheng editions insist on the fact that since the Mongolian territory had been conquered, its people were subjected to the Qing Empire and especially to the Lifanyuan.[41] But it is only with the Qianlong edition of the *Collected Statutes* that the scope from Mongolia to the more precise Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Muslims and *Fanseng* was enlarged.[42] Here *Fan* refers to Tibetans. Indeed, in the introductory part of the Qianlong edition for the Outer Mongolian Bureau, Tibet and Qinghai are mentioned as having 'entered the map' of the Qing Empire (*Rubantu*).[43]

Consequently, with Qianlong, Tibet entered the structures of the Lifanyuan significantly stronger than before. Its affairs were now incorporated mainly in the long existing Outer Mongolian Bureau, though a smaller part was delegated to the Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau. The Lifanyuan acquired its definitive structure after the conquest of Kashgar (1762) comprising now six offices, four of which were, however, still dedicated to the Mongols: The Outer Mongolian Bureau (*Dianshusi*), the Inner Mongolian Bureau (*Qijisi*), the Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Rouyuansi*), the Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Wanghuisi*), the Eastern Turkestan Bureau (*Laiyuansi*) responsible for Xinjiang, and the Judicial Bureau (*Lixingsi*).[44] Although neither of them was particularly dedicated to Tibetan affairs, from the *Collected Statutes* we know that the Lifanyuan regulations addressed three important Tibet-related aspects: the tribute of the high Tibetan masters to the Qing court,

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Seminar "La transformation des rituels dans l'aire tibétaine à l'époque contemporaine" held in Paris on 8th and 9th November 2007, ed. Katia Buffetrille et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 53–60.

[40] See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, for the order of Qianlong to the *Junjichu* on the 26th September 1792 and the report from Fukang'an to Qianlong from 12th January 1793.

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[41] *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690), juan 142, 1a. *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng edition, 1732), juan 221, 1a.

[42] *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 79, 2a. Some scholars understand *fan* as Tibetans, which is occasionally the case, but sometimes the notion refers only to the Tibetans living on the border of China's inner territory (i.e. the territory the Qing inherited from their Ming predecessors).

[43] Ibid., juan 80, 1a.

[44] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998): 295. The Kangxi and Yongzheng *Collected Statutes* do not follow the same organization, as the Lifanyuan acquired its definitive structure under Qianlong until Emperor Guangxu when it changed again.

the religious affairs administered by the Qing Court and both Manchu and Tibetan administrative and military organization in Tibet.

The official Qing translation for the Lifanyuan in Tibetan was Department for the Governance of Outer Mongolia (*phyi'i sog po'i khrims grwa*). The designation referred to the sub-office of the Lifanyuan responsible for Tibetan affairs, which, in fact, was primarily and mainly devoted to the management of Outer Mongolia. Apparently, no literal Tibetan translation for the term 'Lifanyuan' exists.

7 The Tribute of the High Tibetan Masters to the Qing Court

As Chia Ning has demonstrated, three central Qing rituals were executed in Inner Asia: the pilgrimage to the emperor (*Chaojin*), the imperial hunt (*Weilie*) and the tribute (*Chaogong*). However, only Mongol rulers who received titles from the emperor, Zünghars from Northern Xinjiang included, were assigned to all of these rituals. Tibetans were not obliged to exercise the pilgrimage to the emperor[45] or the imperial hunt.[46] But, Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans offered tribute to the Qing. The tribute from Mongols and Muslims were due by those who had been granted titles from the emperor.

Regarding Tibet, the tribute "was offered by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in rotation. The two top lamas were not required to come to the capital themselves, but to send a tribute mission from one of them at the end of each year."[47] Although the Qing paid special respect to these missions by sending Lifanyuan officials "to welcome the mission at Xining" in Qinghai province and "accompanied them all the way to the capital, arranged their living accommodations in the West Yellow Temple, and managed the actual process of the tribute ceremony"[48], since 1694 their size was regulated and controlled upon arrival in Xining and Beijing, i.e. the tribute missions should not change composition during their stay in China.[49] In general, the Dalai Lama and the

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[45] Chia Ning, "The Li-Fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14, no. 1 (1993): 64.

[46] For the imperial hunt at Mulan, see also Mark C. Elliott and Chia Ning, "The Qing Hunt at Mulan," in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James Millward et al. (London: Routledge, 2004), 70–1.

[47] Chia Ning, "Inner Asian Rituals," 71.

[48] Ibid.; about the products exchanged between Tibetans and the Qing, ibid. 72. The Lifanyuan office responsible for the welcome to the capital was the Outer Mongolian Bureau.

[49] *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng edition, 1732), juan 222, 8b.

Panchen Lama had to send tribute to the Qing court in turn on the occasion of 'celebrations' (*Qingzhu*).[50] Their tribute missions were required to be composed of high officials and to convey particular goods to the Chinese capital.[51] After the conquest of Jinchuan (part of Khams), Tibetan *Tusi* from Sichuan province were also subjected to the tribute.[52]

Although these tribute missions had an obvious commercial aim, the Inner Asian leaders also looked to get an imperial recognition of their status and position while the Qing court expressed its supremacy in this way. From another perspective, these missions also show a religious content. It seems clear that the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were required to come to Beijing as heads of the two Qing defined regions: Inner and Outer Tibet. However, the vocabulary used to qualify these missions is arguable. Were the Tibetans obliged to send missions to the capital for 'celebrations' (*Qingzhu*) or as a manifestation of their submission (*Rugong*)? The mission was delegated from Tibet's clerical hierarchy's highest masters and the religious objects offered to the emperor make us believe that these missions' intentions were religious first and political second. They corresponded to the interpersonal relationship of a typical chaplain-donor relation. As a matter of fact, Lifanyuan was concerned with the organization of these missions.

8 Tibetan Religious Affairs Administered by the Qing Court

Since Qianlong, the reincarnated masters and monks from Tibet and Inner as well as Outer Mongolia were classified, numbered, registered, and called 'Lamas': the Lamas living in Beijing (*Zhuiing lama*) who worked in the Office of the Seals,[53] the Lamas from abroad (*Fan lama*) who were from Gansu, Qinghai,

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[50] *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 80, 9a-b, 10a.

[51] Ibid., juan 80, 9a–b. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 30b. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 67, 12b–13b.

[52] *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 68, 7a.

[53] *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 80, 8b. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 25a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 2a–7b. The Qing established a hierarchy inside the Office of the Seals (*Lama yinwu chu*), the highest of which was called 'Jasag Lama Keeper of the Seals' (*Zhang yin zhasake da lama*). He was aided by a 'Vice Jasag Lama Keeper of the Seals' (*Fu zhang yin Jasak da lama*), four 'Jasag Lamas', eight to ten 'Da Lamas', seven 'Vice Lamas', and ten lamas occasionally. Their disciples were called Gelong and Bandi. Some masters and monks, coming from the Chengde, Duolun, Wutaishan monasteries or others from Sichuan, were part of the Lamas living in Beijing. Some of these reincarnated masters like lCang skya Qutuqtu, Minzhu'er Qutuqtu

Sichuan and Yunnan,[54] and the wandering Lamas (*Youmu lama*) from Outer Mongolia and Tibet.[55] Every category had its reincarnated masters who were duly registered and could receive specified titles and seals.[56]

Yet another important regulation concerning the recognition of the Tibetan reincarnated masters was implemented by Qianlong in 1793. The motives of the emperor were obviously to avoid the corruption of the oracles and to protect the *dge-lugs-pa* against a possible takeover of coming reincarnation lineages and their seizure, and thus to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of only one or a few Tibetan families. For this reason Qianlong added a final stage (the drawing of lots) to various Tibetan traditional rituals which he refused to modify or to exclude. He thus exercised his role as protector of the *dge-lugs-pa* by protecting the religious and esoteric part of the successive rituals and institutionalised the last test by imposing the presence of his representative in Lhasa during the drawing of lots.[57]

The Lifanyuan was commissioned to register the reincarnated masters and the lay people who would like to be ordained.[58] It was also in charge of controlling the movement of this clergy.[59] But its main role was to act as an intermediary between periphery and Court. The Lifanyuan had thus, for example, to check inquiries and demands with existing local traditions. When the new Jibzundamba (rJe-btsun-dam-pa) requested permission to go to Beijing to receive a seal and a tablet, the Court asked the Lifanyuan to check the conformity of such a demand with tradition.[60] It also transmitted new orders from the Court to the local *Yamen*. Again, in the case of the Jibzundamba Khutugtu,

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or Jilong Qutuqtu, either taught Tibetan Buddhism in China or went to Tibet on special occasions. They alternately became abbots of the Yonghe gong in Peking. All Lamas living in Beijing received a salary from the Qing court, cf. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 68, 1b–2a.

[54] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 26a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 975, 1a–9a.

[55] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 26a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 7b–24a.

[56] *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 80, 8b.

[57] *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 26a–27a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 975, 9a–13b. See *Bod kyi lo rgyus yig tshags gces bsdus*, document number 50, for the first article of Qianlong's Tibetan edict from 1793.

[58] *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 7a, 8a–b; juan 975, 1a.

[59] The monks had, for example, to ask for a certificate if they wanted to go to Mongolia and in that case the Lifanyuan actor in the field was the military governor; Ibid., juan 974, 21a–b.

[60] Ibid., juan 974, 13a.

as soon as his reincarnation became known, the Lifanyuan was to be informed and had to convey the news to the *Yamen*.[61] These duties were extended to the Tibetan monks living in the Shaanxi province.[62] Moreover, an official from the Lifanyuan was in charge of the 'drawings of lots' that should be done in the Temple of the Lamas (*Yonghegong*) in Beijing jointly with the 'Jasag Lama Keeper of the Seals'.

9 Qing Agencies and Officials in Tibet

Surprisingly but as a matter of fact, the *Collected Statutes* make no mention of the Qing officials and militaries based in Tibet or of the Tibetan administrative and military organizations. The way the Lifanyuan was involved in these structures is not specified. But, the official career of the Ambans can be examined in order to determine whether they were part of the Lifanyuan at some point in their career.

Qing officials of the Lhasa *Yamen* were composed of two Ambans, one or two secretaries, and one administrative employee. As we have seen before, only one of the secretaries, responsible for the Manchu language archive, was appointed by the Lifanyuan. The other officials, and especially the most important, the Ambans, were selected by the emperor or the Board of Appointments through the *Neige* or the *Junjichu*. However, some careers reveal a certain link between the Lifanyuan and the Ambans.[63] Thus, from the 173 Ambans and vice Ambans, eighteen were members of the Lifanyuan. Among them, only one Amban became Lifanyuan vice minister (*Shilang*) at the same time.[64] Two were first Lifanyuan vice minister and later Amban.[65] Three were at first Amban and later during their term became vice minister.[66] In the long term of their careers, five were at first Amban and later became Lifanyuan vice ministers.[67] Only one occupied first the post of a vice minister before he was appointed Amban.[68] Some Ambans occupied other posts within the Lifanyuan, for instance as bureau director (*Liangzhong*),[69] others became high officials: Dachen.[70] Among these eighteen officials, twelve were imperial commissioners and six vice imperial commissioners.

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[61] Ibid., juan 974, 22a.

[62] Ibid., juan 975, 7a.

[63] Wu Feng pei and Ceng Guoqing, *Qing chao zhu Zang dachen zhidu de jianli yu yange* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1989), 111–170. *Qing dai zhiguan nianbiao*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), vol. 1–3.

[64] Baotai (保泰) was vice minister (1780) and vice Amban (6.3. 1780–16.3. 1783).

[65] Bazhong (巴忠) was vice minister (1785–1791) and Amban (30.12.1788–21.1.1789). Boqing'e (博清額) was Lifanyuan vice minister (1777–1779), Lifanyuan high official (1780–1785) and Amban (4.12.1780–9.1.1785).

[66] Huixian (惠顯) was vice minister (1829–1831) and Amban (23.4.1827–8.9.1830). Funai (輔鼐) was vice minister (1763–1767) and Amban (27.2.1761–7.3.1764). Yuning (玉寧) was vice minister (1806–1809) and Amban (3.12.1805–30.11.1808).

These figures show that a large portion of the Ambans (15 of 18) was later promoted member of the Lifanyuan.[71] In return, only a few (3 of 18) became one after having been member of the Lifanyuan, namely Baotai, Bazhong, and Boqing'e.

This state of affairs is corroborated by an archive correspondence between General Fukang'an and the *Neige* regarding the criteria for the selection of a new Amban for Tibet in 1792: After various considerations concerning officials in reserve and without seeking advice from the Lifanyuan, Fukang'an made reference to Shulian (舒濂) "who administers the affairs meticulously and understands the country's tribute situation"[72]. But Shulian died as soon as he arrived in Tibet. Fukang'an then proposed Kuilin who had been Amban before. In his favour, Kuilin showed experience in the restoration of the Taiwan Island conducted jointly with Fukang'an. In his disfavour, Kuilin was not a Buddhist. Therefore, Fukang'an decided to temporarily appoint Eldemboo, who later became Dachen in the Lifanyuan, and finally confirmed Ehui. However, as Ehui showed himself weak (*Xuruo*) and Chengde not tidy enough (*Culu*), Helin (和琳, †September 1796), recognized as meticulous (*Xixin*), was

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[67] Pufu (普福) was vice minister (1790, 1798–1800) and vice Amban (21.1.1789–30.6.1790, 30.6.–10.8.1790). Hening (和甯) was vice minister (1801, 1804–1806) and vice Amban (7.12.1793–January 1800). Hutili (瑚圖禮) was vice minister (1813) and Amban (15.12.1811–2.10.1813). Songyun (松筠) was vice minister (1832–1833) and Amban (14.8.1794–25.2.1799). Longwen (隆文) was vice minister (1834–1836) and Amban (3.12.1830–26.2.1833).

[68] Qinghui (慶惠) was vice minister for one year in 1808 and vice Amban (26.2.1811–28.4.1812).

[69] Wenkang (文康) was vice Amban (20.5.–2.8.1846).

[70] Sengge (僧格) was Dachen (1733–1738) and Amban (20.2.1727–19.2.1733). Boqing'e was Dachen (1780–1785) and Amban (4.12.1780–9.1.1785). Liu Baozhu (劉保柱) was Dachen (1785–1796) and Amban (28.10.1775–3.3.1779, 9.1.1785–10.10.1786). Kuilin (奎林) was Dachen (1776–1780) and Amban (17.10.–5.12.1791). Eldemboo (Eledengbao (額爾登保, *1748 †1805) was Dachen (1801–1802) and vice Amban (8.2.–17.12.1792).

[71] Kuilin, Qinghui, Wenkang, Pufu, Hening, Hutili, Songyun, Longwen, Huixian, Funai, Yuning, Sengge, Liu Baozhu and Eldemboo (Boqing'e enters both categories).

[72] See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 894, for the memorial of Fukang'an to the Dalai Lama, 18th February 1792.

appointed Amban jointly with Ehui.[73] The nomination of Helin corresponded to the imperial expectations that the Amban was not only diligent (*Jinchi*) with mediocre intelligence (*Zhongcai*), but a high official of the empire (*Dayuan*).[74] Although this appointment marked the beginning of the Qing restoration programme for Tibet in July–August 1792 (to be finished in April–May 1793) and reflected Emperor Qianlong's desire to exercise more control over the Tibetan administration, personal links between officials, their personalities and experience in the border management seemed to be the decisive nomination criteria rather than any affiliation with the Lifanyuan.[75]

However, Lifanyuan officials were not totally absent from the Tibetan political arena. Some were sent to Tibet for short missions, together with governmental officials. The 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, for example, while on his way back to Tibet received his seal from the ministers of the Lifanyuan (Dudali 度達禮) and the Board of Ceremonies (*Jueluo langqiu*) in 1653.[76] And when Sanggye Gyatsho (Sangs rgyas Gya mtsho) concealed the death of the 5th Dalai Lama in 1682, the emperor sent an executive member of the Lifanyuan (*Zhushi Baozhu*) to Tibet to check the matter.[77] Again, a Bureau Director of the Lifanyuan (Elai 鄂賴) was sent to Tibet in 1723.[78]

10 Conclusions

The Lifanyuan provided an institutional link between the imperial centre and the periphery of Inner Asia. For Qing officials it played an essential role in governing Tibetan affairs. The preservation of every final, Tibet-related decision in its archives underlines the Lifanyuan's administrative reference and importance for Beijing. But, the Lifanyuan was not a decision-making agency for Tibetan affairs. In order to fulfil its archival functions, the Lifanyuan was responsible for the appointment of a secretary to be in charge of the Manchu archive in the Lhasa *Yamen* of Tibet. However, the Lifanyuan duties did not include the selection and nomination of Ambans. Very few from these active Qing Ambans based in Tibet came from the Lifanyuan or had started a career there before. All of them were ethnic Manchus or Mongols, none of them was Tibetan.

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[73] Ibid., document 903, order of the *Neige*, 22nd March 1792.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Jagou, Fabienne, "Manzhou jiangjun Fu Kang'an: 1792 zhi 1793 nian Xizang zhengwu gaige de xianqu," in *Bianchen yu jiangli*, ed. Paola Calanca et al. (Peking: Zhonghua shuju: 2007), 147–167.

[76] Zahiruddin Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Rome: Ismeo, 1970), 184. *Da Qing shilu* (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1982), Shunzhi, 18th May 1653.

[77] Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations*, 305. *Da Qing shilu*, Kangxi, 28th February 1697. *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 552, 13th June 1696.

[78] Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet* (Leiden: Brill, 1950), 74. *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 610, order from the emperor, 20th March 1723.

Aside from these administrative and military aspects, the Lifanyuan was, however, competent for the ritual dimension in the relation between the Tibetan masters, both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, and the Qing Emperors. The religious life of Tibet, especially the recognition of the Tibetan master's reincarnations, the ordination of monks and the administration of some monasteries through offerings, as well as the remuneration given to Tibetan officials and monks in Beijing, was organized through and administered by the Lifanyuan, some rituals even jointly with the Libu.

The way the Qing governed Tibet finally offers an image of the Manchu understanding of and the administrative adaptation to the Tibetan dual political organization—the secular and the spiritual world. The mundane governance remained with the highest departments of the Qing government and the inner court: the *Neige*, the *Junjichu* and the emperor himself. Despite the specific policies defined for Tibet, if compared with Mongolia or Xinjiang, Tibet was controlled like any other part of the empire. The Qing spiritual administration for Tibet was more complex. The Lifanyuan exercised a large part of it and Emperor Qianlong, thanks to the Master Court and the advisor Changkya Khutugtu (lcang-skya ho-thog-thu) Rolpai Dorje (*1717 †1786), was involved himself. From a Tibetan point of view, the Lifanyuan did not exist as an institutional administrative structure. The Tibetan court's interlocutor was the emperor, no one else. As such, the 'chaplain-donor relationship' was plainly vivid. Qing agents in Tibet were seen as representatives of the emperor and were mere observers. Anyway, both party searched for its own benefits. The Tibetans benefited from the protection of the imperial army and from the Qing emperors' recognition of the high Buddhist masters granting them a high status within the empire, while the Qing succeeded to maintain Tibet under their control to achieve peace with the Mongols without much expenditure. It seems in no way excessive to add that the relations between the Dalai Lamas and the Qing emperors also resembled that of a 'bodhisattva-to-bodhisattva relationship' and that the administrative structure surrounding both was unable to corrupt this spiritual Buddhist link.

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CHAPTER 11

From Lifanyuan to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission

Mei-hua Lan

The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (*Mengzang weiyuan hui*), in short MTAC, was established in 1928 as the successor institution to the dissolved Lifanyuan. In this chapter I shall briefly show how the MTAC was related to and developed out of interrelated governmental agencies: the Lifanyuan, the *Lifanbu*, the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (*Mengzang shiwu chu*), the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (*Mengzang shiwu ju*), and the Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (*Mengzang Yuan*). Attention will also be given to the way responsibilities were organized inside the MTAC, and to the challenges it will face in the next years.

With the dissolution of the Qing empire and the foundation of the Republic of China in January 1912, China rapidly disintegrated and became politically split. Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet came under significant influence of Russia, Japan, and Britain for quite a long time. Although the two governments of northern and southern China were concerned about the situation in Inner Asia and engaging in Mongolian and Tibetan affairs, they made but little progress. It was only with the Kuomintang's victory in the Northern Expedition and the nominal unification of China in 1928 that the Nanjing government established the MTAC as a new agency authorized to deal with a set of responsibilities.

However, while the Republic of China celebrated its 100-year anniversary in 2012 only few people may have paid attention to a significant change supposed to take place in the near future in the organization of the Taiwanese government: the quiet disappearance of the MTAC and its absorption by the Mainland Affairs Council (*Dalu weiyuanhui*). It is said that only two offices will remain, dealing with Mongolian and Tibetan affairs respectively. However, due to the inefficiency of the Legislative Yuan it is still not clear how the MTAC will be eventually integrated into the Council. Nevertheless, it seems to be settled that this agency, which once succeeded the Lifanyuan, is going to complete its mission that has lasted for more than eighty-five years, and to pass into history. For the Commission, this will be a tremendous change and in some respects also for the Republic of China. The symbolic meaning of this cannot be overlooked. It indicates that the government is willing to make a compromise with *Realpolitik* and to reduce its territorial sovereignty to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Mainland China, including regions with non-Han population, will then no longer be considered part of the Republic of China.[1]

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1 The Qing's Perception of Ethnic Affairs

Counting on Mongolian help, the Manchus successfully took over Ming China and became the new ruling dynasty in 1644. Earlier, however, in spring 1636, forty-nine princes from sixteen Southern (Inner) Mongolian groups went to Mukden (Shengjing, now Shenyang), the Manchu capital, to participate in a ceremony in which Hūwangtaiji accepted a honourable title in the Chinese form (*Kuanwen rensheng huangdi*) and changed the name of his dynasty from Jin to Qing.[2] This ceremony not only symbolized the Manchu founding of the Qing dynasty, but also indicated that Inner Mongols were now all to come under Manchu rule. Hence, the Mongol Office (*Menggu yamen*) was established that same year to supervise the relationships between the Qing and the Mongols. It was renamed Lifanyuan two years later and enlarged in scope and responsibilities. In its affairs, that new office had increasingly to deal not only with Mongolia, but also with Tibet and, later, Muslim polities in the far west.[3] Inner Mongolia became an integral part of the Qing empire.

Established in 1638 as a follow-up agency to the Mongol Office, the Lifanyuan, being among the highest ranking bodies of the new Qing administration, was thus a Manchu innovation unprecedented among Chinese institutions. Its status was equal to the Six Boards, though its organization was different. There was only one president (*Shangshu*, *Chengcheng* until 1644), in contrast to the synarchy system of the Six Boards.[4] The Lifanyuan was relatively independent and communicated directly with officials positioned in Mongolia and other frontier areas, a practice which significantly eased its executive burden. When Emperor Kangxi ordered the suspension of four Chinese second-class secretaries (*Zhushi*) in 1699,[5] all Lifanyuan officials were either Manchus or Mongols. The territories of Mongolia, Tibet, and East Turkistan thus came under control of the government of the Manchus who wanted no Chinese involved in the management of Inner Asia's ethnic affairs.

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[1] Mei-hua Lan, "Mengzang weiyuan hui de cunfei wenti," *Guozheng pinglun*, May 2, 2002, http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/CL/091/CL-C-091-175.htm.

[2] *Daqing taizong wen huangdi shilu* (Taipei: Hualien chubanshe, 1964), 28/10b–17b.

[3] *Qingshi gao*, ed. Zhao Erxun (Beijing: Guoshi guan, 1928), juan 122, zhiguan zhi 2, p. 2b; *Daqing taizong wen huangdi shilu*, 42/2a.

[4] Lü Shipeng, "Qingdai de Lifanyuan, jianlun Qingdai dui meng zang hui zhuzu de tongzhi," *Donghai daxue lishi xuebao* 1 (1977): 61, 64.

The name of Lifanyuan remained unchanged until 1906 when it was transformed into a ministry and renamed Lifanbu in the course of a general administrative reform. Obviously, Inner Asia was now considered more significant in the defence of China's borderlands, so the institution dealing with Mongolian, Tibetan, Turkistan, and Qinghai affairs was upgraded. The reform included structural changes and staff rearrangements. Finally, with the cabinet reshuffle of 1911, the office of the Lifanbu's president (*Shangshu*) was renamed minister (*Dachen*), and that of its vice president (*Shilang*) deputy minister (*Fudachen*).[6] These transformations show how the Qing government tried to modernize the Lifanyuan. However, these as well as many other reforms brought but little success. The Qing Empire collapsed and when the Republic of China came into being in late 1911, Mongolia and Tibet declared their 'independence'.

2 Changing Policies Towards Mongolia

In general terms, Qing strategies in Mongolian policies were intended to use Mongolian military strength as a reserve to defend the empire's northern frontiers and to keep the Mongols from reuniting under a powerful leader. In order to control the Mongols, the government employed the banner system to restrict migration between banners. The Qing established administrative bodies of various levels, secured the loyalty of the Mongolian nobles with a system of hierarchical ranks, titles, salaries, rewards, and marriage alliances, and created a system of control and punishment to keep the Mongolian princes in check. For a long time, the Qing tried to shield the Mongols from Chinese influence and exploitation in order to prevent possible alliances between the two nations, and they limited Chinese immigration to a level which would not provoke Mongolian resentment.

Early Qing policies towards Mongolia were successful, and the situation there was relatively peaceful. Nevertheless, as the Manchu dynasty evolved into a Chinese-style regime and was dragged into international maritime entanglements, the role of the Mongols became less important. As a result, the Qing began to increasingly pay attention to the Han-Chinese population, thereby altering their relations towards the Mongols. Additionally, as the dramatic increase of the Chinese population put a strain on land resources in central China, more and more people were forced to migrate to Manchuria or Mongolia to survive. The increasing presence of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia required the government to consolidate its control in the regions to fend off these new pressures. All these factors led to a change in Qing policy towards Mongolia. The court officially abolished the prohibition of Han-Chinese in-migration and began to actively enforce a new kind of administration in Mongolia. This aroused strong opposition among the pressured Inner Mongols. The Khalkha Mongols of Outer Mongolia, to whom the Qing had previously left more administrative power than to the Inner Mongolian groups, felt even more provoked by the aggressive colonialist approach and decided to seek independence in 1911. After several months of preparation, the Mongolian state officially came into being with the appointment of the 8th Jibzundamba Khutugtu (*1869 †1924) as supreme ruler (Bogda Khan) in December 1911.

3 Institutional Reorganizations after 1912

While attempting to persuade Outer Mongolia to abandon its independence, the Beijing government also tried to retain control over Inner Mongolia and to prevent the Inner Mongols from joining or supporting Urga's struggle for independence. One of its first steps to achieve this was to familiarize the Mongols with the idea of a republic. The term *Lifan* was considered inconsistent with Sun Yatsen's concept of the Republic of Five Nationalities (*Wuzu gonghe*). Following the principle of equality of Han-Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans, the republican government decided that Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang should no longer be treated as dependencies, and that their affairs should be governed by the Interior Ministry (*Neiwubu*). The fact that only Mongolia and Tibet were provided with a special administrative status after East Turkistan had been turned into a province called Xinjiang in 1884 was also taken into consideration. Therefore, on April 21, 1912 Yuan Shikai, President of the Republic of China (1912–1915), formally ordered the Lifanyuan to be abolished and its responsibilities assumed by the Interior Ministry where the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was established the next day.[7]

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[5] *Huangchao wenxien tongkao*, in *Yingyin Wenyuange sikuquanshu, shibu* 391, zhengshu lei (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1984), 82/3a.

[6] Zhao Yuntian, "Qingdai de lifan zhidu," *Zhonghua Wenhua Wang*, ttp://www.qinghistory.cn/qsyj/ztyj/ztyjzz/ 2009-11-13/4362.shtml#_edn13.

[7] *Linshi gongbao*, April 24, 1912, gongchi.

In July, this office was reorganized as the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (*Mengzang shiwu ju*) and upgraded to be directly under the supervision of the Prime Minister.[8] In September, Beijing appointed the progressive Inner Mongolian Gungsangnorbu Wang (*1871 †1930), ruler of the Kharachin Mongols, head of the Bureau.[9] In May 1914, this institution was once more upgraded into the Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (*Mengzang shiwu yuan* or *Mengzang Yuan*) under the direct supervision of the President. Gungsangnorbu remained its head.[10] This renaming and the change of formats from Lifanyuan to *Mengzang Yuan* also reflect the evolution of China's governing concept regarding Mongolia and Tibet. After the transformation from Lifanbu into the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, this agency was considered more and more important and was upgraded twice.

The Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs consisted of a Counsellor's Office (*Canshi shi*), a Secretary's Office (*Mishu shi*), the Department of General Affairs (*Zongwu ting*), and two Departments (*Si*). The First Department was in charge of civic affairs (*Minzhi*), economic affairs (*Chuanye*), and frontier defence (*Bianfang*); the Second Department was in charge of personnel (*Fengxu*), religion, and ceremony. The First Department, thus, dealt with the affairs concerning Mongolian and Tibetan lands, the Second Department with the affairs of the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples, especially their rulers and lamas.[11] The duties of the Second Department included some that were formerly handled by the Lifanyuan.

Besides name, structure, and area of responsibility Eastern Turkistan was no longer included there was still another obvious difference between the Lifanyuan and the *Mengzang Yuan*. According to the *Encyclopaedia on Institutions of the Great Qing* (*Daqing huidian*), the major duties of the Lifanyuan were related to the implementation of governmental orders and punishments, the bestowal of official titles and remunerations, and the organisation of imperial audiences, all of which concerned the nobility and the people of the border regions.[12] The duties of the *Mengzang Yuan*, on the other hand, were clearly divided into two parts: affairs regarding the Mongolian and Tibetan regions and those regarding the Mongolian and Tibetan people. This shift in policy focus from people to both land and people indicates the continuity and change of the two agencies.

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[8] *Zhengfu gongbao*, July 25, 1912, no. 86, falü.

[9] Ibid., September 10, 1912, no. 133, mingling.

[10] *Xinhai ihou shiqi nien zhiguan nienbiao*, ed. Liu Shoulin (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1974), 8, 110.

[11] *Mengzang weiyuan hui jianshi*, ed. Mengzang weiyuan hui (Taipei: Mengzang weiyuan hui, 1971), 9–10.

[12] Qinding daqing huidian (Jiaqing chao), in *Jindai zhongguo shiliao congkan sanbian*, ji 64, ed. Tuojin et al. (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1992), 49/1a.

Despite its heightened significance, the *Mengzang Yuan* could not improve Beijing's governance in Mongolia and Tibet because China was paralyzed by the warlords' struggle for power, and unable to pay much attention to the situation in the border regions. Russia, Japan, and Britain seized the chance to strengthen their control in Outer and Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Although diplomatic disputes with the imperial powers increased, the *Mengzang Yuan* was unable to handle such problems.

4 Establishing the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission

While successfully unifying China, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) moved the capital from Beijing to Nanjing in April 1927 and launched plans to establish the MTAC. In January 1928, the nationalist government appointed Zhang Ji (*1882 †1947)[13] together with six commissioners, three of them as executives, to make preparations for the establishment of the MTAC. However, being occupied with other things the commissioners made little progress though they often met for discussion. The government decided to make the MTAC a single-headed agency when it appointed General Yan Xishan (*1883 †1960) chairman (*Weiyuanzhang*) of the MTAC on December 18 and Zhao Daiwen (*1867 †1943)[14] his deputy being in charge of administrative affairs. The number of the commissioners was increased to eleven, more than half of which were Mongols and Tibetans.

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[13] Zhang Ji (张继) was an important figure in the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the Kuomintang. He became engaged in politics after 1900 and was a favourite of the revolutionary public opinion. In the young Republic of China he was elected speaker of the first senate (*Canyiyuan*) in 1913, and later participated with Sun Yatsen in the movement fighting against Yuan Shikai's restoration. In 1924 he was elected member of the Kuomintang supervision committee. After the Northern Expedition Zhang Ji became first vice president and, in 1932, president of the Legislative Yuan, though he did not assume the office. In the latter part of his life, he participated in writing the history of the Kuomintang and the Republic of China and served as head of the Academia Historica (Bureau of National History, *Guoshi guan*).

[14] Zhao Daiwen (赵戴文) was a trusted aide of Yan Xishan. With the recommendation of Yan, he served as the deputy chairman of the MTAC, (deputy) minister of the interior, and president of the Control Yuan (1929–1930).

The MTAC began its official duties under the supervision of the Executive Yuan on December 27, 1928. It consisted of a Department of General Affairs, a Counsellor's Office, a Secretary's Office, a Compilation and Translation Office, an Investigation Office, a Department of Mongolian Affairs, a Department of Tibetan Affairs, and a Committee of Mongolian and Tibetan Education. A branch office was set up in Beijing. Included were also a Mongolian and a Tibetan school in Beijing, a guest house, a political training class, a newspaper called *Mongolian and Tibetan Ten-Day Newspaper* (*Mengzang xunbao*, later renamed *Mongolian and Tibetan Monthly, Mengzang yuekan*), a news agency in India, and four offices for managing relay stations in Kalgan (Zhangjiakou), Shahukou, Gubeikou, and Xifengkou. The MTAC heads and commissioners took the oath of office on January 5, 1929.[15]

According to former MTAC staff member Yang Jiaming, however, there had been considerations from the onset to appoint a president (*Zhuxi*) or later a group of executive committee members (*Changwei*) to head the MTAC. Based on its law on organization promulgated on March 30, 1928, the MTAC was then formed with five or seven commission members, one of whom served as president. On June 8, the number of commission members was increased to seven or nine all nominated by the government, with three of them representing the executive committee performing presidential duties. In December, the 168th meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang decided to again increase the number of commission members to nine or thirteen and finally adapted the organizational form to the chairman (*Weiyuanzhang*) model.[16]

5 The MTAC's Responsibilities and Institutional Continuities

In the early 1990s, when the indigenous rights movement unfolded its activities more vigorously in Taiwan, proposals were made to establish a governmental agency to take charge of the affairs concerning the aboriginal people. The MTAC got unexpectedly embroiled in the discussion when confronted with suggestions that it should be reorganized into a commission dealing with all ethnic minorities, not just with Mongols and Tibetans. Suggestions went even to the point of abolishing the MTAC and replacing it with a commission that dealt only with Taiwan's aboriginal people.

Legitimatizing the existence of the MTAC and in order to maintain its organizational structure, Liu Xueyao, chief secretary for many years, had to explain how the MTAC was established and what its central functions are. In his opinion, the MTAC is a governmental agency dealing with the local administration of the Mongolian and Tibetan regions (two special regions different from regular provinces), not with the affairs of the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples. Hence, Liu Xueyao argued that it would be a misunderstanding of responsibilities to follow suggestions that the MTAC should deal with other ethnic minorities. To replace the MTAC with a commission dealing with aboriginal people would simply be not in accordance with the law.[17]

The law on organization of March 1928 defined the functions of the MTAC as follows:

1. to examine critically the administrative affairs of Mongolia and Tibet,
2. to sketch various reform plans for Mongolia and Tibet.

There were to be three sections in the MTAC: the Secretariat, a Department of Mongolian Affairs, and a Department of Tibetan Affairs. On February 7, 1929, a new version of the law on organization was promulgated. Here, the terms 'examine critically' (*Shenyi*) and 'sketch reform plans' (*Jihua*) were abandoned and replaced with 'be in control of' (*Zhangli*). The MTAC had become a governmental agency with practical power.[18]

Besides, according to the fourteenth clause of the law on organization from March 1928, the term *Mengzang* refers to two special regions: Mongolia and Tibet.[19] The business affairs of the MTAC thus covered only part of the land inhabited by the Mongols and Tibetans. However, this clause was likewise eliminated in the revised version of February 1929, which extended the responsibilities of the MTAC beyond Mongolia and Tibet.[20] Although the MTAC bore only these two regions in its name, its sphere of activity was, as a matter of fact, not limited to Mongolia and Tibet but also included Xinjiang and the Muslim peoples, resembling actually the Lifanyuan responsibilities, at least spatially.[21]

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[15] *Mengzang weiyuan hui jianshi*, 13.

[16] Yang Jiaming, "Mengzang weiyuan hui zhi shezhi yu chuqi tizhi biange," *Mengzang jikan* 18,2 (2009): 28–33. For the law on organization promulgated on March 30, 1928, see *Guomin zhengfu gongbao*, 45 (March 1928): 15–6.

[17] Liu Xueyao, *Mengzang weiyuan hui zhi shezhi jiqi yiyi* (Taipei: Mengzang weiyuan hui, 1992), 1–2, 8–18.

[18] Yang Jiaming, "Mengzang weiyuan hui zhi shezhi yu chuqi tizhi biange," 33.

[19] *Guomin zhengfu gongbao* 45 (March 1928): 15–6.

[20] Yang Jiaming, "Mengzang weiyuan hui zhi shezhi yu chuqi tizhi biange," 33, 36.

[21] Ibid., 34; *Mengzang weiyuan hui jianshi*, 77.

According to Kong Xiangxi (*1881 †1967), then Minister of Industry and Commerce in the Nanjing nationalist government (1928–1931), who gave a speech at the Mongol Conference (*Menggu huiyi*) held in Nanjing in 1930 from May 29 to June 12, the government deliberately established a commission, not a ministry, to take charge of the Mongolian and Tibetan affairs. Obviously, a commission could benefit from mutual discussions where the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples would have better opportunities to express their perspectives while a ministry led by a few people could not provide such options.[22]

In July 1933, Prince Demchugdongrub (De Wang 德王, *1902 †1966), leader of the Inner Mongolian autonomy movement, held an important conference for autonomy in Beile-yin Sume[23] calling for a unified Inner Mongolian autonomous government with a high degree of autonomy. At that time, both the Manchu and Muslim peoples asked for the establishment of a governmental agency that could serve as a platform for their participation in political affairs. The Kuomintang reacted to this request by means of reforming the MTAC and tried to meet the demand for establishing a Commission for Nationalities (*Minzu weiyuanhui*).

Chairman of the MTAC Shi Qingyang (1931–1935) suggested to transform the MTAC into a Ministry of Frontier Affairs (*Bianwu Bu*), consisting of four bureaus to deal with Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. Dai Jitao (*1891 †1949), then chairman of the Central Committee of the Readjustment of Administrative Laws and Ordinances (*Zhongyang xingzheng fagui zhengli weiyuanhui*) and President of the Examination Yuan (1928–1948), agreed to this proposal. Bai Yunti (*1894 †1980), a leading political figure from Inner Mongolia whose Mongolian name was Serengdongrub, also reacted in a positive way to the reorganization of the MTAC. However, due to budget and personnel constraints this plan was not carried out. Both Shi Qingyang and Dai Jitao focused on regions, not on peoples or on ethnic groups. To consider the political participation of various non-Han-Chinese groups from the perspective of administrative regions and not of ethnic origin had been a central principle of the Kuomintang for a long time.[24]

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[22] *Mengzang weiyuan hui jianshi*, 63.

[23] Also known as Bailing miao, Pailingmiao, Bat Khaalga, or Bathahalak; cf. Uradyn Erden Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China's Mongolian Frontier* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 86–94.

[24] Bai Yunti (白云梯) joined the Kuomintang in 1919 and held many important posts in that party as well as in the nationalist government, particularly with regard to affairs of Mongolia. He was a member of the Mongol Local Autonomy Political Affairs Committee

Yang Siji also concedes that the responsibility of the MTAC, based on the fourteenth clause of the law on organization from 1928, was originally designed to be limited to Mongolian and Tibetan regions. However, as more and more people approached the MTAC in the 1930s about becoming organized in a commission for ethnic affairs, the commission's obligations were no longer limited to regional administrative aspects, but included matters of Mongolian and Tibetan peoples.[25]

Following the inauguration in early 1929, the MTAC issued two documents: a policy outline with procedures (*Shizheng gangling ji jinxing chengxu*) and a timetable with work instructions (*Xunzheng gongzuo fenpei nianbiao*). Reading through these documents, it is sometimes hard to tell which part of the MTAC's duties was related to the regional and which to the ethnic sphere. The assignment of responsibilities consisted of various points:

- give award to princes and nobles who abandoned their titles on their own initiative,
- instruct schools in China to admit Mongolian and Tibetan students free of charge and without taking an entrance examination,
- send Mongolian and Tibetan students to both Central and Beiping (Beijing) Universities,
- encourage intermarriages between Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chinese peoples,
- and regulate how Mongolian and Tibetan young men could be admitted to the central military academy, etc.[26]

The princes and nobles mentioned here were surely from Mongolia and Tibet. But how do we know whether they were ethnically Mongolians and Tibetans or rather came from Mongolia and Tibet? In practice, these objectives were not only regional, but also ethnic issues.

After the nationalist government had moved to Taiwan in 1949, it lost control over Mongolia and Tibet. The main groups actually served by the MTAC were the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples. From its official agenda and the work instructions we know that sending Mongols and Tibetans to study at universities and military academies in central China was part of the MTAC policy, which thus contrasted significantly with imperial times and Lifanyuan policies.

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since 1934 and MTAC chairman (1948–1949); cf. Yang Siji, "20 shiji 30 niandai neimeng zizhi shengzhong mengzang weiyuan hui gaizu zouyi," *Minzu yanjiu* 5 (2010): 96–102.

[25] Ibid., 102–3.

[26] *Mengzang weiyuan hui jianshi*, 14, 18, 39, 42–3, 49.

6 Instead of a Conclusion: A Preliminary Comparison of MTAC and Lifanyuan

If we now compare the organizational forms, functions, and responsibilities of the Lifanyuan with those of the MTAC from the Nanjing decade (1927–1937), a couple of differences become apparent:

1.) The Lifanyuan treated the Mongols and Tibetans as subjects of dependencies (*Fan*), while the MTAC addressed them as members of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) that consisted of Han-Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans. That is why the republican government ultimately changed the name of the Lifanyuan into *Mengzang weiyuan hui*, being first an office, then a bureau, a board, and a commission of Mongolian and Tibetan affairs.

2.) The Lifanyuan was an imperial agency dealing with frontier affairs during the Qing dynasty while the MTAC was an office of the central government administering the regions of Mongolia and Tibet.

3.) The Lifanyuan took charge of affairs of all leagues and banners of Mongolia, as well as of Tibet and Xinjiang, while the MTAC was concerned with regions where only part of the Mongolian and Tibetan peoples lived.

4.) The presidents and vice presidents of the Lifanyuan were either Mongols or Manchus. Besides, staff members of Mongolian archives were also all Mongols, while Chinese archives were staffed by either Manchus or Chinese; all other staff members were either Mongols or Manchus. In contrast, staff members of the MTAC consisted of Han-Chinese, Mongols or Tibetans, and its chairs were either Han-Chinese or Mongols.

5.) The scope of Lifanyuan responsibilities included imperial orders, official titles and remunerations, audiences with the emperor, as well as punishments concerning the nobility and lamas. The duties of the MTAC were originally said to be not different from those of the Lifanyuan;[27] in reality, however, the MTAC's affairs were more limited.

6.) The Lifanyuan depended significantly on close relations between the Manchu and Mongolian nobility based on intermarriages. It also cultivated friendly relations with Tibetan high lamas who exercised great influence, not only over Tibetan but also over Mongolian commoners. In contrast again, the MTAC did not develop such relations and was opposed to the idea to involve lamas in affairs of national level.

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[27] *Archives of the MTAC Organizational Statutes*, Academia Historica, no. 0010120712351432 (September 20, 1928).

7.) The Lifanyuan was a powerful governmental agency that held tremendous influence over its subjects, whereas the republican government never had full control over Mongolia and Tibet since East Mongolia was under the influence of Japan and Tibet under the influence of England at that time. The actual power of the MTAC was, therefore, rather limited, a situation that was further complicated by the way responsibilities and competencies were settled among central governmental agencies.[28]

It becomes obvious even from this preliminary comparison that, although it was clearly a successor to the Lifanyuan and its succeeding agencies, the MTAC was restrained by historical and political realities from the very beginning. It was unable to develop its intended functions, and the role it could play was thus far more insignificant than that of the Lifanyuan.

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CHAPTER 12

Clashes of Administrative Nationalisms: Banners and Leagues vs. Counties and Provinces in Inner Mongolia

Uradyn E. Bulag

1 Towards an Interactive Approach to Administrative Nationalism

Administering culturally differentiated populations is an age-old problem confronting not only colonial empires but also nation-states. Colonial empires put unrelated peoples in one single state, usually deliberately, but try to keep them away from the European metropolises. Nation-states with different ethnic groups, on the other hand, aspire for cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Both types of polity tend to classify peoples according to putative ideas of culture, investing them with ideas of difference or affinity, demarcating their cultural and territorial boundaries, but not always neatly. Neither has been successful in keeping the populations imprisoned in their colonial or national territories. Ethnic mixing has led to cultural and racial hybridity; transnational migrations have threatened national sovereignty; and empires have struck back, with millions of people from colonies settling in the European metropolises. Today, instead of a borderless world, borders have become more significant.[1]

During the Qing Empire, Inner Asia and China came under a composite state, but they were divided and ruled in separate administrative systems. In this chapter, I will discuss the banner (*Khoshuu*) and league (*Chuulgan*) system introduced by the Qing in Mongolia in relation to the county (*Xian*) and province (*Sheng*) system implemented in inland China among the Han Chinese. While banners and leagues were a territorial administrative system instituted on the basis of Mongol traditions, they served to keep the Mongols separate from the Chinese in the very process of bringing the two peoples under the same composite state.[2]

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[1] See Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson. *Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State.* Oxford: Berg, 1999. I would like to sincerely thank Dittmar Schorkowitz and Chia Ning for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

[2] Territorially, the Mongols were segregated from the Chinese by the Great Wall and the Willow Palisade, and the boundaries were demarcated to prevent movement between

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Nicola Di Cosmo has argued that the Inner Asian territories including Mongolia were 'colonies' acquired by the Qing through conquest, not unlike European overseas colonies, and the Lifanyuan was to administer these colonies separately from the Chinese heartland.[3] Like European colonizers, the Manchu conquerors also appear to have subscribed to what Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler call a 'grammar of difference'[4] between the Mongols and the Chinese. While I agree with this view in principle, I suggest that the resettlement of large numbers of Chinese famine refugees in Mongolia and the need to administer them from as early as the late 18th century severely challenged the *raison d'être* of the banner and league system, thereby constituting the basic tensions of the Qing empire in Inner Asia. The waning of Qing power towards the end of the 19th century in the face of external threat from European and Japanese powers saw not only a Manchu alignment with Chinese interests, but also the promotion of counties and provinces at the expense of banners and leagues, whereby the Chinese nationalist logic began to trump the Manchu imperial imperative. Thus, a key to understanding Qing administrative institutions in Inner Asia lies as much in identifying their distinctive features as in exploring how and whether the Mongols and Chinese could be kept separate.

This chapter adopts an interactive approach by putting the banner and league system and the county and province system in the same political 'field' of the composite state mediated by the centre (imperial, national, or 'third party').[5] In the dynamic interaction or competition, the two systems have become 'regimes of value'[6] with affective value investment made by the two sides, i.e., the Mongols defend the banner and league system as 'Mongolian' just as the Chinese promote the county and province system as 'Chinese'. The clash between the Mongols and Chinese since the late 19th century has been as much about the ethnic identity of the administrative systems as about political identities produced by these systems: Chinese were known to Mongols as civilians (Mo. *Irgen*, Chin. *Minren*) as opposed to 'Mongol', a political identity defined by the Lifanyuan-managed legal-administrative institutions of banners and leagues.[7] The irony is that 'province' was in fact a Mongolian invention in the first place, and banners and leagues were Manchu administrative institutions though modified after the original Mongol institutions. I thus attempt to capture this 'irony' of Mongolian nationalism imbedded in the administrative entanglement which emanated from the Qing era, an approach that helps to better understand the political impulse of the successive Chinese governments, and the intervening Manchukuo (1932–1945) established by the Japanese, to transform the Mongolian administrative systems of banner and league to accommodate Chinese settlers.

2 Tensions of Empire: Juxtaposition of Mongolian Banners and Chinese Counties

The banner and league system, insofar as it is an Inner Asian polity, must be put in a larger historical context of the Inner Asian conquest of China and the administration of the Chinese population. To the extent that the Mongol Yuan

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banners. See Uradyn Erden Bulag, "Rethinking Borders in Empire and Nation at the Foot of the Willow Palisade," in *Frontier Encounters: Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese and Mongolian Border*, ed. Franck Billé et al. (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2012).

[3] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998); see also Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan of the Early Qing Dynasty" (PhD diss., the Johns Hopkins University, 1992), and Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)," *Late Imperial China* 14,1 (1993).

[4] *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

[5] Here I follow the classical approach advanced by Max Gluckman in his *Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940) where he argued that Zulu and whites, however much they were opposed in terms of political interests, have to be seen as part of a single field of social relations.

[6] For the notion of 'regimes of value', referring to ways whereby value is constructed by and invested in material objects, see Arjun Appadurai, "Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value," in *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[7] It is generally agreed that the Qing court was not interested in ethnic assimilation and that the Lifanyuan's administrative and legal management of various ethnic groups contributed to the formation of political nationalities in modern China. See Chia Ning, *Lifanyuan and the Management of Population Diversity in Early Qing (1636–1795)* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012); Pamela Kyle Crossley, "Making Mongols," in *Empire at the Margins. Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, *State Authority Contested along Jurisdictional Boundaries: Qing Legal Policy Towards the Mongols in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2012). This is remarkably similar to the European and Soviet practices of managing their colonial empires. See Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Günther Schlee, *Territorialising Ethnicity: the Political Ecology of Pastoralism in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2010); Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Yuri Slezkine, "The Soviet Union as a Communal Apartment, or how a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," in *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000).

and Manchu Qing were conquest dynasties encompassing multi-ethnic populations, their primary principle was 'to govern in accordance with the customs of the targeted population' (*Yinsu er zhi*). Political identities are, thus, products of composite states of all ages, not just those of modern colonialism practiced by Europeans and of nation-states as conventional wisdom maintains.

During the Yuan dynasty which ruled over Inner Asia, China, the Southwestern and North-western highland frontiers, the Mongols introduced two unique administrative systems: the native chieftain system (*Tusi*), applied to non-Chinese peoples in Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and Gansu,[8] and the province (*Xingsheng*),[9] an unit above the traditional prefecture (*Jun*) and county (*Xian*), both of which have become part of modern China's administration. *Jun* and *Xian* were local units, part of a centralised Chinese bureaucracy controlled by the court, but based on ecological conditions; they had the tendency of localisation.[10] *Xingsheng* combined the formerly separate prefectures and counties into one administrative unit; the localising impulse of *Jun* and *Xian* was further offset by centrally appointed administrative and military governors (usually Mongols or their allies, the *Semu* people from Western or Central Asia). Furthermore, centrally appointed Mongol Darughachi[11] replaced former

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[8] John E. Herman, "The Cant of Conquest: Tusi Offices and China's Incorporation of the Southwest Frontier," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Jennifer Took, *A Native Chieftaincy in Southwest China: Franchising a Tai Chieftaincy under the Tusi System of Late Imperial China* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2005). There is consensus among Chinese scholars that the *tusi* system in Yunnan, Guanxi and the north-western regions was established in the Yuan period, see: Du Yuting, "Shilun Yunnan Tusi Zhidu Yanjiu zhong de jige Wenti," *Xueshu Yanjiu* 1 (1964); Wu Yongzhang, "Qingdai Guangxi Tusi Zhidu," *Xueshu Yanjiu* 4 (1984); Gao Shirong, *Xibei Tusi Zhidu Yanjiu* (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 1999).

[9] *Xingsheng* is an abbreviation of *Xing zhongshu sheng*, meaning a branch secretariat of *Zhongshu sheng*, central secretariat of the Mongol Khan. Later, it was simplified as *Sheng* and has become the name for province. For a study of the provincial system, see Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); Li Zhi'an, *Xingsheng Zhidu Yanjiu* (Tianjin: Nankai Daxue Chubanshe, 2000); John Fitzgerald, "The Province in History," in *Rethinking China's Provinces*, ed. John Fitzgerald (London: Routledge, 2002); John Donaldson, "Provinces: Paradoxical Politics, Problematic Partners," in *China's Local Administration: Traditions and Changes in the Sub-national Hierarchy*, ed. Jae Ho Chung et al. (London: Routledge, 2010).

[10] Li Zhi'an, *Xingsheng Zhidu Yanjiu*, 520.

[11] Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule*. See also Vásáry who discussed the term *daruga* in the Golden Horde as a Mongol territorial/administrative leader with a special authority to

county magistrates who were locals. What transpired here is that the province was intended to exert military and external control over local administrations.[12]

During the Yuan, the Mongol homeland *Lingbei* which coincides roughly with today's Mongolia and the north-eastern part of Inner Mongolia was also administered as *Xingsheng*, set up in 1307, and those who migrated southward were administered in *Gol-un Ulus* (Chin. *Fuli*) under the jurisdiction of the Khan's central secretariat (*Zhongshu sheng*) which covered today's Inner Mongolia and areas surrounding Beijing: Hebei, Shaanxi and Shandong. To be sure, the privileges of the Mongol nobility made *Gol-un Ulus* and *Lingbei Xingsheng* different from other *Xingsheng*s, but what I wish to highlight here is the Mongol origin of the provincial system and the fact that the Mongols were administered in this system as were the Chinese. The administrative difference was reserved for non-Mongol and non-Chinese peoples.

After the collapse of the Yuan dynasty and being pushed out of China, the Mongols abandoned the provincial system as they fragmented into a loose confederation. The ensuing Ming dynasty replaced the *Xingsheng* by the Administration Commission (*Chengxuan buzheng shisi*) but retained the centralized military and political control of local regions being a central feature of the province. Indeed, the name *Sheng* persisted informally, and the *Tusi* system survived too, although the Ming tried to abolish it later to integrate far-flung regions.

The Qing, again, revived the *Xingsheng* but turned it into an administrative system for the Chinese with Manchu control, while they organised themselves into a unique military eight-banner system which set them apart from the Mongol precedent in ruling a multi-ethnic empire. The Qing initially organized their territory into three large ethnic categories: *Mengdi* (Mongol land),

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collect taxes from conquered and ruled lands and peoples divided into various levels of administration. István Vásáry, "The Golden Horde Term *daruga* and its Survival in Russia," *Acta Orientalia Hungarica* 30 (1976).

[12] Hong Fu, in an influential article proposing a readjustment of provincial regions in China, argued that the province was the "remnant of a medieval colonial system"; a provincial region, in his view, was a "military controlled region, controlling military resources to support garrison army in order to suppress the local regions." Hong Fu, "Chonghua Shengqu Fang'an Chuyi," *Dongfang Zazhi* 43,6 (1947): 1. Qian Mu, one of modern China's leading political thinkers, argued as early as in 1955 that the term *xingsheng* or *sheng* must be abolished, being a foreign imposition on China and a representation of central control. In other words, the 'province' was not perceived as an administrative unit, but as an agency of the *zhongshu sheng* for military and economic control over local regions. See Qian Mu, *Zhongguo Lidai Zhengzhi Deshi* (Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian, 1955/2001, 116–7, cf. also 120–1.

Qidi (Eight banner land), and *Mindi* (civilian land), i.e. 'China Proper'. Each category of people was administered separately from the other.[13] The Lifanyuan was in charge of the Mongol banner (*Khoshuu*) and league (*Chuulgan*) system which was built on the Mongol territorial divisions of *Aimag, Otog, Tumen*, and *Ulus*, and it may even have Mongol origin, as these institutions (*Khoshuu, Chuulgan*) can be found in 16th-century Mongolian sources.[14] In Qing time, the *Khoshuu*, built on the appanage of nobilities, became the basic Mongolian unit headed by a *Jasag*. *Chuulgan* was a higher semi-administrative unit controlling several banners. Headed by a league chief appointed by the emperor through the Lifanyuan, a *Chuulgan* assembly was convened every three years for the purpose of dealing with legal cases and inspecting the military preparedness of the banners.[15] While most of the banners were headed by a nobility who enjoyed considerable autonomy, some banners, such as the Chakhar, Tümed, Butha and others, were organized on the principle of the eight-banner system. As professional military units, their leaders were mostly court-appointed Manchus or Mongols from the Mongol eight banners. They were controlled by a Qing General-in-chief (Jiangjun), by military lieutenant governors (Dutong), and the Imperial resident (Amban). They were not subject to any leagues nor to the Lifanyuan.[16] These two kinds of territorial banners were further to be distinguished from the Mongolian eight banners, which were imperial army units garrisoned in the capital and throughout the empire. In this chapter, however, we are concerned with the autonomous *Jasag* banners and non-autonomous banners within Mongolia, especially Inner Mongolia, bordering inland China.

The autonomous Mongol banner system differed from the county and province system in one fundamental aspect: the legal position of its subjects (*khariatu*) who were usually bondservants (*albatu*) performing various military and economic duties for the banners, their amount set by the Lifanyuan. The banner nobility of various ranks then performed military and tributary

duties for the emperor. The Chinese subjects in a county, on the other hand, were civilians and legally required to pay taxes to the Qing state through county magistrates who were appointed by the court. This institutional and legal difference between Mongol banners and Chinese counties set the Mongols apart from the Chinese, as the Lifanyuan laws prohibited Mongols from marrying Chinese, learning the Chinese language, or even hiring Chinese scribes.[17] With borders drawn between Mongol banners and between Mongolia and inland China, which were regularly patrolled, trespassing borders was a severely punishable crime.

This territorial administrative particularism was largely successful in preventing inter-banner migration,[18] but its record of keeping the Mongols and Chinese separate was poor. From the very beginning, the Qing had to mediate between a growing pressure from the Chinese to move north for land and the demand of Mongol nobles for hiring Chinese labourers, while maintaining the segregation policy. During the Kangxi era, each year eight hundred passports were officially issued to Chinese labourers to cross the border into Mongolia. In fact, the figure was much higher, as in June 1712, when Emperor Kangxi noted:

> As many as one hundred thousand civilians from Shandong have gone beyond the Pass for cultivation. These are all my common people, since they have gone beyond the Pass to make a living by cultivating land, where else can you let them go except to shelter them? But if they are not checked carefully, they will all become Mongols.[19]

In the first and second year of Yongzheng's reign, when a famine struck the Zhili (present-day Hebei) and Shandong regions, the emperor passed a decree encouraging the famine refugees to enter Mongolia to make a living, granting them tax relief should they wish to migrate. This decree of borrowing Mongol land to feed Han Chinese (*Jiedi yangmin ling*) brought almost a million Chinese into Mongolia, granting them cultivation rights while acknowledging the Mongol land tenure. According to Mongol archival data, in the regions of

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[13] Wang Jian'ge, "Qingdai Mengdi de Zhanyouquan, Gengzhonquan yu Menghan Guanxi," *Zhongguo Shehui Jingjishi Yanjiu* 3 (2003). Song Ling, "Cong Acheng Dang'an kan Qingdai dui Dongbei Qiren Tudi Quanli de Baohu," *Guizhou Minzu Yanjiu* 6 (2008).

[14] The term *khoshuu* was used for administrative units already in the mid-16th century. When Geresenje Jalair Khung-Taiji (*1513 †1548), the youngest son of Batu-Mönke Dayan Khan (*1464 †1543), died, he allocated his land and people to his seven sons, and the seven appanages were called *khoshuu*. Hiroshi Futaki, "Shirakaba hōten ni tsuite," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 21 (1981): 52.

[15] Heuschert-Laage, "State Authority Contested," 14.

[16] Zhang Yongjiang, *Qingdai Fanbu Yanjiu: Yi Zhengzhi Bianqian wei Zhongxin* (Harbin: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2001), 190–1.

[17] *Lifanyuan Zeli* (Hailaer: Nei Menggu Wenhua Chubanshe, 1998), 249, 365.

[18] For modern Mongol inter-banner migrations, see Burensain Borjigin, *Jinxiandai Menggu Ren Nonggeng Cunluo Shehui de Xingcheng*, trans. Narangerel (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Daxue Chubanshe, 2007); Zhu Sa, *18–20 Shiji chu Dongbu Nei Menggu Nonggen Cunluo Hua Yanjiu* (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 2009); Tong Shuangxi, "Early Mongols Northward Migration and the Mongol Society," *Menggu Xue Jikan* 3 (2011).

[19] *Qingshengzu Shilu*, vol. 250, Kangxi 51 nian 5 yue ren yin (23 June 1712).

Rehe (Jehol) and Kharachin banners alone more than half a million Chinese had settled in the first decade of the Yongzheng era.[20]

In permitting the famine-stricken Chinese into Mongolia, the Qing authority attempted to release pressure upon itself, but the court was equally afraid that their resettlement might strengthen Mongol power. Moreover, their service for a Mongol nobility would cause a loss of revenue for the government. Thus, instead of allowing the Mongol banners to absorb and naturalise these settlers, in 1738 the Qing established a sub-prefecture (*Tazigou ting*) in the Kharachin Left banner to administer the Chinese for taxing purposes, and it was turned into Jianchang county (*Xian*) in 1778. A year earlier, the Qing had set up a prefecture-level outpost agency, the *Guisui* Circuit (*Dao*) in today's Hohhot region, to administer Chinese peasants resettled from inland China to cultivate Mongolian land. In the 53rd year of Qianlong's reign (1789), the government was setting up five *Ting*s under *Guisui Dao*: in Guihua, Salaqi, Tuoketuo, Helinge'er and Qingshuihe. Most interestingly, these prefectures and sub-prefectures were jurisdictionally under neighbouring provinces, as *Guisui* Circuit belonged to Shaanxi province. By 1906, 12 *Tings* were set up in today's central Inner Mongolia, and they were all subsequently upgraded to counties.[21]

The establishment of these sub-prefectures and counties on Mongol land meant that one single banner territory had two administrations, banner and county, and that provincial authorities outside of Mongolia had the power to administer Chinese in Mongolia while the Mongol nobility had not. This dual system in Mongolia is habitually called *Qixian bingcun, Menghan fenzhi*, i.e. the territorial superposition of banner and county, but separate administration for Mongolian and Chinese subjects. In many cases, Chinese families settled around Mongol families, which led to ethnically mixed communities. The two separate administrations for different ethnic groups living on the same territory followed the principle of *lex personalis*: the Mongols were governed and taxed on the basis of banners, the Chinese on the basis of counties—a recipe for ethnic conflict.

It should be noted that the invention of the dual system in Mongolia coincided with the Qing programme of *Gaitu guiliu* in the southwest (including the Kham regions of Tibet), though it may not initially have followed the same logic. *Gaitu guiliu* was a policy to abolish the native chieftainship and to bring the non-Chinese regions under the county and province system with appointed officials.[22] Setting up counties and prefectures in those regions was seen as an effective way to control native chieftains who became more rebellious, and to increase tax revenues by 'liberating' their subjects from bondage.[23] The strategy soon developed into a political practice to dismantle the native autonomy system and to bring rebellious people and regions into the directly controlled county and province system. Rebellions in Turkestan and the perceived threat from Russia prompted the Qing to establish a Xinjiang province in 1884 and abolish the *Beg* system among the Muslims.[24] Indeed, something fundamental had changed since the middle of the 19th century, as the Qing tried to impose a uniform administrative system of county and province throughout the empire: in the past, sub-prefectures and counties had been set up to administer an already existing Chinese populace on the frontier to keep the populations separate; now they were deemed the most effective instrument to control the frontier, as the Manchu began to identify with Han Chinese interests. Moreover, the county and provincial system was economically advantageous, for the Chinese could be taxed by the state that was impoverished due to the wars with Western and Japanese powers and the Boxer Rebellions. Once this had become consensus towards the end of the 19th century, the conversion of Mongolian pastures into cultivated land and the transformation of Inner and Outer Mongolia into provinces became politically imperative, as was directly reflected in the Qing new administration (*Xinzheng*) initiated in 1902.

The public debate about changing the territorial administrative system of Mongolia started in 1903, but gained momentum after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. In May 1905, Yao Xiguang, deputy director of the Military Political Department (*Junzheng si*) of the Commission for Army Reorganization (*Lianbing chu*), was sent by the Qing government to investigate the military situation in eastern Mongolia. In September, he presented a report in which he called for setting up provinces in Inner and Outer Mongolia following the Xinjiang precedent: two in Inner Mongolia and three in Outer Mongolia.[25]

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[20] Zhu Sa, *18–20 Shiji chu Dongbu Nei Menggu Nonggen Cunluo Hua Yanjiu*, 23.

[21] Justin Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth-Century China* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), has given by far the most interesting and comprehensive discussion of this territorial administrative system.

[22] C. Patterson Giersch, "'A Motley Throng': Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 1700–1880," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60,1 (2001).

[23] Ma Tingzhong and Zhao Jianzhong, "Qingchao Gaituguiliu Mudi Lun," *Minzu Shi Yanjiu* 4 (2003).

[24] For Xinjiang, see James Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), for the late Qing *gaitu guiliu* in eastern Tibet, see Wang Xiuyu, *China's Last Imperial Frontier: Late Qing Expansion in Sichuan's Tibetan Borderlands* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011).

[25] Yao Xiguang, *Chou Meng Chuyi* (Taibei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1905/1965), 80–1.

In 1906, the government set a model by the configuration of three provinces—Heilongjiang, Jilin and Fengtian—in Manchuria, the Manchu homeland. In the following year, Cen Chunxuan, governor-general of Liangguang, proposed that three provinces be built for Inner Mongolia: Suiyuan, Chakhar, and Rehe. Yigu, the Manchu governor of Suiyuan who spearheaded a Mongol land reclamation project, was strongly in favour of setting up Suiyuan province.[26] According to these plans, arable land would be sold to Chinese peasants who would then be administered in counties. Mongol banners and leagues would be put under counties and provinces and eventually abolished.[27] As a result, sub-prefectures, counties or preparatory counties (*Shezhi ju*) mushroomed in Inner Mongolia, all for the purpose of reclaiming Mongol land for Chinese, and the whole operation was overseen by the state. In this process, the Lifanyuan finished its mission as it was transformed into a ministry (*Lifanbu*) in 1906, being responsible not to administer the outer dependencies but to 'resettle Chinese to strengthen the frontier' (*Yimin shibian*) and to dismantle Inner Asian administrations in order to integrate them into the Chinese system.

It is important to note that the county- and province-building was not just an imposition of direct rule. Since the province was an administrative system for the Chinese, and indeed actively promoted by Chinese officials with whom the Manchu now identified and relied on as bulwark in defending the far-flung frontiers, province-building also meant coming under direct Chinese control. Yet unlike during the Yuan dynasty, when provinces were a superimposition of Mongol military control over Chinese prefectures and counties, the new Qing provinces in Mongolia were to facilitate Chinese settler colonization of the region following what Patrick Wolfe called the 'logic of elimination'.[28] Unlike in European overseas colonialism intended for resource extraction but not for European population settlement, where natives were put to use and exploited by the colonial rulers, in settler colonialism the natives, both their population and their mode of production, were rendered useless, and were therefore to be eliminated and replaced by the settlers.

The Manchu-promoted Chinese expansion through county and province building was settler colonialism *par excellence*. It was the fear of elimination by Chinese settlers assisted by Qing state authorities—the former Inner Asian allies—that prompted the Mongols, especially the nobles, to put up a strong resistance to Chinese land grabbing. The ensuing turmoil in Inner Mongolia ultimately led Outer Mongolia to declare independence on 29 December 1911 "to protect the land, race, and religion"[29] from the Chinese, as Bogd Khan (r. 1911–1924) legitimized the move.

Outer Mongolia's independence and the failure of Inner Mongolia to either gain independence or unify with Outer Mongolia set two separate development paths for the Mongols. While Outer Mongolia expelled most of the 100,000 strong Chinese population[30] who were concentrated in cities like Kyakhta, Uliastai, Urga (Ulaanbaatar), and the Selenge region, Inner Mongolia had to reckon with millions of Chinese and a militant Chinese settler administration. More importantly, unlike Outer Mongolia, which had the advantage of a large group called Khalkha plus some small Western Mongolian groups, Inner Mongolia was much more fragmented, not only due to the larger numbers of disparate Mongol groups, but also because of the Chinese settlements which became physical wedges between various Mongolian groups. Thus, twentieth century Inner Mongolian nationalism was faced with the task of not only challenging the implementation of Chinese counties and provinces, but also unifying the disparate groups into one single administrative unit, and ideally to unify with Outer Mongolia. In this sense, Inner Mongolian nationalism was primarily administrative in character, aiming to make nationality and polity congruent.[31] The banner and league, for all its negative colonial legacy (e.g. the prevention of inter-banner communication), began to acquire a strong positive value as something uniquely Mongolian, and something that represented Mongolian autonomy in legislation, jurisdiction, land ownership rights, tax revenues, language, education, cultural identity, and many other aspects.

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[26] Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan*.

[27] Sudebilige, *Wanqing Zhengfu dui Xinjiang Menggu he Xizang Zhengce Yanjiu* (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 2005), 90–2.

[28] Patrick Wolfe, "Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide," in *Empire, Colony and Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).

[29] Uradyn Erden Bulag, "Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 1911 Revolutions," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 10, issue 52, No. 3, December 31, 2012, accessed June 27, 2013, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.

[30] In 1918, there were 100,000 Chinese in Autonomous Mongolia, which had a total population of 647,504 people. Many of these Chinese were subsequently expelled; see Ivan [Mikhajlovich] Majskij, *Orchin Uyiin Mongol: Avtonomit Mongol XX zuuny Garaan Deer*, trans. Tsagaany Othon (Ulaanbaatar: Sogoo Nuur, 1921/2001), 26. By 1956, the Chinese numbered 16,200; see Christopher Atwood, *Encyclopaedia of Mongolia and the Mongol Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 93. In 1969, the Chinese population had declined to 725, and in 1989 there were only 247 Chinese in Mongolia; see Uradyn Erden Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 30.

[31] Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

The central question confronting Inner Mongolians was, however, how to deal with an overwhelming and still in-migrating Chinese population, and whether the banner and league administrative system, which they defended, had the capacity for their integration. In the ensuing struggle throughout the twentieth century, as Inner Mongolia went through several externally imposed regimes, the banner and league system underwent radical mutations.

3 The Republic of China: Administrative Sinicisation of Inner Mongolia

The Republic of China, proclaimed on 1 January 1912, had to juggle between an extreme racial exclusivist desire to 'drive out the barbarians and restore China' (*Quzhu dalu, huifu zhonghua*) and the necessity to reconstitute the Republic as a successor state to the fallen Qing Empire in order to retain Inner Asia, which comprised more than seventy per cent of the Qing territory. A compromise was reached when Prime Minister Yuan Shikai (*1859 †1916) managed to force the Empress Dowager to endorse the Qing Imperial Edict of Abdication of the Qing Emperor (*Qingdi Tuiwei Zhaoshu*) on 12 February 1912, bequeathing the entire empire, including Inner Asia and its peoples, to the Republic of China in exchange for benign treatment.[32] On 22 April 1912, the new president of the Republic, Yuan Shikai, issued a presidential order stipulating that

> [n]ow that the republic of five nationalities has been established, all areas of Mongolia, Tibet and Muslim frontiers are integral territory [*Lingtu*] of our Republic of China, so that all the nationalities [*Minzu*] of Mongolia, Tibet and Muslim frontiers are equally nationals [*Guomin*] of our Republic of China, and the designations used in the period of the imperial rule should be discontinued. Henceforth, overall planning should be carried out regarding Mongolia, Tibet and Muslim frontiers in order to achieve the domestic unification and realize the great harmony of all nationalities.[33]

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[32] Gao Quanxi, *Lixian Shike: Lun 'Qingdi xunwei zhaoshu'* (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2011); Zhang Yongle, *Jiubang Xinzao: 1911–1917* (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2011); see also Bulag, "Independence as Restoration."

[33] "Linshi Da Zongtong Yuan Shikai Mingling: 1912, 4, 22," in *Yuan yilai Xizang Difang yu Zhongyang Zhengfu Guanxi Dang'an Shiliao Huibian*, ed. Zhongguo Zangxue et al. (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, 1994), vol. 6, p. 2346.

'Equality with the interior provinces' (*Yu neidi gesheng pingdeng*) is the key notion in this order, but this apparently new enlightenment concept meant no recognition of territorial administrative differences, but total integration into the Republican order. In late April 1912 the newly established Republic of China abolished the Lifanbu and replaced it with the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Department (*Mengzang shiwu chu*), renamed Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau (*Mengzang shiwu ju*) on 1 August 1912. The afore-mentioned Yao Xiguang, a great enthusiast for establishing provinces in Mongolia, was first appointed president (*Zongcai*).[34] Realising that the frontier issues could not be wished away, the Republican Government upgraded the Department to a Mongolian and Tibetan Council (*Mengzang yuan*) in May 1914, placing it under direct control of the president. In 1928 the new Nationalist Government established in Nanjing again downgraded the Council to a ministry-level commission under the Executive Yuan while changing its name to Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (*Mengzang weiyuan hui*).[35] However, unlike the Lifanyuan which administered dependencies and tried to keep them separate from inland China, its successors were all charged with a mission to sinicize the administrative system of Outer Mongolia and Central Tibet and to deal with any residual issues related to Mongolian banners in Inner Mongolia as well as Tibetan regions in the Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces. Xinjiang was no longer in the purview because it was already a province.

Ethnicity and nationalism in modern China must thus be understood to be closely tied to the territorial administrative system, and the Chinese solution to ethnic problems was primarily a transformation of the native administrative systems, bringing them into the uniform administration of Chinese provinces. It may be argued that Chinese nationalism in the frontier was 'politicidal', a notion introduced by Baruch Kimmerling to describe processes "whose goal is to destroy the political and national existence of a whole community of people and thus deny it the possibility of self-determination."[36] I suggest that the policies of the late Qing, the Chinese Republican and the Nationalist government were all intent on destroying the political and organizational capacity of the Mongols (and other non-Chinese peoples) to produce or reproduce a polity of their own or one that would govern their relation to others.

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[34] As a result of Mongol opposition to Yao, Yuan Shikai later appointed Gungsangnorbu (*1871 †1930) as president and Yao as his deputy. Kishi Toshihiko, "Nei Menggu Diqu Yuan Shikai Zhengquan Tongzhi Tizhi de Xingcheng: Mengzangyuan de Chengli he Nei Menggu sange Tebie Xingzhengqu de Shezhi," *Guowai Zhongguo Jindaishi Yanjiu* 21 (1992): 127.

[35] For a brief history of the Commission, see *Mengzang Weiyuan hui Jianshi*, ed. Mengzang Weiyuan hui Bianyishi (Taibei: Mengzang Weiyuan hui, 1971).

[36] Baruch Kimmerling, *Politicide: Sharon's War against the Palestinians* (London: Verso, 2003), 4. For the attempted destruction of self-determination in the context of the Soviet nationalities' question, see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories," in *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical*

This logic was followed through in Inner Mongolia more vigorously than anywhere else. In May 1913, the Republican government submitted a proposal on the Establishment of Provinces in Inner Mongolia (*Nei menggu sheng de shezhi*) to the parliament, but in the following year three regions were set up: Suiyuan, Chakhar, and Rehe. Intended as preparatory provinces, these special administrative regions (*Tebie xingzheng qu*) were jurisdictionally separated from the Zhili and Shaanxi provinces and represented a direct Chinese takeover of Inner Mongolia, each absorbing a number of Inner Mongolian leagues.[37]

In September 1928 the Nationalist government upgraded them to provinces and divided Inner Mongolian banners into seven provinces: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Chakhar, Rehe, Suiyuan and Ningxia.[38] Inner Mongolia as an ethno-geographical name thereupon disappeared from the map, as noted even by Chinese politicians and scholars.[39]

The establishment of these special administration regions and provinces did not, however, lead to the immediate abolishment of either the banner and league system or the Mongolian aristocracy due, no doubt, to strong Mongol resistance. Moreover, transforming banners and leagues, especially those in remote and sparsely populated areas, into counties and prefectures would be a costly practice. Economically it was more convenient to bring banners and leagues under one or a few provincial administrations, and to set up parallel counties for Chinese settlers on banner territories, thus obviating the need to outright challenge the Mongol administrative system. In a calculation to squash Inner Mongolian secessionism and efforts to join Bogd Khan's Mongolia, in 1912 the Republican government decided to keep the Mongol noble titles, while simultaneously weakening their control of their banners.[40] In October 1931, only days after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, in an effort to prevent the Mongols from allying with the Japanese the Chinese Nationalist government passed an Organisational Law of Mongolian Leagues, Tribes and Banners,[41] granting the Mongols some concessions by recognizing leagues and banners as their legitimate administrative units. Curiously, although by law the league was made equal to province in status and the banner equal to county, it did not specify the boundaries between provinces and leagues. In recognizing the legitimacy of both leagues and provinces superposed on one territory, the weak Chinese Nationalist government in the face of Japanese invasion gave in to its own political expediency, as it pitted the two administrations against each other. While the Nationalist government wanted to hit two birds with one stone with this measure, which they hoped would constrain both the secessionist Mongols and the frontier Chinese warlords who wanted to maintain their autonomy from the central government, the Mongols found allies in the Japanese and the Chinese Communist Party in this existential struggle.

4 Manchukuo: Mongolian Ethnocracy at a Price

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 and the founding of Manchukuo on 1 March 1932 were a major event in the history of modern Inner Mongolia, introducing unprecedented changes to the banner and league system in its eastern part (Hulunbuir region, J̌irim, J̌uu Uda and J̌osutu leagues) which were incorporated into Manchukuo. The Japanese intervened as a 'sympathetic' third party in the conflict between Mongols and Chinese, but gradually changed their position from supporting Mongolian independence to granting autonomy within a multi-ethnic state.[42] The administrative unit of

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Overview, ed. Edward Allworth (Durham, London, Duke University Press, 1999); Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (New York: Macmillan, 1970); Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*; Dittmar Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten in Rußland: Der Integrationsprozess der Burjaten und Kalmücken, 1822–1925* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2001), and Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to post-Stalinist Society* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

[37] Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu* (Shenyang: Liaoning Minzu Chubanshe, 2010), 66–91; Kishi Toshihiko, "Nei Menggu Diqu Yuan Shikai Zhengquan Tongzhi Tizhi de Xingcheng".

[38] For a detailed discussion on Suiyuan, see Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan*, and for Ningxia's conflict with Inner Mongolia, see Wulanshaobu, "Cong Ningxia yu Alashan Jiufeng kan Jindai Nei Menggu de Shengqi Maodun," in *Weilate shi Lunwenji: Xinjiang Shifan Daxue Xuebao Zhuanhao*, ed. Xinjiang Shifan Daxue Xuebao Bianjishi (1987). For Xikang province established in 1939, see Wang Chuan, "Jindai Minzu Guanxi Shi shang de Xikang Sheng jiqi Lishi Yiyi," *Xizang Daxue Xuebao* 23,1 (2008).

[39] See Huang Fengsheng, *Mengzang Xinzhi* (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1938), 1, and Tan Tiwu, *Nei Menggu zhi Jinxi* (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1935), 32.

[40] Kishi Toshihiko, "Nei Menggu Diqu Yuan Shikai Zhengquan Tongzhi Tizhi de Xingcheng".

[41] Wulanshaobu, "Zhongguo Guomindang dui Meng Zhengce," in *Nei Menggu Jindaishi Luncun* 3, ed. Nei Menggu Daxue Zhonggong Nei Menggu Diqu Dangshi Yanjiusuo et al. (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1987).

[42] James Boyd, *Japanese-Mongolian Relations, 1873–1945: Faith, Race and Strategy* (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2010); Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo*

this autonomy was the province (*Sheng*), as the General Staff of the Japanese Kwantung Army designed on 2 February 1932:

> Establish a special province for the Mongols, with animal husbandry as its main economy, allowing it to implement autonomy. The Mongols in other provinces living in mixed areas can be subject to special administration provisionally. 1. Designate the eastern part of Inner Mongolia and Hulunbuir as an administrative region; gradually absorb Chakhar Province into it. 2. Call it Xing'an Province, and recognise it as an autonomous province when a new state is established. 3. Abolish the aristocratic system and accommodate a certain number of Mongols in the Senate.[43]

There appeared to be no single unified organization in Manchukuo that dealt with ethnic territorial administration, although the new nation projected itself as multi-racial: harmony of five races (*Gozoku kyowa*), Japanese, Manchu, Han Chinese, Korean, and Mongolian. In March 1932 when the Manchukuo government was founded, the Khingan Bureau (*Xing'an ju*) was set up earmarked to administer the Mongols of the newly founded Khingan province. Subordinated to the state council (*Guowu yuan*), the Bureau was headed by a Mongol noble, Chimedsampil (*1874 †1942), formerly ruling the Gorlos Front banner and chief of the J̌irim League. His deputy was a Japanese called Kikutake Jitsuzo. Its mission was to supervise four Mongolian provinces. Renamed Xing'an General Administration (*Xing'an zongshu*) in August the same year, it was reorganised as Mongolian Administration Ministry (*Mengzheng bu*) in December 1934, after Manchukuo was proclaimed an empire. It was headed by Chimedsampil as minister, the Japanese Yoda Shirou being his deputy. In July 1937, the ministry was reorganized as Xing'an Ju, headed by the Mongol Jagar (†1944) and two deputies: the Mongol Buyanmandakh (*1894 †1980) and the Japanese Shirahama Harusumi. Placed under the Prime Minister's office, this Bureau had less power than its predecessor, and had no direct authority over the Mongol provinces. It was dissolved in October 1943 when a General Province (*Xing'an zongsheng*) was set up, with Buyanmandakh as governor.[44]

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and the East Asian Modern (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu*. Dan Shao, *Remote Homeland, Recovered Borderland: Manchus, Manchoukuo and Manchuria 1907–1985* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011).

[43] Quoted in Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu*, 134.

[44] Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu*, 134–44.

The first and foremost change for the Mongols of Manchukuo was the abolition of all leagues and the establishment of provinces. Initially they came under six provinces: four Khingan branch provinces (*Xing'an fensheng*) and the Jinzhou and Rehe provinces. The boundaries of these newly established provinces were arbitrary, with some leagues scattered over them. For instance, the Khingan West province administered only the northern six banners of the former J̌uu Uda league; its seven southern banners were transferred to Rehe. The four Khingan branch provinces were upgraded to full provinces in 1934, but in 1943 three of them (the East, South, and West) were downgraded to three districts (*Diqu*) one of a larger province called Khingan General Province (*Xing'an zongsheng*). The Khingan North province (formerly Hulunbuir) managed to retain its name and status thanks to its strategic location bordering the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) with which the Japanese Kwantung Army waged a battle in 1939 and was thoroughly defeated at Khalkhyn Gol.[45]

In the revamped provinces, most Chinese counties were gradually abolished and were either renamed as banners or amalgamated into existing banners. The abolished counties were administratively replaced by banners, stipulated in a 'Banner Law' passed on 5 July 1932. Under this law, people who lived on banner territory, regardless of ethnicity, were rendered banner residents (*Qi zhu min*), following the territorial principle.[46]

While the abolition of Chinese counties proved to be relatively easy in the Mongol-dominated Khingan provinces, doing so on Mongol banner land which came under the Chinese-dominated Rehe and Jinzhou provinces was a hard piece of work. In May 1933, Manchukuo divided the Rehe Province into a Khingan West branch province and a Rehe province, allocating 14 banners to the latter (the former J̌osutu League's Kharachin Left, Kharachin Middle, Kharachin Right, Tümed Left, Tümed West, Tangut Khalkha, Shiretu Khuree, and the former J̌uu Uda League's Ongni'ud Left, Ongni'ud Right, Aokhan Left, Aokhan Right, Aokhan South, Naiman, Khalkha Left Wing). While the 14 counties on those banners such as Jianchang, Ningcheng, Jianping, Fuxin, Chaoyang, Suidong, Wudan, Chifeng, Xinhui and others were announced as local administrative units, the status of the 14 banners was not specified, leading to an open attempt by the Chinese county administrations to take over the banners. This was stopped only when outraged Mongols directly petitioned Emperor Puyi (1932–1945), the Manchukuo head of state, demanding recognition of the Mongolian banner autonomy and the restoration of its administrative power.[47]

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[45] Alvin D. Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Uradyn Erden Bulag, "The Nomonhan Incident and the Politics of Friendship on the Russia-Mongolia-China Border," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 48-3-09, November 30, 2009, accessed July 2, 2013, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3263.

[46] Jin Hai, *Riben zai Nei Menggu Zhimin Tongzhi Zhengce Yanjiu* (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2009), 85.

In response, in 1934 the Rehe provincial government allowed the Mongol banners to exercise authority over the Mongols under their jurisdiction, and in 1937 the Manchukuo government recognised the legal status of the Mongol banners in parallel with the Chinese counties. Known as Banner and County Composite System (*Qixian fuhe zhi*), this arrangement proved, however, to be no answer to ethnic conflicts in the Rehe province. It was not until January 1940 that the Manchukuo government eventually abolished the six counties of Wudan, Chifeng, Jianchang, Ningcheng, Jianping, Xinhui which had jurisdictional overlapped with the Ongni'ud Left, Ongni'ud Right, Kharachin Left, Kharachin Middle, Kharachin Right, and Aokhan banners. As for the Jinzhou province, the counties of Fuxin and Chaoyang which overlapped with the Tümed Left and Tümed Right banners were abolished and replaced by banners.

In Manchukuo, the four Khingan provinces were headed by Mongols, and so were all the banners in these as well as in the Rehe and Jinzhou provinces. Nevertheless, Mongol power was curtailed by the Japanese, who served as deputy heads or so-called advisors. While the former Mongol nobility exercised military command, the new banner leaders were pure administrative heads without military power. Moreover, Mongol aristocrats were stripped of their titles and privileges for which they were given material compensation. The banner unit was thus transformed from a principality to a regular local administrative unit, though it was turned into a Mongolian ethnocracy where Chinese residents were made second-class citizens.

The Mongolian experience in Manchukuo shows that although Mongols triumphed administratively, managing in large measures to abolish Chinese counties and restore Mongol authority, the banner no longer enjoyed any privileges as an autonomous administrative unit, but became subordinated to the larger provinces which were autonomous, yet also an integral part of the larger multi-ethnic Manchukuo polity. Moreover, the banners were no longer Mongolian, but multi-ethnic in composition. Interestingly, since the provinces were now controlled by Mongols and had become Mongolian administrative units, '*Sheng*' lost its former ethnic Chinese connotation in Manchukuo. On the other hand, Manchukuo privileged the Mongols, rendering them a class

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[47] Ibid., 77–95; cf. Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu*, 132–53.

superior to the Han Chinese, thus mitigating the inconvenience of placing the Han in the same administrative units.

5 Mongolian Autonomy under Japanese Tutelage

In the wake of widening Japanese control over eastern Inner Mongolia in 1931, the provincial governors of Suiyuan and Chakhar—Fu Zuoyi (*1895 †1974) and Song Zheyuan (*1885 †1940)—intensified their efforts to expand Chinese governance, pushing the Mongols on the verge of revolt. In 1933, the young deputy governor of the Shiliin Gol league, Prince De (Demchugdongrub, *1902 †1966), rallied the nobility of the Shiliin Gol, Chakhar, Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu leagues to demand from the Chinese Nationalist Government not only banner and league autonomy, but more importantly the abolition of the provinces in order to create a unified Mongolian regional autonomous government having jurisdiction over the remaining leagues and banners. This move was unprecedented, for it was an attempt to create a unified Mongolian administration for Inner Mongolia.[48] It sent a shockwave through the Chinese authorities, who perceived the claim as a ploy to secede from China. The Chinese opposition to De's autonomy plan was also driven by the concern that it would serve Japanese interests, as it was assumed to be the case in Manchukuo. De, however, insisted that a unified Mongolian autonomous government was legitimate and closely following the spirit of Sun Yatsen's support for minority self-determination. A Mongolian autonomy would, he argued, inspire Mongols to defend their homeland against Japanese encroachment.[49]

Negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist Government, facilitated by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (*Mengzang weiyuan hui*), produced a mixed result in 1934: the Chinese government permitted local autonomy within the provinces, which were not to be abolished as the Mongols demanded—nor were the counties. Mongol autonomy would be tolerated only in areas not yet colonized by Chinese counties, and Mongolian banners were allowed to exercise power over their subjects living in Chinese counties. The only achievement was the approval of a Mongolian Local Political Council, which was given power to coordinate Mongolian affairs in the Shiliin

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[48] Sechin Jagchid, *The Last Mongol Prince: The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 1902–1966* (Bellingham, WA: Western Washington University, 1999); Uradyn Erden Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism: The Politics of Friendship on China's Mongolian Frontier* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 133–63.

[49] Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism*, 113–5.

Gol, Chakhar, Ulaanchab and Yekhe J̌uu leagues. But its influence was curtailed by appointing none other than Yan Xishan (*1883 †1960)[50] as supervisor (*Zhidaoguan*) to advise the Mongols on how to exercise autonomy. This was the practice of so-called political tutelage, a stage designed by Sun Yatsen to follow the military conquest before the implementation of democracy.

The Council failed to solve the central issue of jurisdictional parallelism, and it immediately came to clash with the Suiyuan and Chakhar provinces. The Chinese provinces did not tolerate a supra-provincial Mongol administrative authority. Any Mongol autonomy, if ever accepted, would have to be under a province. After only two years of existence, the Council was divided up under the Suiyuan and Chakhar provinces. This proved to be the last straw for any political solution of the administrative conflict between the two sides. In 1936 Prince De proclaimed a Mongolian Military Government, choosing to collaborate with the Japanese who had promised support for Mongolian independence. In the ensuing military clashes, the Chakhar province was conquered and Suiyuan was pushed to the west of Baotou. In November 1937 a Mongolian Autonomous Government of Allied Leagues (*Mengjiang lianmeng zizhi zhengfu*) was proclaimed, which claimed jurisdiction over the Ulaanchab, Shiliin Gol, Chakhar, Bayantal (newly created) and Yekhe J̌uu leagues and the cities of Hohhot and Baotou, although its power did not extend to the western part of Yekhe J̌uu (it controlled only the Dalad and Jungar banners) and the western part of Bayantal which was the stronghold of Fu Zuoyi. This government lasted less than two years, but a (partial) unified trans-league Mongolian administration with Mongol leadership was nevertheless established for the first time in the history of Inner Mongolia.[51]

This partial unification of Inner Mongolia was achieved not by the Mongol force alone, but with the assistance of the Japanese, the third party in the conflict which had a major stake in the outcome. However, rather than delivering the original promise of supporting Mongolian independence, the Japanese army amalgamated the Mongolian autonomous government with the two Chinese autonomous governments of Southern Chakhar (*Chanan*) and Northern Shaanxi (*Jinbei*), founding a Mongolian Borderland Joint Committee

(*Mengjiang lianhe weiyuan hui*) on 22 November 1937 headed by a Japanese.[52] In September 1939 the Joint Committee was turned into the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government (*Menggu lianhe zizhi zhengfu*) with Prince De elected chairman and two Chinese deputies. The Mongolian Autonomous Government of Allied Leagues was thereupon dissolved, and its Mongolian national flag replaced by a four-coloured seven striped flag symbolising Japanese imperial cosmopolitanism called 'ethnic harmony' (*Minzoku kyowa*) of Yellow Chinese, Blue Mongols, White Hui, and Red Japanese.[53] Subsequently, the Mongolian Allied Autonomous Government became a regional autonomous administration of Wang Jingwei's Republic of China, a puppet state established in Nanjing (1940–1945). In the following year, on 4 August 1941, the government was renamed Mongolian Autonomous State Government (*Menggu zizhibang zhengfu*) with jurisdiction over five Mongolian leagues, three cities (Baotou, Hohhot, Zhangjiakou) and the Chanan and Jinbei prefectures (*ting*), the latter two being upgraded and renamed Xuanhua and Datong provinces (*sheng*) in January 1943.[54]

The Mongols had never expected that the Japanese, who had initially supported Mongol independence, would push them back into the Chinese state, albeit a revamped pro-Japanese Chinese state. From a Japanese military perspective, Mongolian independence appeared to serve no further purpose than advancing Japanese interest on the continent. The Japanese had misgivings about Mongol nationalism which proved to be a double-edged sword. After all, Mongol collaborators were nationalists, using the Japanese to get their own independence not only from the Chinese, but also from the Japanese. Like the Chinese Nationalist Government, the Japanese preferred to intertwine Inner Mongolia administratively with the Chinese for the sake of power balance, an instrumentalist policy that won them no friends among the Mongols. Prince De became deeply disillusioned with the Japanese, just as he had been with the Chinese Nationalists.[55]

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[50] He was the Shaanxi warlord who controlled Suiyuan. For the relationship between Shaanxi and Suiyuan, see Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan*.

[51] For general information about the Suiyuan province, its war-time activities, and the Mongol relations with Suiyuan, see Tighe, *Constructing Suiyuan*; Jagchid, *Last Mongol Prince*; and Ding Ping, *Kangzhan Shiqi Suiyuan Shengzheng yu zai Suixi Shizhi Lishi Yanjiu* (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Daxue Chubanshe, 2012).

[52] Jin Hai, *Riben zai Nei Menggu Zhimin Tongzhi Zhengce Yanjiu*, 73–5. Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu*, 158.

[53] Jin Hai, *Riben zai Nei Menggu Zhimin Tongzhi Zhengce Yanjiu*, 116.

[54] Ibid., 111–7. See Jagchid, *Last Mongol Prince*, 216–318.

[55] This sentiment was best captured by Jagchid, *Last Mongol Prince*; see also Sechin Jagchid, "Inner Mongolia under Japanese Occupation, 1935–1945: An Eye Witness Report," *Zentralasiatische Studien des Seminars für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens der Universität Bonn* 20 (1987).

To be sure, in this Japanese-induced administrative configuration the Mongols were granted a considerable degree of autonomy by the Nanjing regime. In areas under Mongol control, this new polity managed to abolish the Chakhar and Suiyuan provinces and to elevate the leagues to primary units having jurisdiction over both banners and counties for the first time.[56] Even the nobility survived, unlike in Manchukuo, and counties in Inner Mongolia survived as well. However, Mongols were not given free rein in this multi-ethnic polity in which the Chinese were an overwhelming majority. Rather, only the master had changed. Prince De had a Japanese supreme advisor, and from September 1939 onward Japanese officials were present in various government units. Although given the power to nominally preside over this cosmopolitan formation, the Mongols had lost all appetite for ruling the Chinese.

6 Inner Mongolian Autonomy in the Service of the Chinese Communist Party

As becomes clear, the greater part of Inner Mongolia had undergone considerable change in administration under Japanese control. In Manchukuo, a unified Mongolian autonomy under the Khingan provinces (later one single general province) emerged, and the Mongolian Autonomous Government of Allied Leagues as well as the Mongolian Autonomous State also enabled the Mongols to exercise some degree of autonomy. However, in those parts of Inner Mongolia under Chinese Nationalist control, settler colonization made further inroads, leading to open rebellion in the Suiyuan Mongolian Local Political Council in 1943 when Suiyuan province officials sent an army into Yekhe J̌uu to reclaim land near the Eight White Tents, the holy shrine of Chinggis Khan.[57] This incident pushed the Mongol nobility to the fold of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which was based in Yan'an and active in the Yekhe J̌uu League.[58]

The CCP prior to 1949 was a minor political force in Inner Mongolia, but it was nonetheless important in its impact on the transformation of the Inner Mongolian administrative structure, especially after 1945. The CCP's initial stance towards ethnicity was an unequivocal support for the national self-determination of non-Chinese peoples who were encouraged to form their own polity even outside China. However, its strategic retreat from the cities to the countryside and the experience in the Long March in the early 1930s ushered in a move from anarchism to state building. The CCP's vision for non-Chinese minorities was closely tied to its existential struggle and perception of the non-Chinese as potential allies against their common enemies, the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Japanese invaders.[59]

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[56] Lu Minghui, *Menggu "Zizhi Yundong" Shimo* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980), 183.

[57] *Yimeng Shibian*, ed. Nei Menggu Wenshi Ziliao (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1991); Jagchid. *Last Mongol Prince*, 299–302.

[58] Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism*, 101–32.

Like the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists, the CCP had some Mongol collaborators who were communists with their own nationalist vision and who were taking the lead in liberating Inner Mongolia, the Tümed Mongol Ulanhu (*1906 †1988) being the most representative figure.[60] Their nationalism compelled them to restore a Mongolian polity of banners and leagues, but their class-based communist ideal forced them to eliminate feudal class structure (integral to the banner and league system) and to accommodate the poor Chinese peasants instead of driving them out as radical nationalists demanded (but never achieved). More importantly, whatever nationalist desire they harboured, since they were members of the CCP they had to subordinate Mongolian interests to the overall CCP's strategic struggle in China and internationally. This conflicting ideological background of communism and nationalism[61] is consequential to appreciating the transformation of the banner and league system under the CCP.

The most explicit policy the CCP adopted was issued in Mao Zedong's *Proclamation to the People of Inner Mongolia* on behalf of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet People's Republic in December 1935, in which he boldly promised to dismantle all Chinese provinces and counties established in Inner Mongolia and to restore the Mongolian banners and leagues.[62] Mao pointed to the ethnic dimension of the Chinese territorial-administrative system, rather than seeing it as the extension of a civic neutral state. In his proclamation, he did not address the feudal constitution of the banner and league, nor did he differentiate between the social categories within the Mongol population, instead treating the Mongols as a collective subaltern group languishing under the Chinese and Japanese rule. This was a typical class-nation strategy, designed to win the Mongols over to the CCP in its struggle against both the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Japanese. Since the CCP defined the Inner Mongolian nationality question in terms of administrative institutions and political identities, justice could not be achieved without restoring the native polity to its people. Thus, in the mid-1930s the CCP believed the restoration of the banner and league system to be a central tool to harness Mongolian nationalism. This was more than a call for the re-establishment of Qing era Inner Mongolia. It was a promise to unify Inner Mongolia administratively, abolishing thus the 'colonial' administration of counties and provinces, as the Japanese imperialists and Mongolian nationalists had aspired or vowed to do.

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[59] Liu Xiaoyuan, *Frontier Passages: Ethnopolitics and the Rise of Chinese Communism, 1921–1945* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2004).

[60] Wang Shusheng, *Wulanfu Zhuan: 1906–1988* (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2007).

[61] Uradyn Erden Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 207–44.

[62] Mao Zedong, "Proclamation of the Central Soviet Government to the People of Inner Mongolia (December 10)," in *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912–1949*, vol. 5: *Toward the Second United Front, January 1935–July 1937*, ed. Stuart R. Schram et al. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 71.

A telling incident illustrates, however, the difficulty in shaking off a deep-rooted Chinese cultural habitus while exercising political expediency. In February 1936, two months after Mao's open call to dismantle counties and provinces in Inner Mongolia, CCP local operatives set up a Wushen County Soviet Government (*Wushen xian suwei'ai zhengfu*) with administrative and military structures on the border of the Üüshin banner of the Yekhe J̌uu league. The CCP centre soon withdrew this decision, criticizing it for creating a county system (*Xianzhi*) which would "cause Mongol suspicion and dismay."[63] In its place, the CCP set up an Üüshin Banner Work Committee, a party organisation whose job was not to take over the Üüshin banner, but to win over Mongolian allies who would then give the CCP not only territorial sanctuary but also economic aid. The CCP consciously presented itself as a 'sworn friend' (mon. *And*; ch. *Bazi*) and 'good Han' to the Mongols, distinguishing itself from the 'bad Han', i.e. the Chinese Nationalist Party.[64]

The CCP did not have a chance to get into Inner Mongolia until 1945 (apart from some guerrilla bases in the Daqingshan Mountains) when Japan surrendered unconditionally. The collapse of Manchukuo and the Mongolian Autonomous State created a political vacuum and set off a scramble of three forces to control it: the Chinese Nationalist Government, the CCP, and the Mongols. Authorities of the nationalist-controlled Suiyuan province swiftly moved back to Guisui (renamed Hohhot in 1954) and recovered their former territory, thwarting the CCP's plan to set up a Suimeng (Suiyuan-Mongolian) government headed by Ulanhu, the highest-ranking Mongol CCP member.

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[63] Tian Wansheng, "Cong Shanbei dao E'erduosi," *Yimeng Gemin Huiyilu* 1 (1981): 204.

[64] Uradyn Erden Bulag, "Good Han, Bad Han: The Moral Parameters of Ethnopolitics in China," in *Critical Han Studies: The History, Representation, and Identity of China's Majority*, ed. Thomas S. Mullaney et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

Ulanhu then moved to Zhangjiakou (Kalgan), which was under control of the Soviet-Mongolian army,[65] where he set up an Inner Mongolian Association for Autonomous Movement (*Nei menggu zizhi yundong lianhehui*).

Taking over the Shiliin Gol and Chakhar leagues from the Soviet-Mongolian occupation army, the Association reformed both, setting up so-called democratic governments of banners and leagues with a new leadership. In order to assuage Inner Mongolian aristocrats who feared that they might be killed as was the case in the MPR, Ulanhu's Mongolian communists engaged some moderate nobles, appointing, for instance, Sunjinvanchug (*1885 †1948), *Jasag* prince of the Eastern Khuuchid banner (currently part of Western Üjümüchin banner), governor of Shiliin Gol league. Like the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists, the Mongol Communists appointed a non-native Mongol communist as his deputy. The Chakhar league, however, a more recent creation (1931), was spared the CCP's United Front niceties; Chen Bingyu (*1918), a Tümed Mongol communist, was appointed governor.

In the wake of the Japanese surrender, the Mongols of Manchukuo switched allegiance to the Soviet Union and the MPR, and set up an Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government in January 1946 after their petition to join with the MPR was rejected. As a high-degree autonomy, the government revived the names of J̌irim, J̌uu Uda, J̌osutu, and Hulunbuir but called them provinces instead of leagues, and created a Naun Muren province out of the old Butaha region.[66] But this high-degree autonomy was short-lived. In May 1946, the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government was merged with the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement Association to build a unified Inner Mongolia with the help of the CCP. Once again, the weakness of collaborative nationalism surfaced, as the Mongols had to subordinate their interest to the CCP's strategic priorities. To strengthen the CCP's position in negotiations with the Nationalist Government in order to build a Chinese coalition government, on 28 May 1946, the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government was renamed Xing'an province with jurisdiction over three newly created leagues (J̌irim, Khingan, Naun Muren) and the region of Hulunbuir.[67]

Note that these were not a revival of the old leagues which had been abolished during the Manchukuo period; they were new administrative units and called *Aimag* rather than *Chuulgan*, adopting the MPR's provincial level administrative name of *aimag*. Interestingly, however, instead of translating *Aimag* as *Sheng* as in Mongolia or *Aimake* historically, *Meng*, the old Chinese term for *Chuulgan*, was retained. The new league leaders were all Mongol communists. Mongol banners and leagues under the CCP were no longer autonomous administrative institutions for and by Mongol nobles and their subjects, but were open to ethnicity and centrally controlled, assuming features of provinces and counties in all but their name. The role of autonomy was reserved for the higher organ of Inner Mongolia.

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[65] For the Soviet-Mongolian joint military operation in Inner Mongolia in 1945 against the Japanese, see Liu Xiaoyuan, *Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 330–80.

[66] Menghe Baoyin, *Jindai Neimenggu Xingzheng Jianzhi Bianqian Yanjiu*, 204–8.

[67] Ibid., 212–3.

In May 1947, in the wake of the collapse of the CCP-Nationalist negotiations for a peaceful post-war settlement and in an effort to secure a base, the CCP permitted the Mongols to set up an Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government placed under the leadership of the CCP, independent of the Chinese Nationalist Government, but in recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of China. Inner Mongolian political autonomy was thus made relational, to serve the wider interest of the Chinese Communist Party.

7 Inner Mongolia Unified

Recall that dismantling Chinese provinces and restoring the Mongolian polity was a CCP promise made in 1935, but the CCP takeover of Inner Mongolia did not lead to an immediate change of administration. In December 1949, after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Mongol leagues came under the following administrations:

TABLE 12.1 *The PRC's Mongol Leagues, December 1949*

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	Hulunbuir, Naun Muren, Khingan, J̌irim, Shiliin Gol, Chakhar
Rehe province	J̌osutu, J̌uu Uda
Suiyuan province	Ulaanchab, Yekhe J̌uu

It took more than six years to put all these leagues into a unified Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The current shape of Inner Mongolia did not form until 1956 when the Alashan and Ejine banners were transferred from Gansu and Ningxia under the jurisdiction of Inner Mongolia. Some banners have been lost to Chinese provinces. The Tümed Left and Right banners of the J̌osutu League, for instance, were included in the Liaoning province and re-organised as autonomous counties based on the former parallel Chinese counties of Fuxin and Chaoyang: Fuxin Mongolian Autonomous County and Chaoyang Mongolian Autonomous County. All Mongol banners outside the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, such as those in the three North-eastern provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, have been turned into counties and remain so.

There appear to be two main reasons for this slow pace of unification, the first being that the newly founded People's Republic did not deal with the administrative system until 1954 when the first Constitution was adopted and the province was made the primary territorial administrative unit. Before 1954, the PRC was divided into six Great Administrative Regions (*Da xingzhengqu*), in short GAR, which had their origins in the CCP organisation and its military operations.[68] The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, a new administrative unit established on 2 December 1949 for the territories under the jurisdiction of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government established on 1 May 1947, was treated as equivalent to one of these GAR.[69] Each GAR had a number of provinces, but the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region demanded the return of the original Mongolian land, and this could only be achieved by dismantling the provinces on the historical land of Inner Mongolia.

Second, precisely because of the Mongol nationalist impulse in the expansion of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Chinese provincial authorities became recalcitrant and opposed Inner Mongolia's administrative enlargement. They argued that since the Chinese Nationalists were defeated, hence having eliminated the source of Chinese oppression to the Mongols, there was no more need for Mongolian nationalism and that the Mongols should be content with their status quo in provinces.[70] Chinese provincial authorities were happy to concede to Mongolian demands for autonomy. The Suiyuan province, for instance, established two prefecture-level Mongolian autonomous regions: the Yekhe J̌uu League Autonomous Region (*Yikezhao meng zizhi qu*) and the Ulaanchab League Autonomous Region (*Wulanchabu meng zizhi qu*) in January and August 1950, respectively.

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[68] Cf. Fan Xiaochun, "Zhongguo Da Xingzhengqu Yanjiu: 1949–1954" (PhD diss., Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao, 2007).

[69] Xinhuashe, "Quanguo Shaoshu Minzu Diqu Sannian lai Zhengquan Jianshe Gongzuo de Juda Chengjiu," *Renmin Ribao*, 17 October 1952.

[70] Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge*, 105–35.

Indeed, the establishment of these two autonomous regions would not have been possible without the effort of Ulanhu. As the CCP's highest-ranking minority leader, he was involved in founding the State Nationality Affairs Commission (*Minzu shiwu weiyuan hui*), the PRC equivalent of the Lifanyuan, on 22 October 1949. Proclaiming its foundation on behalf of the Chinese government, Ulanhu initiated the drafting of the Commission's programme and regulations. In 1954 he became the director of the Commission and a vice-premier in charge of nationality affairs. While he assumed the top party, government and army positions of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, he was also appointed vice-chairman of the Suiyuan military and political council (government), and deputy commander of the Suiyuan military district in December 1949.[71] He seemed to be poised to take over Suiyuan.

Suiyuan was, however, a hard nut to crack as it was unique among all the three provinces, not only because it was built entirely on Mongolian territory, but also because the Suiyuan Chinese Nationalists had the credential of fighting the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Mongols, and gained further political capital by delivering Suiyuan to the CCP negotiating a special settlement in 1949. Among the Chinese communist leaders were also anti-Japanese and anti-Mongolian guerrilla fighters from Suiyuan. In January 1950, when a new Suiyuan province government was established merging the CCP led Suimeng government with the Nationalist Suiyuan government, it was Dong Qiwu (*1898 †1989), the Nationalist governor and commander of Suiyuan Province, who was appointed chairman of the so-called People's Government of Suiyuan Province.

At the end of the day, however, the merger of Inner Mongolia with Suiyuan required Mao's personal intervention, not least because Mongols presented their demand for unification as no more than an implementation of Mao's 1935 promise. Failure to deliver that promise would have severely upset the Inner Mongols, sending a negative signal to other ethnic minorities as well as to the MPR and the Soviet Union. Inner Mongolia's administrative unification in the 1950s thus became a touchstone of the CCP's nationality policy. Ever aware of the reality on the ground, i.e. the overwhelming Chinese presence in Inner Mongolia and the Mongol nationalist sentiment, Mao designed a scheme, calling it "opening two doors" (*Kai liangshan men*).[72] The Suiyuan province was expected to open its doors to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Inner Mongolia to accept Chinese settlers.

The Mongols might appear to have won the battle in dismantling the Chinese provinces and restoring most of historical Mongol land under a Mongolian administration. However, the cost was heavy. The unified Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of 1954 was no longer a Mongolian polity as was the Eastern Mongolia Autonomous Government established in 1946 or the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government established in 1947. The latter two governments both declared that the land of Inner Mongolia belonged to the Mongolian nation.[73] The government of the enlarged Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, on the other hand, became a bi-nationality coalition government with Ulanhu as chairman and four Chinese and three Mongolian deputies.[74] Moreover, with the incorporation of millions of Chinese, the enlarged autonomous region made the Mongols a tiny minority, outnumbered by the Chinese by seven to one.[75] This was the CCP's scheme of promoting inter-nationality friendship (*Minzu tuanjie*) on the assumption that it had removed the exploitative classes, the source of inter-ethnic antagonism. In fact, however, it spurred conflicting political identities to compete against each other, causing each to develop a profound sense of deprivation. Mongols, though defined as titular nationality, became a tiny minority within the Autonomous Region set against the Chinese who demanded majoritarian democracy in a People's Republic.

Another challenge to the Mongols was how to change the parallelism of banners and counties. In eastern Inner Mongolia, most of the counties had already been dismantled and amalgamated into Mongolian banners in the Manchukuo era. In central Inner Mongolia, as noted, counties were not in fact abolished, though they were put under leagues. In the Chinese Nationalist-controlled areas of western Inner Mongolia, counties expanded their territories, and this process intensified after 1945 when the Nationalist control of

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[71] *Wulanfu Nianpu*, ed. Wang Shusheng et al. (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1989), 211–3.

[72] Wang Duo, *Wushi Chunqiu: Wo Zuo Minzu Gongzue de Jingli* (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Daxue Chubanshe, 1992), 368–9; see also Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism*, 174.

[73] The Political Programme of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government passed on 27 April 1947 pledged to "protect the integrity of the Mongolian Nation's total rights over land"; see *Zhongguo diyige Mminzu Zizhiqu Dansheng Dang'an Shiliao Xuanbian*, ed. Qian Zhanyuan (Hohhot: Yuanfang Chubanshe, 1997), 54.

[74] *Zhongguo Gongchandang Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Zuzhi Shi Ziliao: 1925.3–1987.12*, ed. Zhonggong Nei Menggu Zizhiqu Weiyuan hui Zuzhibu (Hohhot: Nei Menggu Renmin Chubanshe, 1995), 424.

[75] For population changes, see *Zhongguo Renkou: Nei Menggu Fence*, ed. Song Naigong (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe, 1987).

Suiyuan was restored. Integrating Suiyuan, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region thus inherited structures of an expansionist Chinese regime.

As said above, in the Suiyuan province both banners and counties followed the principle of *lex personalis*, so that Mongols paid taxes to banners and Han Chinese to counties. In the early 1950s, however, measures were taken to territorially separate the banners and counties, drawing clear territorial boundaries between them. Some counties were abolished, and in other cases county areas with a Mongol majority were assigned to Mongolian banners. However, although banners and counties were partitioned according to territoriality and ethnicity, there were still many Chinese in banners and Mongols in counties. There was no way to expel the Chinese out of banners, nor could counties force Mongols out. Thus, in the partitioned banners and counties the principle of *lex loci* was adopted, whereby Mongol banners gave up their jurisdictions over their former banner subjects now residing in Chinese counties, and vice versa.[76] This solution followed a unique motto proposed by Ulanhu, namely "respect history and take the reality into account [*zunzhong lishi, zhaogu xianshi*]."[77] That is, historically Inner Mongolia was Mongolian territory, but in reality there were many Chinese settlers who could no longer be repatriated to 'China Proper'.

Although the demarcation of banner and county boundaries has been celebrated as an ingenious CCP solution to a longstanding problem that had troubled the Mongols for two centuries, it was in fact neither a Communist innovation nor did it produce positive results for the Mongols in the long term. First of all, the CCP was not as radical as the Japanese in restoring historical justice, for the Japanese abolished almost all the counties in Mongol banner territories whereas the CCP did not. Second, the CCP followed the Japanese precedent in Manchukuo where the principle of *lex loci* was adopted, which made banners multi-ethnic, leading to a higher stage in the assimilation process. An unforeseen consequence was that the principle of *lex loci* trumped the ethnic principle of the banner administration where Mongols were supposed to be the 'titular' (*Zhuti*) nation. By incorporating Chinese population into banners where in most instances they outnumbered the Mongols, this arrangement invited the Chinese to challenge the principle of Mongolian autonomy by appealing to the communist principles of nationality equality and majoritarian democracy. Leagues were in the same situation.

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[76] Qingeletu, "Suiyuan Diqu Jiejue 'Qixian Bingcun, Menghan Fenzhi' Wenti Chutan," *Nei Menggu Shida Xuebao* 1 (1996).

[77] Wulanfu, "Minzu Wenti yu Minzu Gongzuo," in *Wulanfu Wenxuan* (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1951/1999), 206.

This built-in contradiction exploded in the early years of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969, when the Chinese persecuted Mongol leaders and took over administration over all banners and leagues throughout Inner Mongolia. Given the escalating conflict with the Soviet Union and the MPR, Mongol insistence on autonomy was perceived not just as a moral indictment of Chinese policy, but as posing a security threat to China's territorial integrity. This situation was resolved by partitioning Inner Mongolia in September 1969, assigning the eastern three leagues to three North-eastern provinces, two Alashan banners to the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and the Ejine banner to the Gansu province, leaving only the former Suiyuan and Chakhar territories to a truncated Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region brought under martial law. It was not until 1979 that the original Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was administratively restored, though not without some territorial losses.

8 Towards an Administrative Cosmopolitan Inner Mongolia?

Although the administrative restoration of Inner Mongolia in 1979 was celebrated as an implementation of the CCP's correct nationality policy, it did not remove the underlying cause of the tension. Deng Xiaoping's (*1904 †1997) policies of 'reform' and 'opening up' soon had their reflections in Inner Mongolia's administration. Starting in 1981, leagues began to be turned into municipalities (*Shi*), and some of them have been given Chinese names:

TABLE 12.2 *Transformation of Mongol Leagues into municipalities* (Shi), *1981–2004*

J̌uu Uda League	Chifeng Municipality	1981
J̌irim League	Tongliao Municipality	1999
Yekhe J̌uu League	Ordos Municipality	2001
Hulunbuir League	Hulunbuir Municipality	2002
Ulaanchab League	Ulaanchab Municipality	2004
Bayannuur League	Bayannuur Municipality	2004

These municipalities have joined ranks with the municipal cities of Hohhot, Baotou, and Wuhai, making Inner Mongolia the world's largest 'urban' space. Today, only three leagues remain in Inner Mongolia: Khingan, Shiliin Gol, and Alashan.

Several reasons can be detected for this transformation of leagues into municipalities (*Meng-Gai-Shi*), and I argue that this is not simply an act of name rectification (*Zhengmin*). First, the change follows the national trend of turning prefectures (*Diqu*) into municipalities. Although not stipulated in the Chinese constitution, a prefecture-level city (*Diji shi*) is legally empowered to exercise autonomy in setting local policies. More importantly, unlike a prefectural league a prefectural municipality is entitled to extract revenues from subordinate banners and counties, thereby gaining superior autonomous financial power and resources.[78] Second, this change is arguably informed by the fetishization of city, endowing the latter with magical power to induce economic development. I have argued elsewhere that the magical power comes not from the neon-lighted urban image, but from cities' ability to get past China's Law on Nationality Regional Autonomy which prescribes that in an autonomous area the executive leader of the government must be from the titular nation. Cities are not nationality autonomous areas controlled by a nationality with some measure of ethnic sovereignty, but cosmopolitan spaces. Thus, turning leagues into municipalities is a major way to offset the nationality autonomy of Inner Mongolia so that the Chinese, both old and new settlers, and the Mongols could develop the regional autonomy of Inner Mongolia shoulder to shoulder, without legal constraint.[79]

Cosmopolitanism in metropolises is usually understood as tolerance of difference and strangers, transcending ethnicity. I argue, however, that municipalities in Inner Mongolia are also colonial institutions aiming at homogenization, equalization, and unification, precisely because of their cosmopolitan spirit. As early as in 1903, Georg Simmel recognized this dimension.[80] For him, cosmopolitanism was a powerful force, colonizing and imperializing, as cities had acquired more land and people at the expense of small towns and villages. However, unlike the expansion of classical urban settlements which has been gradual, cities in Inner Mongolia claim jurisdiction over large rural areas. By changing leagues into municipalities, all banners under their jurisdiction are rendered open. Municipalisation ultimately hollows out the 'nationality regional autonomy' of Inner Mongolia.

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[78] Jae Ho Chung and Tao-chiu Lam, "China's 'City System' in Flux: Explaining Post-Mao Administrative Changes," China Quarterly 180 (2004).

[79] Uradyn Erden Bulag, "From Yeke-juu League to Ordos Municipality: Settler Colonialism and alter/native Urbanization in Inner Mongolia," *Provincial China* 7,2 (2002).

[80] Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (1903), in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950).

9 Conclusion

After this comprehensive review of administrative transformations in Inner Mongolia, we can conclude that neither the Lifanyuan nor its successors can be idealized as something naturally defensive of Inner Asian interests. As a state agency, it could only serve the interest of the state, and its nature changed along with the changing state. The banner and league system, to the extent that it was to rule the Mongolian subjects for the colonial-cum-imperial Qing state, could be sustained only insofar as such a rule was deemed necessary for the imperial maintenance of power. It was not surprising that the Qing government broke its own rule by introducing county and sub-prefecture systems as soon as Chinese were settled in Mongolia in substantial numbers.

The establishment of counties and sub-prefectures for Chinese settlers in Mongolia was initially a strategic operation to keep the two populations apart, so as to mitigate potential threat from their fusion; but by juxtaposing the two ethnically differentiated administrative systems on one single territory, the Qing brought about unforeseen dynamics of ethnic conflict between Mongols and Chinese. Unfortunately for the Mongols, in this existential struggle their Manchu allies stood on the side of the Chinese, not least because the county system was economically more profitable as the Chinese subjects could be taxed, but more importantly because it was more integral to the Qing centralized state. In the waning years of the dynasty, the Manchu began to identify with Chinese interests and became the very agent to promote these interests and their administrative manifestations. Thus, the record of Lifanyuan institutional activities in Inner Asia calls for a radical revision of our conventional understanding of Inner Asian administration under the Qing.

I have suggested that this logic of governmentality must be put at the centre of any discussion of Inner Asian or Mongolian nationalism in opposition to Manchu or later Chinese territorial administrative colonization. Administrative nationalism is the Mongol form of nationalism, concerned as it is with equality, dignity, identity, land rights, and so on. While the Qing/Chinese administrative colonialism-cum-nationalism may be inclusivist and expansionist in the sense of its capacity to absorb the Mongols as long as they were de-feudalized (i.e. displaced from their banner administration), Mongolian administrative nationalism tends to be exclusivist, inward-looking, with little capacity or appetite for ruling Chinese settlers. Thus, administrative nationalism deprives the Mongols of a crucial ability to find a solution to deal with the large number of Chinese residents settled on their territory without either fleeing from them or imagining they could somehow be conjured away. Contemporary Mongol abhorrence of the county and provincial system, seeing it as distinctly Chinese, is ironic if not unfortunate because this is an institution introduced by the Mongols themselves seven hundred years ago, when they were not any larger in number.

It is in this ethno-territorial administrative battle between the banner/league and the county/province system as much as in China's overall trend that we may find an answer to the emergence of a new transcendentalist administrative system of municipality that has now covered about 70% of Inner Mongolia's territory. Yet, a post-colonial perspective may alert to the colonizing power of this seductive administrative cosmopolitanism.

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CHAPTER 13

Dealing with Nationalities in Imperial Formations: How Russian and Chinese Agencies Managed Ethnic Diversity in the 17th to 20th Centuries

Dittmar Schorkowitz

1 Imperial Formations and Colonial Transcontinuities

At first glance, government actions of Great Powers today have apparently little in common with those principles and factors that governed their policies in the past. This supposed discrepancy is particularly striking when we compare the Postsocialist positions of Russia and China with the situation in the age of new imperialism (1860–1914): in both empires, we seem to witness an almost diametric reversal. This perspective has, however, been challenged for quite some time by a vivid debate on the imperial dimensions of Russia and the Soviet Union, insisting on the significance of cross-epochal legacies for imperial formations.

Condensed to what has become known as the *imperial turn*, this controversy gained substantial momentum due to recent investigations focussing on Russia as a multinational state that have considerably widened our understanding of the complex relationships between the state and nationalities (ethnic groups).[1] In their comments on the course taken by this debate and

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[1] There is a broad corpus of literature on this topic. For introductions, see Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996); *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, ed. Daniel R. Brower et. al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998); Francine Hirsch, "Empire of Nations: Colonial Technologies and the Making of the Soviet Union, 1917–1939" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1998); Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, trans. Alfred Clayton (Harlow: Longman, 2001); *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia*, ed. Robert Geraci et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Dittmar Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten in Rußland. Der Integrationsprozeß der Burjaten und Kalmücken, 1822–1925* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001); Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); *Imperial Rule*, ed. Alexei Miller et al. (Budapest: Central European University Press,

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in their review of its different directions, the editors of *Kritika* not long ago stressed the need to concentrate more on "the forces holding the tsarist empire together for so long and, by the same token, of the long-term challenges and continuities affecting the multinational Soviet Union."[2] They thus addressed those cohesive forces on which multinational empires rely—especially in times of social upheaval—to strengthen their coherence, the effects of which become visible particularly during historical caesuras (e.g. 1917, 1991). It seems obvious that the assumption that structures of long duration are at work in these contexts is of theoretical relevance for the analysis of contemporary nation-building processes as well.

Even if one takes a sceptical stance towards the 'continuity-of-empire' hypothesis because it allegedly "essentalizes Soviet Empire,"[3] the search for "resources of the empire's longevity" and its "ability to stabilize society, despite its ethnic, religious and sociocultural heterogeneity"[4] is still an open-ended question. On the other hand, perceiving the Soviet Union "as a radically new imperial project,"[5] as Aleksei Miller has proposed following Terry Martin, also seems to be a misconception and also somewhat misleading. The phenomenon of the Soviet-borne multinational state cannot be explained just out of itself. Giving thought to the consistency of the ancient regimes' methods to rule, "which include modern methods of census-taking and map-making,"[6] thus continues to be a constructive and convincing approach to both Russia's

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2004); Willard Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

[2] Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, "The Imperial Turn," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 7,4 (2006): 707.

[3] Mark R. Beissinger, "Soviet Empire as 'Family Resemblance'," *Slavic Review* 65,2 (2006): 297.

[4] Alexei Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research*, trans. Sergei Dobrynin (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008), 2.

[5] Miller, *Romanov Empire*, 215, cf. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

[6] Hirsch, "Empire of Nations," 2–3; cf. Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," in *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny et al. (Oxford: University Press, 2001); Willard Sunderland, "Imperial Space: Territorial Thought and Practice in the Eighteenth Century," in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Rudolf A. Mark, "Mit Schwert und Feder: Russland und die Eroberung Mittelasiens seit Peter," *Osteuropa* 62,3 (2012): 88–93, 99–100.

and China's nationality policies where these methods became evident. The Bolsheviks merely adopted proven power strategies that were enhanced by new practices and better control mechanisms, and refined into a process of "conceptual conquest."[7] They could build upon methods and experiences of tsarist colonial administration.

A classification of ethnic groups into hunter-gatherers, nomadic, and sedentary peoples (*brodyachie, kochevye, osedlye*) was introduced in Siberia as early as in 1822 by governor-general Mikhail Speransky, whose reform design was influenced by the three-stage-model of civilization widely discussed in 'enlightened' Europe at that time.[8] Later, this model was easily adjusted to the secular belief system of progress and modernity and expressed as "ethno-historical evolution of the population in Marxist-Leninist terms."[9] The socio-cultural differentiation of the socialist model was thus largely based on knowledge of governmentality that had been accumulated by the great expeditions since the early 18th century. The detailed instructions given to these expeditions show that Russia's ruling class and government agencies were well aware of the fact that collecting information was an essential prerequisite for both the administrative penetration of the empire, as well as the exploitation of its resources.[10]

In a recent essay, Jane Burbank thus rightly pointed to the *longue durée* of imperial formations. In prompting us to "focus on the structure of states, rather than their names,"[11] she refers to Russia's long term expansion, the early phase of which began with the conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan Tatar khanates and Siberia in the late 16th century by the Muscovian state. Early modern empire-building since Peter the Great, who, by opening Russia's windows to the West "instituted Christianizing policies"[12] preparing thus the ground for a Eurocentric mission civilisatrice to the East, was likewise accomplished as a "continental expansion of the tsarist might which, by submitting non-Russian populations, constituted colonial power relations sui generis."[13] This interdependency of colonial expansion and imperial formation with its particular implications for the subjects was probably best understood by no one else but Lenin himself who, a few years before his death, used the notion of 'people's prison' to vigorously advocate against 'Great Russian chauvinism' in favour for national self-determination of the peoples oppressed by the tsarist regime.[14]

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[7] Hirsch, "Empire of Nations," 8; cf. Beatrice Forbes Manz, "Multi-ethnic Empires and the Formulation of Identity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26,1 (2003): 72, 92–6.

[8] Marc Raeff, *Sibiria and the Reforms of 1822* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956); Marc Raeff, *Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772–1839* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957); Helen Sharon Hundley, "Speransky and the Buriats: Administrative Reform in Nineteenth Century Russia" (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1984); V.A. Fedorov, "Mikhail Mikhajlovich Speranskii," in *Rossiiskie reformatori XIX–nachalo XX v.*, ed. A.P. Korelin (Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995); Dov Boris Yaroshevski, "Empire and Citizenship," in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, ed. Daniel R. Brower et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Manz, "Multi-ethnic Empires," 91.

[9] Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making of the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 312.

[10] Gudrun Bucher, *"Von Beschreibung der Sitten und Gebräuche der Völcker": Die Instruktionen Gerhard Friedrich Müllers und ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Ethnologie und der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002); Han Vermeulen, *Before Boas: The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015); Sergey Glebov, "Siberian Middle Ground: Languages of Rule and Accommodation on the Siberian Frontier," in *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire*, ed. Ilya Gerasimov et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009).

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[11] Jane Burbank, "The Rights of Difference: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler et al. (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 77.

[12] Manz, "Multi-ethnic Empires," 91.

[13] Dietrich Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus: Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860–1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1977), 14. In his seminal analysis, Geyer discusses the "Sonderweg" of Russian imperialism (catch-up modernization process, capital dependency, military-feudal complex), focusing on the antagonism of the "driving forces which influenced the great power policy of the Tsar's empire" and the "repercussions of an international engagement on domestic Russian tensions and development problems", ibid., 11. The German edition was translated by Bruce Little, see Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914* (Leamington Spa, Berg, 1987); cf. Jürgen Osterhammel, "Russland und der Vergleich zwischen Imperien: Einige Anknüpfungspunkte," *Comparativ: Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsordnung* 18,2 (2008): 12–3, Ulrich Hofmeister, "Russische Erde in Taschkent?—Koloniale Identitäten in Zentralasien, 1867–1881," *Saeculum—Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* 61,2 (2011): 267–70, 278, and Mark, "Mit Schwert und Feder," 81–8.

[14] Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin, „Zur Frage der Nationalitäten oder der 'Autonomisierung' (30.12. 1922)," in *Lenin Werke*, vol. 36, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974); Eli Weinerman, "The Polemics Between Moscow and Central Asians on the Decline of Central Asia and Tsarist Russia's Role in the History of the Region," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 71,3 (1993): 434; Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53,2 (1994): 414; Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, reprinted with a new introduction by Denis Sinor (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), 110; Adeeb Khalid, "The Soviet Union as an Imperial Formation: a View from Central Asia," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler et al. (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 118.

Since Russia consolidated its position as a modern Great Power only after 1917 (actually, after 1945) while maintaining structures of a continental colonial empire in new garb, including "rude methods of exploitation and oppression,"[15] any analysis of imperial conditions cannot confine itself to tsarist times, because beyond the Bolshevik nationalities question a paradox legacy remained: "how to maintain a great state in the territory of the former Russian empire and to recognize the right to national self-determination for the dozens of peoples who now lived under their rule?"[16] Ethno-historical investigations seem to be particularly suited to deal with such phenomena, termed 'trans-continuities,' because they reveal elements "which survive revolutionary alterations and always re-emerge; albeit perhaps under a different name and guise; whatever social ruptures may occur."[17] James Forsyth's brilliant study on Siberian peoples is a good example of such research, which reveals that colonial expansion was no peaceful process, that subordination under the double-headed eagle often did more harm than good to the indigenes, and that there are in fact conformities "between Russian rule and other colonial regimes under which native peoples were cruelly exploited."[18]

The impact of colonial-imperial legacies of tsarist autocracy was not, however, restricted to the political and economic agendas of socialist times.[19]

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[15] Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus*, 254; cf. Olaf Caroe, "Soviet Colonialism in Central Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 32,1 (1953): 138–40; Benjamin Loring, "'Colonizers with Party Cards': Soviet Internal Colonialism in Central Asia, 1917–39," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 15,1 (2014). For tools of rude oppression (Holodomor, Deportation, Gulag) in Soviet times see for instance Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York: Norton, 1978); Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History* (New York: Doubleday, 2003); Norman M. Naimark *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[16] Ronald Grigor Suny, "Introduction: Nation-making among the Ruins of Empire," in: *Ethnic Politics after Communism*, ed. Zoltan Barany et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2005), 3; cf. Khalid, "The Soviet Union," 119–20.

[17] Günther Schlee, "Regularity in Chaos: The Politics of Difference in the Recent History of Somalia," in: *Imagined Differences: Hatred and the Construction of Identity*, ed. Günther Schlee (Münster: Lit: 2002), 266.

[18] James Forsyth, *A History of the Peoples of Siberia: Russia's North Asian Colony, 1581–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), XVII. This was by no means a radical standpoint, but rather a paraphrase of Nikita Khrushchev's address to the United Nations in 1960 where he acknowledged the fact that the "colonial policy of the Tsarist government did not differ essentially from the actions of Western powers in their colonies", see Weinerman, "Polemics," 452.

[19] Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (London: George Philip & Son Ltd, 1952); Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*; Jörg Baberowski, "Auf der Suche nach Eindeutigkeit:

Their influence is present even today.[20] The quest for independence by many soviet republics in early Gorbachev reform years, which was "accompanied (and in part precipitated) by an extraordinary explosion of anti-imperial mobilization,"[21] is part of this heritage, just as is post-socialist nation building whose ethno-political conflicts and decolonization processes have dominated the debates on security and stability with regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia since 1988.[22] Political discourses on the 'near abroad' (*blizhnee zarubezh'e*) and on ambitions to recover Great Power status during the intervention in Georgia in August 2008 clearly demonstrate the degree to which foreign policy in Russia is still influenced by sentiments of lost greatness.[23] This is understandable from an imperial perspective, as the Baltic States and the Ukraine, as well as all eight republics from the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, gained independence with the decline of the Soviet Union. From amongst the assets of a colonial past only Siberia, the Volga region and Northern Caucasus became part of the new federation.

The post-socialist trajectory of Russia thus differs significantly from the development in China, the other continental colonial Great Power in Eurasia,[24] which apparently better understood how to preserve its imperial heritage in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet until today. Among many explanations, it seems very likely that the outcome depended fundamentally on the policy of Deng Xiaoping, who as early as in the late 1970s gave primacy to economic over political reforms. This was in contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev who, years later and badly advised by Western 'experts,' "decided that the only way to accomplish economic reforms was to introduce political reforms first."[25] The preservation of China's national unity may thus well have been at the center of a political logic directed at introducing economic reforms first in order to avert a foreseeable disintegration of the socialist system and planned economy.[26] As a result, two different bureaucratic systems of managed democracy evolved. Under the new conditions the multinational soviet state shrunk to a Russian Federation with Great Power ambitions and—if we follow Vladimir Shlapentokh—neo-feudal dependencies; meanwhile, the neo-liberal policy of a nominally socialist People's Republic of China has overtaken capitalism 'on the left,' so to speak.

When investigating imperial formations, one should not get irritated by the changing forms of government, as Jane Burbank has pointed out. Her reference to the *longue durée* is cutting-edge and confirmed, ironically, even by

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Kolonialismus und zivilisatorische Mission im Zarenreich und in der Sowjetunion," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 47,4 (1999); Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, 'National' Identity, and Theories of Empire," in *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny et al. (Oxford: University Press, 2001); Roland Cvetkovski, "Reich der Ränder: Zu den imperialen Peripherien in Russland," *Neue Politische Literatur* 55,3 (2010): 368–9.

[20] The focus of this chapter is on institutions and trans-continuities, rather than on imprints left by social or constitutional history. For these latter aspects see, for instance, Carsten Goehrke, "Transformationschancen und historisches Erbe: Versuch einer vergleichenden Erklärung auf dem Hintergrund europäischer Geschichtslandschaften." in *Transformation und historisches Erbe in den Staaten des europäischen Ostens*, ed. Carsten Goehrke et al. (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000); Idem, *Russland: Eine Strukturgeschichte* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010); and Emil' Pain, "Russia Between Empire and Nation." *Russian Politics and Law* 47,2 (2009): 69; for a longue-durée perspective setting out in the Middle Ages, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Early Feudalism—The Best Parallel for Contemporary Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48,3 (1996).

[21] Beissinger, "Soviet Empire," 295.

[22] Georgiy Mirsky, *On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997); Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998); Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001); Suny, "Introduction"; Pain, "Russia"; Dittmar Schorkowitz, "Geschichte, Identität und Gewalt im Kontext postsozialistischer Nationsbildung," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 135 (2010).

[23] William Safire, "On Language: The Near Abroad," *New York Times*, May 22, 1994, http://query.nytimes.com/ gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07EED81E39F931A15756C0A962958260; Klemens Büscher, *Transnationale Beziehungen der Russen in Moldova und der Ukraine: Ethnische Diaspora zwischen Residenz- und Referenzstaat* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004); Margarete Klein, *Russia's Military Capabilities: "Great Power" Ambitions and Reality* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009); Elena Kropatcheva, *Russia's Ukraine Policy against the Background of Russian-Western Competition* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); Peter Rutland, "The Presence of Absence: Ethnicity Policy in Russia," in *Institutions, Ideas and Leadership in Russian Politics*, ed. Julie Newton et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).

[24] Widely used today, the hybrid term 'Eurasia' is undoubtedly catchy, yet at the same time imprecise. The term may denote either the two parts of the double continent or their junction, i.e., a region of cultural intersection that shows characteristics of both European and Asian settings.

[25] Susan L. Shirk, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 4.

[26] See Peter Nolan, *China's Rise, Russia's Fall: Politics, Economics and Planning in the Transition from Stalinism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 302–11, and Pitman B. Potter, "Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on the Periphery in Contemporary China" in *The Chinese State at the Borders*, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 250–1.

Valery Tishkov's robust polemic in favor of a 'Russian citizen' (*rossiyanin*);[27] in his recent attempt to portray "Russia as a 'normal country,'"[28] he postulated "that the Russian state, regardless of its organizational structure—monarchy/empire, a union of republics and country of Soviets, or a republic/federation—can and must be classified as a nation-state."[29]

2 Why Some Institutions Do Not Die

Looking into the fractures of imperial formations, we can better understand the mechanism of how governance is transferred. There have been three caesura-like ruptures since early modern times that have fundamentally jeopardized Russia's cohesion: the extinction of the Rurik dynasty with the resulting 'Time of Troubles' (1598–1613), the revolutions of February and October 1917 with their civil-war aftermath until 1924, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–91), often referred to as the "explosion of the ethnic."[30] With regard to China, which, like Russia, considers herself as a "multi-ethnic empire and centralised state,"[31] similar caesuras did occur twice and almost at the same time as in Russia: the demise of the Ming dynasty in 1644 and the Xinhai revolution of 1911, the latter giving rise to independence movements (Mongolia, Tibet) and warlordism until 1928. So far, however, China has been spared the kind of repercussions experienced by Russia with the end of socialism.

Against this backdrop, the question arises as to what resources the two empires had at their disposal to overcome these recurrent caesuras, i.e. a "rise and fall of political integration" commonly described as 'dynastic' or 'administrative cycles,'[32] especially with regard to the heterogeneity of their ethno-cultural composition. In which ways and by what means was the loss of identity-creating dynasties—Qing in 1912 and Romanov in 1917—absorbed and transformed into new forms of governmentality? We may safely assume that multiple factors were at work in that process, and one may expect that "habits of imperial governance helped the state survive these disastrous collapses by providing structures, imagination, and the will to reconfigure an empire-state."[33] By the same token, however, structures may define habits that—over the centuries—are shaped into traditions of imperial representation.

To clarify the implicit dialectic is of particular interest, for in the end it was the hierarchies and authorities, the functionaries and military, and ideologies and attitudes of the respective ancien regimes that paved the way to the new socialist era. The cross-epochal transfer of imperial structures and objectives was, of course, fundamentally shaped in the arena of the social forces of modernization and persistence. To what extent these transitions had been influenced by tested strategies and power structures or rather by merits of a new elite generation is thus an open question, as is the search for similarities and/or differences in Russia's and China's historical trajectories.

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[27] *Rossiyanin* seems to be an advanced construction of the older and eventually discarded concepts of 'Soviet Man' (*sovetskji chelovek*) and 'Soviet Citizen' (*sovetskij grazhdanin*). The term is intended to give priority to civic consciousness (*grazhdanstvennost'*) over ethno-territorial identities, and to national unity over ethnic diversity. The notion seems to be a typical product of 'Utopian social engineering' aimed at the assimilation of peoples—who are dispossessed of national consciousness and cultural identity. Additionally, one has to keep in mind that with the comeback of imperial ideology, a dominance of Russianness is reinvented. As a matter of fact, there is no other influential national idea in today's Russia but Russian nationalism. Contrary to wishful thinking in official statements, people (even Russians) do not consider themselves as *rossiyanin*, but as Russian, Armenian, or Georgian. See the concurrent critiques in Pain, "Russia," 61, 68–9, 76–8, and Rutland, "Presence of Absence". For an instructive introduction to the conceptual history of 'social engineering' and its implications when applied to Russia, see Ilya Gerasimov, "Redefining Empire: Social Engineering in Late Imperial Russia," in *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire*, ed. Ilya Gerasimov et al. (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009).

[28] Valery Tishkov, "What are Russia and the Russian People," *Russian Politics and Law* 47,2 (2009): 38.

[29] Ibid., 53; cf. Rutland, "Presence of Absence," 121–3. Tishkov's dictum of 'Russia as a nation-state' has been significantly modified by Vladimir Zorin, his deputy as director of the institute for ethnology and anthropology, in a recent talk before the 10th anthropological congress at Moscow in that "Russia is not a nation-state in the general European sense of the word, but a nation-state [*gosudarstvo-natsiya*] that is at the same time a civilization-state [*gosudarstvo-tsivilizatsiya*]"; see Vladimir Yur'evich Zorin, "Strategiya gosudarstvennoj natsional'noj politiki: Traditsionnost' i novye podkhody k ukrepleniyu edinstva mnogonatsional'nogo naroda Rossii (Rossijskoj natsii)," in *X Kongress ėtnografov i antropologov Rossii: Tezisy dokladov. Moskva, 2–5 iyulya 2013 g.*, ed. M.Yu. Martynova et al. (Moscow: IĖA RAN, 2013), IX.

[30] Uwe Halbach, "Nationalitätenfrage und Föderation: Die 'Explosion des Ethnischen' in der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa* 40,11 (1990): 1011–3.

[31] Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, *China. Vielvölkerreich und Einheitsstaat. Von den Anfängen bis heute* (München: C.H. Beck, 1997). For the Russian equivalent, "Russia—united and indivisible" (*Rossiya edinaya i nedelimaya*), see Gerhard Simon, *Warum ging die Sowjetunion unter?* (Köln: Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1995), 10.

[32] Peter C. Perdue, "Strange Parallels across Eurasia," *Social Science History* 32,2 (2008): 264.

[33] Burbank, "Rights of Difference," 77–8.

Given their relevance for the system, the governmental capacities for integration may be observed best when focus is laid on administrative and legal systems, on imperial institutions and elite networks. Agencies principally concerned with governing ethnic minorities since the 17th century and developing strategies for the integration of colonial peripheries thus come under scrutiny. Initially arranged non-systematically for various territorial administrations of Russia and China, they formed a kind "of self-government in the 'colonies' within an 'imperial' judicial and administrative framework";[34] this resulted—quite colonialism-like—in administrative parallelism, even forms of 'imperial simultaneity' and legal pluralism, as "legal status depended on how tribes were brought under Qing rule."[35] Both empires, however, already demonstrated efforts to take stock of and classify the newly aggregated diversity along linguistic, cultural, and racial concepts in the early 18th century.[36] Following the military advance of the frontier and a subsequent transfer of pacified territories into the hands of competent civil departments (Di Cosmo refers to Inner Asia even as "systems of government of the frontier regions"),[37] governmental strategies in the 19th century aimed, with different pace, at the unification, formalization, and centralization of their colonial administration. Strategies that—in contrast to the principle of "integration by difference"[38]—have been widely described as assimilation of the ethnic minorities' legal and cultural spheres to the metropolises' norms and value systems were dubbed as Russification and Sinicisation, respectively.[39]

While the integration of 'marginal' cultures initially belonged to the domains of various agencies, the latter's structure was condensed over time and moulded into independent institutions that dealt solely with so called 'nationalities questions,' paralleled by the transformations of a "nationalizing state."[40] The significance of these interfaces for continental colonialism—Dietrich Geyer, speaking of Russian Turkestan, once coined the phrase of an "intrastate colonial system" and the "intrastate colonies of the empire"[41]—becomes evident from their longevity and capacity to adapt to the changing conditions of imperial formations. Influence was guaranteed by their prominent position in the hierarchy of imperial administration and close networking with central institutions. Additionally, the transcontinuity of these agencies was fostered both by the cross-epochal hegemonic ideologies of *l'idée d'Empire*—i.e., mission civilisatrice, manifest destiny, harmony and peoples' friendship, the formula of 'rescue and develop Central Asia,' pan-Slavism, Confucianism, socialism, and an elaborated governmentality achieved through permanent practice, which made them "skilled in frontier politics."[42]

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[34] Nicola Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia" *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 292.

[35] Dorothea Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols," *The International History Review* 20,2 (1998): 314; cf. Virginia Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe. The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 3–5; Paolo Sartori, "Behind a Petition: Why Muslims' Appeals Increased in Turkestan under Russian Rule," *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 63,2 (2009): 401–4. On the concept of 'imperial simultaneity' see the chapter of Pamela Kyle Crossley in this volume.

[36] Yuri Slezkine, "The Sovereign's Foreigners: Classifying the Native Peoples in Seventeenth-Century Siberia," *Russian History* 19,1–4 (1992); Idem, "Naturalists versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars Confront Ethnic Diversity," in *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, ed. et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); Dittmar Schorkowitz, "Peter Simon Pallas (1741–1811) und die Ethnographie Russisch-Asiens im 18. Jahrhundert," in *Ethnohistorische Wege und Lehrjahre eines Philosophen: Festschrift für Lawrence Krader zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. Dittmar Schorkowitz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995); Charles Steinwedel, "To Make a Difference: the Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russian Politics, 1861–1917," in *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. David L. Hoffmann et al. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Susi K. Frank, "Anthropologie als Instrument imperialer Identitätsstiftung: Russisch-sibirische Rassentheorien zwischen 1860 und 1890," in *Kultur in der Geschichte Russlands: Räume, Medien, Identitäten, Lebenswelten*, ed. Bianka Pietrow-Ennker (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007).

[37] Nicola Di Cosmo, "The Qing and Inner Asia: 1636–1800," in *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 334.

[38] Günther Schlee, *Ruling over Ethnic and religious Differences: A Comparative Essay on Empires* (Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2013), 2.

[39] This transformation process has been aptly analysed for China by Xiaoyuan Liu, *Recast All Under Heaven: Revolution, War, Diplomacy, and Frontier China in the 20th Century* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 14, who concludes: "In late Qing, the old ethnic segregation policy and the old approach of managing different frontier regions with different types of offices were suspended. The new policy was to extend the Chinese province system, station central government's army, and move Han-Chinese into the frontier regions. These measures continued during the republic period."

[40] Tishkov, "Russia and the Russian People," 36.

[41] Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus*, 17, 239; cf. Khalid, "The Soviet Union", and recently Hofmeister, "Russische Erde," 265, who reassured us of the political correctness in applying the notions 'colony' and 'colonialism' for Russian Turkestan.

[42] Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 275; cf. Thomas Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik in den Gebieten nationaler Minderheiten in China* (Bremen: Universitätsverlag, 1984), 37–8; Weinerman, "Polemics," 442; Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 287, 296.

3 The Russian Tradition

For the purpose of diachronic comparison, the general context of some aspects mentioned above can be established with due historical depth starting in pre-Petrine Russia, where the Ambassadorial Chancellery (*Posol'skij prikaz*) was in charge of developing relationships with Europe and Asia since 1549.[43] Treaties between states (*gramoty*), registers of presents (*rospisi podarkov*), and instructions (*nakazy*) for outgoing envoys including "a list of questions which the opposite party might ask, along with prepared answers,"[44] as well as incoming official diary journals (*statejnye spiski*) prove the routine of that agency, which "was fully equipped with all the tricks and techniques of steppe diplomacy."[45] Responsible for representing Muscovia's interests vis-à-vis the Ottoman, Persian, and Chinese empires, this office also managed the subordination of rulers from the Caucasian and Siberian periphery who sought for protection.

In the course of Tsar Peter's reforms, the Ambassadorial Chancellery merged into the Collegium of Foreign Affairs (*Kollegiya inostrannykh del*)[46] in 1718 with a special Department of Asian Affairs (*Departament aziatskikh del*) since 1797, outsourced as an independent Asian Department in 1819, and a Teaching Department for Oriental Languages (1823–1893). In addition, the foreign ministry established an Asian Committee in 1820, which turned into a permanent institution after 1827. The Asian Department became "de facto Russia's Colonial Office"[47] and persisted, despite administrative reforms implemented in 1832, as

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[43] Boris Meissner, „Die zaristische Diplomatie," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 4,3 (1956): 240, 242.

[44] Nikolai M. Rogozhin, "Posolski Books as a Source in the Study of Political Relations of Russia with Peoples and Countries of the Orient," in *Altaica Berolinensia: The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World. Permanent International Altaistic Conference, 34th Meeting, Berlin, 21–26 July 1991*, ed. Barbara Kellner-Heinkele (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993), 192. From among 766 so-called ambassadorial books (*posol'skie knigi*) documenting the activities of the Chancellery, 156 refer to foreign peoples and dominions that later became integrated into or subjected under the colonial administration of the Russian empire, for instance, the khanates of Crimea (1774), Bukhara (1868) and Khiva (1873).

[45] István Vásáry, "Muscovite Diplomacy with the States of the Orient" in *New Directions and Results in International Russistics*, ed. Gyula Szvák (Budapest: Magyar Ruszisztikai Intézet, 2005), 29.

[46] Following the administrative reforms of Alexander I., the Collegium of Foreign Affairs was reorganized as foreign ministry (*Ministerstvo inostrannykh del*) in 1802.

[47] Michael Khodarkovsky, "The Return of Lieutenant Atarshchikov: Empire and Identity in Asiatic Russia," *Ab Imperio* 1 (2009): 159. A great deal of good ideas on the paradox

one of the ministry's central departments until 1917. Even though renamed in December 1897 and receiving the inconspicuous label of a First Department, it continued to deal with all sorts of Orient (*vostok*) related questions.[48]

Simultaneously, expansion into Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia initiated the formation of special territorial administrations, "particularistic arrangements of rule,"[49] providing ethnic minorities and nationalities with varying forms of legal and cultural autonomy.[50] After all, indigenous self-governments and steppe Dumas (*Inorodcheskaya stepnaya duma*) were neither permanent subjects of the Asian Department nor of the military border administration; rather, they gradually came under the authority of civil institutions and governorate's jurisdiction as the frontier advanced. Most ministerial bureaucracies (interior, imperial domains, war, agriculture, religion, education) were thus faced with the challenge to constantly build up new competencies of their own in dealing with 'other' cultures, and to develop strategies for the latter's integration—with varying results.

This process was enhanced first by co-opting and, since the late 19th century, by instrumentalising indigenous elites. Their service for the administrative bodies, the Academy of Sciences and military became just as important as their mediatory role for Russia's imperial expansion in Asia.[51] Following the

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that Russia was a colonial empire that had no formal colonial office are given by Willard Sunderland, "The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was but Might Have Been," *Slavic Review* 69,1 (2010), suggesting that the Ministry of State Domains was well positioned to perform as such; ibid. 123.

[48] Erik Amburger, *Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Grossen bis 1917* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 116, 128–9; Joseph Fletcher, "Sino-Russian Relations, 1800–62," in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10 (Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, part I)*, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 321, 325.

[49] Khalid, "The Soviet Union," 117.

[50] As was the case with the Tatar and Bashkir, the Samoyedic and Khakass peoples, Yakuts, Buryats, Kalmyks, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Armenians, Kabardians, and Nogais; see for instance Amburger, *Behördenorganisation*, 130, 283–92; Raeff, *Sibiria and the Reforms*; Hundley, "Speransky and the Buriats"; Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten*, 70–108; David MacKenzie, "Kaufman of Turkestan: An Assessment of His Administration, 1867–1881," *Slavic Review* 26,2 (1967); Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, 102–13; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories," in *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, ed. Edward Allworth (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 1999).

[51] David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 171–98; Khodarkovsky, "Lieutenant Atarshchikov"; Gulnar Kendirbai, "Challenging Colonial

1905 revolution, ethnic minorities were thus entitled to have representatives in the first two Dumas (1906–07), despite continuing objections and restrictions (class, sex, age, sedentarism, Russian language skills). It is indicative of the continuity of the dynastic patronage principle, however, that national elites preferred to keep asserting their influence directly and via personal contacts with the tsar (and later with Lenin) and his ministers.[52]

The involvement of ethnic minorities in civil service and central decision-making institutions, as well as the empire's urgent need to streamline the manifold competencies of its administrative branches, eventually culminated in the establishment of a National Department at the Provisional Government's Ministry of the Interior (*Natsional'nyj otdel ministerstva vnutrennykh del vremennogo pravitel'stva*)[53] in September, 1917, to be soon followed by the National Council at the Provisional Siberian Regional Soviet (*Nacional'nyj sovet pri vremennom Sibirskom Oblastnom Sovete*)[54] in December. Being at the peak of its crisis, the ancien regime began to flatter the empire's national representatives in an effort to better meet their aspirations and to mobilise fresh loyalty resources hitherto withheld. The victorious Bolshevik, however, immediately understood how to make better use of these cohesive forces. Both the tsarist National Department as well as the National Council of the Provisional Siberian government were overtrumped by a significantly upgraded and influential ministry headed by Stalin himself: the People's Commissariat of Nationalities (*Narodnyj komissariat po delam natsional'nostej RSFSR*). Its main role consisted, as is well known, in guiding the transforming and independence-minded nations on their way into a Soviet state and in keeping national-orientated candidates on a course towards integration. There was no intention to grant them independence; at best, they were offered a limited Moscow-oriented and controlled form of autonomy. While the old regime disintegrated, the empire continued to exist in remodelled form. For that reason, the People's Commissariat was short-lived. It was dissolved only one day after the first Soviet government had been elected on July 6, 1923; some of its functions were curtailed and transferred to the Soviet of Nationalities (*Sovet natsional'nostej*) in 1924.[55]

It does, however, not really come as a surprise to see this interface re-emerge when, with the decline of the Soviet Union and of those forces that had for a long time guaranteed the cohesion of this multi-ethnic empire, the need for mediating ethnonational policies became urgent once again. Just like the People's Commissariat 70 years before, the RSFSR State Committee for Nationalities Issues (*Gosudarstvennyj komitet RSFSR po natsional'nym voprosam*)[56] took the lead in settling conflicts at the empire's new fault lines on November 15, 1989, followed soon after (27.3. 1990–14.11. 1991) by the USSR State Committee for Nationalities Issues (*Gosudarstvennyj komitet SSSR po natsional'nym voprosam*). Renamed many times and upgraded on January 10, 1994, as a Ministry of the Russian Federation for Nationalities Issues and Regional Politics (*Ministerstvo Rossijskoj Federatsii po delam natsional'nostej i regional'noj politike*), this institutional form existed until 2004.[57] Among the ranks of its rapidly rotating

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Power: Kazak Cadres and Native Strategies," *Inner Asia* 10,1 (2008); Aleksandr Ivanovich Andreev, *Ot Bajkala do Svyashchennoj Lkhasy: Novye materialy o russkikh ekspeditsiyakh v Tsentral'nuyu Aziyu v pervoj polovine XX veka* (*Buryatiya, Mongoliya, Tibet*) (Sankt-Peterburg: OOO Agni, 1997); Lothar Kölm, "Chokan Valikhanov (1835–1865) und Sibirien," *Berliner Jahrbuch für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 2 (1997).

[52] Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten*, 410–3; Rustem Tsiunchuk, "Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics: The State Dumas and the Constitution of New National Elites," in *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930*, ed. Jane Burbank et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 368–70, 372–9, 384–6; Juliette Cadiot, "Un empire « un et indivisible »? La question de la représentation politique des non Russes à la Douma après la révolution de 1905 (1905–1907)," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 48,2–3 (2007): 222, 228–9, 238.

[53] "Protokoly s"ezdov revolyutsionno-obshchestvennykh organizatsij i uezdnykh komissarov Zabajkal'skoj oblasti, vozzvaniya k buryatskomu naseleniyu o predostavlenii avtonomii i prizyv k edinstvu s Rossijskim gosudarstvom (July 1917–August 1918)," *Natsional'nyj Arkhiv Respubliki Buryatiya*, fond R-483, opis' 1, delo 7.

[54] "Perepiska s Vremennym Sibirskim oblastnym Sovetom ob organizatsii Sibirskogo Vremennogo Pravitel'stva (27.11.—30.12. 1917)," ibid., fond R-483, opis' 1, delo 10.

[55] Gerhard Simon, *Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion: Von der totalitären Diktatur zur nachstalinschen Gesellschaft* (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1986); Galina Petrovna Makarova, *Narodnyj komissariat po delam natsional'nostej RSFSR, 1917–1923 gg.: Istoricheskij ocherk* (Moskva: Nauka, 1987); Stephen Blank, *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities, 1917–1924* (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1994); Jeremy Smith, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917–1923* (London: MacMillan, 1999); Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten*; Martin, *Affirmative Action Empire*.

[56] Renamed on July 14, 1990, in *Gosudarstvennyj komitet RSFSR po delam natsional'nosteij* and transformed in 1991, December 18 in *Gosudarstvennyj komitet RSFSR po natsional'noj politike*; see "Spisok ministrov natsional'noj politiki Rossii", http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Список_министров_национальной_политики_ России.

[57] There was further reshuffle: the *Gosudarstvennyj komitet Rossijskoj Federatsii po natsional'noj politike* from December 1991 was renamed *Gosudarstvennyj komitet Rossijskoj Federatsii po delam federatsii i natsional'nostej* on March 2, 1993, upgraded as *Ministerstvo po delam natsional'nostej i federativnym otnosheniyam Rossijskoi Federatsii* on March 4, 1996, and renamed once more *Ministerstvo regional'noj i natsional'noj politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii* on April 30, 1998. This ministry was split into two portfolios on September 22, 1998: a *Ministerstvo regional'noj politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii* and a *Ministerstvo natsional'noj politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii*; the latter was renamed *Ministerstvo po delam federatsii i*

authorities we find anthropologists (G.V. Starovojtova, V.A. Tishkov), historians (V.A. Mikhajlov, V.Yu. Zorin), philosophers (R.G. Abdulatipov), experts on law (S.M. Shakhraj) and economy (E.S. Sapiro), and politicians (A.M. Belyakov, L.P. Prokop'ev, N.D. Egorov, V.A. Kirpichnikov, A.V. Blokhin). And the recent foundation of a Presidential Council for Intra-National Relationships[58] on June 7, 2012, again shows a particular desire to display, at least formally, a representative but highly centralized institution to address the so called 'national question' which, at a closer look, focus indeed on "the formation of a single political nation,"[59] the dissemination of Russian culture (language, history books, literature) and a systematic monitoring of areas with ethno-religious conflict potentials.

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natsional'nostej Rossijskoj Federatsii on May 25, 1999 and restructured again on May 17, 2000 as *Ministerstvo po delam federatsii, natsional'noj i migratsionnoj politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii*. Since its abolishment on October 16, 2001, a special Minister of the Russian Federation (*Ministr Rossijskoj Federatsii, kuriroval natsional'nuyu politiku*) has been in charge of nationality policy. See "Spisok ministrov natsional'noj politiki Rossii"; Rutland, "Presence of Absence"; Virginie Coulloudon, "New Appointment may Presage Changes in Russia's Nationalities Policy," *RFE/RL NEWSLINE*, December 19, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142583.html. Valery Tishkov, "U.S. and Russian Anthropology: Unequal Dialogue in a Time of Transition," *Current Anthropology* 39,1 (1998).

[58] With this foundation, ordered a month earlier by Putin's *Ukase* of May 7, the government (in fact the Presidential administration) compass to develop and implement long term strategies for a nationality policy, partly with the support of well-known experts (Abdulatipov, Mikhajlov, Tishkov, Zorin); see: "Obrazovan Sovet po mezhnatsional'nym otnosheniyam", http://state.kremlin.ru/council/28/news/15577, cf. http://kremlin.ru/acts/15240.

[59] Zorin, "Strategiya gosudarstvennoj natsional'noj politiki," IX. To bring this '*ex pluribus unum*' about, much attention is paid to the construction of a 'Russia related identity' (*rossijskaya identichnost'*) and to the idea of an 'All-Russia related civic nation' (*obshcherossijskaya grazhdanskaya natsiya*); ibid., IX–XI. The pattern of de-ethnicization with its intrinsic demand of acquiring 'sameness' is highly visible here. The more identification is achieved, the less control is needed—a striking criteria for large political entities. On 'difference' and 'sameness' as different modes of integration in society, empires, and nation states see the insightful essay by Schlee, *Ruling over Ethnic and religious Differences*. Examples for 'difference as a mode of integration' (Habsburg Empire, Islamic Caliphate, Mongol Empire, Ottoman Empire) are discussed by Manz, "Multi-ethnic Empires" and Fikret Adanir, "Religious Communities and Ethnic Groups under Imperial Sway: Ottoman and Habsburg Lands in Comparison," in: *The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World*, ed. Dirk Hoerder et al. (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003).

4 The Chinese Tradition

As a result of the Manchu's frontier strategy, their ambitious and ambivalent policy towards the Mongols,[60] the Qing established an analogous institution, the Mongolian Office (*Monggo jurgan, Menggu yamen*), for China, under Hūwangtaiji as early as in 1636. The office was renamed in 1638 as Lifanyuan, often translated as the Court of Colonial Affairs,[61] and "designed specifically to deal with the non-Han peoples of Mongolia in the north, Tibet in the southwest, and Sinkiang in the northwest."[62] Playing a central role in the formation of the empire, the Lifanyuan thus gained a prominent position from the very beginning of Manchu rulership. In 1661, under the reign of emperor Kangxi it was placed on a level with the Six Boards (*Liubu*) and the Censorate (*Duchayuan*), fulfilling the tasks of a ministry.[63]

Consistently developing its competencies, the Lifanyuan received its final shape in 1764 when it became structured into six departments: the

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[60] Michael Weiers, „Die Kuang-Ning Affäre: Beginn des Zerwürfnisses zwischen den mongolischen Tsakhar und den Mandschuren," *Zentralasiatische Studien des Seminars für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens der Universität Bonn* 13 (1979): 78–9; Idem, "Der erste Schriftwechsel zwischen Khalkha und Mandschuren und seine Überlieferung," ibid. 20 (1987): 108; Idem, "Mongolenpolitik der Mandschuren und Mandschupolitik der Mongolen zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre des 17. Jahrhunderts," ibid. 22 (1991): 269–70; Pamela Kyle Crossley, "The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire," in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9* (*Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800*), ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 319–20; Di Cosmo, "The Qing and Inner Asia," 338–40; on the shift from partnership to subordination in Manchu-Mongol relations, see also Di Cosmo's, "From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest," *Frontiers of History in China* 7,2 (2012).

[61] This translation of the Chinese term Lifanyuan is not very precise in rendering the proper meaning either of the original Manchu term (*tulergi golo-be dasara jurgan*, Office (Court) for the administration of the outer provinces) or of the Mongolian notion (*γadaγadu mongγol törö-yi ǰasaqu yabudal-un yamun*, Office for procedures, dealt with by the outer Mongolian government). Most probably all three branches did exist and cooperate under one umbrella (personal communication by Michael Weiers, 8.7. 2010); cf. Jacques Legrand, *L'administration dans la domination sino-mandchoue en Mongolie Qalq-A: Version mongole du Lifan Yuan Zeli* (Paris: Collège de France, 1976), 161; Chia Ning, "The Li-fan Yuan in the Early Ch'ing Dynasty" (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1992), 1, 19–20; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 98; Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 289, 294; Idem, "From Alliance to Tutelage," 182–6.

[62] Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan," 1.

[63] Ibid., 28–9; Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 295; Idem, "From Alliance to Tutelage," 180; Idem, "The Qing and Inner Asia," 354–6.

Inner Mongolian Bureau (*Qijisi*), the Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Wanghuisi*), the Outer Mongolian Bureau (*Dianshusi*), the Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau (*Rouyuansi*), the Eastern Turkestan Bureau (*Laiyuansi*), and the Judicial Bureau (*Lixingsi*).[64] These were in turn supplemented by various offices (Manchu Archives, Chinese Archives, Mongolian Archives, General Services Office, Seal Office, the Treasury, and a Translation Office) and associated agencies: "the Mongol officer's school, the Tibetan Buddhist printing office, and the office for the compilation of the Lifan Yuan's regulations (*zeli*)."[65]

While the Lifanyuan was initially only responsible "for the administration of Mongolian affairs inside and outside Manchuria, for religious matters related to Lamaism, and the Ch'ing court's relationship to Tibet,"[66] its scope of responsibility soon came to include most parts of Inner Asia. During the mid-18th century, it supervised Mongolian and Tibetan areas and was in charge of large parts of the population in Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Burma (Myanmar). Administering the outer provinces from the North to the Southwest, that office rapidly advanced into one of the most eminent agencies of the expanding Qing empire.[67]

On the one hand, the Lifanyuan represents a Manchu invention that had no precedent in the Ming dynasty; on the other hand, however, this office featured functions analogous to those of the much older Board of Rites (Libu) that had been performing similar tasks in the East, South, and Southeast of China since the ancient Tang dynasty. The territorial focuses of the two agencies thus were different, as were their integration strategies over time, and the Libu has often been described as the real agency of Chinese tradition in developing colonial relationships. Control over ethnic communities in Inner Asia and Mongolia was structured indirectly by "un système bureaucratique"[68] of co-opting indigenous elites and local self-administrations without intending—at least in the first half of the Qing period—to impose "Chinese law on the

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[64] Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan," 37–42; see also the table in her chapter "Lifanyuan and Libu in the Qing Tribute System" in this volume. Established translations do not always render the precise meaning: *qijisi* (bureau for banner registration), *wanghuisi* (bureau for the reception of the princes), *dianshusi* (bureau for the administration of dependencies), *rouyuansi* (bureau for cherishing those from afar), *laiyuansi* (bureau for causing distant people to submit); (personal communication by Michael Weiers, 6.10. 2009).

[65] Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 295.

[66] Gertraude Roth Li, "State Building Before 1644," in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 9 (Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800)*, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 62.

[67] Crossley, "Conquest Elite," 336–7, 346, 351–4.

[68] Legrand, *L'administration*, 168.

Mongols"[69] and "without committing large numbers of troops or spending large sums of money."[70] In contrast, the Qing absorbed "newly acquired territory into the provincial administrative system"[71] in Southwest China by imposing a regime of direct rule that resulted in the Sinicisation of non-Han Chinese groups and elite displacement. This Ming-based system of forced assimilation, which was elaborated under the Qing and "termed *gaitu guiliu*, which means literally 'change the locals and return to the current' [... that] is the regular bureaucratic stream or current of promotions and transfers,"[72] appears to have provoked more rebellions than any form of indirect rule in Inner Asia.[73] However, despite varying interests, their initial situations and goals, these two agencies were united in their core concerns: subordination of the periphery to the center, ideological control by means of rituals, extraction of tribute in ritualized form, tax, and military service and, finally, the handling of alliances and the flow of commodities.[74]

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[69] Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism," 317.

[70] Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 292.

[71] Ibid., 293: "Administration, school, and laws introduced in the south gradually marginalized the natives [...,] native administrators (*tuguan*) and chieftains (*tusi*) were replaced by officials from the interior [...,] men were forbidden to wear their traditional clothes [...,] intermarriage between Chinese settlers and native women, discouraged at first on the assumption that children would follow the mother's customs, was encouraged during the Qianlong era in the hope that it would promote assimilation", ibid. On the *Tusi* system in general, see Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik*, 38–9; on the notion of graded assimilation—the 'raw' (*sheng*) and 'cooked' (*shu*) barbarians—see Magnus Fiskesjö, "On the 'Raw' and the 'Cooked' Barbarians of Imperial China," *Inner Asia* 1,2 (1999). For Ming period relations with northern Tai polities cf. Volker Grabowsky, "The Northern Tai Polity of Lan Na (Ba-bai Da-dian) in the 14th and 15th Centuries: The Ming Factor," in *South East Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Geoff Wade et al. (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010), 203–8, 226–8; with Annam see Leo K. Shin, "Ming China and its Border with Annam," in *The Chinese State at the Borders*, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007). The Sinicisation concept has been criticized in recent times by C. Patterson Giersch, "'A Motley Throng': Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 1700–1880," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60,1 (2001): 70–1, Pamela Crossley, and others for being a too imprecise analytical tool to explain cultural dominance, whereas the colonial empire approach offers more options.

[72] Colin Mackerras, *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 25; cf. Giersch, "Motley Throng," 70, 76.

[73] Thomas Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik der KP China* (Frankfurt am Main: Sendler Verlag, 1982), 4–6.

[74] John King Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, ed. John King Fairbank (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

Being under central supervision, the Lifanyuan was composed of high-ranking civil servants, nobility, and officers of either Manchu or Mongol, but not Han Chinese origin,[75] representing an exception to the rule of traditional synarchy in "joint Sino-foreign administration."[76] Organized along regional branches, it represented a crucial interface between the semi-autonomous leaders of newly subjected regions and the imperial court. It was highly instrumental for negotiating between the divergent orders of the center and the 'barbarians' in economic, religious, and cultural matters; hence, it effectively shaped China's official perceptions of ethnic diversity on the Inner Asian frontier.

Legislation for the Mongols, whose subordination, co-optation, and integration remained a crucial field of political activity of the evolving empire throughout the 18th century, was one of the main tasks of the Lifanyuan.[77] Other aspects of colonial administration were no less important: resolving conflicts over land rights, the control of trade, migration, and currency flow, the arrangement of imperial marriage alliances, providing genealogical evidence of princely succession, the performance of Buddhist rituals and, last but not least, taxation, tributes, and document archiving.[78] The Lifanyuan was in charge of negotiations on border, transit, and trade issues with Russia, which the Qing regarded as a tribute-paying vassal (*fan*)[79] until 1861, when, under pressure of the intervention powers, a Court in Charge of Affairs of all Nations (*Zongli geguo shiwu yamen*) was founded. It was this new agency that now managed foreign relationships, particularly those with European colonial powers that previously had been handled either by the Libu or Lifanyuan according to the tributary classification of 'internal' and 'external' dependencies, respectively. However, the Lifanyuan, renamed the Ministry for Arranging non-Chinese Affairs (*Lifanbu*) in 1906, continued to exist until April 21, 1912.[80]

Integrating the nationalities (*Minzu*) remained a central task of the Kuomintang and Communist Party's policy until 1949, albeit without ministerial agencies that would take care of these groups' particular needs. In fact, the Lifanyuan was restructured, and its functions became limited. In May, 1914, a Board of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (*Mengzang yuan*) was created, which was renamed into the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (*Mengzang weiyuan hui*) in 1928. This decrease in importance was clearly in line with the paradigm shift of the new revolutionary era. The ancient regime was now referred to as a rule of foreigners, and the Manchu-Mongolian cultural hegemony was successfully and lastingly replaced by an ideology of Han Chinese nationalism (*Hanzu* or *Han minzu*), so that "the category Han is now an integral part of the Chinese collective consciousness."[81] When Sun Yatsen still referred to "China as 'the Republic of Five Nationalities'" in March, 1921, he was simply making concessions to the notion of "certain racial distinctions" between Han Chinese, Mongols, Manchu, Tibetans, and Hui, "which distorts the meaning of a single Republic."[82] The ultimate ambition, however, was to merge "all races into a cultural and political whole."[83] It was not until 1924 that the Kuomintang became ready to compromise by granting some kind of "self-determination (*zijue*) and autonomy (*zizhi*),"[84] a reaction to Lenin's influential nationalities policy. While the aforementioned Commission was active in Taiwan as a ministry of the Republic of China until late 2012 the People's Republic of China established the State Nationality Affairs Commission (*Minzu shiwu weiyuan hui*) as a central agency in 1949, directed by the State Council.[85]

1968), 2–4, 12–3; Mark Mancall, "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretative Essay," ibid., 72–89; Legrand, *L'administration*, 149–50, 161.

[75] Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 68–70, 125, 295–6; Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 295; Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan," 32–3, 43; Legrand, *L'administration*, 162.

[76] John King Fairbank, "Synarchy Under the Treaties," in *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, ed. John King Fairbank (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 205.

[77] Legrand, *L'administration*, 41–4; Di Cosmo, "The Qing and Inner Asia," 356–7; Heuschert, "Legal Pluralism," 314–7; see also the chapters of Dorothea Heuschert-Laage and Uradyn Bulag in this volume.

[78] Rawski, *Last Emperors*, 70, 147, 153, 252–4.

[79] Fairbank, "Preliminary Framework," 9–13; see also Fletcher, "Sino-Russian Relations," 322–3, and in more detail the chapter of Ye Baichuan and Yuan Jian in this volume. For a fresh look on the tribute theory see Zsombor Rajkai, "Early Fifteenth-Century Sino-Central Asian Relations: The Timurids and Ming China," in *Frontiers and Boundaries: Encounters on China's Margins*, ed. Zsombor Rajkai et al. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012), 91–3.

[80] Chia Ning, "Li-fan Yuan," 27; Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 289; Xiaoyuan Liu, *Recast All Under Heaven*, 13. Pamela Crossley in her preceding essay notes that the *Lifanbu* was based upon different principles of bureaucratic practice, despite the similarity in name.

[81] Florent Villard, "'Class', 'Race' and Language: Imagining China and the Discourse on the Category 'Han' in the Writing of Marxist Revolutionary Qu Qiubai (1899–1935)," *Asian Ethnicity* 11,3 (2010): 312.

[82] Mackerras, *China's Minorities*, 54, 56.

[83] Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik*, 6.

[84] Mackerras, *China's Minorities*, 57; cf. Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik*, 43, and Villard, "'Class'," 316.

[85] Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik*, 48–9; a detailed account of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission is given by Mei-hua Lan in this volume.

5 Asymmetries in Time and Format: Challenges to the Comparative Arrangement

Any attempt at comparing Russia's and China's political institutions—as in our case with regard to the structures, functions, and effectiveness of colonial administration—is fraught with certain problems related to a lack of symmetries and considerable variance. Thus, while the Lifanyuan and the even older Libu were central agencies responsible for all kinds of colonial matters in every single province at a very early point in time, the development took a different course in Russia where special administrations dealt with specific needs of particular regions, and where centralization emerged comparatively late. This diversity in the evolution of political institutions is strikingly evident in the Asian Department that remained part of the foreign ministry and never became an officially recognized colonial office. Consequently, the administration of new colonial territories was part of the department's obligations only temporarily, until its duties were successively transferred to other ministerial agencies that developed their own sub-divisions, competencies, and interests.[86] In contrast, the Lifanyuan and Libu were always in charge of China's foreign relations as well, managing them as ritualized forms of tributary relationships. Hence, there was no need for a foreign ministry until 1861; moreover, that ministry was established only under external pressure at a time of internal weakness, and was a derivative of the two colonial agencies.

The picture is no less complicated in the Chinese case. Colin Mackerras, for instance, picking up a thought first proposed by Mark Mancall, has convincingly raised the issue that the Qing were actually operating with two different kinds (NB not variants) of colonial administration: on the one side, the Lifanyuan in charge of the nomadic societies in the North and West, which was a Manchu invention consistent with their traditions designed to maintain a clear distinction between their way of life and Chinese culture.[87] On the other side, the Libu, deeply rooted in Ming-time Confucian traditions and in charge

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[86] For instance the Bureau for Horde-Peoples of the Astrakhan' Chamber of State Domains (*Otdelenie ordynskikh narodov Astrakhanskoj palaty gosudarstvennykh imushchestv*), the Interior Ministry's Department for Religious Affairs of Foreign Denominations (*Departament dukhovnykh del inostrannykh ispovedanij*), or that department's branch for the Lamaistic canon (*Departament dukhovnykh del inostrannykh ispovedanij po zakonu lamaiskomu*). The absence of a separate colonial office was a phenomena which Russia shared with two other continental colonial powers: the Habsburg and Ottoman empires; see the tour d'horizon in Sunderland, "Ministry of Asiatic Russia," 127–32.

[87] Mackerras, *China's Minorities*, 31–2; cf. Mancall, "Ch'ing Tribute System," 73–5.

of sedentary, crop-cultivating, non-Han Chinese nationalities in the South and East of the country, a region described by John Fairbank as the 'Sinic Zone' (Korea, Annan, Liuqiu, Japan) or 'Chinese culture area.'[88] The most convincing explanation for the divergent functions of these two agencies may thus not be "whether the region of their responsibility was part of China or not," but rather "its geographic location and perceived socio-economic category."[89] However, reflecting Jonathan Skaff's call for more transnational and interdisciplinary, "integrationist perspectives" towards the "entangled histories"[90] of the two zones, too little is known about the relationships between the two agencies, and the same is true of their differing attitudes, competencies, and classifications with regard to the people and ethnic communities they were managing.

The asymmetries pinpointed here for an early modern period persisted well into the 20th century, but with reversed signs. While it was now the young Soviet state that had created a central office (People's Commissariat of Nationalities) for the time of civil war, the Chinese Republic first dissolved the Lifanyuan and then replaced it by a minor regional commission (1914), which was, in turn, transformed into a central state office (Nationalities Affairs Commission) as late as 1953.

For the purpose of diachronic comparison, however, such non-synchronisms in the evolution of political institutions are rather of secondary importance. In our analysis of imperial formations, the role played by trans-continuities and the transformations of structures is, ultimately, more crucial than temporalities. The central issues are similarities in the properties of the features compared, the compatibility of hegemonic techniques and the preponderance of mutual, reinforcing influences; this is obviously the case. Thus, Mikhail Speransky's reforms and his famous 1822 *Statute for the Administration of the Aborigines*[91] of Siberia were most probably influenced by the early edition (1789) of the Lifanyuan Regulations. Fragments of that code were translated first by Vasilij Novoselov, who worked in Irkutsk as a translator for the Siberian governor-general, and then by Nikita Bichurin (Father Hyacinth) who, completing his spiritual mission in Beijing, met Speransky in 1821 on his way back to St. Petersburg.[92] The categorization of today's 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities in the PRC was, in turn, influenced for a considerable period of time by the application of criteria established by Stalin in 1913 in response to the Austro-Marxist nationality program.[93]

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[88] Fairbank, "Preliminary Framework," 2; for Libu's Confucian traditions see the chapter of Zhang Yongjiang in this volume. There is a new, critical debate on Fairbank's 'Sinic Zone' concept focussing less on economic-ecological factors, but on 'textual culture' instead to the effect that the boundaries between Inner Asia and the Sinic Zone, most notably 'China Proper', become blurred; see Jonathan Karam Skaff, *Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power, and Connections, 580–800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6–8.

[89] Mackerras, *China's Minorities*, 32.

[90] Skaff, *Sui-Tang China*, 3–4.

[91] "Vysochajshe utverzhdennyj Ustav ob upravlenii inorodtsev," in *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii*, sobranie pervoe, vol. 38, No 29126 (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya II Otdeleniya Sobstvennoj Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Kantselyarii, 1830).

A comparison of institutions in charge of nationality affairs hence provides basic insights into particular contradictions of multinational states, even if we would limit our discussion to the People's Commissariat and the Lifanyuan's successor, the *Lifanbu*. Both are agencies of continental colonialism that exemplify imperial crisis management at the transition into the new socialist era. This is of some relevance not only from a methodological point of view, but also for present-oriented considerations. The effects of socialist ruling practices can only be adequately appraised if they are related to instruments of colonial rule developed earlier: the divide-and-rule policies of administrative-territorial delimitations, ethnic categorizations, and the will to classify, identity formation and ethnicity building, censuses, language policies, national quotas, etc.[94] In exploring these aspects, one should always be aware of the abundance of cultural diversity, and thus differentiate between the various practices of "piecemeal social engineering"[95] in the dealings of agencies with ethnic minorities. Over-generalizations, extenuations, and historiographical distortions can be avoided when positive effects of state-driven affirmative programs or 'civilization-implementing' actions are juxtaposed with the dark sides of hegemony in other parts of the empire, i.e., the decapitation of national elites and the punishment of whole peoples by deportation, hunger-whip, or genocide.[96]

The co-optation of indigenous elites, whose motives were generally guided by their disposition in maintaining traditional order and/or their interest in (self-)integration, always played a central and cross-epochal role in colonial management. Nationality policy is no unilateral process, not even under hegemonic conditions, but it requires cooperation by representatives of national minorities. Their willingness to cooperate may change, and their forms of resistance are subject to many changes over time as well. Initial co-optation is, as a rule, later replaced by instrumentalization.[97] The dialectic is part of a development in which national elites, who are eager to preserve their status, are forced to transfer regulations and concepts of rule from the center to a dependent and exploited periphery, and to implement them—often against their will and sometimes in modified forms: "Flexibility and centralization, naked coercion, and 'enlightenment' missions were often entangled in complex ways."[98] Being a dynamic part in the colonial management process, they met and interacted with high-ranking members of various ethnic groups in the metropolises of the empire, establishing networks of communication and solidarity.[99] While thus developing their own strategies, however, they also cooperated closely with state agents, bureaucrats, and the military; this actually led to the emergence of a dense network between all the parties involved in colonial management, whose functionaries often owed their careers to personal contacts and patronage. It is precisely this kind of joint action-taking along different strategies, a sort of "meaningful practices"[100] in the complex encounter between colonizers and colonized, that can explain why "imperial elites may have *viewed* their domains from a metropolitan centre, but their actions, let alone their consequences, were not necessarily *determined* there."[101]

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[92] Stepan Lipovtsov, *Ulozhenie Kitajskoj Palaty vneshnikh snoshenij*, tom pervyj (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya departamenta narodnago prosveshcheniya, 1828), VII–XII; Nikita Yakovlevich Bichurin, *Zapiski o Mongolii* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya K. Kraiya, 1828); Aleksandr Nikolaevich Khokhlov, "Mongolist Vasilij Novoselov i ego perevod "Lifan'yuan' tsze-li"," in *Istoriya i kul'tura Vostoka Azii: Materialy mezhdunarodnoj konferentsii 9–11 dekabrya 2002 g.*, tom pervyj, ed. Sergej Vladimirovich Alkin (Novosibirsk: Institut arkheologii i etnografii SO RAN, 2002). This orientation towards administration models of imperial China and the transfer of ruling practices was no isolated case. Thus, the second edition (1817) of *Lifanyuan zeli*, known in Irkutsk as the 'Code of Mongol laws' (*Ulozhenie mongol'skikh zakonov*), was in part translated by the orientalist Aleksandr Vasil'evich Igumnov, a co-worker of Speransky, and used by governor-general Nikolaj Murav'ev-Amurskij as a much welcomed pretext to force his own restrictive reform on the Buddhist clergy of East Siberia in May 1853; see: "Polozhenie o Lamajskom Dukhovenstve Vostochnoj Sibiri," *Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Istoricheskij Arkhiv*, fond 821, opis' 133, delo 409, ll. 120a–121a.

[93] Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, "Marksizm i natsional'nyj vopros (1913)," in *Marksizm i natsional'no-kolonial'nyj vopros: Sbornik izbrannykh statej i rechej*, ed. Institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina pri TsK VKP(b) (Moskva: Partizdat TsK VKP(b), 1934), 7–10, 218; Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik*, 30, 50–1; Jiann Hsieh, "China's Nationalities Policy: Its Development and Problems," *Anthropos* 81 (1986): 1, 4–5, 16–7; Thomas S. Mullaney, "Ethnic Classification Writ Large: The 1954 Yunnan Province Ethnic Classification Project and its Foundations in Republican-Era Taxonomic Thought" *China Information* 18,2 (2004): 226–31; Villard, "'Class'," 313–4. Manz, "Multi-ethnic Empires," 92–3.

[94] Juliette Cadiot, "Organiser la diversité: la fixation des catégories nationales dans l'Empire de Russie et en U.R.S.S. (1897–1939)," *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 31,3 (2000): 147; Dominique Arel, "Language Categories in Censuses: Backward- or Forward-looking?," in *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*, ed. David I. Kertzer et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 102–5; David Abramson, "Identity Counts: The Soviet Legacy and the Census in Uzbekistan," ibid., 178–9; Uradyn E. Bulag, "Inner Mongolia: The Dialectics of Colonization and Ethnicity Building," in *Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 86–8; Mullaney, "Ethnic Classification," 214–7; Anna Stammler-Gossmann, "'Indigene Völker': Historische Wurzeln der russländischen Minderheitenpolitik," *Osteuropa* 61,2–3 (2011): 418–20.

[95] Gerasimov, "Redefining Empire," 232.

[96] Nekrich, *Punished Peoples*; Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides*; Weinerman, "Polemics"; Robert Geraci, "Genocidal Impulses and Fantasies in Imperial Russia," in *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008); *Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Detlef Brandes et al. (Wien: Böhlau, 2010). See also my detailed critique on Martin's, *Affirmative Action Empire*: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/id=4794.

[97] Caroline Humphrey, "The Fate of Earlier Social Ranking in the Communist Regimes of Russia and China," in: *Institutions and Inequalities: Essays in Honour of André Béteille*, ed. Ramachandra Guha et al. (Oxford: University Press, 1999), 63–5; Schorkowitz, *Staat*

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und Nationalitäten, 229–85; David Sneath, "Competing Factions and Elite Power: Political Conflict in Inner Mongolia," in *Conflict and Social Order in Tibet and Inner Asia*, ed. Fernanda Pirie et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 88–94.

[98] David-Fox, Holquist, and Martin, "Imperial Turn," 707.

[99] Giersch, "Motley Throng"; Robert Barnett, "Beyond the Collaborator-Martyr Model: Strategies of Compliance, Opportunism, and Opposition within Tibet," in *Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region*, ed. Barry Sautman et al. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 31–3, 56; Liliana Riga, "Reconciling Nation and Class in Imperial Borderlands: the Making of Bolshevik Internationalists Karl Radek and Feliks Dzierżyński in East Central Europe," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 19,4 (2006): 450–2, 458; Dittmar Schorkowitz, „Gesellschaftliche Emanzipation und nationale Politik der Burjaten, 1825–1925," *Periplus: Jahrbuch für Außereuropäische Geschichte* 17 (2007): 180–6; Kendirbai, "Challenging Colonial Power," 66, 69–71; Peter C. Perdue, "War Qing-China ein koloniales Empire?," in: Kolonialgeschichten: Regionale Perspektiven auf ein globales Phänomen, ed. Claudia Kraft et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2010), 264.

[100] John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 37.

[101] Ann Laura Stoler, and Frederick Cooper, "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, ed. Frederick Cooper et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 29; cf. Hofmeister, "Russische Erde," 266–9.

6 Continental Colonialism in Comparative Perspective

The transformation from empire to nation-state is widely regarded as one of the mega-projects of political modernity, as is the related replacement of dynastic bureaucracies by party systems (from the Romanovs to Lenin/Stalin, Qing to Sun Yatsen/Mao, Ottoman to Atatürk, Habsburg to Renner/Bauer).[102] A closer look reveals, however, different process-related developments and various forms of completion. As measured by a) the heterogeneity in sociopolitical structures, ethnic identities, and languages spoken, b) centre-periphery dependencies, and c) unsettled nationalities conflicts, the mission of the nationalizing state seems by far not yet completed, neither in Russia nor in China. The party system of both multinational states can, furthermore, still be aptly characterized as 'apparatus state,' whose dynastic principle continues to be evident today—and even more so, by the way, in Azerbaijan and North Korea.[103] Given the *longue durée* of these trajectories, there is all reason to challenge the long-held view of "transition from empire to nation as an index of modernity"[104] and to critically address the teleology of uncertain social progress paradigms generally modelled on European notions of nation-state development.

Assuming that it "has not given way to a stable, functioning world of nation-states,"[105] the empire still represents a cross-epochal and operable variant of governance and reference (even in Turkey today), the cohesiveness of which can be shown by "modular comparisons between component parts of imperial formations."[106] The diachronic-synchronic comparison—exemplified in this chapter by ways in which imperial agencies were managing ethnic diversity in Russia and China—is a plausible approach. It bolsters the thesis of imperial continuity and rebuts state-supporting discourses on the past that emphasize national unity, harmony, and a 'unifying centre.'[107] Furthermore, it disqualifies approaches that do not "distinguish between regions of Chinese civilization that were directly incorporated into an imperial field administration and Inner Asian regions under indigenous polities,"[108] and thus offers fresh insights into the manner in which persistent hegemonial concepts are continually being remodelled.[109]

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[102] Cf. Nicolai N. Petro, and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State* (New York: Longman, 1997); *Russian Empire*; Pain, "Russia"; Villard, "'Class'"; Thomas S. Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

[103] See Max Weber's notion of the modern state as an "institution-like sovereignty association" with "forms of patriarchal and patrimonial rule, sultanic despotism and bureaucratic governance"; Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie*, besorgt von Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: Mohr, 1980), 824; cf. Karl August Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 430, 441.

[104] Peter C. Perdue, "Erasing the Empire, Re-racing the Nation: Racialism and Culturalism in Imperial China," in *Imperial Formations*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler et al. (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 141; cf. Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 10–1, 23–8; Manz, "Multi-ethnic Empires," 71–2.

[105] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 443.

Recent research on colonial experiences in Eurasia has once more shown the importance of comparative approaches to the ways and degrees of cultural penetration and imported modernisation.[110] However, there have been only few attempts to combine the Turnerian notion of 'frontier' (1893)—as a dynamic process of continuous advance—which has been convincingly

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[106] Perdue, "Erasing the Empire," 143.

[107] Alexander Woodside, "The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political Theory," in *The Chinese State at the Borders*, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 12–3; cf. Haiying Yang, "The Politics of Writing History in China: A Comparison of Official and Private Histories," *Inner Asia* 3,2 (2001); Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 287.

[108] Karl E. Ryavec "Manchu Empire or China Historical GIS? Re-mapping the China/Inner Asia Frontier in the Qing Period CHGIS," *Inner Asia* 6,2 (2004): 179.

[109] Peter Perdue thus convincingly establishes a line of continuity between the new 'Develop the West' economic policy of the PRC and the "integration policies of the Qing Dynasty when it first conquered the western regions of Mongolia and Xinjiang", Perdue, "Erasing the Empire," 167; cf. Hauke Neddermann, *Sozialismus in Xinjiang: Das Produktions- und Aufbaukorps in den 1950er Jahren* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 193–213.

[110] Dominic Lieven, "Empire on Europe's Periphery: Russian and Western Comparisons," in *Imperial Rule*, ed. Alexei Miller et al. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004); Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2005; Alexei Miller, "The Value and the Limits of a Comparative Approach to the History of Contiguous Empires on the European Periphery," in *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire*, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007); Alexander Stephen Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910. A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: University Press, 2008); Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*.

applied to Inner Asia,[111] with the concept of 'internal colonialism' and to subsume these related perceptions of centre-periphery relations under the category of continental colonialism, comprising at least the Chinese and Russian Empires and possibly the Ottoman Empire as well.[112] Obviously and despite the seminal works of Peter Perdue, James Millward, and Yingcong Dai, to name but a few, the 'frontier in comparative view' approach[113] remains a challenge still unanswered for many parts of the Russian Empire (Siberia, Caucasus, Central Asia), North and East India, Southwest China, and the northern fringes of Southeast Asia.[114]

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[111] Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Irvington: Capitol Publishers, 1951); Robert H.G. Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History* (Cambride, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970); Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*; C.R. Whittaker, "Roman Frontiers and European Perceptions," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 13,4 (2000): 472–3.

[112] John P. LeDonne, "The Frontier in Modern Russian History," *Russian History* 19,1–4 (1992); Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*; Suchandana Chatterjee, *The Steppe in History: Essays on a Eurasian Fringe* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2010). Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1999).

[113] Dietrich Gerhard, "The Frontier in Comparative View," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1,3 (1959); cf. Mark Bassin, "Turner, Solov'ev, and the "Frontier Hypothesis": The Nationalist Signification of Open Spaces," *The Journal of Modern History* 65,3 (1993): 474–5. Alfred J. Rieber, "Frontiers in History," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 9, ed. Neil J. Smelser et al. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 5814, 5816.

[114] For a short overview regarding the debate on China's Inner Asia frontier see Di Cosmo, "From Alliance to Tutelage"; cf. also C. Patterson Giersch, *Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan Frontier* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 2–9; Yingcong Dai, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Shin, "Ming China," 101–2; Fiskesjö, "'Raw' and 'Cooked' Barbarians"; Xiaoyuan Liu, *Recast All Under Heaven*, 10–3, 229–38; Michel Bruneau, *L'Asie d'entre Inde et Chine: Logiques territoriales des États* (Paris: Belin, 2006), 41–76; Grabowsky, "Northern Tai Polity"; James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Thomas E. Ewing, "The Forgotten Frontier: South Siberia (Tuva) in Chinese and Russian History, 1600–1920," *Central Asiatic Journal* 25,1–2 (1981); Alfred J. Rieber, "The Comparative Ecology of Complex Frontiers," in: *Imperial Rule*, ed. Alexei Miller et al. (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 184–92; Goehrke, *Russland*, 43–7; Cvetkovski, "Reich der Ränder," 375–80.

Such a synthesis would be reasonable in theoretical terms, and in fact a useful tool for comparative historical analysis. To begin with, tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union[115] as well as China[116] have been strikingly—though neither exhaustively nor without controversy[117]—described under the aspects of 'internal colonialism' and the exploitation of ethnically and culturally distinct groups.[118] Drawing, though not explicitly, on three categories of 'internal colonization' (sic): the own (Russian peasant-serfs), the other (colonized Non-Russians), and the self (disciplined individuals), Alexander Etkind stressed not only the concomitance of these formats, but also their interdependence. However, significant differences still remain between a class-based, age-long peasantry exploitation in Russia's heartland and the establishment of hegemonial order with almost no economic returns in a 'backward,' constantly shifting periphery (frontier) of non-Slavic cultures.[119]

In addition, such a synthesis offers a good starting point for specifying in what respects continental colonialism actually differs from the various forms of overseas colonialism by the 'seaborne empires' of the British, Spanish,

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[115] Nikolaj Mikhajlovich Yadrintsev, *Sibir' kak koloniya v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i istoricheskom otnoshenij* (Sankt Petersburg: Sibiryakov, 1892); Baymirza Hayit, *Sowjetrussischer Kolonialismus und Imperialismus in Turkestan als Beispiel des Kolonialismus neueren Stils gegenüber einem islamischen Volk in Asien* (Oosterhout: Anthropological Publications, 1965); Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus*; Alvin W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," *Telos* 34 (1978); Weinerman, "Polemics"; Schorkowitz, *Staat und Nationalitäten*; Lev Mikhajlovich Dameshek, *Sibirskie « inorodtsy » v imperskoj strategii vlasti* (*XVIII—nachalo XX veka*) (Irkutsk: Vostochno-Sibirskaya izdatel'skaya kompanya, 2007); Goehrke, *Russland.*

[116] David Goodman, "Guizhou and the People's Republic of China: The Development of an Internal Colony," in *Internal Colonialism: Essays Around a Theme*, ed. David Drakakis-Smith et al. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1983); Heberer, *Nationalitätenpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik*; Dru C. Gladney, "Internal Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and its Subaltern Subjects" *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et la monde turco-iranien* 25 (1998).

[117] Barry Sautman, "Is Xinjiang an Internal Colony?," *Inner Asia* 2,2 (2000): 243; Susi K. Frank, "'Innere Kolonisation' und *frontier*-Mythos: Räumliche Deutungskonzepte in Rußland und den USA," *Osteuropa* 53,11 (2003): 1667; Osterhammel, "Rußland," 22.

[118] See Robert J. Hind, "The Internal Colonial Concept," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26,3 (1984): 552; Pablo González Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1,4 (1965): 33.

[119] Alexander Etkind, *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 62–71, 251–2; cf. the worth reading, critical review by Anna Fournier, "Reflective Colonization: Domination, Consent, and the Self in Imperial Russia," *Russian History* 39 (2012); see also Loring, "'Colonizers," 78–80.

French, and Portuguese. As has been argued throughout this chapter, "territorial contiguity"[120] of both the Russian and Chinese empires with their Central and Inner Asian peripheries can hardly be used as a counter-argument against classifying their rule as colonial and contrasting their continental formations with overseas variations.

Being directly involved with the locals on a much broader scale than the British in India, Russian military and bureaucrats, merchants, peasants, workers, and intellectuals accounted for a significantly higher degree of western interference and for the dissemination of a European-oriented modernity first dubbed Russification and later Sovietization, being "the Soviet project aimed at the *conquest* of difference."[121] As the Romanovs transformed their newly acquired frontiers step-by-step into internal colonies, that continuous shift from indirect to direct rule eventually resulted in a more rigid integration and domination, as was the case with the Qing's expansion into Inner Asian borderlands. China's march to the West led to the formation of "inner dependencies, and outer dependencies of the celestial dynasty"[122] or, in other words, "areas of the 'inner periphery,' particularly Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang."[123] British indirect rule in India, on the other hand, was geared towards extracting as much profit as possible, and was relatively short-lived.[124]

This "contrast between British commercial and Russian military-dynastic empire" in colonial and frontier politics clearly overlaps, as Dominic Lieven argues, "with another distinction: the one between maritime and land empire,"[125] resulting in different forms of exploitation and socio-cultural transformations among the colonised. With regard to the legal sphere a litigant in Africa, for example, was not "confined to the native courts but could appeal to 'British' courts" that could overrule a first instance's decision, whereas a Mongolian litigant's case would always be decided within the "official hierarchy of Qing administration in Mongolia."[126] Despite the impact of 'internal colonialism' and its legacies, e.g. in Central Asia,[127] it is evident that in contrast to the colonies of the British empire, no "persisting cleavage in development existed between the European core [...] and the Asiatic acquisitions"[128] of the Russian empire. The two forms of continental and overseas colonialism simply represent different formative forces of imperial development, each with distinct results in reshaping social systems, cultural identities, and imperial habits.

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[120] Di Cosmo, "Qing Colonial Administration," 290, 306. Regarding the duality of the terms, I prefer 'continental' over 'terrestrial' since overseas colonialism is also land-based; but see Fournier, "Reflective Colonization," 520.

[121] Khalid, "The Soviet Union," 120.

[122] Xiaoyuan Liu, *Recast All Under Heaven*, 11.

[123] Potter, "Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives," 241; for indirect rule in Qing China see also Perdue, "Qing-China," 265–7.

[124] It is symptomatic that the Tsar's expenditure in Russian Turkestan almost consistently amounted to twice as much (Weinerman, "Polemics," 479, refers to "a factor of three to one") as his income from that region between 1868 and 1910, while in India "the local revenues paid for a vast army of largely native troops, which made Britain a world power on land as well as on sea", see Morrison, *Russian Rule*, 31. For a concise discourse analysis regarding the French and British colonial systems' direct-or-indirect-rule paradigm, see Véronique Dimier, "Direct or Indirect Rule: Propaganda around a Scientific Controversy," in *Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France*, ed. Tony Chafer et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); cf. also Kathryn Tidrick, *Empire and the English Character* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), especially her chapter on 'The Meaning of Indirect Rule', 194–221.

[125] Lieven, "Empire on Europe's Periphery," 138.

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Glossary

Aiwuhan	爱乌罕
Anhui	安徽
Anjiyan	安集延

Bada'ang	巴达昂
Badala	巴打拉
Badashan	拔达山
Balebu datouren	巴勒布大头人
Baliekamu	巴呺卡穆
Bangzha	蚌札
Banshuo	颁朔
Banwei	班位
Banzhao	颁诏
Baohedian	保和殿
Baqi	八旗
Baqi xuetang	八旗学堂
Barköl	巴里坤
Bawang	巴汪
Bayamen	八衙门
Bayannao'er diji shi	巴彦淖尔地级市
Beifa	北伐
Beise	贝子
Beiyuan	北元
Bianfang	边防
Bian wei si	边卫司
Bianwu bu	边务部
Bili	臂篥
Bin	宾
Bingbu	兵部
Binkesi	宾客司
Binli	宾礼
Bitieshi	笔帖式
Boduna	伯都纳
Boke	伯克
Bu	部
Bulei	不垒
Bulukeba	布鲁克巴
Buluo	部落
Bulute	布鲁特

Cangqing	苍清
Canshi shi	参事室
Canyiyuan	参议院
Canzan dachen	参赞大臣
Caozhou	曹州
Chaha'er	察哈尔
Chahanwusu	察汗乌苏
Chamuda'ao	查穆达傲
Changchun Yuan	长春园
Changwei	常委
Chaogong	朝贡
Chaogong geguo	朝贡各国
Chaogongguo	朝贡国
Chaohe	朝贺
Chaojin	朝觐
Chaozhi huici	超值回赐
Chengchen rugong	称臣入贡
Chengde	承德
Chengdu zhufang	成都驻防
Chenghuang	城隍
Chengzheng	承政
Chifeng diji shi	赤峰地级市
Cilai qiangui	赐赉遣归
Culu	粗率

Dabu	达卜
Dachen	大臣
Daiga	代噶
Dala	达拉
Dalu weiyuanhui	大陆委员会
Danbidayue	丹陛大乐
Danbula	丹布拉

Dangyuechu	当月处
Daoshi	道士
Dapitiaoli	大辟条例
Daqing huidian	大清会典
Daqing lüli	大清律例
Da Song	大宋
Daxueshi	大学士
Dayuan	大宛
Dazangjing	大藏经
Deli	得梨
Deyuezong	得约总
Di	狄
Dianshusi	典属司
Dingbian jiangjun	定边将军
Dongbei	东北
Dongzhiyan	冬至宴
Douyan	朵颜
Du	渎
Duchayuan	都察院
Dutong	都统
Efu	额驸
Eleuth	厄鲁特部落
Ejile	额济勒
E luo si guan	俄罗斯馆
E'erduosi diji shi	鄂尔多斯地级市
Falü	法律
Fan (non-Chinese)	番
Fan (frontier)	藩
Fanbu	藩部
Fanfu	藩服
Fanguo	藩国
Fan lama	番喇嘛
Fanglüe	方略
Fanmin	番民
Fanren	番人
Fanseng	番僧
Fanzi	番子

Fanzi tusi zeli	番子土司则例
Fawang	法王
Fengbiao rugong	奉表入贡
Fenggong xifeng	奉贡袭封
Fengjiao	风教
Fengshang youcha	封赏有差
Fengxu	封敘
Fengyun leiyu shanchuan chenghuangtan	风云雷雨山川城隍坛
Fengze Yuan	丰泽园
Fu (prefecture)	府
Fu (to pacify)	抚
Fudachen	副大臣
Fujiang	福建
Fujing	赴京
Fujing zhanyang	赴京瞻仰
Fu rehe chaojin	赴热河朝觐觐
Gai lifanyuan yamen wei neisanyuan	改理藩院衙门为内三院
Gaitu guiliu	改土歸流
Gansu	甘肃
Gao	诰
Gengding menggu yamen wei Lifanyuan	更定蒙古衙门为理藩院
Gengji	耕藉
Ghurkha Salangji	廊尔喀之萨郎济
Gong (tribute)	贡
Gong (noble rank)	公
Gongbu	工部
Gongguli	达布拉，公古哩
Gongqi	公启
Gongqing sheng'an	恭请圣安
Gongguo	贡国
Gongma	贡马
Gongxian	贡献
Gongxian gouma	贡献狗马

Gongzhi	贡职
Guanfu	冠服
Guangdong	广东
Guanglusi	光禄寺
Guangxi	广西
Guanhun	冠婚
Guazhou	瓜州
Gubeikou	古北口
Guicheng	归诚
Guifu	归附
Guishun	归顺
Guizhou	贵州
Gurkha	廓尔喀
Guochuding	国初定
Guoshiguan	国史馆
Habu'er	哈布尔
Haer zhake	哈尔札克
Hai	海
Hami	哈密
Hamiwei	哈密卫
Handangfang	汉档房
Hanjun	汉军
Haohan hanguo	浩罕汗国
Henan	河南
Heshuo	和硕
Hezhuomu	和卓木
Hong jiao	红教
Honglusi guan	鸿胪寺官
Houjin	后金
Houwang bolai	厚往薄来
Houyuan	后元
Huabei	华北
Huangqing zhigong tu	皇清职贡图
Huangshicheng	皇史宬
Huaxia	华夏
Huayi	华夷
Hubei	湖北
Hubu	户部

Huihe	回纥
Huijiang	回疆
Huijiang zeli	回疆则例
Huimeng	会盟
Huimu	回目
Huiren	回人
Huitongguan	会同馆
Huitong siyiguan	会同四夷馆
Hulunbei'er diji shi	呼伦贝尔地级市
Hulunhu	呼伦湖
Hunan	湖南
Huobusi	火不思
Huohan	霍罕
Huqin	胡琴
Hushi	互市
Ji	吉
Jia (praise)	嘉
Jia (music instrument)	笳
Jiangjun	将军
Jiangsu	江苏
Jiangxi	江西
Jiao	剿
Jiemangniedoubu	结莽聂兜布
Jieneitadouhu	接内塔兜呼
Jiezu	接足
Jihua	计划
Jilin	吉林
Jimi	羁縻
Jin	金
Jinchi	谨饬
Jinchuan	金川
Jing	京
Jinjing	进京
Jingshan	精膳
Jingshan qinglisi	精膳清吏司
Jinxianmapi	进献马匹
Jisi	祀祭
Jisi qinglisi	祭祀清吏司

Jiwanxieku	稽湾斜枯
Jueluo langqiu	觉罗朗球
Jun	军
Junfa	军阀
Junjichu	军机处
Junwang	郡王
Juren	举人
Kaidaha’er	恺达哈尔
Kaixuanyan	凯旋宴
Kar nai	喀尔奈
Kashige’er	喀什噶尔
Kazakh	哈萨克
Kuanwen rensheng huangdi	宽温仁圣皇帝
La Babu	喇巴卜
Laijing	来京
Laijing zhanyang	来京瞻仰
Laiyuansi	徕远司
Li (manage)	理
Li (ritual)	礼
Li’ang	礼昂
Liangzhong	郎中
Libantu	隶版图
Libu (Board of Rites)	礼部
Libu (Board of Appointments)	吏部
Libu muchang	礼部牧场
Libu tangsiguan	礼部堂司官
Lidai diwang miao	历代帝王庙
Lidian	礼典
Liezhuan	列传
Lifanbu	理藩部
Lifanyuan	理藩院
Lifanyuan zeli	理藩院则例
Liji	礼记
Lingdui dachen	领队大臣
Litan	历坛

Liubu	六部
Liubu eryuan	六部二院
Liuxianzheng	六弦筝
Lixingsi	理刑司
Lizhi	礼制
Longsimardelewo	龙思马尔得勒窝
Lukabuzha	鲁卡补札
Luxunsi	禄勋司
Mandangfang	满档房
Manwen lufu	满文军机录副
Manwen yuezhe bao	满文月折包
Manzhouguo	满洲国
Maoyiguo	贸易国
Manzu	满族
Mashate	吗沙特
Meng	盟
Mengbuke	蒙部科
Mengdangfang	蒙档房
Menggufang	蒙古房
Menggu huiyi	蒙古会议
Menggu lüli	蒙古律例
Menggu tang	蒙古堂
Menggu yamen	蒙古衙门
Menggu zu	蒙古族
Mengwen fanyi ke	蒙文翻译科
Mengzang	蒙藏
Mengzang shiwu chu	蒙藏事务处
Mengzang shiwu ju	蒙藏事务局
Mengzang shiwu yuan	蒙藏事务院
Mengzang weiyuan hui	蒙藏委员会
Mengzang xunbao	蒙藏旬報
Mengzang yuan	蒙藏院
Mengzang yuekan	蒙藏月刊
Miao	庙
Miqiongzong	蜜穹总
Ming	明

Miniyake	密尼雅克
Minren	民人
Mingling	命令
Minzhi	民治
Minzu shiwu weiyuanhui	民族事務委員會
Minzu weiyuanhui	民族委员会
Mishu shi	秘书室
Mu‘anba	穆安巴
Na ga la	那噶喇
Nakuan guicheng	纳款归诚
Nei dachen	内大臣
Neifu	内附
Neige	内阁
Neiguoshiyuan	内国史院
Neihongwenyuan	内宏文院
Neimishuyuan	内秘书院
Neisanyuan	内三院
Neitachen	内大臣
Neiwubu	内务部
Neiwufu	内务府
Nianban	年班
Nianli koubai	年礼叩拜
Nibuchu	尼布楚
Niedoujiang	聂兜姜
Nieniedoujiang	聂聂兜姜
Noyon	诺颜
Pa‘erxiyu	帕尔西话
Paiban	拍版
Paiqierdelewo	拍且尔得勒窝
Panchen zhi deli	班禅之得梨
Panwancai ci (memorial temple)	潘万才祠
Para man	巴拉满
Pingding	平定
Pipa	琵琶
Poluo’er	坡罗尔

Qi	旗
Qianqing gong	乾清宫
Qianqiuyan	千秋宴
Qianshi	遣使
Qianshi rugong	遣使入贡
Qijisi	旗籍司
Qinding xiyu tongwen zhi	欽定西域同文志
Qing	清
Qinghai	青海
Qinghai fanzi luli	番子律例
Qinglisi	清吏司
Qinglongwu	庆隆舞
Qingming	清明
Qingshigao	清史稿
Qingzhu	庆祝
Qinwang	亲王
Qinyang weide	钦仰威德
Qiqiyusu	启齐玉苏
Qixinlang	启新郎
Quanye	劝业
Quli	屈里
Ren	仁
Rouyuan housi	柔远后司
Rouyuan qiansi	柔远前司
Rouyuansi	柔远司
Rubantu	入版图
Rugong	入贡
Rujin	入觐
Saitar	塞他尔
Sanfan zhiluan	三藩之乱
Sangang	三纲
Sansing	三姓
Sanzhi dachen	散秩大臣
Sengren	僧人
Shaanxi	陕西
Shahukou	殺虎口

Shandong	山東
Shangshu	尚书
Shangxi	山西
Shangyuan	上元节
Shangzhuoteba	商卓特巴
Shaoshu minzu	少数民族
Shejitan	社稷坛
Sheng (province)	省
Sheng (music instrument)	笙
Shengjing	盛京
Shengxun	圣训
Shenqitan	神祈坛
Shenyang	沈阳
Shenyi	审议
Shidu xueshi	侍读学士
Shilang	侍郎
Shilu	实录
Shiwei	侍卫
Shixianshu	时宪书
Shiyuesuo	十月朔
Shizheng gangling ji jinxing chengxu	施政纲领及进行程序
Shuaizhong guicheng	率众归诚
Shucheng neishu	输诚内属
Shucheng neixiang	输诚内向
Shucheng xianghua	输诚向化
Shuguo	属国
Shujing	书经
Shun Dian	舜典
Shu Qing zi ma jia	书清字马甲
Si	司
Sichuan	四川
Siguan	司官
Siku quanshu	四库全书
Siwu	司务
Siwuting	司务厅
Sizhang	司章
Suer nai	苏尔奈
Suigong hamigua dengwu	岁贡哈密瓜等物
Sui li bantu	遂隶版图
Suoshu	所属
Tabunang	塔布囊
Ta'erqi	塔尔奇
Taihe	太和殿
Taihemen	太和门
Taixue	太学
Taiji	台吉
Taili	泰历
Tan	坛
Tanggute xue si	唐古忒学司
Tangzi	堂子
Tianchao lizhi tixi	天朝礼制体系
Tianchi (tea)	天池茶
Tianming	天命
Tianxia wanmin	天下万民
Tiben	题本
Ting	厅
Tiqin	提琴
Tongliao diji shi	通辽地级市
Tongshi	通事
Torghud	土尔扈特部
Touchen ancha	投诚安插
Toucheng neifu	投诚内附
Touqing	偷青
Toumu	头目
Tu bazong	土把总
Tumu	土目
Tu qianzong	土千总
Turpan	吐鲁番
Tusi	土司
Waibang conghua	外邦从化
Waifan	外番
Waifan wanggong	外藩王公
Waifanyan	外藩宴
Waiguo	外国
Waiguo gongshi	外国贡使
Waiwubu	外务部
Wala	瓦剌
Wanghuisi	王会司
Wanshuyuan	万树园
Weiguo yili	为国以礼
Weilie	围猎
Weiyuanzhang	委员长
Wenfeng xianghua	闻风向化
Wensanpin	文三品
Wuchang	五常
Wu'ergenqi	乌尔根齐
Wuerpin	武二品
Wulanchabu diji shi	乌兰察布地级市
Wuli	五礼
Wulun	五伦
Wumen	午门
Wuzu gonghe	五族共和
Xia	夏
Xian (present respectfully)	献
Xian (county)	县
Xiangshi	乡试
Xianliang ci	贤良祠
Xiannongtan	先农坛
Xianzhong ci (temple)	显忠祠
Xifengkou	喜峰口
Xiao	箫
Xin	信
Xinfu waifan	新附外藩
Xinfu waiguo	新附外国
Xingbu	刑部
Xingtangzha	兴堂扎
Xinjiang	新疆
Xiong	凶
Xi qin	奚琴
Xixin	细心
Xiyang	西洋
Xiyangguo	西洋国
Xiyangzhuguo	西洋诸国
Xiyu	西域
Xizang	西藏
Xizang suoshu	西藏所属
Xizang tongzhi	西藏通制
Xuantong	宣统
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Yamen	衙門
Yanli	燕礼
Yanyanyue	筵燕乐
Yikezhao	伊克昭
Yi (barbarian)	夷
Yi (rightness)	义
Yidi	夷狄
Yihan	夷汉
Yili	伊犁
Yingtai	瀛台
Yinku	银库
Yi xian	以献
Yixue	义学
Yiyulu	异域录
Yizhang	仪仗
Yizhengwang tachen	议政王大臣
Yizhi	仪制
Yizhi qinglisi	仪制清吏司
Yonghegong	永和宫
Youmu lama	游牧喇嘛
Youyueguo	有约国
Youyue zhiguo	有约之国
Yuan	院
Yuanhuiyan	元会宴
Yuanriyan	元日宴
Yuan shizu	元世祖
Yuan Taizu	元太祖

Yudie	玉牒
Yue	岳
Yukin	月琴
Yuguo	与国
Yulanpen	盂兰盆
Yunnan	云南
Zaisang	宰桑
Zangweike	藏卫科
Zhangjiakou	张家口
Zhang yin zhasake da lama	掌印扎萨克达喇嘛
Zhangli	掌理
Zhangzhong ci (temple)	彰忠祠
Zhanyang	瞻仰
Zhaowuda	昭乌达
Zhaozhong ci (ancestral hall)	昭忠祠
Zhasake	札萨克
Zhasake fuguogong	扎萨克辅国公
Zhazheng	轧筝
Zhejiang	浙江
Zhelimu	哲里木
Zhen	镇
Zheng	筝
Zhenguogong	镇国公
Zhi	智
Zhi bian xue tang	殖边学堂
Zhi chan si	殖产司
Ziguang Ge	紫光阁
Zhigong tu	职贡图
Zhili	直隶
Zhiliting	直隶厅
Zhilizhou	直隶州
Zhi yimianyu rujin	至伊绵峪入觐
Zhongcai	中才
Zhongguo	中国
Zhongheshaoyue	中和韶乐
Zhonghua minzu	中华民族
Zongren fu	宗人府
Zhongyuan	中元
Zhongyang xingzheng fagui zhengli weiyuanhui	中央行政法规整理委员会
Zhou	州
Zhuiing lama	駐京喇嘛
Zhuke	主客
Zhuke qinglisi	主客清吏司
Zhukesi	主客司
Zhushi	主事
Zhuxi	主席
Zhuyinju	铸印局
Zhuzang dachen	驻藏大臣
Zhushi baozhu	主事保住
Ziguang ge	紫光阁
Zizhi tongjian	资治通鉴
Zonggaoji	总稿机
Zongli geguo shiwu yamen	总理各国事务衙门
Zongren fu	宗人府
Zongwu ting	总务厅
Zouzhe	奏折

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